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In doing research on local government reforms in Germany in the 1970s,
it soon became apparent that there was very little information in English
in the scholarly literature on local government in Germany. I attempted
to fill this gap by writing a book on the subject (Local Government in the
German Federal System) that was published by Duke University Press in
1986. While writing that book, I became aware of the lack of information
in English on the German Länder and German federalism in general.
There are some edited books on German federalism that have appeared
in English, but they generally deal with selected current issues or with the
functioning of German federalism overall. There was little or nothing
that provided an overview of the origins of the current German Länder,
their constitutional or administrative framework, financing, or parlia-
ments. Much has been written in English on German parties and elec-
tions, but there has been very little focus on the Länder in these areas.
Given the importance of Germany, the role federalism has played in
the democratic experience of that country since 1949, and the influence
German federalism has had in Europe and elsewhere, it seems obvious
that a relatively detailed overview in English of the Länder and the federal
system within which they operate is long overdue. The purpose of this
book, then, is to provide that overview and close another gap in the liter-
ature on German politics and institutions.   
I have many people to thank in helping me to achieve this goal. For
reading and commenting on one or more chapters, I am indebted to Pro-
fessors Willi Blümel and Gisela Färber, both at the German Postgraduate
School of Administrative Sciences in Speyer; Professor Arthur Benz, Fern-
Universität Hagen; Gert Hilmann, Leitender Ministerialrat, Hanover and
Honorarprofessor, Göttingen; Klaus-Eckart Gebauer, Director of the Cab-
inet Staff in Rhineland-Palatinate; Uwe Leonardy, Ministerialrat a.D,
1
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Bonn; and Peter Lindemann, President of the Land Social Court in Lower
Saxony, a.D. For institutional support, I thank the University of Richmond
for various and sundry grants and other support; the German Institute for
Federalism Studies in Hanover and its director, Professor Hans-Peter
Schneider; the library staff at the Parliament of Lower Saxony and the
Chief Administrator of the Lower Saxon Parliament, Professor Albert
Janssen; and I am especially grateful to the Research Institute at the Ger-
man Postgraduate School of Administrative Sciences in Speyer and its
director, Professor Karl-Peter Sommermann. I also thank my wife, Regine,
for her patience and understanding for the time spent away from her.
Preface ix
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American and European usage of certain political concepts and terms is
not always identical, and I have tried in this book to make the reader
aware of potential misunderstandings that might arise from these differ-
ences. A common problem of semantics and a potential source of confu-
sion is the term “government.” In Europe, “government” usually means
“cabinet” or “executive leaders,” or “administration,” while for Ameri-
cans it often means what Europeans would call “the state.” Therefore,
what Americans call the “federal” or “national” government (or espe-
cially in the past, “the Union”) may be called the “state” in German; how-
ever, Germans are more likely to use the more precise term of Bund or
“federation.” The Bundesregierung, or, literally, “federal government,” is
the cabinet, or what Americans call “the Administration.” Thus it’s the
“Kohl or Schröder government” in Germany, but the “Clinton or Bush
Administration” in the United States. In this book “government” will
usually mean “cabinet” unless the context is clear that the more general
American sense of the term, i.e., the European “state,” applies.
To complicate matters further, both Americans and Germans use the
term “state” to describe their respective subnational regional units. While
the German “states” have been called Länder (plural form) since 1919,
“state” can still refer either to the subnational Land (singular form) or
national political system. Indeed, “state” administration in the German
context usually means administration by the Land.
Another term that is used commonly in Britain and on the Continent
is “competences” for what Americans call “powers.” In this book I will
follow American practice and hope for the tolerance of European readers
and others who might be unfamiliar with American terminology. 
In Germany the ceremonial head of the national state is the president.
The head of government is the chancellor. As in the United States, there
1
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is only a head of government at the Land level: the minister-president.
Since this term is so foreign to American readers, I will use instead the
common term for the head of government in a parliamentary system, the
prime minister. The American term, governor, is inappropriate because
it suggests direct election by the people, not selection by the majority
party or coalition of parties of a parliament.  
The term “liberal” can also be easily misunderstood by European and
American readers. In Europe “Liberal” usually refers to classical liberal-
ism, i.e., the European philosophical tradition of individualism that sup-
ports policies of laissez faire in both civil liberties and economics. In the
United States “liberal” generally refers to someone who supports both
civil liberties and a significant role for government in the economic and
social arenas. Thus a European “Liberal” is generally in the center or even
right of center on the ideological spectrum between “left” socialists or
social democrats and “right” conservatives, while the American “liberal”
is “left” of center.
Germans and Americans also use the term “dual federalism” in differ-
ent ways. In the United States the term emphasizes separate spheres of
activity for the executive and legislative branches of the federal and state
government. Thus, the federal government is responsible for old-age
security, the states for education and highways. This kind of dualism still
exists to some extent, but since the New Deal and the Great Society, the
federal and state governments have been sharing more and more respon-
sibilities, including the financing of a wide variety of public policies. Thus
American federalism today is not as much a dual federalism as it is a
cooperative federalism based on intergovernmental relations. In Ger-
many the concept of dual federalism usually refers to the focus at the
national level on legislation and the focus at the Land level on adminis-
tration. But cooperation and sharing in a variety of forms have also led
Germans to talk more of cooperative federalism or Politikverflechtung, a
form of interlocking intergovernmental relations. As a result of these dif-
ferent conceptions of dual federalism, the use of terms such as “func-
tional federalism” or “horizontal” and “vertical” relationships can have
different meanings in the two countries. On the other hand, some Ger-
mans also use these terms in the American sense, which can be confusing
to the reader who thinks he or she has made the appropriate adjustment
to general usage in each country. 
Some disagreement exists in the United States about the use of the con-
cept of “levels” when describing national, state, and local governments.
Daniel Elazar insisted that speaking of different arenas or, better yet,
A note on terminology xi
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“planes,” would be better, because “levels” suggests hierarchy, higher and
lower, more important and less important. He preferred thinking of fed-
eral systems in terms of a matrix, in which “there are no higher or lower
power centers, only larger or smaller arenas of political decision making
and action.”1 For a number of reasons, I will use the more conventional
concept of  “levels.”  First, because “level” is the term used in both coun-
tries by most people when they identify the different units of government
and distinguish among them. Second, because it (Ebene) is the term used
virtually without exception by German legal scholars as well as the general
public. And third, because while it is true that one level may not in fact be
“higher” than another in some hierarchical order, a distinction is fre-
quently made today between “high” and “low” politics, terms which gen-
erally refer to policies with international or major domestic consequences
as opposed to those that have only a more limited even if important
domestic impact. National governments of federations are responsible for
“high” politics, not subnational units.  
Notes
1 Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,
1987), pp. 37, 200–201.
xii A note on terminology
prelims  27/5/03  11:39 am  Page xii
Germany, like most European states, has a well-established parliamentary
system with the typical array of rights and liberties associated with all rec-
ognized, functioning democracies. It is also clear to anyone who travels
to Germany that the country is a federation. Even the most unobservant
foreigner knows that Bavaria is somehow separate and distinct from
other regions of Germany, and he or she may even be aware of the exis-
tence of the fifteen other states (Länder) that constitute the country. A
beginning student of Germany soon learns something about the names
and locations of sixteen capital cities other than the national capital,
Berlin, including the anomaly of two capitals that are across the Rhine
River from each other (Mainz and Wiesbaden). Later the student may
learn that, unlike Washington, DC, Berlin is not the home of a number of
very important federal institutions, such as the Federal Constitutional
Court and other federal courts, the Federal Employment Office in
Nuremberg, the Federal Statistics Office in Wiesbaden, and some min-
istries left in Bonn after the general move to Berlin at the turn of this cen-
tury. The student also learns that in this respect Germany is very different
from the typically more centralized, unitary European states such as
Great Britain, France, or Sweden.
Making comparisons among democratic states
When comparisons are made between and among democratic political
systems, one of the first steps is to distinguish between presidential, semi-
presidential, and parliamentary institutions. The United States is the
model for most of the few functioning presidential systems, which are
characterized by the direct and separate election of the president – who is
Introduction
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both head of state and head of government – and the legislature. The
American model is also characterized by a strong system of separation of
powers between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches, the latter
of which is further divided into two independent and co-equal legislative
chambers. The French semi-presidential model provides for a directly
elected president as head of state, who then appoints the prime minister
as head of government. This head of government is responsible both to
the president, who can dismiss him or her virtually at will when he has
majority support in parliament, and to the popularly elected parliament,
which can remove him or her in a vote of no-confidence under certain
conditions. This provides a certain control of the otherwise rather 
weak legislature over the premier as head of government but not over the
president as head of state. As suggested above, the president has more
power over the premier when he has majority support in the parliament,
but his options are rather limited if he is faced with a parliamentary
majority in opposition. The president is not limited to ceremonial duties
as head of state; indeed, there can be considerable overlap between the
duties of head of state and head of government, especially in defense 
policy, foreign affairs, and other “high politics” areas. The degree of over-
lap depends to a considerable extent on the support or opposition the
president has in parliament and whether the president can appoint a 
premier of his choice or is forced to “cohabit” with a premier who 
comes from the opposition. The semi-presidential system became popu-
lar in Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism, for example, in
Russia, where the president has become even more dominating than in
France.
Most democracies are parliamentary systems, of which there are many
different models. The British “Westminster” model is characterized by a
single-party government that is led by a strong prime minister as head of
government who is supported by a disciplined party that has majority
control of parliament. The role of the opposition party or parties is to offer
alternatives, criticize the government, and draw public attention to the
perceived flaws in the government’s policies. Given the nature of the
“Westminster” model, however, there is little or nothing the other parties
can do to change or delay government policy. The continental European
models are more consensus-oriented, because with very few exceptions
the governments (cabinets) are composed of coalitions of two or more
parties (which is largely the result of the electoral system), with the head
of government (prime minister, chancellor) usually drawn from the ranks
of the largest party. Though the degree of party discipline varies to some
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extent among different parties and countries, the parties are typically
rather strongly disciplined. The reason, of course, is that the stability of 
the cabinet depends largely on the disciplined support it receives in the
parliament, which has the right to call for a vote of no-confidence in 
the government under certain conditions. In all democracies, including
parliamentary systems, there is a separation of powers between the judi-
cial branch and the other branches; however, in contrast to the presiden-
tial systems, and especially to the American model, there is no clear
separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches,
because the executive emerges out of the legislature, i.e., the prime minis-
ter and all or most of the cabinet ministers are also members of parlia-
ment, the majority of which has the responsibility of supporting the
cabinet. The separation of powers that does exist between the executive
and the legislature is between the government and its majority on the one
hand and the opposition party or parties on the other.
Democratic federal states
In addition to the institutional comparisons above, comparisons are
made based on distinctions in territorial organization – that is, unitary,
federal, and confederal organization of territory for governing and
administrative purposes. Most states, including democracies, are unitary,
while there are twenty-three federations, most but not all of which are
also democracies. There are no states organized as confederations today,
but Ronald Watts suggests that the European Union (EU), Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS), Benelux, and the Caribbean Com-
munity are examples of contemporary confederations. The twenty-three
federations contain about 2 billion people or 40 percent of the world 
population.1 India alone has almost a billion people, and most of 
the other billion come from the United States, Russia, Brazil, Mexico,
Nigeria, and Germany. Many of these federations also cover very large
territories, for example, Australia, Canada, Brazil, Russia and the United
States. There are five federations in Europe: Germany, Switzerland, Aus-
tria, Spain and Belgium.
Some of the twenty-three mostly democratic federations have parlia-
mentary systems, others have some form of presidential system. The dif-
ferences between the federal parliamentary and federal presidential
systems have consequences for the nature of the political system. For
example, as noted above the separation of powers between the executive
Introduction 3
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and legislative branches is weaker in parliamentary systems, and the
direct popular election of a president as opposed to the selection or con-
firmation of a prime minister by a parliament can affect not only the
party system but also the relationships between the head of government
at the national level with the heads of governments of the individual
regional territorial units such as states or provinces.
The size of the overall state is one factor which may lead to federation.
The large states listed above, for example, Canada and the United States,
would be difficult to govern from a central government in a unitary sys-
tem. Another factor that may lead to federalism is racial, ethnic, religious,
language, and cultural differences among the people who may live in dis-
tinct parts of the federation that encompasses them, for example, India
and Russia, or even Canada with its French-speaking minority in Quebec
province, where it is the majority. Federation is a practical alternative to
fragmentation into small independent states if there is sufficient recogni-
tion among these people of the common economic, security, or other
advantages of union that they might enjoy while also retaining some
degree of autonomy. A third reason for federation is history. It is difficult
to imagine the federations in Germany or Switzerland without consider-
ing the impact of the Holy Roman Empire, and, in Germany, the German
Confederation after 1815, the Bismarck Reich after 1871, the Weimar
Republic from 1919 to 1933, and the Third Reich from 1933 to 1945.
Some would argue that the role of the Allies in the postwar years was an
even more important factor in the re-emergence of federalism in Ger-
many after 1949.2 It is also difficult to imagine federalism in the United
States without the experience of the colonial era, the Revolutionary War,
and the Articles of Confederation. A fourth reason is the promise of more
grassroots democracy and popular participation in public affairs offered
by a federal system. Switzerland is a good example of this, but so is Ger-
many since 1945. If one looks at the number of elected public offices in
Germany, for example, in comparison with France or Great Britain, there
is a very significant difference. Thus, there are almost 2,000 deputies
elected to the parliaments of the German Länder who have no counter-
parts in France, Great Britain, or in the other unitary political systems of
Europe. A fifth and more abstract reason that has been important in
American political theory and to some extent in Germany is the division
of power that federalism promotes. In other words, American theory sug-
gests that a tyrannical state can be prevented or countered not only by the
institutional separation of powers mentioned above but also by the divi-
sion of government into different territorial spheres of influence and
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activity.3 This was one of the reasons why the Americans, in particular,
pushed for the federal organization of Germany after 1945. The division
of power is related also to popular participation in that political parties
may not be so successful at the national level but may have a strong
regional base which may reduce potential centrifugal pressures from frus-
trated supporters. An example for Germany would be the Greens in the
1980s and the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) and some right-wing
parties in the 1990s. That these considerations may be completely irrele-
vant for another federation is one indication of the variety of federations.
While perhaps not consciously proposed reasons for forming a feder-
ation, there may be some positive consequences of a federal system that
can be important at times. For example, the regional governments in a
federation may engage in certain policy or administrative experiments
that are of interest to other regions and to the national government. This
“laboratory function” is especially important in federations in which the
regional units enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Sometimes federalism is
also seen as a means of relieving the central government of responsibility
for certain problems that are region-specific. Regional elections might
also be seen as providing voters with the opportunity to demonstrate
support or opposition to national policies.
The basic notion behind a federal system is that there is a combination
of shared rule for some purposes and regional self-rule for other pur-
poses within a single political system so that neither is subordinate to the
other. But federations differ, not only in the ways mentioned above, but
also in the character and significance of the underlying economic and
social diversities; in the number of constituent units and the degree of
symmetry or asymmetry in their size, resources and constitutional status;
in the scope of the allocation of legislative, executive, and expenditure
responsibilities; in the allocation of taxing power and resources; in the
character of federal government institutions and the degree of regional
input to federal policy making; in procedures for resolving conflicts and
facilitating collaboration between interdependent governments; and in
procedures for formal and informal adaptation and change.4
The variety of federal structures, procedures, and conditions is reflected
in the large number of adjectives used to describe different federal systems.
We speak, for example, of dual federalism, cooperative federalism, picket-
fence federalism, coercive federalism, fiscal federalism, “fend-for-your-
self ” federalism, and many other “kinds” of federalism in the United
States. Germans also speak of dual federalism, cooperative federalism,
administrative federalism, executive federalism, participatory federalism,
Introduction 5
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and, more recently, competitive federalism. One author found as many as
500 such terms in the scholarly and popular literature in 1984,5 and many
more have been added since then.
If the twenty-three federal states that Ronald Watts has identified dif-
fer in a variety of both minor and important ways, what kind of federal
state is Germany? Is it more like the former British colonial states of the
United States, Canada, and Australia, each of which has a history and a
territorial expanse very different from Germany’s? More like the multi-
ethnic and religiously fragmented India or Russia? More like Switzerland,
which contains ethnic divisions quite different from India’s or Russia’s?
Or is federalism in the relatively homogeneous German state sui generis?
A systematic comparison of German federalism with other federal states
is not the purpose of this book, but the many unique features of this 
system will become apparent to any reader with some knowledge of or
background in comparative politics and institutions of government. The
purpose of this book is to present in some depth the major features of
German federalism, including its origins and development, especially
since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. We will
be taking a close look at the German model of federalism which has been
the subject of much admiration as well as criticism, depending on one’s
understanding of federalism and the expectations one has from that
understanding.
Notes
1 Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s (Kingston: Queen’s
University Instutute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1996), pp. 4, 10–11.
2 Roland Sturm, “Das Selbstverständnis des deutschen Föderalismus im Wan-
del,” in Krise und Reform des Föderalismus, edited by Reinhard C. Meier-Walser
and Gerhard Hirscher (München: Olzog Verlag, 1999), p. 111.
3 Arthur B. Gunlicks, “Can Comparative Federalism Really Be Comparative?,”
in The American Federal System, edited by Franz Gress et al. (Frankfurt and
New York: Peter Lang, 1994), pp. 217–226.
4 Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, pp. 1–2.
5 Ellis Katz, “Cooperative – Dual – Competitive Federalism: The Pros and Cons
of Model Building,” in Gress et al., The American Federal System, p. 91.
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Introduction
Where is Germany? What are its constituent parts? Who is a German?
These questions may not be entirely unique to Germans; they are 
sometimes asked in many nation-states in Europe and elsewhere. But
questions about identity have been asked for centuries in Germany and
to some extent are still asked today. For hundreds of years “Germany” was
a group of tribes located in north-central Europe, most but not all of
which became a part of the empire of Charlemagne and, after the death
of Charlemagne, a part of what would become the Holy Roman Empire.
This empire consisted of hundreds of political units of widely varying
sizes and shapes, including noncontiguous territories, speaking different
dialects and developing different cultures, headed by kings, princes,
dukes, counts, bishops, and various and assorted minor nobility gener-
ally referred to as knights. Those who lived within the borders of the
empire were not all Germans by today’s standards, but most were even if
they did not know it. For in the middle ages, people did not think in terms
of nationality. They were the parochial subjects, not citizens, of a prince
or lord, and nationality was not a meaningful concept for them.
Later, in the sixteenth century, they became divided also by religion.
This and other divisions led to a devastating Thirty Years’ War (1618–48)
between Protestants and Catholics, both German and foreign, on Ger-
man territory. For many decades this had far reaching negative effects on
the economic, cultural, and political development of Germany. The Holy
Roman Empire, not a “state” but a historically unique league of princes
with some confederate features, was naturally weakened by the Thirty
Years’ War and other conflicts between and among the princes, but it con-
tinued to exist in some form until Napoleon forced its dissolution in
1
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1806. One important change between the Thirty Years’ War and 1806,
however, was the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 which, among other
things, is generally credited with having introduced the modern concept
of the state. Subjects were now more likely to identify themselves as
Bavarians, Württemberger, Hanoveranians, Saxons, and so forth. 
Following the French Revolution, the concept of the state was modified
to include a particular kind of state: the nation-state. This meant that it
was now the goal of people who identified with one another – whether
because of geography, language, religion, history, or culture – to form 
a state which included this distinct group of people. This led to the rise 
of nationalism, which generally replaced religion as the major focus of
common identity. Napoleon had manipulated national feelings to great
personal advantage, and the monarchical heads of state in the German
and Austrian territories had good reason to fear the consequences of
nationalism in their own highly divided and fragmented states.1
In 1815, with the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo, the German
Confederation of thirty-nine states, including Austria, was formed. It was
a very loose confederation, the main purpose of which was to provide
internal and external security. This confederation, supplemented by a
Customs Union of 1834, which excluded Austria, continued to limp
along until 1866, when the two major German states, Prussia and Austria,
fought a brief war that led to their final separation within even as loose an
arrangement as the German Confederation. In 1867 more than twenty
German states joined in the formation of the North German Federation,
led and dominated by Prussia. Following a brief war in 1870 between
France and Prussia, the states in the North German Federation and the
four separate and independent South German states joined to form a
united German state for the first time in history. 
But the questions of where Germany is and who is German were not
resolved. The German population in Austria and the majority German
population in Switzerland did not become a part of the new German
state. Then, following defeat in the First World War, many Germans who
had been a part of the Kaiserreich were now in France or Poland, and even
more Germans who had been a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
were now in various, mostly newly created, separate countries, such as
Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Romania. These developments fed nationalis-
tic fervor among many Germans, with the result that the most radical
nationalistic elements under the leadership of Adolf Hitler and his
National Socialist Party were able to capture the German state and launch
a war to unite all Germans and expand German territory in the East at 
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the expense of the peoples living there. They also, of course, led to the
Holocaust and other crimes against any and all opponents of Nazi rule. 
Following the Second World War, the questions arose again. Where is
a Germany that has lost one-fourth of its pre-war territory and many for-
mer citizens to Poland and the Soviet Union, has had to absorb as many
as 12 million refugees and expellees, is divided first among the four Allies
into four zones and then into two hostile camps facing each other
throughout the Cold War, and then is presented suddenly and unexpect-
edly with the opportunity to unite in peace? This latest unification seems
to have answered once and for all the question of where Germany is if not
in every case who is German. But now Germany is faced with two other
questions that are new to the post-war era: where and how does Germany,
and, for that matter, where do the other European states, fit into an
increasingly integrated Europe? And, less dramatically but still of consid-
erable importance, where and how do the current German states (Län-
der) fit into a united Germany? Are there too many of these Länder?
Should they be joined in ways that would reduce their number from six-
teen to perhaps eight or ten? Would the predicted economic and admin-
istrative benefits outweigh the potential costs in loss of traditions and
regional identity? Is there a strong German identity that is shared
between former East and West Germany in spite of forty years of experi-
ences with profoundly different regimes? 
This chapter and this book cannot answer all of these questions 
satisfactorily, but they can help to provide some background and a frame-
work for understanding how Germany and the Germans literally have
come to where they are today. The focus, then, will be less on the larger
issues of German identity over the past decades and more on the sources
of identity of the people within Germany for the regions in which they
live today. 
The Holy Roman Empire 
Following Charlemagne’s death, the Treaty of Verdun in 843 divided his
“Roman Empire” into three parts: the West Frankish Kingdom, the Mid-
dle Kingdom, and the East Frankish Kingdom. The West Kingdom would
become the core of France, the East Kingdom the core of Germany. The
Middle Kingdom would become the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, and areas later contested by France and Germany, such as Alsace-
Lorraine and the west bank of the Rhine. There were five “stem duchies”
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(Stammesherzogtümer) in the East and Middle Kingdoms, based origi-
nally on Germanic tribes (Saxony, Franconia, Swabia, Bavaria, and 
Lorraine – which included the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg
on today’s map). They did not, however, prove to be durable territories.
Election of kings by the nobility in the Carolingian Empire was a 
Germanic influence that complemented the Roman administrative insti-
tutions adapted to the local conditions. This meant that the king was
more primus unter pares, and that the kingdom represented a central
authority versus particularistic tendencies.2 The empire followed this tra-
dition of election in the selection of emperors by the stem dukes before
the tenth century and again after the beginning of the thirteenth century. 
By “the middle of the eleventh century the realm was firmly united
under its ruling dynasty and all traces of particularism seemed on the
point of disappearance.” 3 The emperors gained power at the expense 
of the duchies by dividing territories, for example, the emergence of 
an important part of Austria from eastern Bavaria in 1156, and by 
using their authority to appoint the high clergy whose administration
competed with that of the dukes. Nevertheless, the tendency was for the
Reich to divide into smaller units of rule, so that while the stem duchies
disappeared, smaller territorial duchies and territories led by the
“princes” emerged in their place. These smaller territories provided 
the actual government over their subjects, but the rulers were not sover-
eign and enjoyed their power only as a part of the Reich and in alliance
with the emperor.4
The emperor ruled through the princes, who in turn ruled through the
lesser nobility, such as the knights. In the imperial free cities small groups
of oligarchs, usually from the guilds, were in charge. There was no capi-
tal city of the Reich, and the emperor traveled from place to place with his
entourage to demonstrate his authority. His territorial base consisted of
his own lands.5 Only in these territories did the emperor rule directly.
While the princes of the realm were not sovereign, they did enjoy consid-
erable autonomy (Landeshoheit). The empire served to protect the
smaller territories from annexation by their more powerful neighbors,
and it provided some protection from outside threats to their territorial
integrity. The nobility was based on heredity, but that, of course, did not
apply to the ecclesiastical princes. In the early centuries the emperor
appointed them and used them for purposes of administration. He also
received the moveable inheritance of the bishops and other revenues. In
return, the Church received various lands, customs duties, and other
benefits. In the twelfth century the emperor relinquished his right to
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appoint archbishops, but his presence at their election still gave him con-
siderable potential influence (map 1.1).6
At this time the controversies over the appointment of the Pope, whose
power and actions had weakened the empire, led to a strengthening of the
territorial princes at the expense of the emperor.7 The princes were also
strengthened by the reestablishment in 1198 of the traditions of electing
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the emperor. Election of the emperor was confirmed by the Golden Bull
of 1356, which gave the right of selection to three ecclesiastical and four
secular princes (Kurfürsten) and broke the bonds of papal subjugation.8
But the rejection of an hereditary emperor also weakened the empire,
because some of the newly elected emperors had to start anew (emperors
from Luxembourg were chosen from the middle of the fourteenth to the
middle of the fifteenth century).9 Indeed, Barraclough renders the harsh
verdict that “[t]he monarchy was [after the Golden Bull] a nullity and
German unity a mere façade.”10 Such a negative view is not, however,
shared by many contemporary historians.11
Even the territorial princes had to contend with a division of their
authority owing to the rights of the aristocracy, e.g., the knights, and of
the free cities, with which they were also in conflict.12 But feudal inde-
pendence from the princes was doomed in the fifteenth century with the
vulnerability of castles to destruction by cannon. The princes also gained
control over the Church.13
By the end of the fifteenth century the lack of imperial territory that
could be used as a basis for support for the emperor meant that only an
emperor with extensive territories outside as well as inside the empire
could even afford to accept the crown. Thus the Austrian Habsburg line
became the dynastic rulers of the empire in the fifteenth century. The
result was that imperial policy became Habsburg policy, and Habsburg
policy was only partially in the interests of Germany.14 This, of course,
continued to be the case even after Emperor Maximilian of Austria added
“of the German Nation” to the old title, “Holy Roman Empire.”15
By the end of the fifteenth century the emperor had been weakened to
an alarming degree. The territorial units were fighting each other, feuds
were common, and the princes were using force to extend their territo-
ries. Finally, an imperial reform concluded in 1500 by the Reichstag, an
assembly of princes, about an “eternal public peace” which intoduced the
principle that the state, not individuals, must secure peace in the land;
established the Imperial Chamber Court (Reichskammergericht) consist-
ing of princes who would decide cases dealing with matters that fell under
the jurisdiction of the empire but not within the individual territories;
created an Imperial Authority (Reichsregiment) which did not last long
after two failed attempts; and divided the empire into “imperial circles”
(Reichskreise) which enforced imperial chamber court decisions with
troops assembled in the circles. The circles established their own circle
assembly (Kreistag) that mirrored the Reichstag. There were ten circles by
1512.16 These circles, according to Hermann Wellenreuther, became the
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key “federal” elements in holding the empire together as intermediate-
level organizations until the end in 1806.17 From settling local and
regional disturbances of public peace to taxation, coinage, and various
administrative tasks and making public proclamations of imperial law to
providing “circle” troops to serve the empire in a number of causes,
including the struggle against Turkish forces in the east, Neuhaus argues
that the circles were crucial factors in explaining the continued existence
of the empire, including the period after 1648.18 Hartmut Lehmann, on
the other hand, argues that Neuhaus exaggerates the role of the circles
and ignores other important factors. He points instead to the influence of
at most a dozen of the larger territories that were not identical with but
often dominated the imperial circles in promoting some kind of federal
principle in the empire.19
By 1500 the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” was “a
patchwork of dynastic and ecclesiastical territories dotted with imperial
free cities and castles of independent imperial knights.”20 The rulers of the
seven electoral principalities elected the emperor and therefore enjoyed a
higher status, but there were also another twenty-five major secular prin-
cipalities, around ninety ecclesiastical principalities, over 100 territories
led by counts, a large number of lesser noble holdings, and many free
cities. These territories were organized in the Reichstag which was equal
to the emperor and consisted of three chambers: one for the seven elec-
toral princes (the bishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier, and the secular
princes of Saxony, the Palatinate, Brandenburg, and Bohemia); one for
the other princely rulers (four archbishops, forty-six bishops, eighty-
three other spiritual rulers, twenty-four secular princes, and 145 counts
and lords); and one for the eighty-three imperial free cities.21 These 392
territories did not generally include the knights and their small estates.22
The Reformation, which began officially in 1517 with Martin Luther’s
nailing of his ninety-five theses on the door of the castle church in Wit-
tenberg, served to strengthen the territorial princes even further, as did
their victories in the Peasants’ War in 1524. Charles V was the last
emperor to be crowned by the Pope in 1529. A religious split occurred
with the Catholic princes siding with the emperor and the Lutheran
princes determined to protect their beliefs and autonomy. The emperor
defeated them in battle in 1547, but it was a Pyrrhic victory in that it
aroused the concern of all princes about the emperor’s power. At the
Augsburg Reichstag in 1555 the princes came to decide which religion
their subjects would embrace,23 which reflected the decline in power of
the Catholic Church as well as the emperor. However, spiritual princes
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who changed religion were to lose their principalities.24 Charles V
resigned in 1556.
During the Thirty Years’ War from 1618 to 1648, the emperor at first
gained power vis-à-vis the princes, but by the end the princes had reestab-
lished their autonomy. Barraclough again comes to a harsh conclusion
with his assertion that “after 1648 the subordination of the principalities
within the empire was a form of words without political significance, the
empire a shadow without substance, beyond all hope of resurrection or
reform.”25 And Daniel Elazar suggests that “[t]he Thirty Years’ War . . .
effectively ended the traditional confederation of German states known
as the Holy Roman Empire. Although its shell survived until 1806, the
rise of Prussia and Austria as modern states destroyed that basis of its
existence.”26 But others have noted that the empire had possessed a
“grandiose historical mystique” as a “living and legitimate successor of
ancient western and Christian Roman Empire as renewed by Charle-
magne and his successors.”27 Gagliardo also suggests that recent scholar-
ship has shown “the consciousness of being part of an imperial structure
was still a very important factor in the policies of German territories large
and small right up to the dissolution of the Empire in 1806.”28
The Thirty Years’ War and the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 did not
bring about major territorial changes, except for Brandenburg, which
gained the eastern half of Pomerania and the bishoprics of Magdeburg,
Halberstadt, Minden, and Kammin. The Cleves duchies had been added
by inheritance in 1614, and in 1721 Western Pomerania was added from
Sweden. Silesia was wrested from Austria in 1741 by Frederick the Great
and West Prussia was gained from Poland in 1772. In the west the empire
had lost Alsace and Lorraine to the French in 1681 and 1766.29
There were also some changes in the “constitution” of the Empire. The
Treaty of Westphalia functioned as a basic law until the empire’s demise
in 1803–6. It gave the princes certain rights and privileges, including the
right to conclude treaties among themselves and with foreign powers as
long as they were not directed against the emperor and empire.30 Techni-
cally, this did not give the princes legal sovereignty, but the autonomy
(Landeshoheit) they enjoyed was close to it and amounted practically to
internal sovereignty.31
With the addition of Bavaria after 1648, there were eight, rather than
seven, electors. In 1692 the number was increased to nine with the addi-
tion of Hanover.32 After 1663 the Reichstag met permanently in Regens-
burg, whereas before then the emperor had called the meetings in different
cities. The Reichstage (diets) were not representative in the modern sense;
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membership was not legitimated by elections but by property. However,
they can be seen as a part of the evolutionary development of representa-
tive systems, in part because the emperor’s powers were tied to the consent
of the estates meeting in the Reichstag.33
The period after 1648 was the beginning of the age of monarchical
absolutism, especially in Austria and Prussia. The princes became the
undisputed rulers in their territories, eclipsing the powers of the ecclesi-
astical authorities and incorporating them into territorial churches.
Whether in terms of the selection of the Church hierarchy, the adminis-
tration of Church property, the taxation of the Church, or the submission
of the Church to the judiciary of the territory, the prince became the
dominant power. This included the knightly estates and the (mostly
small) free cities as well. The goal of the princes became increasingly to
achieve a tight coordination and rule over their territory which for the
first time was becoming a modern state administered by offices and civil
servants rather than vassals.34 According to Vierhaus, however, the goal
was never achieved fully, because at least the lesser princes lacked the
tools and personnel to assume the various administrative and judicial
functions performed by the lower nobility.35
In spite of their inclusion in the empire, some princes were oriented
toward Sweden (Brandenburg), some toward France (Bavaria), and some
remained loyal to the emperor. Austria grew in strength, not because the
emperor was Austrian, but because of his own territorial base, which
included lands outside the empire (e.g., territories in what are today
Hungary, southern Poland, Slovenia, Croatia, northern Italy and parts of
Romania). Some other princes also had territories outside the empire.
Thus the electoral princes of Saxony were also the King of Poland from
1697 to 1763, and the electoral princes of Hanover were also the Kings of
England, which made it more difficult for the Austrian Emperor to main-
tain authority over them.36 There were also German speaking territories
outside the empire in East Prussia (where the Duke of Brandenburg was
King), Switzerland, and Alsace as well as non-Germans within the
empire, e.g., Flemings, Walloons, Italians, Czechs, and some other Slavs.37
In the eighteenth century, as before, there were four categories of terri-
tories. First, there were the ecclesiastical states, ruled as distinct principal-
ities by prince-prelates of the Catholic Church. They ruled their territories
essentially like secular princes and at the same time had ecclesiastical
oversight of districts which did not necessarily coincide with the political
boundaries of their states. Most of these states were small, and they saw
the empire as their guarantor.38 The second and most powerful group was
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the secular principalities, governed by the hereditary high nobility with
titles of king (Bohemia), duke, count, landgrave, margrave, etc., and sim-
ply “prince.” The size of territories varied dramatically, but in most the
landed nobility, towns, and Catholic clergy had formal rights of represen-
tation in the territorial diets (Landtage).39 The number of territories for-
mally listed as independent for certain military and financial obligations
declined from 405 in 1521 to 314 in 1780.40 Third were the imperial cities
or towns, which accounted for only about 2 percent of the total popula-
tion. The fifty-one cities were governed by “exclusive and often self-per-
petuating patrician oligarchies,”41 and most were in the west and
southwest. Some cities like Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck prospered
owing to trade, while others declined to mere villages. They were espe-
cially loyal to the empire as a protection against the territorial princes.42
The fourth group consisted of the imperial counts and knights, found
mostly in the west and southwest. Most of their territories, especially
those of the knights, were very small, numbering between 1,600 and
1,700, but they also enjoyed autonomy. This often gave them a personal
authority over their few subjects which was more complete than that of
the more powerful princes. Given the rule of primogeniture, positions
outside the estate had to be found for the other heirs. In Catholic families,
these were often with the imperial Court or with ecclesiastical princes,
while in Protestant families they were generally with a secular prince.43
The attack on Austria by Frederick the Great in 1740 by which Prussia
gained Silesia was a serious blow to the cohesion of the empire, and the
Seven Years’ War from 1756 to 1763 which again involved Prussia against
Austria served to weaken further the empire and emperor. The institu-
tions of the empire were used increasingly to air differences between
Prussia and Austria, and the smaller states began to consider alliances to
ally themselves against both of the larger states. Prussia took up the idea
on its own and formed an Alliance of German Princes which in 1785 con-
sisted of Prussia, Hanover, Saxony, and later others, with the goal of pro-
tecting and preserving the constitutional order of the empire. Soon,
however, the Alliance failed and the empire was in a desultory condition
when the French Revolution broke out in 1789.44
The French Revolution and its aftermath
In the year of the French Revolution, 1789, the empire, including Austria,
included 314 secular and Church territories and imperial cities and 1,475
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knightly estates, or 1789 political units of widely varying size and power.45
Soon after the Revolution the empire was at war with France, which
quickly occupied the left bank of the Rhine. The armies of the empire
were weak and easily defeated, and even Prussia agreed to a separate
peace, even though this was an egregious violation of imperial law.46 Fol-
lowing a second Austrian defeat in 1800, the Peace of Lunéville was con-
cluded in 1801 according to which the emperor accepted the French
Republic on behalf of the empire and of Austria as well as the loss of the
west bank of the Rhine. The secular princes who lost territory on the 
left bank were to be compensated by the secularization of ecclesiastical
territories on the right bank. 
The Reichstag created an Imperial Deputation, consisting of plenipo-
tentiaries of five electors and three other princes, with the purpose of
drawing up a specific plan of indemnification. But between July 1801 and
May 1802 several states of the empire made a separate peace with France,
which in turn guaranteed them substantial shares in the indemnification
and removed many decisions from the Imperial Deputation which had
not yet convened. After a few minor changes, the French-induced plan
was accepted by the Deputation in 1803, approved by the Reichstag, and
ratified by the emperor. This is the famous Reichsdeputationshauptschluss
or “Final Recess” that dissolved around 112 political units: all ecclesiasti-
cal principalities (about twenty archbishoprics and prince-bishoprics
and forty abbeys and convents) and all but six free imperial cities 
(Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, Frankfurt, Nuremberg, and Augsburg).
Thus the spiritual principalities were secularized, which meant the elim-
ination of spiritual rule and the annexation of church property into the
state. Bishops were no longer the equal of the prince, and the churches fell
under the regulation of the individual states. To compensate for losses on
the left bank of the Rhine, Prussia gained even more territory on the right
bank, as did Baden:47
With these compensations, Bonaparte realized one of the great goals of his
German policy: the creation of a group of enlarged German client states on
or near the French border, of sufficient size and internal cohesion as to
diminish their sense of dependence on Austria, yet not so large as to be able
to forget that their recent good fortune as well as their possible future
expansion was due to the good will of France.48
The growing influence of Napoleon on the south and central German
princes and other factors led Austria to enter into an offensive alliance with
Russia and Britain against France. But France, in alliance with Baden and
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Württemberg, again defeated Austrian forces at Austerlitz, and Austria had
to accept the Peace of Pressburg in December 1805. Prussia was forced to
give up territories on the east bank of the Rhine, while Baden, Württem-
burg, and Bavaria were recognized by France as sovereign states.49
In July 1806 several German princes declared their withdrawal from
the empire and formed the Rheinbund (Confederation of the Rhine).
Napoleon demanded that the emperor lay down the imperial crown, thus
ending the empire for good. Prussia presented France with an ultimatum
to withdraw from all of Germany, but in the ensuing war France defeated
Prussian forces at Jena in October 1806. France now controlled all of 
Germany, and Prussia was saddled with reparations to France. The
Rheinbund started with sixteen states, but after the Prussian defeat and
the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, it grew to thirty-nine. Only Austria, Prussia,
Danish Holstein, the Hanseatic cities, and Swedish Pomerania remained
outside. Through consolidation of imperial cities and further seculariza-
tion, Napoleon increased the size of Baden, Württemburg, Bavaria, and
Hesse-Darmstadt. The Grand Duchies of Berg (a new territory created 
on the east bank of the Rhine) and Würzburg were expanded and the
Grand Duchies of Frankfurt and the Kingdom of Westphalia were
formed. At the same time, the Rheinbund states had to relinquish some
territory to France, and though formally sovereign were now under the
dominance of Napoleon.50
A Bundestag (federal assembly) was established in Frankfurt as the
common organ of the Rheinbund. Not unlike the imperial Reichstag, its
purpose was to deal with common interests and resolve disputes between
member states. Each member was obliged to come to the aid of any other
member that was involved in a continental conflict. Intervention, of
course, was determined by Napoleon, which meant that the sovereignty
of the members was in fact circumscribed politically if not legally. In any
case the Bundestag never met. Officially the Rheinbund was a confedera-
tion of German states, but in practice it was more a French protectorate.51
The assessment of the Rheinbund varies among historians, but it 
certainly had important consequences. Numerous reforms and territor-
ial changes were introduced,52 and a growing homogeneity of living con-
ditions in different states created the basis for the development of a
middle class. Absolute monarchism was promoted by the sovereignty the
territories now enjoyed – even if limited by Napoleon – and a national
sentiment began to grow. Indeed, the idea of a German nation grew 
with the writings of nationalist poets and philosophers and the rise of a
middle class that replaced the estates weakened by secularization and the
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consolidation of cities.53 Thus “the tendency of the empire to create
autonomous territories from dependent states changed in the direction
of autonomous territories combining to form a federation and therefore
coming closer together.”54
With the French defeat in Russia in 1812, Russia, Austria, and Prussia
formed an alliance in 1813. Prussia declared war on France and was
joined by a large coalition of European states whose forces defeated
Napoleon at Leipzig in 1813. Napoleon retreated to Paris, he was exiled
to Elba, and his domination of Germany for two decades was ended. It
was now left to the Congress of Vienna, interrupted by Napoleon’s return
and the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, to establish a new order for Europe
and Germany. Prussia ended up with a small part of Poland, part of West-
phalia, territories on the left bank of the Rhine and on the Saar that had
been taken by France (but not Alsace). Bavaria was given Landau in the
Palatinate (map 1.2)
In the meantime the Rheinbund had ceased to exist, and the German
Confederation (Deutscher Bund) was established in 1815. It consisted of
thirty-nine states, excluding the eastern parts of the territories of Prussia
and Austria. Some historians suggest that it continued the old Reich in a
new form.55 It was established for the limited purposes of securing the
states against both internal and external dangers and for the promotion
of trade. Though a clear expression of federal powers was not contained
in the founding document, the Federal Treaty, there was a general clause
which authorized the confederation to carry out its purposes. As time
went on, the confederation became the means of internal restoration or
reaction rather than an instrument of external protection which in prac-
tice was left up to the individual states. In other words, the states retained
their sovereignty, but the confederation served to protect the status quo.56
The confederal organ responsible for common matters was a perma-
nent federal assembly or diet (Bundestag) in Frankfurt. Otherwise there
was no head of state, no government, no administration, and no courts.
The Bundestag, chaired by Austria, consisted of representatives who
served their states with an imperative mandate, i.e., as delegates rather
than trustees. When the assembly met in full session for the purpose of
voting, a two-thirds majority or even unanimity was required. The seven
largest states had 4 votes each, the other thirty-two states 1 vote. An exec-
utive committee consisted of the largest eleven states with 1 vote each.
Another 6 votes were distributed among the smaller states. Decisions of
the committee were made by majority vote in general, but in some cases
unanimity was required.57
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There were some important reforms in Prussia and in other German
states – especially in the south – at this time, but in Prussia reforms
ended in 1819, and in general the German Confederation was noted
until 1848 for the Austrian Prince Metternich’s promotion of policies of
restoration and hostility to democracy, liberalism, and nationalism
because of the threat each posed for multi-national Austria. South 
German states continued to make some modest reforms, but these were
not allowed to challenge the monarchical principle. Restoration was
more the norm in northern Germany. Yet while the constitutional order
of the German Confederation stagnated, economic and social modern-
ization were taking place. One result was the Hambach Festival in 1832
which demanded German unification and popular sovereignty; but this
brought about even more reactionary measures pushed by Metternich.
On the other hand economic changes also led to the establishment of 
a Prussian–German customs union in 1834 in which Austria did not
participate.58
After the defeat of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna in 1815, 
Prussia was located in the East as well as the West of Germany, with a hole
in the middle. Though Prussia was an absolutist state, it was not really a
unitary state. Historical regions retained their characteristics, e.g., Bran-
denburg, East and West Prussia, and Silesia, while the new territories in
the West, Westphalia and the Rhine Province, were not historical. The
country was divided into ten, then eight, provinces, which were subdi-
vided into administrative districts (Regierungsbezirke). The period before
1848 was “pre-constitutional,” in that the king resisted any efforts to pro-
mulgate a constitution; however, government was not arbitrary, for it was
bound to abide by the rule of law.59
The Customs Union (Zollverein) of 1834, which was formed under
Prussian leadership, was the result of a reluctant but steady increase in
support for free trade. It is ironic that Prussia therefore succeeded 
in achieving considerable economic unity while together with Austria
and the Bundestag it continued to suppress the national and liberal move-
ments. Unlike the German Confederation established in 1815, the 
Customs Union did not include Austria, Bremen, or Hamburg, but it 
did include Luxembourg. It had no assembly of delegates, but it did 
have a general conference of governments with one vote each. Again, 
it was another form of confederation that overlay the German Confeder-
ation of 1815.60
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The Revolution of 1848 to the Second (Bismarck) Reich of 1871
The Revolution in March 1848, which followed revolutionary uprisings in
France, was a key event in German constitutional and political history, an
event comparable in some ways to the disturbances in East Germany in
1989.61 It was the culmination of a national movement, which derived the
idea of a German nation-state from the French Revolution, the writings of
nationalist philosophers, and from increasing democratic pressures. But
the idea of a liberal nation-state did not find favor in the governments of
the individual states,62 in spite of the fact that by 1848 all but four German
states had constitutions; however, the two key states, Prussia and Austria,
did not.63 One of the many ramifications of the Revolution was the efforts
of the Frankfurt Assembly in the Paulskirche, elected in May by relatively
democratic procedures throughout the German Confederation, to devise
a constitution for a united, federal Germany that would meet basic demo-
cratic requirements, satisfy the many monarchical ruling houses in the
German states, and somehow accommodate the conflicting interests of the
two major German powers, Prussia and Austria, whose reemergence after
Napoleon’s defeat had “left no room for a nationalistic agenda.”64 By this
time the idea of a federal state, as opposed to the more traditional German
idea of a loose confederation, had taken root with the United States often
perceived as a kind of model.65 But the conditions in Germany were differ-
ent from those faced by the American Founding Fathers. In the first place
the territorial developments in Germany were very different: from hun-
dreds of states at the end of the eighteenth century, there were still thirty-
nine states ranging in size from thousands to many millions of inhabitants
and in territory from city states to large monarchies; there was no unitary
legal system; economic unity was inadequate in spite of the Customs
Union; and reformers faced states with an authoritarian, feudal–absolutis-
tic tradition. Second, economic prosperity was generally lacking, a prole-
tariat had formed, and as a result there was resistance by many to universal
male suffrage. Third, the German Confederation had been hostile to
democratic and progressive change. There was no political center, but
rather two restorative powers competing for hegemony. Thus, in the
United States the issue was separation from a distant political center in
London and the gradual formation of a nation, while in Germany “the aim
was to unite different sovereign states with rather distinctive peculiarities
and to create a powerful central government in opposition to internal par-
ticularistic forces but also in opposition to the great powers in Europe,
which were not interested in the formation of a new powerful state.”66
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By the fall of 1848, it became clear to the ruling houses of Prussia and
Austria that they still enjoyed the loyalty of the military and could resist
the pressures of the Frankfurt Assembly. The initial hopes of a majority
of the Assemblymen that they could forge a united Germany including
Austria were dashed in November by the Austrian government’s rejection
of any such plan. Efforts to form a “small” Germany without Austria 
continued with the writing of a constitution for the other states of the
German Confederation. The Constitution of March 1849 provided for a
federal state with enumerated powers for the federation and reserve pow-
ers for the states. The federation was made responsible not only for for-
eign affairs; war and peace; internal law and order; trade, currency,
weights and measures; immigration and citizenship; postal affairs, etc.,
but also railways and health. Provisions for achieving unitary economic
conditions were included, and there was an implied powers clause not
very different from the American “necessary and proper clause.” The
result was a constitutional draft somewhat more centralist than the
American model. On the other hand, only the navy was under national
control, while ground forces were to be provided by the states. Only in
wartime would they come under national command. The federal parlia-
ment was to pass the laws, but the states were to execute them in order to
preserve the monarchical character of the states and their bureaucracies.
The federation was to have only supervisory powers over the execution of
the laws. These provisions reflected “the ambivalence of the unitarian–
particularistic German approach very clearly.”67
The Frankfurt Constitution of 1849,68 accepted by twenty-nine states
of the German Confederation, was doomed to failure, however, when the
Prussian King, Frederick William IV, rejected the offer to become the
crowned head of state of a new, united Germany, on the grounds that it
“does not bear the stamp ‘by the grace of God’ on its head.”69 The Pruss-
ian and Austrian delegates to the Frankfurt Assembly were recalled, and
in May the central authority that had been established dissolved the
Assembly. Left- wing elements decided to fight, but they were easily
defeated by Prussian troops by the end of July.70
In 1850 the king of Prussia reluctantly accepted a constitution which
provided for an upper house composed of the nobility and a plutocratic
parliamentary assembly, one-third of which was elected by those very few
Prussians who paid the top one-third of the taxes, one-third by a modest
proportion of citizens who paid the next one-third in taxes, and one-
third by the remainder of the citizens who paid taxes. Austria did not fol-
low with a constitution until 1861. In the meantime most of the other
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German states became more authoritarian, even though the principle of
representative government was not abandoned.71
Following the dissolution of the Frankfurt Parliament in 1849, Prussia
proposed a plan for German unification which would provide for Pruss-
ian executive dominance in a league of princes with a plutocratically
elected parliament. Austrian objections, supported by Russia, led to
abandonment of the effort by several German states, and an assembly
elected in early 1850 as a first step toward establishing the new league was
dissolved by the end of the year. By the spring of the following year Prus-
sia and Austria had reestablished the German Confederation. In 1851 the
Customs Union was also reestablished, again under Prussian leadership.72
In 1859 representatives of several German states gathered together to
discuss the adoption of common civil and criminal laws for the Confed-
eration and a German supreme court. Committees were formed to begin
the process of codifying civil and commercial laws in 1862, and in 1861
the Saxon head of government proposed a plan of German unification in
which executive power would be shared by Prussia, Austria, and a third
German state. Austria expressed interest and proposed a revised alterna-
tive plan. Prussia was wary of having to share power in such a federal
arrangement and proposed its own plan which was another version of its
1850 plan for unification. A commercial code which Prussia had worked
out for the Confederation and a free-trade arrangement between Prussia
and France which Austria could not accept led to tensions between the
two large states, and Prussia refused to attend a conference in Frankfurt
in 1863 at which Austria presented its ideas for German unification. This
led to failure of efforts to unite Germany with Austria as a member state.73
In 1864 Prussia and Austria joined forces to defeat Denmark in a brief
war over Denmark’s intention to annex Schleswig and perhaps Holstein
as well. Rather than create a new German state for the Confederation,
Prussia and Austria divided the new territory so that Prussia secured
Schleswig and Austria occupied Holstein. In 1866 the two quarreled over
the spoils, and Austria took its case to the Assembly of the Confederation.
Prussia seized Holstein in retaliation, and Austria responded by seeking
approval from the Frankfurt Assembly to mobilize against Prussia. It won
the support of most of the kingdoms, including Saxony and Hanover,
while Prussia was supported mostly by smaller states in the North. In the
brief war that followed, Prussia quickly defeated the forces of Hannover,
Hesse-Kassel, and Bavaria before they could join with the Austrians, and
then went on to defeat the Saxon and Austrian armies at Königgrätz. The
Confederation was dissolved, and Austria withdrew from Germany.
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Schleswig and Holstein were annexed by Prussia, as was Hannover,
Hesse-Kassel, Nassau, and Frankfurt. Prussia stopped at the Main River,
however, to avoid provoking France. Prussia formed the North German
Confederation in 1867, which left three Germanies: one in the North,
including Saxony; one in the South; and Austria. South Germany was 
in the French zone of influence, but the South German states of Hesse-
Darmstadt, Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria agreed secretly to give
Prussia high command in case of war. No territory was taken from 
Austria, nor was any given to the bitterly disappointed Napoleon III.74
After the war Prussian proposals for a new constitutional order were
accepted by twenty-three states. A Reichstag was elected and, after several
changes, approved the constitution on 16 April 1867. It had rejected the
demands of the progressive Left for a unitary state, which Bismarck had
opposed in favor of a federation that would be legally less problematic,
would grant the states considerable autonomy, and would serve as a bar-
rier against parliamentary-democratic tendencies. It had also rejected par-
ticularistic demands from the traditional aristocratic feudal Right and the
newer parliamentary particularism found especially in newly annexed
states.75 The new “Constitution of the North German Federation” then
went into effect on 1 July 1867. Prussia, with a large majority of the pop-
ulation and territory, was, of course, the dominant state in the Federation.
The executive head of the Federation was the “Federal Praesidium” which
consisted of the King of Prussia. He was authorized to appoint the chan-
cellor as head of government, who had to countersign all acts of the Fed-
eral Praesidium, and he had the overall command of the armed forces. The
states and their princes were represented in the Bundesrat, which was the
“carrier” of sovereignty in the Federation rather than the individual states;
however, law enforcement, religion, and education were retained by the
states. Prussia had 17 of 43 votes in the Bundesrat, enough to prevent
amendments without its consent. The Reichstag was the chamber that rep-
resented the people and was elected by what was then in Europe a remark-
ably democratic system of universal male suffrage (in contrast to the
plutocratic class system of voting for the Prussian legislature which con-
tinued without change). Indeed, the Frankfurt Parliament had passed a
law in February 1849 that called for universal male suffrage by secret bal-
lot, in spite of serious opposition from many middle-class delegates.76
Though its powers were limited, the Reichstag had to approve all domestic
legislation passed by the Bundesrat and signed by the King of Prussia. Of
course the North German Federation was formed essentially as the result
of a revolution “from above” by governments, in contrast to the efforts of
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the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848; on the other hand the revolutionary
changes introduced by the Federation were supported by the people “from
below” through the political parties. The new Federation signed a customs
treaty with the four South German states in July 1867, which created a 
unified economic area for all of Germany except Austria.77
In 1870 Chancellor Bismarck maneuvered Napoleon III into declaring
war on the Federation, which was joined by the South German states in
defeating French forces at Sedan and Metz. The South German states
expressed an interest in unification, and they joined with the North 
German Federation to form the Second German Reich (also Kaiserreich,
Hohenzollern Reich or Bismarck Reich) in January 1871. Thus was created
for the first time a German “center” in the capital of Berlin (map 1.3):
The ubiquity of territorial politics in the history of Germany before unifica-
tion necessarily had the consequence that there was no centre. As a result of
this fact the picture which most Germans have of their past 
differs profoundly from the historical images familiar in Britain, France or
Spain where there is a long experience of government from a dominant 
capital city. There has been no single all-pervasive centre in the German
political evolution.78
From the Second Reich to the Third Reich
The constitution of the German Reich was modeled closely after the 
constitution of the North German Federation. The highest organ of the
German Reich was the emperor (Kaiser), who was also the King of Prus-
sia. He appointed the Chancellor who was also the Minister-President
(prime minister) of Prussia and was responsible to the Kaiser as head of
government. The Chancellor chaired the Bundesrat meetings and had to
answer to the Reichstag, but he was not dependent on the confidence of
that body as was the case in the British parliamentary model. The legisla-
tive bodies consisted of the Bundesrat and Reichstag. Both chambers had
to approve all legislation. The dominance of Prussia in this constitution
is reflected by Koppel Pinson: “The men of ‘48 had wanted Prussia ‘to
merge itself ’ into a greater Germany. Bismarck annexed the non-Prussian
Germany to Prussia in order to create an enlarged Prussia.”79
The Reichstag was elected in single-member districts by universal male
suffrage for those who were over twenty-five years of age, and its mem-
bers were “representatives of all the people.” However, its powers were
limited in several ways. First, it had no influence on the appointment or
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removal of the Chancellor. Second, it had to share legislative powers with
the Bundesrat. The list of legislative powers in Article 4 of the Constitu-
tion was modest, but it expanded in practice, e.g., in the area of courts,
judicial procedures, and a nation-wide code of civil law still in operation
today. By the end of the century it had become the major factor in legis-
lation in spite of the Bundesrat, promoted strongly by the national polit-
ical parties.80
The Bundesrat consisted of delegates from the twenty-five states listed
in Article 1 of the Constitution81 that made up the new Reich (twenty-two
monarchies and three city states; Alsace-Lorraine became a special Reich-
sland with representation in the Reichstag), and they voted by instruction
from their state governments, led mostly by the traditional princes (actu-
ally four kings, six grand dukes, five dukes, and seven princes). The Bun-
desrat was the first organ mentioned in the Constitution, and it “carried”
the sovereignty of the Reich. This meant that the individual states were no
longer sovereign, even though they retained considerable autonomy in a
number of areas. It was the organs and activities of the Reich, however,
that represented sovereignty, including the Kaiser, the Chancellor, the
Reich administration, the Reichstag and Bundesrat, foreign policy, and
army and navy that had never existed before for Germany as a whole.
Prussia had 17 of the 58 votes in the Bundesrat, in spite of the fact that it
had about three-fifths of the population and two-thirds of the territory of
the Reich. On the other hand, amendments to the Reich Constitution
required 14 votes. The three kingdoms of Bavaria, Württemberg, and
Saxony had 14 votes together (6, 4 and 4, respectively). The seventeen
small states had 1 vote each.82
Since the Kaiser was the supreme commander of the armed forces, over
which there was no civilian control and therefore no parliamentary con-
trol, “the Kaiser virtually remained an absolutist monarch in the military
field.”83 Indeed, Pinson suggests that the Prussian army was the core of
the Prussian state and therefore of the Kaiserreich. Therefore, it “was the
most obvious instrument of power and influence in the new Reich.”84 The
constitutional order of the Reich remained stable, in spite of numerous
challenges, for example, from Protestant–Catholic tensions and the
growing working class and their leaders.85 The challenge which it did not
survive, however, was the First World War. Facing certain defeat, the High
Command pressed for an armistice that would be signed by a new parlia-
mentary-democratic government led by the former opposition, the
Social Democrats, Left liberals, and Catholics. While deemed necessary at
the time owing to the fear that the Allies would not conclude an armistice
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or conclude peace with a government lacking democratic legitimacy, the
result was that it was the democratic opposition, not the Kaiser and his
government, that ended up facing charges of treason by the extreme
nationalists. In October 1918 the necessary changes were made in the
constitution to bring it more into conformity with a democratic parlia-
mentary system. The Reichstag approved the necessary changes, but the
November Revolution and the overthrow of the Kaiser and the old order
required the writing of a new constitution. 
Elections in January 1919 for the constitutional assembly (National
Assembly) in the small city of Weimar yielded a majority for the Social
Democrats, German Democratic Party (progressive liberals), and the
Catholic Center Party, which together formed the center-left democratic
coalition responsible for writing the Weimar Constitution (map 1.4). The
far left and far right were not well represented. In the meantime the states
also elected constitutional assemblies for their own new constitutions, in
spite of the fact that the Social Democrats in Weimar (but not state lead-
ers!) favored a unitary state together with the leadership of the German
Democratic Party. 
In his proposals of early January 1919, the constitutional scholar, Hugo
Preuss, did not call for a federation but rather for sixteen territories of
approximately equal size, including Austria, that would become adminis-
trative units in a decentralized unitary state. His goal was to break up Prus-
sia, but the identity of the people with their traditional states was too
strong. Even the national leaders of the Social Democratic Party, who sup-
ported Preuss, had to deal with the party’s leaders in Prussia, who, with the
elimination of the old Prussian three-class voting system for the state par-
liament, were now confident that they would be (and indeed did become)
the dominant force in Prussia.86 As a result of these kinds of pressures,
Preuss’ draft, along with four others, was rejected. A committee of states
was formed at the end of January with the agreement that it had to
approve proposals brought before the Weimar National Assembly, which
had the effect of guaranteeing the continuation of a federal system. Nev-
ertheless, Preuss insisted that ‘“[t]he foundation of the entire Weimar
Constitution is that this republic is not an association, a league of German
states, but that the German state is and shall be the political organisation
of the unified German people living within this state.’”87 A new constitu-
tion was drafted and accepted, and it went into effect in August 1919.88
The Weimar Constitution89 provided for a parliamentary democracy
in which the government, with a chancellor as head of government, was
made dependent on the Reichstag. The head of state was a popularly
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elected president. The new republic was a federation, with the Reichsrat
replacing the Bundesrat; however, the Reichsrat, which had 66 votes, was
not made a regular participant in the legislative process and could be
overridden by the Reichstag. Prussia received two-fifths of the votes, but
half of the Prussian delegation of twenty-six came from the Prussian gov-
ernment, the other half from the Prussian provincial administrations
represented by political parties. The states were now called Länder and
over the years were reduced in number from twenty-five to seventeen by
1932. Territorial changes remained minor, however, in comparison with
Napoleon and even Bismarck.90
The seventeen Länder were: Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg,
Baden, Thuringia (created in 1920), Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 
Oldenburg, Brunswick (Braunschweig), Anhalt, Lippe, Mecklenburg-
Strelitz, Schaumburg-Lippe, and the three city states of Bremen, Ham-
burg, and Lübeck. Austria, which wanted to join the new federation, was
prevented from doing so by the Allies. Unlike the Constitution of the
Kaiserreich, the Länder were not listed in the Weimar Constitution on the
grounds that the Reich territory, including Prussia, would be reorganized
so that the Länder would be of roughly equal size. As it turned out, how-
ever, territorial reorganization of the kind envisaged by Preuss receded
into the background in light of many more urgent problems.91
Under the Weimar Constitution the relationship between Prussia and
the Reich was changed dramatically. Prussia lost its hegemony through
the elimination of the Personalunion between the prime minister of 
Prussia and the chancellor of the Reich. The powers of the Reich were also
expanded. A Reich administration of financial matters was created along-
side the finance administrations of the Länder, and by 1930 a reform
commission consisting of delegates from the Reich and the Länder
were calling for the dissolution of Prussia; creation of new Länder from
Prussian territory that would have less autonomy than the larger, older,
Länder; and the consolidation of small Länder. These proposals never
reached the Reichstag owing to more pressing matters.92
In contrast to the Constitution of the Kaiserreich, the Reichstag, rather
than the Bundesrat (now called the Reichsrat) was the first organ to be
mentioned in the Weimar Constitution. The Reichstag was elected by
men and women by proportional representation, with only 60,000 votes
making up one parliamentary seat. This system led to fair representation,
but it also led to a greater role for the political parties and promoted a
fragmented multi-party system. The Reichsrat represented the Länder,
which received one vote for each million inhabitants; however, the largest
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Land (Prussia) could not have more than two-fifths of the total member-
ship in spite of its population which was more than three-fifths of the
total. In addition, half of the Prussian votes were from the various
provinces rather than from the central government of Prussia. 93
The Chancellor was appointed and dismissed by the popularly elected
Reich President; however, the Chancellor and his ministers were also
dependent on the support of a majority of the Reichstag. These provisions
of the Weimar Constitution which are very similar to those of the French
Fifth Republic today broke down by the end of the 1920s because of the
inability of the polarized multi-party system to form stable majority
coalition governments. This, in turn, led to an increasing dependency on
the emergency rule of the President under Article 48. In the end, exas-
peration with these conditions led to the invitation to Adolf Hitler to
form a government. 
When the National Socialists came to power in January 1933, they
began the process of Gleichschaltung, the “coordination” of the Länder,
first by replacing non-Nazi governments in ten Länder by Reich commis-
sioners, then by giving the Land governments (cabinets) legislative pow-
ers. By April a kind of governor (Reichsstatthalter) was placed over the
Land governments, and in January 1934 the autonomy of the Länder was
transferred to the Reich. The Länder became administrative districts of
the Reich, acting only on behalf of the central administration. As a result
the Reichsrat became superfluous, and it was dissolved in February 1934.
The Land parliaments were also dissolved, and the Land governments
were appointed by the Reich. In the meantime the two Mecklenburg Län-
der were consolidated, Lübeck was absorbed by Prussia, and the Saarland
was placed under the Gauleiter (regional party leader) of the Palatinate,
which was part of Bavaria. Over time the Gauleiter assumed greater
importance than the Länder.94 Both the Nazi Party and the state which it
governed under the highly centralized dictatorship of Adolf Hitler made
no pretense of the contempt with which any semblance of regional or
local autonomy and democratic rule were held.95
The Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany 
There was a dramatic shake-up of German states with the dissolution of
the old Reich in 1806, a dramatic growth in size by Prussia in 1815, a strug-
gle over hegemony between Prussia and Austria and the incorporation of
several states into Prussia in 1866, and the collapse of the Kaiserreich in
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1918 followed by a reduction in the number of states from twenty-five to
seventeen during the fourteen years of the Weimar Republic. But none of
these changes could compare to the events following the defeat of the
Third Reich in 1945. 
Germany was divided into four zones of occupation, with the supreme
commander in each zone, a general from the United States, Great Britain,
France, and the Soviet Union, respectively, acting as the highest authority.
Berlin, like Vienna and the rest of Austria, was also occupied by the four
Allies. In each case a council was established to provide for coordination
and cooperation in the whole of Germany or Berlin, but from the begin-
ning tensions among the Allies prevented almost all common actions. Ter-
ritories east of the Oder/Neisse Rivers were placed under Polish and Soviet
“administration,” and several millions of their German inhabitants
became the victims of “ethnic cleansing.” The Soviet Zone consisted of the
five pre-war Länder of Mecklenburg-Strelitz and Mecklenburg-Schwerin,
Anhalt, Thuringia, Saxony, and the two Prussian provinces of Branden-
burg and Saxony. In the zones of the three Western Allies, old Länder with
administrative continuity included only Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden,
Hesse-Darmstadt in the south, and tiny Schaumburg-Lippe, and the city
states of Bremen and Hamburg in the north. Most of the territory in the
north consisted of former Prussian provinces. The military governments
decided whether to use the administrative structures in the old Länder or
to create new ones.96
The American zone
The Americans, who wanted a federal structure from the beginning, cre-
ated three Länder in the South in September 1945.97 They re-created the
old Land of Bavaria without the Bavarian enclave of Landau in the Palati-
nate; other than that minor territorial loss, Bavaria was the only Land in
the three Western zones other than Bremen and Hamburg that emerged
unchanged. A new constitution for Bavaria was drafted during the first
half of 1946 and approved by an elected constitutional assembly and a
popular referendum on the day of the first election to the Bavarian par-
liament in late autumn of 1946.98
The Americans also created the new Land of Württemberg-Baden, con-
sisting of the northern halves of the former Länder with these names. The
Americans had given the southern half of Baden, rather than all of it, to
France for its occupation zone in order to prevent the French from sepa-
rating territories along the Rhine from the rest of Germany. Dissatisfaction
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with the creation of this Land and the one created by the French in their
zone led to further changes which are discussed below.99
Finally, the new Land of Hesse was created. “Large Hesse” (Grosshessen),
as it was called initially, consisted of the older Land of Hesse, without
Rheinhessen, which went to the French zone; the former Prussian
province of Nassau, without four counties that went to the French zone;
and the former Prussian province of Kurhessen.100 Each of these three 
Länder drew up a constitution in 1946 which was approved by an elected
constitutional assembly. The northern city-state of Bremen, which the
Americans secured as a port of entry, was re-created in January 1947.101
Local elections in the south were held in early 1946, county elections and
elections in the larger cities in the spring, and constitutional assemblies
approved draft constitutions in late autumn. At the same time Land
parliaments were elected and Land governments formed.102
The French zone
The French zone was carved out of the original British and American
zones, because the Soviets insisted at Yalta on retaining their zone that
had been drawn by the British, Americans, and Soviets without the
French in mind.103 It consisted of several Prussian territories: the south-
ern part of the Rhine province of Prussia, parts of the former province of
Nassau, the Saar, the Palatinate, and Hohenzollern. It also got parts of
four older Länder: Rheinhessen from Hesse, the southern halves of Baden
and Württemberg, and the Bavarian territory in the Palatinate around
Landau. In 1947 the southern half of Baden was created as a new Land,
(South) Baden, and the southern half of Württemberg and the Prussian
enclave of Hohenzollern became the Land of Württemberg-Hohen-
zollern. The new Land of Rhineland-Palatinate was formed from the
Prussian administrative districts (Regierungsbezirke) of Koblenz and
Trier, four counties of the former Prussian administrative district of
Wiesbaden, the former Hessian administrative district of Rheinhessen,
and the former Bavarian enclave of Landau mentioned above.104
The Saarland was a special case. It had been occupied by Napoleon
from 1801 to 1815, and Napoleon III had expected to receive it in com-
pensation for standing by when Prussia went to war against Austria in
1866. After the First World War it was occupied by France but returned
to Germany as a result of a referendum in 1935. In 1946 the French sep-
arated it from Germany again and turned it into a legally autonomous
but in fact dependent territory of France. The French went so far in 1948
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as to change the nationality of the inhabitants from German to a “Saar-
land nationality.” With efforts by the French and German leaders to move
in the direction of European integration, and after German complaints to
the Council of Europe about violations of basic rights, the French began
to modify their position and to be more conciliatory. After numerous ups
and downs and the apparent success of efforts to “Europeanize” the Saar-
land, the French allowed the voters to decide whether to accept this solu-
tion in 1955. They rejected it, and a new Land parliament was elected for
the first time with pro-German parties. The French finally accepted
majority sentiment and agreed to return the Saarland to Germany on 1
January 1957; however, the Saarland remained in economic union with
France until the end of December 1959.105
The British zone
The British waited somewhat longer with the territorial reorganization of
their zone, which was more heterogeneous than the others. It consisted 
of the four previous Prussian provinces of Hannover, Schleswig-Holstein,
Westphalia, and the northern part of the Rhine province; the four small
Länder of Braunschweig (Brunswick), Oldenburg, Lippe-Detmold, and
Schaumburg-Lippe; and the city-state of Hamburg. The other city-state
in the north, composed of Bremen and Bremerhaven, was occupied by
the Americans, who wanted to have control over the port of entry for
American troops and supplies. 
North-Rhine Westphalia was formed from the province of Westphalia,
the northern part of the Rhine province, and, somewhat later, the small
Land of Lippe-Detmold. These territories incorporated the heavily
industrialized and densely populated Ruhrgebiet which made this new
Land then and still today the most densely populated in all of Germany.
It was first created in August 1946, with Lippe being added in January
1947. The first Land parliament was appointed in October 1946. Work on
the first constitution was begun in the spring of 1947 but, owing to much
controversy, not completed until the spring of 1950.106
Lower Saxony was formed in 1946 from Hanover, Oldenburg, Braun-
schweig, and Schaumburg-Lippe, the smallest traditional Land in Ger-
many. In September 1946 the British appointed a Land parliament, which
approved a temporary constitution in February 1947. A few months later,
the members of the first elected Land parliament entered office. A second
“temporary constitution” was passed by the Land parliament in 1951 and
went into effect in May of that year. Some efforts were made to separate
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Oldenburg and Schaumburg-Lippe from Lower Saxony, but they were
unsuccessful.107
Schleswig-Holstein, including the former city-state of Lübeck which
lost its autonomy in 1937, was elevated to the status of a Land in 1946. It
is the only former Prussian province that became a Land with no change
of boundaries.108 The first Land elections took place in April 1947. The
Social Democrats wanted to combine Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, and
Lower Saxony into one large “Northwest State,” but Hamburg was vehe-
mently opposed.109 The constitution, which did not go into effect until
December 1949, reflected an agreement with Denmark which guaranteed
minority rights for the Danes in Schleswig-Holstein and for the Germans
in Denmark.110
The traditional city-state of Hamburg was re-established as a Land in
1946, and the first election for its parliament was held in November 1946.
The first constitution, however, was not completed until June 1952. As
noted above, Bremen and Bremerhaven, at first occupied by the British,
were turned over to the Americans who proclaimed them to constitute a
Land in January 1947. It was and remains today the smallest Land in pop-
ulation and territory.111
The Soviet zone
In 1945 American and British troops occupied Thuringia, parts of Saxony,
Halle-Merseburg, Magdeburg, and Mecklenburg. In accordance with the
Yalta Agreement, these troops were withdrawn from these territories in
July 1945, and they were replaced by Soviet troops. The territories east of
the Oder/Neisse River – Pomerania, Silesia, and the lower half of East
Prussia – were given to Poland for “administration,” while the northern
half of East Prussia was annexed by the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Zone
west of the Oder/Neisse River there were five older Länder: Mecklenburg-
Strelitz, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Anhalt, Thuringia, and Saxony; and 
two Prussian provinces: Brandenburg and Saxony. These were used for
administrative purposes and given constitutions in 1947, when Prussia
was formally dissolved. 
In June 1946 the Americans formed a provincial government in
Thuringia which was replaced by the Soviets in July with a government
completely dominated by communists. A new constitution for the Land
of Thuringia went into effect in 1947, and in 1948 the capital was moved
from Weimar, where the Americans had placed the seat of government,
to Erfurt.112
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The old Kingdom of Saxony, which had been turned into a republican
Land in the Weimar Republic, was occupied in 1945 by American troops
in the west and Soviet troops in the east. This led to the appointment by
the Americans in their half of mostly social democratic and middle-class
politicians and of communists and left-wing social democrats in the
Soviet half. The Soviets occupied the entire territory in July 1945, and
local elections and parliamentary elections were held in September and
October 1946, respectively. In spite of Soviet support, the communists
(Socialist Unity Party, SED, see below) received a little less than half of the
seats in the parliamentary elections. A constitution was passed by the
Land parliament in February 1947.113
In 1945 Soviet forces entered Mecklenburg from the east, while British
and American troops entered from the west and south. The Soviets
occupied all of the two Mecklenburg territories and the western portion
of Pomerania in July 1945. Not only was the territory east of the Oder
given to Poland; Polish gains also included the area around Stettin just
west of the Oder. In spite of considerable Soviet harassment, the non-
communist parties received half the seats in parliamentary elections in
October 1946. The new government that was formed was, however, con-
trolled by the communist-dominated SED. A constitution for the new
Land consisting of the two Mecklenburgs and western Pomerania was
passed by the parliament in January 1947.114
Like Mecklenburg, the former Land of Anhalt and the Prussian
province of Saxony which contained Halle-Merseburg and Magdeburg
were occupied by British, American, and Soviet troops, but they became
part of the Soviet zone in July 1945. The Soviet military government
organized an administration for Halle-Merseburg and Magdeburg and
the Land of Anhalt with the seat of government in Halle. Deputies of a
provisional consultative assembly were appointed in July 1946, and
county and parliamentary elections were held in October. Again, the SED
failed to gain an absolute majority of seats, but it did dominate the coali-
tion government that was formed. A new constitution for the region went
into effect in January 1947. After the dissolution of Prussia, Saxony-
Anhalt was declared a Land.115
The Prussian province of Brandenburg was occupied by Soviet forces
in 1945, which began immediately with the construction of a communist
administration. Potsdam was made the seat of government. In June 1946
a consultative assembly was organized. Local elections were held in Sep-
tember, parliamentary elections in October. Even though the SED did not
receive an absolute majority in spite of Soviet support, it became the
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dominant partner in a coalition government. A constitution was passed
and went into effect early in 1947, and with the dissolution of Prussia on
25 February 1947 Brandenburg became a Land. In the elections of 1950,
a “unitary” list of parties was presented to the voters in all of the Länder
in the Soviet Zone, which meant for all practical purposes that any mean-
ingful opposition in the parliament was eliminated.116
At the Yalta Conference in September 1944, the Allies agreed to divide
Berlin into three occupation sectors just as Germany was divided into
three zones of occupation. A common administration was to be exercised
by the three sector commanders (Kommandatura). The city was captured
by Soviet forces in April and May 1945, and a city administration was
formed that was one-half communist. Western Allied troops, including
French forces, which received part of the British sector, entered the city in
July. Soon controversy emerged over the transit corridors for the Western
Allies. Rail traffic and air routes were regulated in the autumn of 1945,
and agreement was reached in May 1946 on road and canal traffic. The
Soviets began to take a separate path early in 1946, when they tried to
force a merger of the old Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) to form the SED. Outside the
Soviet sector the SPD members voted against the merger by 80 percent;
however, the merger took place in the Soviet sector and in the rest of the
Soviet Zone of occupation. The Allied Komandatura issued a provisional
constitution in August 1946, and it went into effect in October. In the first
and only free election that followed, the Social Democrats received 49
percent of the vote, the Christian Democrats 22 percent, the Liberals 9
percent, and the communist-dominated SED only 20 percent. Increasing
Soviet–Western differences made the work of the city government
increasingly difficult, and in the spring and summer of 1948 the Soviets
left the Allied Control Council and Kommandatura, respectively. The
Western currency reform took place on 20 June 1948, and in response the
Soviets introduced the East German Mark. In an attempt to force the
Western Allies out of West Berlin, the Soviets began the Berlin Blockade
on 24 June 1948; the Blockade failed and was lifted on 5 May 1949. In the
meantime the SED in the eastern half of the city stopped their coopera-
tion with their Western colleagues, and the city administration was effec-
tively divided by the end of 1948. The SED refused to participate in the
elections of December 1948, which then led to two city administrations,
one in the East and one in the West.117
Largely in response to the West German Basic Law, an East German
constitution, like the previous Land constitutions in the Soviet Zone
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modeled after the Weimar Constitution but largely ignored by the com-
munist-dominated SED, went into effect in October 1949. The Volk-
skammer (Peoples’ Chamber) was the popularly elected body dominated
completely by the SED. The deputies of the five Länder parliaments
elected representatives to a second body, the Länderkammer (Länder
chamber), but it was given little authority and attention. As Georg Sante
noted, in East Germany
[t]he Länder are the atavistic and contrary element of the constitution. They
point to the example of the Weimar Constitution, to past history, which is
to be superseded in its old form. They contradict the socialist, communist
principle of “democratic socialism,” which amounts to a unitary state.118
In effect the Länder became administrative districts, and they were dis-
solved de facto in July 1952 when they were subdivided into the three
administrative districts created from each Land that reported directly to
East Berlin, which was one of the fifteen districts. The three districts
within each Land (except Saxony-Anhalt, which had two) continued to
elect delegates to the Länderkammer until 1958, when it was finally dis-
solved officially.119
Developments after the creation of the new Länder in the West
Political developments
In the West it became apparent that the Länder or administrative regions
that had been created were too small for economic purposes, so the
Americans formed a Länder council in November 1945, and the British
formed a similar council for consultative purposes in February 1946. In
January 1947 the two were joined economically to form the
British–American Bizonia. The French, in the meantime, tried to admin-
ister their zone with as little contact with the other Allies as possible. They
had the most centralized, rigorous and strict administration of the three
Western zones. In May 1947 an economic council – in effect a parliament
– was added to the Bizonal administration. This council, located in
Frankfurt, consisted of delegates from the Länder parliaments. The
French did not create a zonal consultative body, but they did join the
Bizonia early in 1948. The administration of this combined economic
zone introduced the famous currency reform of Ludwig Erhard on 20
June 1948. Together with the Marshall Plan of June 1947, this reform was
an important element in the so-called German “economic miracle” that
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began soon after. The growing tensions between the Western Allies and
the Soviets led to the Berlin Blockade from June 1948 to May 1949.120
In July 1948 the Western Allies gave the eleven prime ministers of the
Länder in their three zones the “Frankfurt Documents” which called for
a constitutional convention to draft a democratic, federal constitution for
the territory of the three Western zones. The prime ministers were also
asked to propose changes for Land boundaries in order to avoid both too
small and too large Länder. The first reaction was generally negative, on
the grounds that a constitution for the Western zones would effect a per-
manent division of Germany. However, the prime ministers finally
agreed, after the military governors accepted a compromise according to
which the new state would be provisional, not with a constitution but a
“basic law.”121
On 10 August 1948 the first meeting of the constitutional convention
was called by the prime ministers in Herrenchiemsee, a palace located on
an island of a large lake in Bavaria. Each Land had one legal expert as a
representative. Together they prepared a draft constitution for the Parlia-
mentary Council, consisting of representatives elected by the eleven Land
parliaments. The Basic Law was approved by the Parliamentary Council
on 23 May 1949 and passed by ten of the eleven Land parliaments.
Bavaria refused to pass it, but it had agreed to abide by the decision of 
the majority.122
Additions and subtractions, 1949–60 
At the time the Federal Republic was created, the Länder were Hamburg,
Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, and North-Rhine Westphalia in 
the British zone; Bremen, Hesse, Bavaria, and Württemberg-Baden 
in the American zone; and the Rhineland-Patatinate, Württemberg-
Hohenzollern, and Baden in the French zone. The Saarland, as noted
above, was incorporated economically and to some extent even politically
into France after 1945, but it was returned to Germany as a Land in 
January 1957.
More complicated – though without the international implications
associated with the Saarland – was the question of the three Länder in the
southwest, Baden, Württemberg-Hohenzollern, and Württemberg-
Baden, which had been created from four parts: northern and southern
Baden and northern and southern Württemberg (including the Prussian
administrative district of Hohenzollern). Considerable dissatisfaction
with the fragmentation represented by these three Länder was expressed
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even before the Federal Republic was created in 1949, and discussions had
taken place among representatives of the four parts of the two former
Länder in 1948 regarding the creation of a new Südweststaat (southwest
state). But so much disagreement ensued concerning proposals for a ref-
erendum that the issue was put on hold until the Federal Republic had
been established. A non-binding referendum was held in September
1950, and the results in the four parts as a whole favored a Südweststaat.
South Baden voted against a combined state, and together with the
northern part of the former Land a very slight majority of voters favored
retention of their former state. Article 118 of the Basic Law permitted the
Bundestag to pass legislation regulating the disposition of the territories
in the southwest, and it did so in May 1951. The law allowed the creation
of a new combined state if approved by a majority of voters in three of the
four territories and if that majority constituted a majority for the com-
bined area. South Baden vehemently opposed the bill and took it before
the Federal Constitutional Court. The Court delayed the referendum
from September until December 1951, but it rejected South Baden’s suit.
The referendum that was held had results very similar to the non-bind-
ing referendum in 1950. In the area as a whole almost 70 percent voted
for the new state; however, in South Baden the vote was 62 percent for the
old Land of Baden, while in the North and South together the vote was 52
percent for the old Land. Since, however, the three territories other than
South Baden voted in favor and the total majority vote in the four terri-
tories was decisive, a new provisional government was formed in April
1952 for the new Land of Baden-Württemberg.123
In the meantime Schleswig-Holstein, which was a poor Land with a
population that had doubled since the war because of refugees from the
East, expressed a strong interest in gaining Hamburg and a strip of land
from northern Lower Saxony. Lower Saxony did not want a poor Land to
its north and suggested that Bremen be included in the annexation. Since
both Hamburg and Bremen were vehemently opposed to the idea of join-
ing Schleswig-Holstein, no action was taken.124
Changes and proposals for change after unification
In December 1989 the government of East Germany formed a commis-
sion to consider the possibility of restoring the five Länder that had been
dissolved in 1952. Newly created “Roundtables” in the various adminis-
trative districts were also looking at the Länder and found that many East
Germans no longer wanted to be identified as citizens of the German
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Democratic Republic (GDR) but rather as Saxons, Mecklenburger, and
so forth. It became clear that the restoration of the Länder could help re-
establish a sense of legitimacy for the emerging political system.125
Soon, however, disputes began to arise over a variety of issues. One of
these concerned the lack of congruence that could be found in many cases
between the boundaries of the former Länder and the administrative dis-
tricts that replaced them. Another was the desire of the inhabitants in
some areas, such as Rostock and West Pomerania, to form new, separate
Länder. A third issue was the location of the capital of Saxony-Anhalt.
The Soviets had made Halle the capital from 1947 to 1952, but Magde-
burg, which had been the seat of government of the Prussian province of
Saxony, laid claim to the title and did, indeed, become the capital after the
first Land elections in October 1990. There was also some question about
certain territories and the Länder to which they belonged.126
During the spring and summer months of 1990, numerous proposals
concerning the boundaries of the five new Länder were discussed in and
out of government circles.127 The simplest options saw the fourteen dis-
tricts without Berlin combined into five Länder, either within the bound-
aries of the districts or of the Länder as of 1952. The third option called for
a division of East Germany into four Länder by merging Saxony-Anhalt
into Brandenburg and Saxony. A fourth option was to divide the GDR into
three Länder, which would combine Saxony and Thuringia on the model
of Baden-Württemberg. This would have made this Land the third largest
in the united Germany, thus giving the East a large Land that could com-
pete with the four large Länder in the West. A final option would have been
to create one very large Land out of the GDR which would have been
roughly comparable in population size to North-Rhine Westphalia.
In the end, of course, five Länder were re-created along with a united
Berlin (map 1.5). The borders of the new Länder ran along the lines of the
administrative districts; however, the questions of which border territo-
ries (in this case, counties) should go to which Land were settled in non-
binding referenda at the end of July 1990.128
At this time there were also some proposals for combining parts of
West and East Germany, for both sentimental and economic reasons. One
serious proposal was to combine Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg with
Mecklenburg, perhaps with either Hamburg or Lübeck as the capital.
Another was to combine Hesse and Thuringia, and there was also some
talk of combining Lower Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt. Finally, some coun-
ties in the East sought to join their western neighbors. Heiligenstadt, the
major city in the Eichsfeld in the East, for example, suggested that it
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should join its sister city, Duderstadt, in Lower Saxony, and leave
Thuringia. None of these proposals was implemented.129
The dramatic changes in the GDR and the creation of the new Länder,
in addition to the debate about whether Bonn or Berlin should be the
capital of a united Germany, initiated an intense debate about a
Neugliederung or reordering of Länder boundaries in West Germany. In
principle this debate was nothing new. In the late 1960s there was much
discussion of territorial reform in Germany, including boundary reforms
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for the villages, towns, cities, and counties. As a result major territorial
reforms were enacted at the local level in the eight territorial states (as
opposed to the three city-states of Bremen, Hamburg, and West
Berlin).130 While these reforms were being enacted by Land legislatures, a
special commission, called the Ernst-Kommission, recommended major
boundary changes for the Länder.131 It proposed that the Federal Repub-
lic have either five or six Länder: North-Rhine Westphalia, Baden-Würt-
temberg, Bavaria; a combination of the Saarland, Rhineland-Palatinate,
and Hesse; and either a combination of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg,
and part of Lower Saxony on the one hand and Bremen and Lower 
Saxony on the other hand, or a joining of all these Länder – Schleswig-
Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hamburg, and Bremen – into one very large
Nordstaat. While no action was ever taken, the discussion of boundary
reform continued unabated over the years.
The debate in the western Länder that was rekindled by the restoration
of the Länder in the East did not resolve the differences between the pro-
tagonists and opponents.132 One of the arguments made for boundary
reform was that “now,” i.e., during the first half of the 1990s, is the time to
act, because the new Länder in the East have not yet established a strong
identity among East Germans, and there was much more interest in
boundary reform even in western Germany since unification. In spite of
this and many other arguments in favor of boundary reform, no action was
taken except for the effort to join the city-state of Berlin with its surround-
ing territory, Brandenburg. The political elites in both Länder favored con-
solidation, but in the referendum held in 1996 the majority of East German
votes in East Berlin and Brandenburg that were in opposition exceeded the
majority of votes in West Berlin that favored consolidation. The failure of
the efforts to consolidate Berlin and Brandenburg has had a discouraging
effect on plans to initiate consolidations elsewhere in Germany. Neverthe-
less, by the end of the decade there was again an intense debate about
boundary reform that was brought about largely because of dissatisfaction
concerning the financing of the Länder, and in particular the system of 
fiscal equalization involving the transfer of funds from richer to poorer
Länder.133 These issues will be considered again later in this book.
Conclusion
German history has not been kind to the concept of a German nation-
state. The Holy Roman Empire was a league of secular and religious
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princes which became more of a league of semi-independent states after
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Like the EU today, it was a unique polit-
ical entity, difficult to define and compare. In a legal work published in
1667, Samuel von Pufendorf suggested that the “Holy Roman Empire of
the German Nation” could only be called by the rules of classification “an
irregular and monster-like state body.”134 It consisted of more than 300
states when Napoleon entered the scene but, following the dissolution of
the Holy Roman Empire (the First Reich) in 1806 and the many consoli-
dations brought about by the pressure of Napoleon and his German
allies, only thirty-nine remained. The Confederation which they formed
in 1815 could be said to constitute “Germany” culturally, but it was no
“nation-state” like France or even a “state.” 
Not until 1867, with the formation of the twenty-two-member North
German Federation, did a German federation with a credible central
authority emerge. This Federation, in turn, served as the foundation for
the united twenty-five-member Germany of 1871 that did not include
German Austria (nor, of course, German Switzerland). During the fifteen
years of the Weimar Republic, the number of states, now called Länder,
was reduced to seventeen. The Länder were weakened during the fourteen
years of the still “federal” Weimar Republic and practically ceased to exist
during Hitler’s Third Reich.
After the Second World War, Germany was divided into four zones and
then into two antagonistic states, each within opposing camps of states
with dramatically different political and economic systems. For West
Germany, the Allied occupation led to the creation of several new Länder,
including the former Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein, Lower
Saxony, North-Rhine Westphalia, Hesse, and Rhineland-Palatinate. Only
three older Länder survived the occupation: Bavaria and the city-states of
Bremen and Hamburg. In 1952 Baden-Württemberg was formed, and in
1957 France returned the Saarland to Germany. These ten Länder made
up the Federal Republic of Germany, while West Berlin remained legally
under Allied occupation throughout the Cold War. In spite of their ori-
gins, the Länder that constituted the Federal Republic formed a political
system under the Basic Law of 1949 that provided not only for democra-
tic government, which had existed also in the Weimar Republic, but also
a federal system identified clearly with democracy. Weimar had been a
federation, but the Länder were so weak that they were practically admin-
istrative units in an otherwise centralized democratic system. 
In the Soviet Occupation Zone, the older Länder, Saxony and
Thuringia, were recreated, while the two older Mecklenburg Länder were
The origins of the Länder 45
chap  1  27/5/03  11:47 am  Page 45
combined with western Pomerania to form Mecklenburg. The former
Prussian province of Brandenburg west of the Oder River became the
Land of Brandenburg, and an older Land was combined with a Prussian
province to form Saxony-Anhalt. These Länder were dissolved in 1952,
but they were revived in 1990 with the second unification of Germany. 
Today, of the sixteen Länder in united Germany, only five existed 
as Länder in 1933, and two of these are small city-states. Only Baden-
Württemberg was created by the Germans themselves. The other ten
Länder were created under the pressure of the Allied occupation author-
ities. Today there is considerable discussion of boundary reforms that
might lead to a reduction in the number of Länder, but it is not a little
ironic that in the past major boundary reforms brought about by annex-
ations and consolidations of various kinds have taken place only as 
the result of war. With the possible exception of the creation of Baden-
Württemberg in 1952, only minor adjustments have been made in peace-
time circumstances. Perhaps the strains of fiscal federalism will force
some changes on reluctant parties, or perhaps developments in the
process of European integration will provide an inducement to change.
But in the meantime popular identities with the existing Länder have
developed some deep roots, and meaningful boundary reforms will not
come easily. 
United Germany today consists of four large Länder in the West and
none in the East. There are five relatively poor to very poor “new” Län-
der in the East and a currently poor united Berlin and ten relatively rich-
to-very-rich Länder in the West. A north–south economic and political
gap in the West now faces a new and deeper East–West economic and
political gap. A largely Protestant North, a largely Catholic South, and a
largely formerly Protestant East – now a secular East – contribute fur-
ther to internal tensions. Taken together, these differences present the
new, united Germany with a set of major challenges. These challenges
may not include the old question of where is Germany, but they do
include the issue of regional identity. (Immigration in Germany – and
elsewhere in Europe – has, of course, also again raised the question of
who is or can become German.) Germans will have plenty to occupy
them in the future when it comes to answering the questions which all
of these issues and others pose regarding the Länder and their place in
German federalism. 
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Introduction
As in the case of the American states, the German Länder existed before
the federation. But unlike the United States, there is no legal controversy
in Germany over the role of the states as opposed to the “people” in creat-
ing the federation.1 Representatives from the Länder met at Herrenchiem-
see in 1948 to draft the new constitution and formed the Parliamentary
Council which negotiated with the Allies over the final text in 1949. The
German Constitution, or Basic Law, was then approved by the parliaments
of the Länder (except Bavaria) rather than by popular referendum. This
does not make the Federal Republic the creature of the German Länder,
however; the Preamble states specifically that the Basic Law is the result of
an act by the German people. 
In accordance with the tradition of civil law countries on the European
continent, the Basic Law is long and detailed in comparison to the very
brief US Constitution.2 The Basic Law has 146 articles, in comparison to
seven original articles and twenty-seven amendments in the American
Constitution. It has been amended fifty times since 1949 in comparison
to seventeen times for the American Constitution since the first ten
amendments were added in 1791. Some of the German amending laws
have contained multiple changes of old articles or additions of new arti-
cles, so that the total number of changes is actually much larger than 
fifty. As these numbers suggest, it is easier to change the Basic Law by a
two-thirds majority vote in the Bundestag (the popularly elected national
parliament) and Bundesrat (a second legislative chamber in which the
governments [cabinets] of the Länder are represented) than in the United
States, which requires not only a two-thirds vote in the House and Senate
but also majority approval by the legislatures in three-fourths of the
2
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states. It can be argued, of course, that the Supreme Court is an instru-
ment of continuing constitutional change in the United States, since its
decisions serve in some ways as a substitute for formal constitutional
amendment. But this is true also, if perhaps to a lesser extent, of the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court in Germany. 
About one-half of the articles of the Basic Law are related in a direct or
indirect manner to federalism, and most amendments have concerned
some aspect of the subject. In the first paragraph of Article 20, the Fed-
eral Republic is described as “a democratic and socially conscious
[sozialer] federal state.” Federalism, though not defined by the Basic Law,
is even protected by a “perpetuity clause” (Article 79, para. 3) which for-
bids changes in “the division of the federation into Länder” or which
affects their fundamental participation in the legislative process. The first
clause does not protect individual Länder from boundary changes or con-
solidation as prescribed elsewhere in the Basic Law (Article 29); however,
it does exclude any fundamental change from a federal to a unitary state.3
The second clause concerning participation in the legislative process
means participation in the Bundesrat.
Two or three tiers?
Controversy over the nature of federalism in the United States has always
focused on the federal government, i.e., the Union, the federation, federal
level, federal tier, or federal plane vs the states. The Civil War decided the
issue of the right of American states to secede, and the Supreme Court
declared in 1868 that the United States was an indestructible union 
composed of indestructible states.4 The issue of contention has usually
been disagreement over the location of sovereignty between two tiers of
government or, at the very least, over the proper distribution of powers
between them.5 When Ronald Reagan claimed in his inaugural presiden-
tial address in 1981 that the states created the Union, thus implying state
sovereignty, few legal scholars agreed. But just where sovereignty does 
lie is still an unresolved question. Daniel Elazar, for example, insists that
in a democratic federal system sovereignty is shared; each arena or
“plane” (he rejects the term “level”) of government derives its sovereignty
from “the people,” and no one arena is superior to the other.6 Paul Peter-
son, on the other hand, speaks of “levels” and argues that since the Civil
War sovereignty has been “concentrated in the hands of the national 
government.”7
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While German scholars since 1949 have not argued about the location
of sovereignty, there have been some differences among them over the
conception of the German federal state as having two or three tiers or
levels. Those who see a two-tier or two-systems model “see the Länder 
as subsystems of the federation.” The Bund is the federation and is
endowed with the powers of a federal government. Advocates of the
three-tier or three-systems model “distinguish among the Länder, 
the central state, and the federation.” The Bund is the central state with
the powers of a federal government, while the “federation is seen as a
rather powerless system embracing both the Länder and the central state.
The central state is a mere subsystem of the federation, as are the Län-
der.” Bund and Länder are almost equal partners, “both subject to the
all-embracing though somewhat nebulous federation.”8 In this case the
federal president and the Federal Constitutional Court would be organs
of the federation, while the federal government (Bundesregierung) and
the Bundestag would be organs of the central state and the federation. In
the two-tier model, on the other hand, all federal organs are organs of
the federation.9
An early decision of the Federal Constitutional Court seemed to sug-
gest that the Court accepted the three-tier model, but later it made clear
its preference for two tiers. Some scholars believe that “a resurrection of
the “three systems model” cannot be excluded,”10 while others argue
vehemently that “the Federal Republic is no three-tier federation.”11 The
two-tier model seems to be the consensus among scholars today.12
The division of legislative, executive, and judicial powers
As we shall see below, a general principle guides the division of powers or
functions in the Basic Law. That principle is contained in Article 30,
which says that “state [Americans would say “governmental”] powers
and the implementation of state [governmental] tasks are the responsi-
bility of the Länder,” unless the Basic Law provides otherwise. This cre-
ates a presumption that governmental powers – legislative, executive, and
judicial – lie with the Länder in cases of doubt.13 But as with the Tenth
Amendment14 to the American Constitution, the provisions of Article 30
are somewhat misleading.15 Indeed, Fritz Scharpf has suggested that such
provisions are a “living lie [Lebenslüge] of federalism.”16
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Division of legislative powers between the federal 
and Land governments17
The general provisions of Article 70
An entire section (Section VII) of fifteen articles in the Basic Law deals
with legislation. The first of these, Article 70, is closely related to Article 30
above. It states simply that “the Länder have the right of passing legislation
insofar as this Basic Law does not grant legislative authority to the federa-
tion.” This means that in contrast to the United States there is little room
or necessity for implied powers. There is a somewhat similar doctrine in
German law of granting powers based on the “nature of the material” (aus
der Natur der Sache) and “subject interrelationship” (Sachzusammen-
hang), but these are used only rarely and under certain conditions and are
not considered really comparable to American implied powers.18
Article 70, para. 2, says that legislative authority is granted in the form
of exclusive and concurrent legislative powers. A third important source
of legislative authority for the federation, not mentioned in Article 70, is
found in framework legislation, which is taken up in Article 75. As indi-
cated above, one can also add unwritten powers based on “the nature of
the material” or “subject interrelationship,” but these are highly restricted
by the requirement of Article 70 that powers of the federation are derived
from provisions of the Basic Law. Finally, one should add European law
as an increasingly important source of law in Germany which affects both
federal and Land lawmaking powers.
The constitutional reality today is that there are relatively few legisla-
tive powers that have not been granted to the federal level by various
means.19 Areas generally left to the Länder are local governments; culture,
including schools as well as the visual or performing arts and electronic
media; public safety, e.g., police; and some aspects of civil service and
health care.20
Exclusive federal powers
In spite of the provisions of Articles 30 and 70, the legislative powers of the
federation are much greater than those of the Länder. This is made clear in
Articles 71–75. Article 71 denies the Länder any powers in the areas of
exclusive federal jurisdiction unless they have been granted specifically by
federal law. Thus a law passed by a Land legislature or a popular referen-
dum in a Land or unit of local government that demanded some action or
inaction by the federal government in an area of its exclusive jurisdiction,
e.g., national defense, would be unconstitutional.21
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The exclusive legislative powers of the federation are listed in Article
73. There are twelve “paragraphs,”most of which contain rather obvious
responsibilities for the federal government, for example, foreign affairs
and defense; national citizenship; currency, weights and measures; cus-
toms and foreign trade; air and rail transport owned by the federation;
postal and telecommunications services; and several other matters. The
list is not complete, because many other federal responsibilities can be
found in other provisions of the Basic Law.22 The power to regulate asy-
lum seekers, for example, is found in Article 16, while the regulation of
political parties and political finance is authorized in Article 21. There are
also certain executive powers, such as planning, that are found in other
articles.23 There is no comparable catalogue of powers for the Länder,
because they retain under Articles 30 and 70 all legislative powers not
granted to the federation. In the case of foreign affairs, Article 73, para. 1,
does not mention specifically foreign aid, which has led the Länder to
establish their own separate foreign aid programs while recognizing the
primacy of the federation in this area (Article 32).24
Concurrent powers
Articles 72 and 74 are concerned with concurrent powers. Both articles
became subjects of discussion as a result of Article 5 of the Unification
Treaty of 1990 which “recommends”that the Bundestag and Bundesrat
consider constitutional changes “with respect to the relationship between
the federation and the Länder . . .”25 In 1992 these two legislative 
bodies formed a Joint Constitutional Commission which recommended
a number of modest changes to the Basic Law, including some changes 
to Articles 72, 74, and 75 which deal with the distribution of legislative
powers between the federation and the Länder.26 The changes recom-
mended by the Joint Constitutional Commission were generally 
accepted by the Bundestag and Bundesrat, but some revisions were
made.27 The final result of these efforts was a 42nd amendment law 
that changed eleven Articles of the Basic Law and added three new 
ones.28
The revised Article 72 contains three paragraphs. The first of these
states simply that the Länder have the power to act in the area of concur-
rent legislation so long and so far as the federation has not “used” its
power to pass legislation in the area of concern (“has used” was inserted
in 1994 to mean having gone through the entire legislative process29).
According to the Basic Law, any action the federal government takes in
the area of concurrent legislation preempts any Land legislation covering
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the same subject, not just provisions that may be in conflict, as in the
United States.30 That is, there is no “dual authority.”31 Therefore, some
legal scholars suggest that “precedence” legislation might be a better term
than “concurrent” legislation.32
The changes made to Article 72 in the 1994 amendments are rather
subtle and esoteric but nevertheless important. In para. 2 the federation
can now claim a concurrent power for itself only if it is “essential” or
“required” (erforderlich) and not just because it perceives a “need”
(Bedürfnis) to act. In the past the federation could claim a “need” to act
because a matter could not be regulated effectively by individual Länder,
because regulation by a Land could affect the interests of other Länder or
the whole (in both cases rare occurrences33), or because the legal and eco-
nomic unity of the country required the “uniformity [Einheitlichkeit] of
living conditions.” These were, of course, such general provisions that
they allowed the federation very broad authority. As of October 1994,
however, the federal government can claim a federal preemption to be
“essential” only in the general interest of preserving “equivalent [gleichw-
ertige] living conditions” or the legal and economic unity of the country.
The standard of equivalency is less strict than uniformity, about which
there was considerable misunderstanding in Germany among politicians
and even some jurists.
Some legal experts insisted that “uniform living conditions” never did
mean equality in any literal or leveling sense; rather, it meant providing
equal opportunities in education; necessary infrastructure for a modern
economy, including transportation; certain environmental standards,
including green spaces and recreation facilities, etc.,34 in addition to an
adequate standard of living to be achieved, if necessary, through the wel-
fare state. Whatever the original intent might have been, some scholars
have concluded that the uniformity clause was an “empty formula” that
could be filled to suit a variety of purposes.35
There can be little doubt that demands to eliminate differences in liv-
ing standards – emerging not only from constitutional interpretation but
also from the public – have had a strong “unitary” or centralizing effect
on the federal system in Germany.36 This is why there was pressure even
before German unification, but especially afterwards, to make Article 72
less sweeping in its language. Thus, it was thought that it is more feasible
for the Länder to provide for “equivalency” in their territory than to
achieve “uniformity” of living conditions, because equivalency can vary
from Land to Land. Furthermore, under a new provision added to Arti-
cle 93 by the changes introduced in 1994, the Land governments, Land
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parliaments, and the Bundesrat can take any disagreements over what is
“essential” to the Federal Constitutional Court, which they could not do
before the 1994 changes.37
Finally, a third paragraph for Article 72 was introduced in 1994 in
order to return power to the Länder38 if and when a “requirement” for
federal action no longer exists.39 Whether this and the changes noted
above will in fact have much of an impact on the legislative power rela-
tions between the federation and the Länder remains to be seen. The fed-
eration already has virtually exhausted its possibilities in the area of
concurrent powers, and it seems doubtful that it will agree to transfer
many – or any – of the subjects it now regulates back to the Länder.
Article 74 provides a list of the concurrent powers that in theory at least
could have remained with or been assumed by the Länder. The list now
contains twenty-eight subject areas, including numerous areas that have
always been and remain responsibilities of the American states, such as
civil and criminal law. The American concept of concurrent legislation
also permits the states to pass or retain legislation in areas in which the
federal government has acted except in cases where specific provisions are
in conflict. In general the German federation has assumed most of the
powers in the general areas of economics, employment conditions, wel-
fare, and justice affairs. As we saw above, the Länder have retained
responsibility for other areas, especially “culture,” which includes schools
as well as the arts and electronic media; local government; police; and a
few other matters.
While these are important functions, they pale in significance to the
concurrent legislative powers of the federation. These are even more
extensive than Articles 72 and 74 suggest. For example, in order to elim-
inate financially damaging competition among themselves, the Länder
agreed via the Bundesrat to grant to the federation in Article 74a the con-
current power of regulating the salary and benefits of the civil service
(Beamte), including the Land civil service, insofar as this power is not
already included in the federation’ s exclusive powers. This was a rather
significant voluntary abdication of the right of the Länder to regulate
their own personnel.40 The tax provisions of Article 105, para. 2, are
another example of concurrent power that will be discussed in a later
chapter.41 Finally, in case of war Article 115c gives the federal government
certain concurrent powers normally in the hands of the Länder.42 In each
of the above cases, however, the federal government needs the approval of
a majority of the Bundesrat.
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Framework legislation
In addition to exclusive and concurrent powers, framework legislation as
provided by Article 75 of the Basic Law is an important source of power
for the federation. Framework laws are different from the laws passed
under the federation’ s exclusive and concurrent powers, however, in that
they are directed at the Land legislators for further legislative action by
them. It is assumed that the legislative details to be completed by the Land
legislators are of some significance and are arrived at freely; indeed, in
order in part to prevent the repetition of some past federal intrusiveness,
a new paragraph inserted in Article 75 in 1994 states specifically that
framework legislation may go into detail only in exceptional cases.43 Some
restrictions have been placed on the federation by the changes of 1994 in
that the provisions of Article 72 apply, according to which the federation
must now demonstrate not merely a “need” but rather a “requirement”
for framework legislation. An additional item, the protection of cultural
artifacts against foreign acquisition, was added in 1994 to the list of six
general subjects that can be regulated by framework legislation, while film
(movies) was removed and given to the Länder. One subject, the regula-
tion of public service personnel, must be seen in conjunction with Article
74a, discussed above, which regulates the salary and benefits of civil ser-
vants (Beamte) as a special category of public service personnel. The gen-
eral regulation of universities in framework legislation must also be
viewed together with Article 91a and 91b, which established a number of
“joint tasks” (Gemeinschaftsaufgaben) in the constitutional reforms
(Finance Reform) of 1969.
Administration in the German federal system
Article 83 and “dual federalism”
Just as one section of the Basic Law deals with the distribution of legisla-
tive powers between the federation and the Länder, another (Section
VIII) deals with the implementation of federal legislation. The first arti-
cle (Article 83) of this section states simply that “[t]he Länder implement
federal legislation on their own responsibility so long as this Basic Law
does not provide otherwise.” The language of this Article shows its rela-
tionship to Articles 30 and 70 above in granting sweeping authority to the
Länder unless the Basic Law provides otherwise. 
Article 83 is a reflection of the concept of “dual federalism” in Ger-
many. As we have seen above, the federation in fact carries most of the
responsibility for legislation, while the Länder are primarily responsible
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for administration. For this reason, German federalism is sometimes
referred to as “administrative federalism.” The division of responsibilities
in German federalism is not one of strict separation, however; rather, it is
a system of cooperation, interconnections, and interrelationships. The
federation carries the greatest responsibility for legislation, but the Län-
der participate in legislation via the Bundesrat. The Länder are generally
responsible for administration, but in carrying out federal laws they may
be subject to many federal instructions and restrictions which they can
usually influence via the Bundesrat.44 The exception to the general rule is
found at the local level, where certain core functions are protected by
Article 28, para. 2, from any direction from above.45
This is very different from the American concept of “dual federalism”
or “dual sovereignty,” according to which a duality exists between the fed-
eral government and its executive and legislative powers on the one hand
and the states and their executive and legislative powers on the other
hand.46 While these two concepts of dual federalism are not as distin-
guishable in practice as one might assume, they do represent a clear dif-
ference in the German and American federal traditions. They also
contribute to some confusion in the sense that some German scholars
speak of a “functional” division between federal legislative and Land
administrative responsibilities, while American scholars (as well as some
Germans47) usually focus on the distinction between public “tasks” or
“functions” performed by federal authorities and those performed by
state or local governments when referring to “functional” divisions.
We saw above that once the federation has acted in the area of concur-
rent legislative power, any legislation already passed by the Länder on the
same subject is preempted by the federal law, i.e., there is no dual legisla-
tive responsibility in Germany except in the limited cases that fall under
framework laws and “joint tasks.” In principle either one level or the
other has legislative responsibility, not both. The same principle applies
in administration; however, here there are numerous exceptions to the
rule.48 Indeed, the many exceptions, whether by design or by practice,
have contributed to the concept of “cooperative federalism” which is now
commonly used in describing German federalism. It is a concept bor-
rowed from the United States, where “cooperative federalism” was used
to describe the reality of shared financing and administrative responsibil-
ities that emerged during and after the New Deal in contrast to the the-
ory of “dual federalism” that prevailed before the 1930s.49 As noted above,
the Finance Reform of 1969 in Germany led to a number of constitutional
changes that included the introduction of two new articles providing for
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the carrying out of “joint tasks” (Gemeinschaftsaufgaben) by the federa-
tion and the Länder: Article 91a and 91b.
The administration of Federal and Land laws
The German “state”at the federal level is a lawmaking state, while at the
Land level it is an administrative state. The federation is more dominant
in legislation than the Länder are in administration, but administration
is still the key element of Land autonomy.50 Article 83 of the Basic Law,
translated above, makes this clear. However, as in the cases of Article 30
and Article 70, which reserve legislative powers to the Länder unless the
Basic Law provides otherwise, there are many opportunities for federal
involvement in administration based on provisions of the Basic Law.
Indeed, Section VIII provides three methods of administering federal law.
Bundeseigene Verwaltung An obvious, but not common, method is
administration solely by federal officials (Bundeseigene Verwaltung) as
either required or authorized by the Basic Law.51 This takes place directly
in state agencies, e.g., finance administration, or indirectly, e.g., social
insurance agencies, where unity throughout the Federal Republic is
required. The Basic Law lists the areas that fall under exclusive federal
administration in Articles 87, 87a and 87b, 87d–87f, and 88–89. Article
87, para. 1, provides for federal administration of the foreign service, fed-
eral finances, federal waterways and shipping; it also authorizes the 
federal government to establish administrative agencies for border patrol,
certain federal police services, and constitutional protection. Paragraph 2
calls for direct federal administration in cases of social insurance pro-
grams when the territory covered goes beyond a single Land. The other
articles mentioned above deal with federal administration of military
forces; air transportation; railroads, post office and telecommunications
(railroads, many post office functions and telecommunications were pri-
vatized in whole or in part in the mid-1990s); the Bundesbank (federal
reserve bank); and federal waterways.52
Bundesauftragsverwaltung A second method is administration by the
Länder of federal laws delegated to them (Bundesauftragsverwaltung),
that is, administration by the Länder according to federal instructions
(Article 85).53 It represents a “middle way” between administration by
federal agencies and by Land agencies on their own responsibility; how-
ever, it is still Land administration.54 The federal government pays the
functional costs, but the Länder pay the administrative costs. Federally
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delegated administration occurs only if provided by the Basic Law or
because of a constitutionally authorized federal law.55 Land administra-
tion of the federal autobahns and other federal long-distance highways
and the administration of major taxes are provided directly by Article 90
and Article 108, para. 1, respectively. Other subjects, such as nuclear
energy and some aspects of air transportation, can be given to the Länder
with the approval of the Bundesrat (Article 87c and 87d), and, upon
application, federal waterways can be administered by a Land.
The delegation of federal laws to the Länder for administration
increased with the passage of the Finance Reform package of 1969. Arti-
cle 104a, for example, provides that when the federation pays 50 percent
or more of the costs of a program, that program is to be delegated to the
Länder for administration. An example is educational assistance legisla-
tion (Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz), under which about one-third
of higher-level pupils (Schüler) and more than 40 percent of university
students receive varying degrees of financial aid for expenses other than
tuition, which is free (by the end of the 1990s, there was growing pressure
to introduce modest tuition charges). The complex relationships between
federal and Land agencies involved in the administration of this legisla-
tion is eased to some extent by vertical contacts between the administra-
tors involved and the effort by the federal authorities to coordinate the
federal directives with the Land authorities. But such examples of dele-
gated administration remain somewhat problematic, because the federal
ministries end up heavily involved in administration.56
Under Article 85 the federation provides for uniform rules of training
for higher and middle-level civil servants who will be involved in imple-
menting federal laws; blue-collar public employees (Arbeiter) are not
included in this training. In rare cases the federal government also approves
the heads of specialized “middle agencies” that execute delegated federal
law, e.g., the head of the high finance offices. These provisions and the right
of the federal ministries to issue instructions to the Land ministries under
which the federal laws are administered demonstrate the extent of federal
influence in Land administrative agencies. This influence was curtailed
somewhat in 1999, when the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the
federal cabinet, with the approval of the Bundesrat, could issue administra-
tive regulations for the implementation of federal laws.57 Before this deci-
sion federal ministers alone sometimes issued instructions to the Land
authorities. On the other hand, federal guidelines and recommendations
usually emerge as a result of committee and commission meetings com-
posed of federal and Land officials.58 Thus federal instructions do not mean
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a federal takeover of Land administration; rather, the Land agencies are
required to follow the “federal will.”59 It should also be noted that federal
agencies must not ignore federal comity, which in this case means provid-
ing the Land agencies with opportunities to respond and react to the fed-
eral instructions before taking the extreme actions authorized in Article 85
of demanding documents and sending officials to the Land agencies to
ensure compliance with the “federal will.”60
Landeseigene Verwaltung A third type of administration, which is the
most common of all, is that carried out by the Länder themselves. That is,
the Länder and local governments, to which the Länder send as many as 75
percent of “state” (federal and Land) laws for execution,61 have the right to
administer higher-level laws on their own responsibility. According to Arti-
cle 84, if the Länder execute federal legislation, they establish the agencies
and regulatory procedures under their organizational powers as matters of
their own responsibility (als landeseigene Angelegenheit), which is generally
referred to as autonomous Land administration (Landeseigenverwal-
tung);62 however, a federal law, to which the Bundesrat has consented, may
provide for federal involvement in the establishment of agencies or in
administrative procedures. Where the Länder administer federal laws on
their own responsibility, they pay both the administrative and functional
costs; however, in cases where the Länder pay more than 25 percent of the
functional costs, consent of the Bundesrat is required. (According to Arti-
cle 104a, as noted above, if the federation pays for more than 50 percent of
the costs, the law must be delegated to the Länder for administration by
federal instructions.) Since there is nothing in Article 84 to suggest that the
federation has to demonstrate a “need” to intervene but rather can do so to
ensure an effective administration, there is a broad opportunity for federal
involvement.63 Nevertheless, federal involvement occurs only with the
approval of the Bundesrat, which means that in the final analysis the 
Länder – actually, the Land governments, i.e., cabinets – control the extent
to which the federation becomes involved in Land administration. 
Examples of this category of administration include federal traffic laws,
federal emission control laws, waste disposal laws, and federal construc-
tion law. Federal laws administered by the Länder on their own responsi-
bility can be based on exclusive or concurrent federal powers, and, to some
extent, framework powers. Increasingly, the Länder are also implementing
EU legislation on their own administrative responsibility.64
In implementing federal laws, the Länder are supervised by federal
authorities to ensure compliance and uniformity; however, whereas
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supervision in the case of delegated laws is both legal and functional, in
the case of implementing federal laws on their own responsibility the
Länder are under legal supervision only. If there is a conflict and no sat-
isfactory resolution occurs, either side may take the case to the Bundesrat
for a decision. If dissatisfied with this decision, either side can appeal to
the Federal Constitutional Court.65
Since there are so many federal laws administered by the Länder, the
consent of the Bundesrat is now required for more than half of the legis-
lation passed by the Bundestag. It was originally thought by the founding
fathers in 1949 that about 10 percent of federal laws would be consent
laws.66 In part the increased role of the Bundesrat is due also to the inter-
pretation by the Federal Constitutional Court that any federal law that
contains a single provision concerning how the statute is to be adminis-
tered by the Länder requires, as a whole, the consent of the Bundesrat.67
This makes it more difficult, but not impossible, for the government and
Bundestag to separate one legislative bill’s section from the others in order
to avoid opposition and even a veto by the Bundesrat.
Administration of Land laws The Basic Law is silent concerning the fourth
type of Land administration, i.e., the right of the Länder to administer their
own laws and organize their own administrative structures. Land authority
for these functions is presumed by Article 30. Thus Land constitutions 
and legislatures are decisive in the area of “own-law” administration.68
Federal–Land cooperation
As a general rule, German law does not permit a combination or mixture
of federal and Land administration in a hierarchical relationship69 (Mis-
chverwaltung) any more than it accepts dual legislative powers over the
same subject. As indicated above, however, there are certain exceptions
that are commonly referred to as “administrative cooperation” or, since
the late 1970s, as “political–administrative interconnections”(Politikver-
flechtung70), a term similar to, but not quite the same as, “intergovern-
mental relations” in the United States.71 Cooperation between the
federation and the Länder is sometimes referred to also as vertikale Ver-
waltungsverflechtung (vertical administrative interconnection).72 This
occurs formally, of course, when the Länder participate in federal policy
making via the Bundesrat, and, one might add, when they participate in
EU policy making via the Bundesrat and their missions in Brussels. 
A well-known form of cooperation which is even cited as an example
of Mischverwaltung takes place under the category of “joint tasks”
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(Gemeinschaftsaufgaben) that are specified in the Basic Law in Article 91a
and 91b. Article 91a, discussed briefly above, gives the federation the
right of codecision (mitwirken) with the Länder in university building
construction, in improving regional economic structures, and in improv-
ing conditions in agricultural and coastal areas. This requires joint plan-
ning between the federal and Land governments, described in the chapter
on Land administration.
The “joint tasks” have been the subject of considerable discussion
among German jurists, administrators, and politicians.73 Some point out
that Article 91a and 91b recognized or even made constitutional a num-
ber of contractual agreements between the federation and the Länder that
already existed before the Finance Reform of 1969.74 The lack of a clear
constitutional authorization for these cooperative agreements led to the
creation of the Troeger Commission which issued a report in 196675 that
served as the basis for the Finance Reform of 1969 and the addition of
Articles 91a, 91b, and 104a to the Basic Law.76 (Article 104a provides the
federation with the authority to make financial grants to the Länder and
is sometimes discussed along with Article 91a and 91b as an “ungenuine”
joint task.77) In spite of this background, these new provisions soon
became very controversial and a subject of investigation in a federal com-
mission on constitutional reform (Enquete-Kommission Verfassungsre-
form) in 1976; however, no serious efforts were made to revise the joint
task provisions.
The joint tasks are defended not only on historical grounds but also on
the grounds that otherwise the federal government would have no con-
stitutional authorization to act in important areas. However, federal
authorities cannot require action. The federal government participates
only in framework planning; every Land government has the right to
reject its application in its territory. The federal government does not
become involved in detailed planning, and each Land implements the
framework as it wishes. The projects are financed jointly.78
The basic criticism of these provisions, however, is that they have
added significantly to the legislative and administrative powers of the fed-
eration at the cost of the Länder. These may have been compensated to
some extent through their participation via the Bundesrat, but joint
administration and joint financing in particular have been responsible
for a general trend toward a reduction in the importance of the Länder.79
The federation has used extensively the instruments of cooperation
granted it in Article 91a and 91b, with the result that the Länder see a 
continued narrowing of their freedom of decision making and of their
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financial room for maneuver.80 The agreements among bureaucrats in
participating ministries at the federal and Land levels serve to narrow the
room left for decision making by those drawing up budgets at both levels
and for the Land parliaments that can do little to change the executive
decisions already reached.81
A form of cooperation takes place also when the federal government
provides the Länder with grants-in-aid under Article 104a, para. 4. As in
the United States, complaints are sometimes heard that these grants
interfere with Land or local autonomy, but empirical evidence does not
support these claims. In any case, as with the joint tasks, the federation is
responding more to the needs expressed by the Länder than to any goals
of its own.82
The weakest form of federal participation in Land administration is
federal supervision and control. If the Land is administering a federal law
delegated to it, the responsible federal minister has the power of subject
matter and legal supervision; he or she exercises legal supervision only 
if the law is being administered as a matter of Land responsibility. In 
practice supervision usually consists of an exchange of information and
consultation.83
Cooperation among the Länder
There are numerous examples of cooperation between the Länder and the
federal government and among the Länder themselves. Indeed, the Land
parliament of North-Rhine Westphalia conducted a study in 1989
according to which there were 330 federal–Land commissions and
120–140 commissions involving North-Rhine Westphalia and other Län-
der without federal participation.84 These are examples of vertical and
horizontal coordination, respectively. The purpose of such coordination
efforts is to resolve practical problems, usually requiring cross-boundary
cooperation, that can be either temporary or permanent in nature.85
Horizontal cooperation between and among the Länder is said to take
place at a kind of extra-constitutional “third level” between the federa-
tion and the Länder. The conferences of Land prime ministers take place
about every three months to consider common demands on the federa-
tion, and subject ministers in the Länder meet regularly to consider a
wide variety of themes, including draft legislation.86
The most common and best-known legal instrument of cooperation
among the Länder is the interstate compact. It is based neither on federal
law nor on Land law but rather on “cooperative customary law” (Kooper-
ationsgewohnheitsrecht) that exists between the federation and the Länder
Constitutional framework of German federalism 67
chap  2  27/5/03  11:53 am  Page 67
at the “third level.”87 There are two forms of compact: the “administrative
agreement” and the “state contract.” The difference is that the first form is
restricted to the executive authorities of the Länder, e.g., the administra-
tive agreement in 1952 among the Länder and, in this case, the federation,
regarding the German Postgraduate School of Administrative Sciences
(Deutsche Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften) in Speyer,88 whereas
the second form, the “state contract,” binds the Länder as such and must
be approved by the Land parliaments, e.g., compacts establishing certain
public radio and television networks and their listening and viewing 
fees or the compact regulating the distribution of students among the var-
ious universities.89 Compacts may involve all or only some of the Länder;
for example, common planning institutions have been established for
Hamburg and Lower Saxony and for Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein,
although the success of these institutions has been limited.90
In addition to formal, legally binding compacts, there is the “political
understanding” (politische Absprache), which is usually the result of a 
recommendation of a conference of Land ministers, whose goal, for
example, might be to reach agreement on model legislation. These
“understandings” are not legally binding, but they are considered to be
politically and morally binding.91
The interstate compacts described here do not include certain well-
known activities such as the conference of Land prime ministers (Minis-
terpräsidentenkonferenz), the conferences of Land subject ministers, 
or the permanent conference of ministers of education and culture (Kul-
tusminsterkonferenz (KMK)) or their various committees. These are 
executive cooperative bodies that do not possess any autonomous admin-
istrative authority.92 They are, however, important elements in the federal
political process. The conference of Land prime ministers, for example,
serves a variety of functions, including guarantor of continuity for Land
government actions in spite of changing majorities in the Bundesrat; con-
trol instrument vis-à-vis the federation and watchdog over EU develop-
ments; clearing house for various compacts among the Länder; and
umpire for Land ministerial meetings. The rule of unanimity and rotat-
ing leadership of the prime ministers’ conferences discourage a strong
partisan approach.93
A “unitary federal state” through interlocking, intergovernmental 
relations?
Taking examples from both federal–Land cooperation, e.g., joint tasks,
and cooperation among the Länder, critics point, among other things, to
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the inequality in the arrangements between the federation on the one
hand and the Länder on the other; to the invasion of Land autonomy that
results; and to the strengthening of Land executive powers at the cost of
the Land parliaments.94 This is symbolized in part by the “traveling fed-
eralism” of high-level federal and Land ministerial bureaucrats who
establish a “coordination bureaucracy” sometimes referred to as “vertical
brotherhoods of experts” (Fachbrüderschaften).95 Some scholars argue
that while cooperation is necessary and desirable, given the demands of a
modern society and welfare state, practice in the Federal Republic may
have exceeded the limits required for maintaining the autonomy of the
Länder within the federal system.96
The numerous cases of federal–Land administrative cooperation and the
“self-coordination” among the Länder, together with federal dominance in
the legislative arena and the resulting federal supervision of the Länder in
the administration of numerous federal laws, have led many scholars to
speak of a “unitary federalism” in Germany.97 “Unitary federalism” does
not quite conform to Daniel Elazar’s description of a “decentralized” uni-
tary state, because the former is the result more of voluntary cooperation
and coordination by the federal units than of central direction.98
With the 1969 Finance Reform, “unitary” federalism was comple-
mented and to some extent replaced by the term “cooperative federalism.”
This term was borrowed from the United States and was introduced to
describe the growing practices of intergovernmental relations. As noted in
several places above, Article 91a and 91b are examples frequently cited, as
are the joint taxes and selected legislation. A later, somewhat narrower,
concept that reflects the centralizing trends described above and the com-
plex interrelationships among various levels and institutions of govern-
ment is “political–administrative interconnections” (Politikverflechtung),99
a term mentioned above that is similar to but not exactly the same as the
American term “intergovernmental relations.”100 Politikverflechtung has
become identified with numerous criticisms of German federalism, e.g.,
that the responsibility for policy making for and financing of various pro-
jects involving the federal and Land levels is unclear; that the budgets of the
Länder both in respect to the initial project funding and follow-up costs are
too restricted; that the sectoral planning between the federal and Land lev-
els takes place at the cost of coordinated general planning at federal and
Land levels, respectively; that the freedom of decision making in the par-
liaments at the federal and Land levels is narrowed; that the federal balance
is endangered, the Länder weakened, the federation given too much plan-
ning power, and a systematic fiscal equalization in the federal system made
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more difficult; and that Politikverflechtung is characterized by a bureaucra-
tized and expensive administrative procedure.101
Gerhard Lehmbruch, while acknowledging the contributions of Fritz
Scharpf and his colleagues, suggests that “policy networks” would be a
more descriptive term than Politikverflechtung. He sees this term as focus-
ing too narrowly on interbureaucratic relations linking autonomous
administrations and neglecting their links with societal actors, especially
the political parties.102
Fritz Scharpf is known not only as the originator of the term Poli-
tikverflechtung; he is also widely cited for his thesis that the German fed-
eral system – and, for that matter, the EU – is characterized in much of its
decision making by a “joint-decision trap.” This “trap” is found especially
in the decision-making process regarding the “joint tasks” but also in
other areas, such as the Bundesrat, and it refers to the necessity of reach-
ing compromises on all important issues since none of the parties in the
decision-making group can dominate the others and unanimity is
required for action.103 This thesis has become a very influential and widely
cited explanation for the – for many Germans frustrating – “gridlock” or
difficulty in achieving reforms in a variety of important political areas. Of
the many current examples, one could name fiscal equalization (Chapter
5) and the related issue of territorial boundary reform of the Länder,
health insurance, and tax policy (especially under Chancellor Kohl). 
Organization of the judiciary104
The division of judicial powers, court organization, and certain proce-
dures are found in Section IX of the Basic Law. As we saw above, Article
30 establishes the presumption that “state functions” are the responsibil-
ity of the Länder, and Article 92, though less clearly than Articles 70 and
83, presumes that judicial authority rests with the Länder.
Nevertheless, the Federal Constitutional Court is mentioned even in
the first article of Section IX, i.e., Article 92. It is a constitutional organ to
which Land courts must turn for interpretations of the Basic Law, there-
fore making unnecessary a case like Marbury v. Madison105 which estab-
lished the right of judicial review in the United States. A ruling of a Land
constitutional court can also be challenged via an individual “constitu-
tional complaint” brought before the Federal Constitutional Court. Of
course decisions of this court are binding on the Land constitutional
courts. Thus there is some hierarchy in the relationship between the 
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federal and Land constitutional courts, but not in a formal, structural
sense. As in the United States, the constitutional courts of the two levels
are basically separate in their fields of operation. An interesting difference
to the United States, however, is that a Land, for example, Schleswig-
Holstein, may decide to turn over to the Federal Constitutional Court all
constitutional questions rather than to establish a separate Land consti-
tutional court of its own.
The federal court system
The Basic Law (Article 95) requires the establishment of five federal
courts. These are the Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe (not to be con-
fused with the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe), which is the
highest appeals court for civil and criminal law; the Federal Administra-
tive Court in Berlin (moved to Leipzig after 2002); the Federal Finance
Court in Munich; the Federal Labor Court in Kassel (which will be trans-
ferred to Erfurt); and the Federal Social Court in Kassel. Unlike the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court, these are not constitutional organs. Their
authority is not set by the Basic Law but by federal statutory law. These
courts are the highest authorities within their subject area. The bound-
aries between them and their respective Land courts are set by federal law,
and uniformity in their decisions is maintained by a “common senate” in
Karlsruhe. Judges for these courts are selected by the federal ministers
responsible for the subject area together with their counterpart ministers
in the Länder and an equal number of Bundestag members.
Other federal courts may also be established by federal law. These are
courts of first instance that answer to the Federal Court of Justice in Karl-
sruhe. Since the Basic Law went into effect in 1949, federal law has estab-
lished a Federal Patents Court, disciplinary courts for public servants,
military courts, and a disciplinary court for judges. With the consent of
the Bundesrat, Land courts can rule on federal law in certain criminal
cases involving agitation against other peoples or for aggressive war.
Land courts
All of the Länder except Schleswig-Holstein have established Land con-
stitutional courts. These are autonomous courts whose organization,
authority, and procedure are set by Land constitutions and laws. In con-
trast to the other courts, the Länder determine the salaries and compen-
sation of their own constitutional court judges.
In accordance with Article 92, the bulk of judicial activity in Germany
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is at the Land level. The courts are organized at the lower and middle
instances, i.e., at local and regional levels, and they follow the specializa-
tion of the federal courts as outlined above. Thus in normal civil and
criminal cases, the levels are local (Amtsgericht), regional (Landgericht),
and Land (Oberlandesgericht); for cases involving administrative law,
there are the administrative courts and higher administrative courts; for
labor cases, the labor courts and the Land labor court; and for social wel-
fare cases, the social courts and the Land social court; and one finance
court for each Land. The federation has used its powers of concurrent leg-
islation to regulate the organization, authority, and procedures of these
courts. The Land Minister of Justice and a judicial selection committee
decide on the selection of judges, but the pay and benefits of the judges
are set by federal law.
While the Länder have an important role in performing judicial 
functions, the German legal system is characterized by the dominance of
federal law. Court organization, boundaries, and procedures are gener-
ally regulated by federal law. Except for the Land constitutional courts,
pay and benefits are set by federal law. The interpretation of constitu-
tional law and of ordinary federal law are basically left to the Federal 
Constitutional Court and the federal superior courts. All of this leads, 
of course, to the uniformity of judicial decision making in the German
federal system. 
Conclusion
The German federal system is based far more on relatively detailed writ-
ten constitutional principles than is the federal system in the United
States, which has evolved in reaction to political and economic develop-
ments in a long, often difficult and discontinuous historical process in
which the Supreme Court has played the key role. While Federal Consti-
tutional Court decisions have been more important in the German polit-
ical system since 1949106 than court rulings in other European countries
and have clarified many provisions of the Basic Law, the brevity and
vagueness of the American Constitution have offered the Supreme Court
even greater opportunities to shape and control the federal system in the
United States.
Although the detailed written constitutional principles of the German
Basic Law stand in contrast to the very general and frequently ambiguous
provisions of the American Constitution, the Basic Law is still misleading
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in its provisions regarding the federal system. Article 30 suggests that the
Länder are the repository of most governmental powers unless exceptions
have been made by other provisions of the Basic Law. Article 70 gives the
impression that the Länder have significant legislative powers, and Arti-
cle 83 appears to give the Länder the right to implement federal laws on
their own authority. Constitutional reality, as German legal scholars like
to say, presents a quite different picture. The conditional clause, “unless
the Basic Law provides otherwise,” has in fact provided for federal domi-
nance in legislation and a complex interrelationship in administration.
In terms of legislative powers, the Basic Law granted the federation a
number of key exclusive powers, and from the rather long list of concur-
rent powers the federation has taken virtually every item for itself. Even
under framework legislation, the federation has expanded its range of
activities in areas normally thought to lie within the competence of the
Länder. It is true that most federal laws now require the approval of the
Bundesrat, but this guarantees the participation only of the Land govern-
ments (cabinets), not of the Land parliaments. It also means that Länder
in the minority in Bundesrat decisions find themselves relinquishing
some degree of autonomy without their consent. In spite of some minor
improvements in the position of the Länder as a result of recent constitu-
tional changes, relatively little has been left to them over the years for
autonomous decision making.
While the Länder are dominant in the administrative arena, as Article
83 suggests they are, the federal government can and does become
involved in administration in a number of ways. It administers on its own
the laws passed under its exclusive powers, and it delegates many other
laws to the Länder for administration with federal instructions. The
remaining federal laws are administered by the Länder on their own
responsibility, but the federal government retains some right of legal
supervision. The federal government also participates with the Länder in
planning and financing numerous “joint tasks.” 
The Länder are an important part of the judicial system, and most
courts are Land courts.
But in the final analysis the federation is the dominant partner in judi-
cial matters, especially since all courts of final appeal are federal courts
and federal law regulates the organization and activities of the Land
courts. As a result, there is little problem in establishing a country-wide
uniformity in judicial decision making. 
The result of the many centralizing tendencies in constitutional reality
has led to a federal system that has been commonly described as a 
Constitutional framework of German federalism 73
chap  2  27/5/03  11:53 am  Page 73
“unitary federation,” while the complex administrative and financial
interrelationships between federal and Land authorities and among 
the latter have promoted a system of “cooperative federalism.” Some
scholars, in turn, see cooperation as having led to Politikverflechtung or a
kind of joint decision making that ends up hindering transparency and
accountability. It is apparent, then, that the German federal system, like
the American federal system, is a complicated array of practices and 
procedures and a source of continuing debate and controversy. 
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Administration after 1945
To some extent the Allies, especially the British,1 tried after the war to
break older administrative traditions in Germany, but the Americans and
French looked for guidance at the pre-Nazi administrative structures in
their occupation zones. Nineteenth-century organizational structures
were largely reinstated under the formula, “a new beginning, but not a
fundamentally new organization.”2 But there was a focus on localizing
administration, in part as a consequence of the Potsdam Agreement that
called for “decentralization” in post-war Germany.3 The reconstruction
of administration from the bottom up helped strengthen and stabilize
local self-government.4 In the nineteenth century it was said that “the
state ends with the Landrat [county administrator].”5 After May 1945 one
could say that in the Western zones of Germany “the state only just begins
with the Landrat.”6
The Germans carried out wide-ranging territorial reorganizations and
administrative reforms in the late 1960s and 1970s,7 but these efforts were
not conceived as a deep-seated political change comparable to the admin-
istrative transformations in Prussia after 1870. Rather, they took the form
of adjustments of the administrative organization to long-ignored
changes in social and economic developments.8
Today the sixteen Länder are divided between thirteen territorial 
states (Flächenstaaten) and three city states (by size of population: Berlin,
Hamburg, and Bremen). There are four large territorial states (by size of
population: North-Rhine Westphalia, Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and
Lower Saxony), eight medium-sized states, and one small territorial state
(the Saarland). There is a remarkable unity in the basic structure of most
of the territorial Länder; the most obvious difference lies in the lack of a
3
Administrative structures
in Germany
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“middle instance” in six small-to-medium Länder. The city states are 
different in principle, because they make no distinction between “state”
and “local” administration (with some modifications regarding Bremen
and Bremerhaven).9
Some principles and concepts
Although Article 83 of the Basic Law speaks only of the Länder executing
federal laws on their own responsibility, there is a constitutional pre-
sumption that there are three administrative arenas in the Federal Repub-
lic: federal, Land, and local. While there are various interconnections
among these arenas, they remain more or less separate and autonomous.
Nevertheless, Articles 30 and 83 make reference only to the federation and
the Länder,10 and the basic constitutional structure, as in the United
States, consists of these two levels.11 Unlike the United States, however,
where the local governments are not even mentioned in the Constitution
and are creatures of the states, counties and municipalities are singled out
for protection by Article 28 of the Basic Law. This protection does not
extend to individual local governments but rather to the institution of the
county and the municipality. Their organizational structure and bound-
aries are matters for the Länder to determine. As constituent parts of the
Länder, the local governments are also responsible for administration
and, therefore, they execute federal as well as Land laws along with their
own ordinances.12
In the discussion of levels of administration below, several distinc-
tions should be kept in mind. One is between direct administration,
which is generally the “own” administration (Bundeseigene, Landeseigene
Verwaltung) by state agencies discussed above in Chapter 2 on the 
constitutional framework – for example, the federal crime office or air
controllers; and indirect administration, which includes the “delegated”
administration – for example, federal highway administration delegated
to the Länder or the federal health insurance program delegated to
regional sickness funds. At the Land level, there is direct Land adminis-
tration of the schools and police and indirect administration of a large
majority of “state” (federal and Land) laws mostly by the semi-
autonomous counties and cities but also by numerous non-governmen-
tal institutions. Another distinction is between general administration,
exemplified best by the mid-level government districts and German
rural counties and large county-free cities versus specialized administra-
tion by a wide variety of special authorities (Sonderbehörden). 
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Federal administration
Federal administration differs significantly from Land administration in
two ways: the federation has no general administrative agencies, only spe-
cialized agencies; and, with some exceptions discussed below, the federa-
tion has only high authorities with no substructures.13 As at the Land
level, a distinction is made between the supreme authorities (oberste
Behörden) and the high authorities (Bundesoberbehörden). A distinction
is also made between direct and indirect administration. 
Federal supreme authorities include the Chancellor and his office, the
federal ministers, the Federal Accounting Office, and the Bundesbank.14
The federal president, the presidium of the Bundestag and Bundesrat, and
the Federal Constitutional Court are sometimes given also as examples of
supreme federal authorities,15 but they are not parts of the state adminis-
trative organization.16
The high federal special authorities answer to the federal ministries,
i.e., to the supreme authorities from which they emerged as semi-
autonomous agencies. They generally have no substructures, but they can
set up branches. Examples of high federal authorities are the Press and
Information Office of the federal government, the Federal Statistical
Office, the Federal Crime Office, the Federal Cartel Office, the Patent
Office, the Office for Constitutional Protection, and the Federal Environ-
mental Office.17 Other examples of direct federal administration are tech-
nical and research institutions (Bundesanstalten) that answer to the
ministries, for instance, the air controllers under the Ministry of Trans-
portation,18 or the Federal Insurance Office under the Ministries of Labor
and Health that supervises the hundreds of public corporations that 
provide retirement, health, accident, and nursing care insurance in con-
formity with federal law.19
Subnational direct federal administrative structures exist only in the
foreign service; federal waterways administration, which falls under the
Ministry of Transportation and is organized at the middle as well as at
lower levels;20 military and border control administration; and finance
administration (see below). The federal railways and postal services had
multiple levels until they were privatized in 1993–94;21 however, the fed-
eral government still has certain supervisory and other responsibilities.22
The twenty-two high finance authorities (Oberfinanzdirektionen) are
mid-level agencies that are a peculiar example of joint federal–Land
administration, i.e., they serve simultaneously as agencies of the Länder.
The head of such an office is both a federal and Land civil servant who
directs both federal and Land sections. Lower- level agencies that answer
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to the high finance authorities include federal customs offices, federal
property offices, and federal forest offices. As one can see from figure 3.1,
the Länder also have their own finance offices that answer to the high
finance authority.23
While less common, indirect administration also exists at the federal
level. There is, for example, the Federal Employment Office in Nurem-
berg which has its own lower Land- and local- level structures. There is
also the Deutsche Welle, which provides radio and television broadcasts
for foreign listeners and viewers, while Deutschlandfunk, now Deutsch-
landradio, serves the domestic audience based on a contract with the Län-
der. The Bundesbank is also an example of indirect federal administration,
but it is completely autonomous, as are its branches in the Länder (Lan-
deszentralbanken).24 A variety of social insurance agencies are also
included in indirect federal administration.
Administration in the territorial Länder and the city-states
The Länder are responsible for their own administrative organization.
Some Länder provide for their organizational structure in a single law,
others have it contained in several laws. In spite of a number of differ-
ences, there are certain common principles of organization based on 
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Figure 3.1 The joint high finance authority
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general and special administrative agencies organized at three levels: the
Land government (cabinet) or ministry level; the government district
(Regierungsbezirk); and the rural county and city-county (or county-free
city). Exceptions to the common principles are the three city-states and
the Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein, Rhineland-Palatinate, Brandenburg,
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and Thuringia (which has a Land Adminis-
trative Office as a substitute), all small-to-medium sized Länder that do
not have the middle-level Regierungsbezirk.25
Administration in the federation and the Länder is separate in princi-
ple. Land administration is not under the federation but rather is an
autonomous arena next to the federation.26 “Mixed administration” is
supposedly not permitted by the Basic Law, for example, in that a Land
agency reports to a federal agency or that the federation must approve
Land measures or exercise some power of co-decision. In fact there are
numerous examples of some form of mixed administration,27 although
these depend in part on what is meant by the term.28 Examples of federal
involvement in Land administration are the federal legal supervision of
laws delegated to the Länder for administration and the joint tasks under
Articles 91a and 91b described later in this chapter and in Chapter 2 on
the constitutional framework of German federalism. An example of a
joint agency is finance administration mentioned briefly above. The fed-
eration and the Länder have their own finance administration, but the
twenty-two high finance authorities serve as joint agencies at the middle
level of Land administration. Joint agencies also exist among the Länder.
For example, the Film Assessment Office in Wiesbaden determines which
movies should receive public subsidies based on a contract among the
Land ministers of education and culture. Finally, there are coordinating
agencies among the Länder, for example, the Conference of Education
and Culture Ministers (Kultusministerkonferenz [KMK]); the Conference
of Ministers of Justice; and the University Rectors Conference.29
The three levels of Land administration
The high level
The first of the three levels is called the high or central level (Oberstufe)
which, as in the case of the federation above, consists of two parts: the
supreme Land authorities (oberste Landesbehörden) and the high Land
authorities (Landesoberbehörden). The supreme Land authorities are the
Land government (cabinet), the prime minister (Ministerpräsident), and
the cabinet ministers. Some would add the speaker of the Land parliament
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Figure 3.2 Structure of administration in the Federal Republic of Germany
Source: Adapted from Frido Wagener, “Äusserer Aufbau von Staat und Verwaltung,” in Öffentliche Verwaltung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
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and the Land accounting office.30 Unity is maintained by the guideline
authority (Richtlinienkompetenz) of the prime minister and the principle
of collegiality in the cabinet. 
As indicated above, the prime minister is more than first among equals
in the cabinet; he exercises the “guideline authority” or leadership of the
government. Thus, in spite of the strong traditions of responsibility of
ministers for their subject areas (Ressortprinzip) and collegiality, the prime
minister is the boss (Kanzlerprinzip); but this is less true in the city-states.
The prime minister represents the Land’s interests vis-à-vis the other Län-
der in the prime ministers’ conference and the federation in the Bundesrat,
where he or she can exercise considerable influence on federal legislation.
In this regard he is far more influential nationally than a typical American
governor. He or she is assisted in leadership responsibilities by a staff
(Staatskanzlei) responsible to the prime minister; in Baden-Württemberg,
the staff is called Staatsministerium, in the city-states, Senatskanzleien. The
prime minister’s political staff has grown over the years along with the
increasing role of the prime minister as dominant Land politician and
Landesvater or “Land prince,” a designation that reflects the prime minis-
ter’s additional role as ceremonial head of state.31 The staff ’s first and per-
manent task is to coordinate the work of the ministers, to support the
prime minister, to manage information, and to be innovative in initiating
and conceptualizing policy proposals. Coordinating Land policy in the
committees and plenary sessions of the Bundesrat is also a major activity.32
In addition, the chiefs of staff organize the meetings of Land prime minis-
ters, which take place about every three months (about every six months
with the Federal Chancellor). For a while, especially in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the prime minister’s staff was engaged in development plan-
ning activities, but these have since been turned over to the ministries.33
On the other hand, political planning remains an important staff activity.34
As a rule the prime minister’s staff is organized into offices that are
responsible for areas such as parties and organizations; local govern-
ments; information and analyses; and preparation of legislation, speech
writing, and setting the prime minister’s calendar. The organization of
the staffs in the city-states is considerably more modest, but press and
public information offices are found everywhere. Some staffs house the
office of the Land representative in Bonn (now Berlin), who usually also
is head of the Land mission in the capital. Some staffs also have a special
representative for European, i.e., EU, affairs.35
In most Länder there are from seven to nine ministries. These include
the six core ministries (Interior, Education and Culture (Kultus), Finance,
Administrative structures in Germany 87
chap  3  27/5/03  11:53 am  Page 87
Economics, Social, and Justice) and others that have been added and
eliminated over the years. For example, since the 1970s a Ministry of Sci-
ence that has been given responsibility for the universities has been carved
out of the older Ministry of Education and Culture36
The specific tasks of the ministries vary from Land to Land. Thus trans-
portation is located in the Ministry of Interior in Baden-Württemberg
but in the Ministry of Economics elsewhere. Sports may be in the min-
istries of education, interior, or social welfare. Variation is especially great
regarding land use and environment, since it can be problematic to place
environment and agriculture in one ministry. The most important min-
istry traditionally has been the Ministry of Interior, which has been a kind
of “umbrella agency” for tasks not assigned to more specialized agencies.
Therefore, it is the ministry with a certain unity of command function.37
Ministers are members of the government (cabinet) and heads of sub-
ject ministries. Thus they are responsible for central leadership and direc-
tion as well as for the personnel and functional supervision of lower-level
authorities and institutions in their area. They develop general regula-
tions and rules for administrative execution at lower levels and do Land-
wide planning. They draft legislation and regulations and deal with the
Land parliament in areas under their responsibility. On the other hand,
they make individual decisions only rarely.38
These activities lead to the dual function of the ministry serving as the
highest administrative authority and at the same time as a political organ
of the cabinet. This dual function is more apparent at the Land level than
at the federal level, because the Land ministries have a complete subject
area and an administrative structure to which they can give some unity
and direction. This does not lead to a dualism between politics and
administration so much as to the function of gearshift (Umschaltfunk-
tion) between politics and administration. Thus the Land ministries more
than their federal counterparts are “simultaneously lawmaking and
administrative ministries.” That is, the experience and information
gained from administrative practice can be taken into account in the pro-
gram development and policy making process in the ministry.39
In actual practice the above distinction between the political and
administrative functions is difficult to make, because of the growth of
Land ministries over the years resulting from demands on central direc-
tion and coordination activities. Growth in the ministries is also due to an
increasing interaction with the Land parliaments in the number of writ-
ten and oral questions raised and the close contact with parliamentary
committees and with governing party group committees. Ministries have
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also borne the burden of an increasing tendency toward a concern with
sets of single issues, such as the construction of an autobahn or federal
highway, airport, or nuclear power plant. This gets ministries very much
involved in planning activities which, in turn, tend to become politicized.
In practice, then, it is difficult to develop a clear picture of the multiple
functions of the ministries. They are program development agencies, but
they also exercise supervision and control over subordinate units.40
In contrast to the supreme Land authorities (oberste Landesbehörden),
the high Land authorities (Landesoberbehörden) are, like their federal
counterparts, specialized agencies responsible to a minister. They tend to
be technically demanding offices with extensive information-gathering
responsibilities and data analysis and research capabilities. Examples
include Land statistical offices, Land crime offices, and Land offices of con-
stitutional protection.41 They also include specialized agencies such as the
Land geological office and offices for environmental protection, earth
research, plant protection, agricultural development, and so forth. A 
completely unique high authority is the Land Administrative Office in
Lower Saxony which combines ten formerly autonomous high authorities
without any particular connecting principle42
The middle level (Mittelstufe or Mittelinstanz)
At this level one finds the director (Regierungspräsident) of the district
government (Bezirksregierung) of the government district (Regierungs-
bezirk). This is where the important Continental administrative principle
of unity of command (Einheit der Verwaltung) has been applied most
clearly in the German administrative tradition. It is where “state” (federal
and Land) policies are “bundled” for implementation and where the
director (similar to the classic example of the French prefect) serves as a
coordinator and mediator between the high and the low levels of admin-
istration. The director of the government district is a political appointee
and the general representative of the Land government in the district, and
he or she ensures that the goals of the government are realized in the dis-
trict. This, of course, is a political function; however, the director is also a
special counsel for the concerns of the region vis-à-vis the Land and fed-
eral governments. Thus he may see himself as an “honest broker” between
the “state” and local governments, as a representative of the Land in the
district and of his district to the Land.43
The director is responsible especially to the Land Minister of the Inte-
rior but also to the other ministers for the proper administration of their
policies and laws. But as an agent of “bundling” and coordination, the
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director is the most important counterweight against an otherwise dom-
inant tendency toward specialization. The director attempts to counter
specialization through a variety of means, including co-signature, discus-
sions with section chiefs, coordinating units and through his involvement
in various planning activities. However, some observers argue that verti-
cal relationships (in the United States, “picket-fence” federalism) are so
strong today in the organization of the government district along minis-
terial lines and between groups of subject experts at different levels that
horizontal coordination is more difficult than in the past.44
There is a strong tradition in German administration – and on the
Continent in general – that holds that specialized agencies such as those
at all levels of American administration, especially the ubiquitous special
districts at the local level, should be discouraged in principle if not always
in fact. Where it is not feasible to integrate various functions in one
administrative unit, there should be at least an attempt to have the func-
tion administered in one territory.45 This tradition today does not deny
that there are some advantages to specialized administration, for exam-
ple, administration by subject specialists, better performance by focusing
on specific tasks, subject neutrality and nonpartisan implementation, and
sometimes greater efficiency of administration. But disadvantages
include “selective attention,” narrowness of view and blindness to other
factors, isolation within the general administrative structures, lack of
coordination with other agencies, exaggeration of the importance of own
area, and perfectionist tendencies among the administrators. This is
reflected in the “vertical brotherhood of experts”46 that exists between
higher and lower levels in German administration. Special administrative
agencies tend to be removed from politics; yet they are subject to capture
by the clientèle they serve and special interest groups. They tend also to 
be less transparent, often less accountable, and removed from citizen
input.47
The director of the government district has the function of guarantee-
ing the legal and uniform conduct of administration throughout the ter-
ritory of the district through his functional and personnel supervision of
subordinate state authorities. In some Länder (Bavaria, Lower Saxony,
North-Rhine Westphalia) this includes the supervision of school teachers,
who are Land civil servants. In other Länder, e.g., Baden-Württemberg,
there is a separate and special hierarchical organization for schools. In a
more general and traditional sense, the director provides legal supervi-
sion of local governments in their areas of autonomous self-government.
This usually involves consultation and advice, but repressive measures are
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available to the director in extreme cases. Related to this function is the
review of grant applications by local governments. The director also pro-
vides legal supervision of other public corporations, such as schools. He
is responsible for the legal and functional supervision of delegated state
tasks carried out by local governments as well as by special authorities
under the authority of the district government.48
While the government districts are in principle institutions of general
administration, they also carry out specialized administration on behalf
of the ministries. This relieves the ministries of certain administrative
burdens that for certain reasons cannot be included in the area of respon-
sibility of local governments. The number and kind of specialized func-
tions performed by the district government, and/or supervised by it at the
local branch level, varies among the Länder, but they tend to require spe-
cial expertise or involve common standards. Examples include the
administration of technically complicated emission controls, traffic plan-
ning, protection of nature areas, management of public property, regional
planning, and planning and taking certain measures in the areas of water
management and agriculture.49
In spite of the theory of unity of command and the efforts to combine
as many tasks as possible in the district governments, counties and cities,
there are special authorities at the middle level that can be found at least
to some extent outside the confines of the district governments. Lower
Saxony differs from the other Länder in that it has a Land Administrative
Office at the high level that combines several functional agencies outside
of the middle-level district governments but is not a “bundling” office.50
Thuringia and Rhineland-Palatinate have also created Land administra-
tive agencies that perform some of the functions found in the district 
governments in other Länder. Nevertheless, even in Lower Saxony there
are special agencies that answer directly to the ministries and do not fall
under the supervision of either the district governments or the Land
Administrative Office. An unusual example of an activity that is not
included in the government districts is finance administration, where the
high finance office is both a federal and a Land middle-level agency
directed by a head who is both a federal and Land official. Salaries and
appointments of the public employees as well as functions are divided
between the federal and Land officials. Below the middle-level agency are
branch offices in the municipalities. The territory served by these local
branches does not always conform with county boundaries.51
Following the territorial and administrative reforms of the 1960s and
1970s and the re-establishment of five new Länder in the East, there were
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thirty-two government districts which differed significantly in size of
population and area. No other administrative institution has been called
into question so often since 1945; the government districts were almost
eliminated by Baden-Württemberg in the early 1970s. In the late 1990s
they were being considered for elimination by Rhineland-Palatinate, and
in 1999 a law was introduced in the Land parliament which did, indeed,
replace the three government districts as of 1 January 2000 with “struc-
ture and licensing directions” in Koblenz and Neustadt/Weinstraße and a
“supervisory and service center” in Trier.52 During the discussions regard-
ing the territorial reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s mentioned
above, some critics argued that the functions of the district governments
could be divided in part by the ministries and the counties, and, espe-
cially, that they could be replaced by integrated planning and administra-
tive and financing agencies at the regional level. At least in the larger
territorial Länder, in contrast to the Rhineland-Palatinate, the view pre-
vailed that they were necessary, and regional planning today is in effect
mostly planning by the government district but in some Länder by the
counties. The government districts appear now to be firmly established in
the larger Länder;53 however, as noted above, there is no middle level in six
of the smaller territorial Länder: the Saarland; Schleswig-Holstein;
Rhineland-Palatinate; Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; Brandenburg; and
Thuringia, which has a substitute in the form of a Land administrative
office.54 North-Rhine Westphalia, which is a large territorial state with the
largest population, is in the process of reforming and reorganizing its 
government districts. 
A nonpartisan administration in the government districts is assumed;
however, given the politicization of much of the higher levels of adminis-
tration in Land and local governments in recent decades, some concern
has been expressed about the tradition of political neutrality at the 
middle level of administration. Certain voices have called for a district
government that is “closer to the people,” a more “democratized” or “par-
liamentarized” or less bureaucratized administration. But there is no 
reason why the middle level should be “political” just because the higher
and lower levels are. Indeed, the difficult job of serving as a mediator and
coordinator between Land and local governments, which often have 
different partisan colors, cannot be performed well by a partisan district
government.55 Besides, any parliamentarization at the government 
district level would subtract proportionately from the authority of 
the Land parliaments and elected county and local government councils
(figure 3.3).56
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Figure 3.3 Organization plan for the government districts of Baden-Württemberg
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Lower Saxony was mentioned at the end of the previous section as hav-
ing a unique high authority in the form of a Land Administrative Office
in addition to government districts. Thüringia, in contrast, differs from
all other Länder in having established a single Land Administrative Office
at the middle level in place of government districts. The Rhineland-
Palatinate, as noted above, has just replaced its three government districts
with three other regional offices. 
The lower level: direct state administration
In all of the Länder there are varying numbers and kinds of offices that in
some cases are directly responsible to high Land special authorities but
mostly answer to the government districts (in the Länder with no gov-
ernment districts, some local state offices are directly responsible to the
supreme Land authorities, i.e., the ministries). Typical examples of the
former are weights and measures, autobahn, road construction, and
finance offices. The far more numerous examples of state offices that are
supervised by the government districts include the police, and land reg-
istry, agriculture, and business regulation offices, and in most, but not in
all, cases, school administration and forestry (figures 3.4 and 3.5).
The lower level: indirect administration by local governments
Public administration on behalf of the state is also carried out by local gov-
ernments. Indeed, it is estimated that 75–80 percent of all federal and
Land laws are implemented by local governments. The most important
units in this regard are the counties, of which there are two kinds: the
“rural county” (Landkreis), which may be in fact rather densely populated
owing to the size and number of municipalities that constitute the
county; and the “city-county” (Stadtkreis),57 a larger city usually referred
to as the county-free city (kreisfreie Stadt). 
The lower level: rural county government German rural counties are ter-
ritorial public corporations consisting of municipalities, their surround-
ing territory, and their citizens (thus Gemeindeverband). There is very little
unincorporated territory in Germany; examples would be certain forests
and lakes. The counties’ purpose is to administer those matters that are
“above” or beyond the reach or capability of the municipalities that con-
stitute the county. Matters of county self-government include the volun-
tary establishment and maintenance of social and cultural institutions
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Figure 3.4 Organization plan of Baden-Württemberg
Source: Rainer Wahl, “Die Organisation und Enturicklung der Verwallung in den Ländern und in Berlin,” in Deutsche Verwaltungsgeschichte, Band 5:
Die Bundesrepublic Deutschland, edited by Kurt G. A. Jeserich et al. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1987), p. 243.
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such as concert halls and museums; the construction and maintenance of
general schools, retirement and nursing homes; hospitals and ambulance
services, etc. Mandated tasks may include fire protection; vocational
schools; county roads; waste disposal; and last-resort public assistance
(Sozialhilfe). Delegated tasks include the administration of student subsi-
dies for promoting education; rent subsidies (Wohngeld); health and vet-
erinary offices; office for foreigners; building supervision; monument
maintenance; dam supervision; and hunting and fishing licenses. The
rural county can delegate some functions to its municipalities.58
The Landrat (until the second half of the 1990s a mostly ceremonial 
figure in North-Rhine Westphalia and Lower Saxony, see map 3.1) is the
chief administrative officer responsible for the administration of both
“state” and local affairs – that is, he combines the two at the rural county
level and is the “connecting link between state administration and self-
government in the county.” As such he falls under the legal and functional
supervision of the government district.59 Germans therefore sometimes
speak of the county’s “loaning” the Landrat to the state (Land) for the
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administration of state (both federal and Land) laws;60 however, in Lower
Saxony the county government has been “communalized” as a result of
the pressure of British occupation authorities after the war to remove 
the “state” from local government. Thus the county manager in Lower
Saxony (now also called Landrat) performs delegated tasks on behalf of
the Land, but as a local official.61 In the other Länder the Landrat can be
seen as an agent of direct state administration, even though he is a local
government official. But there are no state administrative offices within
the jurisdiction of the cities, towns, and villages that make up the county,
so their administration of state laws is indirect administration under the
legal supervision of the Landrat. Of course, the specific responsibilities of
the Landrat vary rather significantly among the Länder.
The lower level: municipal governments The cities, towns, and villages
(Gemeinden in German; communes in French) are territorial public 
corporations which have the right of self-government as guaranteed by
Article 28, para. 2, sent. 1 of the Basic Law (see map 3.2). They are respon-
sible for the entire range of public administration in their territory, which
is in conformity with the principle of unity of command (Einheit der 
Verwaltung) that stands in sharp contrast to the functional fragmentation
98 The Länder and German federalism
Map 3.2 The municipalities (Gemeinden) in the county of Göttingen
chap  3  27/5/03  11:53 am  Page 98
of local government administration in the United States. They have 
different political and administrative structures, depending on the
respective Land-wide charter law (Gemeindeordnung).62 There was a
change in the Länder in the 1990s to direct election of the mayor as chief
executive officer (even in the North German city manager systems),
which has always been a feature of the South German Council form found
in Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. With its adoption by the five new
Länder in the East, the South German Council form of local government
is now the most common in Germany.63
German municipalities are responsible for two kinds of administration:
matters of self-government (Selbstverwaltungsangelegenheiten), also called
“own area of responsibility” (eigener Wirkungskreis); and delegated mat-
ters (Auftragsangelegenheiten), also called delegated area of responsibility
(übertragener Wirkungskreis). In matters of self-government, the principle
of general powers (Allzuständigkeit) applies.64 According to this principle,
which is somewhat comparable to home rule in the United States, the
municipalities (and counties) in Germany have the authority to do any-
thing they wish so long as it is within the framework of and does not con-
flict with a Land or federal law (Article 28, para. 2). In theory at least it
stands in sharp contrast to the American ultra vires rule, according to
which American municipalities may engage only in those activities autho-
rized by their charters. In practice the Länder have not left their cities and
towns all that much room to maneuver, so that the general powers rule,
like Articles 30 and 70 of the Basic Law regarding the powers of the Länder
and the federation, is somewhat misleading. 
Matters of self-government include voluntary (freiwillige Aufgaben) and
mandated tasks (Pflichtaufgaben). Voluntary tasks may in fact be required
in the sense that they are needed and cannot be ignored. Or, on the other
hand, voluntary tasks may not be performed owing to a lack of financial
means or a lack of administrative capability. The focus of voluntary tasks
is the provision of social, cultural, and economic public facilities and ser-
vices. Examples of voluntary tasks are the construction and maintenance
of swimming pools, athletic fields, lecture halls, libraries, museums, and,
in larger cities, theaters; support of cultural associations and music
schools; the provision of parks and green areas; the construction and
maintenance of nursery schools, youth centers, retirement and nursing
homes, hospitals, and so forth. Mandated tasks include, for example, waste
collection; sewerage; public playgrounds; street construction and mainte-
nance; fire protection; zoning; maintenance of elementary schools, and,
for the city-counties, maintenance of secondary schools.65
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Delegated matters are responsibilities that must be carried out by the
municipalities because there are no general and direct state agencies at the
municipal level for such purposes. Municipalities carry out fewer dele-
gated tasks than the counties, but they are involved to some extent in this
area of responsibility. There are no special authorities in municipalities.
Delegated matters include passport administration; local registration of
inhabitants and the provision of personal identity cards, which in turn 
is connected to registration for the military draft (or alternative civilian
service); building supervision; care of the homeless and of refugees and
asylum seekers. On the other hand various welfare tasks and the promo-
tion of economic development and culture are mostly in the category of
self-government matters.66
In their administration of matters of self-government, German munic-
ipalities are responsible for their actions, that is, they must operate within
the law. For municipalities in the counties, this means they are subject to
the legal supervision of the Landrat (or county manager) for the self-
government activities and to his or her functional supervision for the 
delegated activities. The Landrat, in turn, is supervised by the director of
the government district who in turn answers to the various ministries. In
those smaller territorial Länder without government districts, supervi-
sion is by the Minister of Interior. Supervision is carried out informally
through routine consultation. The next stage usually takes the form of
requests for information. In cases of noncompliance, the supervising
authority can order compliance, arrange to implement measures at the
cost of the municipality, or, finally, replace the local authorities with a
state commissar, which was done on numerous occasions during the last
difficult years of the Weimar Republic but only rarely in the Federal
Republic. To prevent such extreme actions, there are various approval
procedures, for example, for selling public property, borrowing money,
etc. In cases of disagreement, municipalities can contest the decision of
the supervisory authority before an administrative court.67
The lower level: the county-free cities In all of the Länder, there is city-
county separation (found as a rule in the United States only in Virginia)
for the largest cities; therefore, as we have already seen, they are referred to
as city-counties (Stadtkreise) or, more commonly, as county-free cities
(kreisfreie Städte). The county-free cities are responsible for administering
all local affairs and serve also as substitutes for lower state administrative
authorities. The responsible organ is the governing mayor (or city man-
ager until the 1990s) who, however, is not “on loan” to the state. Rather,
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he administers state laws as “delegated matters” of local government on
his own responsibility. Again, there are no state administrative offices
within the jurisdiction of the county-free cities, so that indirect state
administration takes place here also.68 In both the rural counties and the
county-free cities, then, the Land is relieved of establishing its own local
agencies, and the administration of state tasks is carried out by those who
are familiar with the local conditions and the people. At the same time
local governments gain some understanding for the concerns of higher
levels via contact with their agents. “[T]he leading and deeper idea behind
the organization of the lower level is not that of a clean separation between
two arenas, but communication, mutual exchange of information, and a
balancing of state and local interests.”69
Administration of delegated state functions by the county-free cities
falls under the functional supervision of the district government (see
above); supervision of all matters of local self-government is legal only. In
some Länder larger cities that are not county-free have been given similar
rights and responsibilities.70
An especially important example of county and county-free city
administration of delegated tasks is the public assistance (Sozialhilfe) that
is provided by federal law to those who have exhausted their unemploy-
ment benefits or have no other source of income. This includes not only
the handicapped and blind but also refugees and asylum seekers. This law
has been delegated to the Länder, which in turn have given the actual
administration of payments for living expenses to the rural counties 
and county-free cities as a matter of self-government. Since these local
governments are responsible not only for administrative costs but also for
providing the actual funds for payments, and since there has been rela-
tively high unemployment in recent years among Germans and even
higher rates among the many foreigners that have come to Germany, the
financial stress of local governments has been exacerbated significantly by
this responsibility.
The result has been considerable conflict between the different levels
over current arrangements. Federal guidelines leave the local govern-
ments little room for maneuver, because benefits are supposed to be stan-
dard throughout the country. When the Public Assistance Act was revised
in 1961, it was assumed that its importance would decline steadily owing
to economic growth and affluence. The restrictions placed on local gov-
ernment autonomy in administering the program were therefore not
taken very seriously. With the rise of long-term unemployment and the
large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers, public assistance has
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become a major bone of contention between federal, Land, and local
authorities. The dilemma facing the localities is that they do not have the
revenues to assume responsibility for public assistance, and even if they
did there are strong ideological and practical reasons for having a federal
program with nation-wide standards.71
Youth and family assistance is also a delegated function that is a matter
of self-government for the rural counties and county-free cities. This
involves subsidies for nursery schools (Kindergarten); programs for
music, sports, international understanding, youth consultation, etc.; and
a variety of family social services and youth homes. Family promotion has
been added in recent years in the Länder in the form of one-time pay-
ments for bearing children (Babygeld). This is in addition to monthly
child support payments (Kindergeld) for all families. Educational promo-
tion funds, for example, funds to pay for board and room costs of some
higher school and university students (tuition is free) based on family
income, are regulated nationally, but some Länder, for example, Lower
Saxony, have added supplements for pupils attending higher secondary
schools (Gymnasien) who cannot live at home because of the distance of
the school from their place of domicile.72
There have been many complaints in Germany – as in the United States
– about the growing influence of “the state” at the local level, especially 
in terms of mandated functions. A recent example is the federal law –
approved by the Bundesrat – that requires all municipalities to provide
nursery schools for all children whose parents want them but without
providing the funding for the schools. Thus some observers see the work
of local governments as consisting more or less of administering state-
mandated and delegated tasks. This has also had a significant influence on
the financial situation of the municipalities, and it raises constitutional
questions about the guarantee of local self-government.73 It also raises
questions about the extent to which the Bundesrat reflects the interests of
local governments as opposed to broader party interests.
The lower level: special inter- and intramunicipal associations Some Län-
der, e.g., Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Württemberg, and
Schleswig-Holstein, also have subcounty associations of villages and towns,
somewhat like a local federation of small municipalities (called, respec-
tively, Samtgemeinden, Verbandsgemeinden, Verwaltungsgemeinschaften,
and Ämter). In other cases some former villages or towns (Ortsschaften)
that were consolidated into larger municipalities during the territorial
reforms of the 1960s and 1970s were given certain limited responsibilities
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in compensation for their loss of autonomy. They are modeled to some
extent on the intra-municipal city districts of certain large cities. Some 
special-purpose administrative associations have been formed in Bavaria,
Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia; Bavaria, North-Rhine Westphalia, and
Rhineland-Palatinate have higher- level multiple-county associations.74
In addition, many municipalities and counties have formed special dis-
tricts (Zweckverbände), usually for a single purpose such as provision of
drinking water, regional planning, constructing a swimming pool, regu-
lating a river separating two political units, maintaining a common
school bus, etc.75 While these are common features of local government in
Germany, they are not as ubiquitous as in the United States. 
The lower level: special supra-municipal associations In some Länder
associations of municipalities have been created at a regional level in
order to carry out certain functions that cannot be administered effec-
tively at the municipal or county levels. The best examples are the two
regional associations (Landschaftsverbände Rheinland and Westfalen-
Lippe) in North-Rhine Westphalia, which are in the process of being
reformed and replaced; the seven districts in Bavaria; and the Bezirksver-
band Pfalz in the Rheinland-Palatinate. There are also Land welfare asso-
ciations in Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, and Saxony as well as the regional
planning associations in Baden-Württemberg. An innovative regional
association was formed by Stuttgart and five surrounding counties in
1994, and it has a wide range of planning and coordination functions.76
Administration in the city-states
Unlike any other existing federation, Germany has three city-states: 
Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin. The first two have their origins in the
Holy Roman Empire as trading cities that were important participants 
in the Hanseatic League, while Berlin’s status is the result of the city’s 
division during the Cold War, its unification in 1990, and the failure of 
a referendum in May 1996 that, if successful, would have led to a consol-
idation of Berlin and Brandenburg. 
Bremen is not a simple city-state, but rather a two-city state. Unlike
Hamburg and Berlin, which are unitary cities, Bremen consists of the cities
of Bremen and Bremerhaven, separated by 65 km with territory from
Lower Saxony in between. The governmental organs (Senat) and parlia-
ment (Bürgerschaft) of the Land Bremen also serve the city of Bremen, but
Bremerhaven has its own city government and council in addition.77
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In Bremen and Hamburg the high-, middle-, and lower-level Land
functions are combined to a considerable extent. The advantage, of
course, is less distance between the citizen and government officials and
administrators; the disadvantage is the resulting complexity of city
administrative organization. In all three city-states neighborhood or dis-
trict offices have been created, but they have fewer powers in Bremen than
in Hamburg or Berlin. 
In Hamburg there is no separation between the “state” and “municipal”
administration. The city, like Bremen, has a lord mayor as head of govern-
ment (Senat) and a parliament (Bürgerschaft). The city is divided into 
districts which are not autonomous but do provide “deconcentrated
administration.” The districts have elected assemblies and an administra-
tion that implements measures that do not require a larger area.78
Unlike the other two city-states, Berlin has two administrative levels,
but it is different from the territorial Länder that have two levels (e.g.,
Schleswig-Holstein and Saarland). It is not a traditional city-state like
Bremen and Hamburg, which were city-states before the war and the divi-
sion of Germany after 1945. Berlin became a divided city-state under
Allied occupation during the Cold War; it was reunited in the summer of
1990, and in June 1991 the Bundestag decided by a close vote to make it
the national capital again. In 1994 the city completed a constitutional and
administrative reform that was to prepare it for its future responsibilities
at least until consolidation with Brandenburg; however, the referendum
that was to bring this about failed in May 1996, so that Berlin’s new legal
framework may last longer than many expected. 
As in the other city-states, there is no difference between state and local
government administration. The tasks of the city as municipality, county
and Land are met by the parliament (Abgeordnetenhaus), government
(Senat), and administration, including administration by the twenty-three
districts into which Berlin was divided (In 1999 the twenty-three districts
were reduced to twelve). There is, then, a high or main administration and
a district administration. These two levels have existed since 1920, when
Berlin annexed eight cities, fifty-nine towns and villages, and twenty-seven
estates. The division of the city into the then twenty districts was designed
in part to compensate the incorporated areas for their lost status.79
There are three categories of tasks or responsibilities in Berlin: the tasks
of the main administration; the tasks delegated to the districts under the
supervision of the city; and district tasks. The 1994 Berlin constitution
enumerates the powers of the main administration and those that can be
delegated. What is not enumerated belongs to the districts. Federal laws
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that are delegated to the Länder are divided in Berlin between the main
administration and the districts which, like local governments in the terri-
torial Länder, implement these laws as matters of their own responsibility.
The districts are responsible for such matters as schools, adult education,
hospitals, libraries, swimming facilities, youth homes, athletic fields,
parks, and music schools. Delegated matters under supervision include
building plans, street maintenance and lighting, elections, and property
issues. The districts can make their own zoning plans, and they enjoy some
fiscal autonomy. The main administration is responsible for general law
and order, constitutional protection, relations with the federal govern-
ment, asylum seekers, citizenship issues, money and credit, city-wide
planning, public housing, etc.80
Unlike the typical territorial Land described on p. 87, the “chancellor
principle” does not apply to the city-states. According to this principle,
the prime minister is elected by the Land parliament and then appoints
his cabinet members. In each of the three cities, however, the lord mayor
is elected by the city parliament which also elects the members of the cab-
inet. The city parliament can also remove cabinet ministers in a vote of
no-confidence. In practice, of course, the parliament elects the cabinet
nominees already selected in negotiations within the majority party or
majority coalition. In any case the lord mayor does not have the power to
set the guidelines of policy as do his counterparts in the territorial Länder,
that is, the principles of collegiality and ministerial responsibility are
stronger in the city-states.81
Special agencies
As noted above, a distinction is made in Germany as in the United States
between general- purpose and special-purpose administration. We have
seen that there are a good many special agencies in Germany. At the 
federal and Land levels special offices are common. These serve at the fed-
eral level in place of missing substructures, but they are subunits of the
various ministries at the Land level.82 They are seen usually as means of
relieving the ministry of an administrative burden in favor of greater
decentralization, but sometimes they are also seen as centralizing agents.
They are usually at the higher level of administration, that is, below 
the supreme and above the middle levels; however, some are also at the
middle level, where they may be to some extent in competition with the
district government. They tend to be technically demanding, e.g., statisti-
cal offices, or responsible for certification functions, e.g., geological
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offices. The Gewerbeaufsichtsämter can be found between the middle 
and lower levels.83 These are special authorities established for the pur-
poses of supervising business operations regarding workplace health and
safety standards, noise levels, temperature conditions, radiation, abuse of
workers or animals, and protection of nature, and so forth. 
At the lower level there is considerable administrative fragmentation,
in spite of unity of command in the rural counties and county-free cities.
This is more evident in the south (Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-
Palatinate, Bavaria) than in the north (North-Rhine Westphalia, Hesse).
Examples of special authorities that are not easily integrated into the rural
counties and county-free cities because of the territory they cover or their
specialization are weights and measures (Eichämter); mountain and for-
est offices; and cultural and road construction offices. Regional develop-
ment and environmental protection can also be difficult to integrate
within a local unit of general administration.84
Indirect administration by nongovernmental 
public bodies and private persons
Direct administration by “state” (Land and federal agencies at various 
levels) and indirect administration by self-governing local governments do
not exhaust the forms and instruments of administration in Germany.
Indirect administration by self-governing nongovernmental public corpo-
rations, institutions, and foundations is also important. Public territorial
corporations have members – those living in the territory – and autonomy,
for example, municipalities and counties. Universities, on the other hand,
are personnel corporations. Public institutions (Anstalten) have the func-
tion of carrying out a particular purpose. They have no members, only
users; examples would be the Sparkassen, which have a monopoly as 
savings and loan associations, or public radio and television networks85
sponsored by the Länder. Public foundations are institutions that have a
continuing purpose set by a founder with funding provided by an endow-
ment from public and/or private sources. All of these legal forms of service
providers share a degree of autonomy or the right of self-government of
their affairs, subject only to the legal supervision of ministries. 
Social insurance agencies86
Next to the local governments, social insurance is the most important area
in which indirect state administration is carried out. The Federal Employ-
ment Office in Nuremberg is responsible for providing unemployment
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compensation as well as employment counseling and other services such
as child support payments for all children in Germany. It is a semi-
autonomous federal institution (Anstalt) with branches at Land and local
government levels.87 Social insurance agencies that provide health and
retirement benefits with responsibilities above the Land level are federal
bodies (that is, special public corporations carrying out federal law), of
which there are several examples.
Social insurance for health, accident, retirement, and, most recently,
nursing care programs is provided by federal law, but administration is
not by government agencies. All employees who earn less than a certain
amount per month – 90 percent of the employed – are required to join a
health insurance provider. In the past there were insurance providers
restricted to special occupations or groups of employees as well as
providers for the general population. Since the beginning of 1996,
employees may select their provider; however, each provider must offer a
uniform system of services and quality standards, and no one may be
refused admission. Therefore, the price competition among the different
providers will be based primarily on the efficiency of their operations,
although there is some concern that the effect of this reform will work to
the disadvantage of the rapidly growing older population.88
The public corporations that provide insurance are semi-autonomous
institutions that implement the social insurance law as matters of their
own responsibility. In most cases an assembly and executive committee
are elected with equal representation for both employers and employees;
social insurance funds for miners, where the insured make up two-thirds
of the self-governing organs, are an exception. Eligible voters for the
assembly elections are the insured employees. 
In the early 1990s there were about 1,235 sickness funds organized in
a variety of forms. The largest number of insured are with 274 regional
funds (Ortskrankenkassen, AOK). There were also 747 funds organized
by companies (Betriebskrankenkassen), 176 funds offered by vocational
groups (Innungskrankenkassen), twenty-one funds for farmers, one for
seamen, one for miners, and fifteen voluntary “substitute” funds. By
the end of 1999, these numbers had been reduced sharply to seventeen
regional funds, 354 company funds, thirty-nine vocational funds, and
nineteen substitute funds.89 Minimum numbers of insured are
required; e.g., 100,000 for the company funds, 1,000 for a vocational
fund.90 All public sickness funds are supervised by the district govern-
ments and Land, while private funds are supervised by the federal
insurance office.
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Retirement programs are divided among three large branches. The first
is for manual workers, which is organized into Land insurance institutions
and institutions for federal railway workers and seamen. The second is for
white-collar or salaried workers which is run by the Federal Insurance
Agency for Employees in Berlin. And the third is the Retirement Insurance
Agency for Mine Workers. Farmers were added in 1957, their family mem-
bers in 1985. Independent journalists and artists were added in 1981, and
as of 1986 mothers receive credit for retirement insurance based on the
number of years they were engaged in child-rearing activities.91
Other significant institutions in the area of social insurance are the
nongovernmental “free providers and associations.” The most important
of these are churches and religious societies as well as groups of private
welfare providers. These are engaged in the “workers’ welfare assistance,”
or the German Red Cross, German Caritas, the Jewish Central Welfare
Center, and so forth, located at different levels of government. German
Christian – especially Catholic – social doctrine focuses on the principle
of subsidiarity, according to which public policies should be carried out at
the lowest level possible. This principle has been adopted to a consider-
able extent by federal law makers, who have delegated to or authorized
private, nongovernmental agencies to carry out numerous social welfare
functions with considerable public financial support. Thus before unifi-
cation private welfare providers (freie Wohlfahrtsverbände) sponsored 40
percent of the hospitals for acute treatment, about 60 percent of the
retirement homes, about 70 percent of facilities for youth, and 60 percent
of the facilities for handicapped persons. Continuing education, espe-
cially in the form of adult education, is also a major activity. In the 1980s
there were about 900 adult education centers (Volkshochschulen) which
were being turned over increasingly to local governments which provided
about two-thirds of their funding.92
Chambers
There are numerous self-governing nongovernmental public corporations,
or chambers, in the Länder that are designed in part to relieve the min-
istries, to which they are responsible, of some administrative tasks. In the
process, they are performing indirect Land administrative functions. They
all have certain common characteristics: required membership; an assem-
bly, directly elected by the members as defined by law; a board elected 
by the assembly and a professional manager; and a president elected to 
represent the concerns of the chamber in the broader community.93
The chambers can be broken down into various categories. In the eco-
nomic area, for example, one finds chambers of industry and commerce,
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chambers of tradesmen/craftsmen, and agricultural chambers. In the area
of free professions, there are chambers of attorneys, somewhat compara-
ble to state bar associations in the United States; and chambers of physi-
cians, dentists, pharmacists, architects, and so forth. The chambers see
themselves more as agencies assisting the state in numerous administra-
tive tasks than as typical interest groups.94
Especially well-known chambers are found in the economic area. Every
Land, for example, has at least one agricultural chamber, membership in
which is required of all farmers. This chamber is financed in part by a
modest assessment on the members based on the value of their property
and collected by the tax authorities. Some income is received from fees,
and at least half to two-thirds of the income comes from the Land. The
chamber is governed by a policy making assembly, elected by the mem-
bers, a ceremonial president, and a professional director and his staff. Tra-
ditional tasks of promoting agricultural interests are joined by other tasks
delegated by the Land. The chamber administration has sections for agri-
cultural technology, animal husbandry, training and continuing educa-
tion, plant and seed protection, forestry, and so forth. It also operates
numerous vocational schools and experimental farms.95
Two other examples of well-known economic chambers that work with
the Ministry of Economics are the Chamber of Tradesmen/Craftsmen
and the Industry and Commerce Chamber. Membership in both is
required and is represented by an elected assembly and officers. The
Chamber of Tradesmen/Craftsmen is responsible for training programs
for apprentices and for the examinations that lead to certification as jour-
neymen (Gesellen) and master craftsmen. The territory covered by such a
chamber usually conforms to that of a government district. The Industry
and Commerce Chamber consists of natural persons, commercial enter-
prises, and legal persons that operate a business in the territory of the
chamber. The chamber is financed by set contributions and by assess-
ments based on the volume of sales. Small business members pay no
assessment and only one-half of the set contribution. The task of the
chamber is to represent the interests of the members as a whole. It pro-
vides reports on the status of businesses, sets ethical standards, establishes
mediating boards for disagreements among members, takes measures
against unfair competition, regulates conditions of sales, and handles
consumer complaints. It engages in numerous other activities as well,
such as registering business enterprises, certifying various activities,
inspecting grocery stores, and providing consulting services. Like the
agricultural chambers and the chambers of tradesmen/craftsmen, it is
also responsible for training programs and vocational education.96
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Chambers of the free professions are numerous but not all-encom-
passing, given the differences that exist among the wide variety of prac-
ticing groups. Free professions form chambers because of the special
relationship they have with clients or patients, a nonmaterial relationship
of trust involving a special responsibility to society. Free professions, in
spite of their “freedom” and self-determination, are bound by certain
obligations and rules, e.g., formal admission procedures, fee structures,
and prohibitions on advertising. All free professions are organized in
chambers, membership in which, again, is required. Nevertheless, not all
groups are included. Thus in the health professions, there are chambers
for physicians and pharmacists, but not for homoeopaths, midwives,
dental technicians, and physical therapists. There are chambers for attor-
neys, notaries, tax advisers, and accountants, but not for business consul-
tants, salesmen, or driver training instructors. Nor are there any
chambers for scientific, artistic, educational or journalistic professions.97
Universities and specialized schools of higher education
(Fachhochschulen)
Institutions of higher education enjoy academic freedom as a constitu-
tional right and have the right of self-government “within the framework
of the laws.” In general these are Land laws, but these reflect the provisions
of the Federal University Framework Law of 1976 in the creation of which
the Länder participated. Thus, while laws vary by Land, they share many
common features. In Lower Saxony, for example, the Senate, the organ
responsible for routine academic affairs, including hiring of faculty, con-
sists of the deans of the schools as a consulting group and four groups
who have the decision making powers: professors; students; academic
assistants, research aides, etc.; and employees in the technical and admin-
istrative services. Actual representation in this “group university” takes
place in the proportion of seven professors, two students, two academic
aides, and two “others.” The concept of the “group university” originated
during the late 1960s, when students engaged in a general revolt against
older academic structures. At first there were three “groups”: faculty,
broadly defined; students; and “others,” including administrative and
technical personnel. Each group had an equal voice. The Federal Consti-
tutional Court ruled in 1973 that the professors must have a majority of
the votes in matters involving teaching and research, and the system
described briefly above emerged as a result.98
The highest official of the university is the president, elected by the
Konzil, a central university organ consisting of more than 100 faculty, for
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a term of six years. The Konzil also elects the chief administrative officer,
the chancellor. Other institutions of higher education, such as the art
schools and the specialized colleges (Fachhochschulen), are led by a rector,
who is elected from the faculty for two years. 
The next level of university administration consists of the general sub-
ject areas (Fachbereiche), roughly similar to schools in the United States,
headed by an elected dean who serves a two-year term. Students are
automatically members of the “student body” which is represented by a
student parliament and a general student committee (AStA) that provides
a number of student services.99
Public radio and television100
Since the electronic media fall under the concept of “culture,” program-
ming and broadcasting are the responsibility of the Länder; however, the
federation is responsible for technical matters. Until the mid-to-late 1980s,
when private satellite and cable television were introduced after consider-
able controversy over their potential effects,101 all radio and television in
Germany was public, which meant sponsored by the Länder. Each of the
individual Länder has the right to create its own network, and many have
done so. Thus Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hesse, North-Rhine
Westphalia, and the Saarland have their own radio and television networks
operated by autonomous boards. The other Länder have joined in various
combinations to form a joint network. The North German Network con-
sists of Lower Saxony, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, and Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, and the Central German Network is composed of Saxony,
Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia. In the south of Germany a part of one
Land (Württemberg) sponsors the South German Network and another
part (Baden) has joined with the Rhineland-Palatinate to form the South-
west German Network.102 In April 1997 these two networks agreed to 
join into one Southwest German Network.103 There are ten public broad-
casting networks (legally, “institutions”) sponsored by the Länder. Each
network offers its own radio programming over two–eight channels, and
each has one regional television channel which it may share in part with
other networks. 
In 1950 the public broadcasting institutions in the Länder formed 
the Working Group of Broadcasting Institutions (ARD), an “umbrella
institution” that runs a nationwide television network known as “the first
program” and regional networks referred to collectively as “the third pro-
gram.” A second network for television only is called in German “the 
second program” (ZDF); it was created in 1961 on the basis of contracts
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with all of the Länder after an attempt by the Adenauer Government to
form a federal network was ruled unconstitutional by the Federal Consti-
tutional Court.104
All of these networks are financed largely – more than 80 percent – by
nonvoluntary fees paid initially via the post office and since 1976 to the
License Fee Office (GEZ) operated by the ARD and ZDF. The fees are 
set by the Land parliaments of all the Länder and amounted in the late
1990s to DM 28.25 per month (after 2001, DM 33.33) per household 
for television and radio. The fees are divided by a ratio of 64:36 between
the ARD and ZDF. The ARD then transfers funds to the various Land 
networks based on their size. Commercials also provide some income,
but they are subject to restrictions; for example, they are limited to 20
minutes a day and are not allowed after 8.00 p.m. or on Sundays and hol-
idays and not at all on the “third program.”105 The financing of the public
radio and television networks is a major theme at the prime ministers’
conferences.106
The networks are operated by a director and supervised by an adminis-
trative council of usually eight–ten members and by a larger board consist-
ing of up to fifty representatives from the parties in parliament, arts and
sciences, religious groups, management and labor, and social organiza-
tions. This internal pluralism is supposed to ensure nonpartisan, compre-
hensive programming. Just how nonpartisan the politically oriented
programs really are is subject to considerable debate, because some are
obviously slanted to the left or right. While political parties normally have
no more than one-third of the membership, their influence is reflected by
other group representatives as well.107 Nevertheless, “there is obviously a
systematic confrontation and counterbalance of political orientations” in
the public systems, that is, “no single political party has ever enjoyed undue
influence over the entire public-service broadcasting system.”108 Therefore,
there seems to be little doubt that the networks are basically independent.109
ARD and ZDF together offer a cable network, SAT 3, for an additional
fee, and they have begun new channels for children and news-oriented
programming. They also joined with a French network to offer ARTE,
which is more culturally oriented. Networks across Europe have joined in
a European Broadcasting Union (EBU) to offer “Euronews” as an alter-
native to CNN.
There is another public broadcasting network at the national level
which is operated by the national government under its authority for for-
eign affairs. Thus radio and television programs are broadcast to foreign
listeners, and while German Radio (Deutschlandradio) can be heard also
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in Germany, the television broadcasts (Deutsche Welle) are available only
outside the country.
As noted above, private television and radio broadcasting was intro-
duced only in 1984. This created the “dual system” of public and private
stations in Germany today.110 Rather than “peaceful coexistence” between
the two systems, controversy has arisen over several issues. In the first
place, the public networks, ARD and ZDF, are required to offer complete,
high-quality programming. Private channels offering specialized pro-
gramming or little more than entertainment have attracted large numbers
of viewers, and they have also attracted most of the money for commer-
cials. Competition has also led to a dramatic increase in the costs of broad-
casting, for example, for major sporting events and movies. These rising
costs have placed the public networks at a serious disadvantage
Thus, Radio-Television-Luxemburg (RTL), based in Cologne, appeals
especially to younger people and is now the most-watched German tele-
vision network, with more than 16 percent of market share.111 Together
with SAT 1, which features movies and sports and operates 24 hours a day,
these two private channels have as many viewers as the public networks.
Indeed, private commercial television now has about 60 percent of the
total viewership.112
Public savings and loan associations (Sparkassen)
Sparkassen were established in Germany to encourage savings and to pro-
vide credit to the local community with particular focus on the middle
classes and weaker social groups. The responsible sponsors are larger
municipalities and rural counties. They are governed by a council, mem-
bers of which come from the local elected city or county council, and by a
two-member management board elected by the council. They are super-
vised by the district governments. Together the various Sparkassen form a
Land association under the supervision of the Land Minister of Finance.113
Foundations
Foundations exist under public, civil, and private law. An example of a pri-
vate law foundation would be the VW Foundation which promotes
research in science and technology. A well-known public foundation
under federal law is the Foundation for Prussian Cultural Treasures, which
maintains libraries, archives, museums, etc., that belonged to the state of
Prussia. An example of a Land foundation is the Lower Saxony Foundation
that provides financial support for cultural activities that the Land does
not or cannot finance, in part due to lack of funds. Its endowment comes
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from an initial bloc of money received from the Land, from gifts from cer-
tain large businesses and banks, and from private persons. Foundations
are most common with respect to the maintenance of certain churches,
monasteries or convents, and to the provision of funds for cultural activi-
ties. They were much more common in the past than today.114
Water and ground associations
In Lower Saxony, as an example of one Land, there are about 2,000 
associations that deal with water and ground issues, including drainage,
sewerage, and water supply. There are numerous dike associations of
which all land owners in certain areas are required to be members. Costs
for the dikes and their maintenance are covered by the Land; the federal
government by way of the federal–Land “joint task” responsibility for
improving agricultural structures and coastal protection (Article 91a of
the Basic Law); and by the property owners. Forestry associations and
hunting and fishing associations are supported by the rural counties.115
“Borrowed” instruments (“Beliehene”)
Certain institutions, groups, or individuals can also be engaged in admin-
istration due to some kind of expertise. Chimney sweeps report on fire
and building conditions, emissions, and energy use in making their
required periodic checks of heating systems in homes and businesses, and
property owners are required to correct defects that have been detected.
The private technical inspection service (TÜV) performs the required
biennial inspections of safety conditions of all cars and trucks. And, owing
to the nature of their positions, ship captains and airplane pilots can 
exercise certain state responsibilities for maintaining safety and order.116
Other examples include game wardens, bankruptcy administrators, some
notary publics (specialized attorneys who offer certain key legal services),
certified private schools, private welfare providers, and so forth.117
Planning in the Länder
General
Given the recent experience of the Nazi regime and the then current
example of the communist system in East Germany, there was a certain
amount of suspicion in the first years of the Federal Republic against
planning beyond zoning and budgetary plans. But some planning did
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exist, for example, in agriculture (Grüner Plan), youth affairs (Bundesju-
gendplan), and with respect to roads, sports, and some other matters. The
Länder also engaged in some planning, especially for refugees and educa-
tion. The main characteristics of this first planning phase were isolated
sectoral planning; individual infrastructure planning with unsophisti-
cated methodologies and little consideration of financial resources; and
little federal–Land cooperation.118
In the period 1966–69, there was a dramatic change in the attitudes and
practices in Germany regarding planning. This was reflected, for example,
in the Federal Law of 1967 on the promotion of stability and growth of the
economy. This led to framework planning for the entire economy, or
“global direction,” on the basis of medium-term goal projections and
multi-year financial planning at the federal, Land, and local levels. It also
produced coordinating agencies, such as the financial planning council
and the economic cycle council and, finally, the corporatist “concerted
action” at the federal level involving consultations among state officials,
large firms, and unions.119
The Finance Reform of 1969, which brought about several major
changes in the Basic Law, included two articles dealing with “joint tasks.”
Article 91a deals with federal–Land cooperation in university construc-
tion, improvements in regional economic structures, and improvements
in agricultural structures and coastal protection, each of which involves a
joint planning committee, medium-term framework planning for invest-
ments, and/or subsidies and joint financing. In 1970 a federal–Land com-
mission for educational planning was created under Article 91b. 
A federal territory planning program was started, and planning staffs
and planning groups were established in all of the ministries and in the
Chancellory. In the Länder work began on “Land development plans” and
numerous functional and regional plans. In larger cities there were city
development plans. Characteristic of this phase was the intensification
and perfection of already existing planning efforts, e.g., federal highway
planning and Land development planning; the introduction of a qualita-
tive new role for financial planning and direction of the economy, and
new planning units in the general administration; the securing by legisla-
tion of middle-range planning in the areas of finance and joint tasks; and
the belief that joint federal–Land planning was necessary under “cooper-
ative federalism.”120
After 1975 there was a period of critical distance from planning, due in
part to the oil crises of 1973 and 1980 and rising unemployment. This called
more for short-term crisis management than for long-term planning, and
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it undermined plans already made. Revenues were now below projections
and indebtedness rose. New problems, including demographic changes,
rising health costs, and environmental concerns led to more skepticism
toward planning, and planning staffs were reduced in size and their tasks
limited. Planning continued as a routine activity, but ambitious systems of
development planning were dropped. Crisis management with narrower
concerns and a shorter range of planning became especially prominent 
at the local level. This has led to a renaissance of functional planning with 
a reduction in expectations of vertical and sectoral coordination. But in
comparison to 1965 there is functional planning in more policy areas than
before; it is methodologically more sophisticated; and there is more areal,
financial and procedural coordination.121
Types of planning
At the federal level, the Basic Law requires or authorizes five kinds of plan-
ning: budget planning; finance planning, which is above all resource 
planning but also functional planning; defense planning; framework
planning under Article 91a; and educational planning under Article 91b.
The latter two will be discussed below, since they involve the federation
and the Länder.
The Länder also engage in budget planning and five-year finance plan-
ning by the Minister of Finance. More specific to the Länder is functional
or sectoral planning for responsibilities such as roads and education (pro-
jections of pupils, teachers, building needs) and regional land-use plan-
ning. Municipal building and zoning plans must conform to these plans,
but local officials have a voice in the process before it is completed.122
Regional land-use planning is one of the most important examples of
Land planning, and it is probably the best example of attempts to coordi-
nate and integrate various sectors of planning sometimes involving fed-
eral, Land, regional, and municipal efforts.123 EU planning regulations are
also of growing importance, e.g., in highway and railway planning, in
nature preservation and the environment in general.124 An American
study of land-use planning in Germany has noted the crucial importance
of the constitutional principle of “uniformity [Einheitlichkeit] of living
conditions” found in Article 72 of the Basic Law for an understanding of
such planning.125 Article 72 is the basis for the federal concurrent legisla-
tive authority to pass the federal framework law on land use (Raumord-
nungsgesetz (ROG)) of 1997.126 But land-use planning is also based on the
German concept of the “social state.”127
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The ROG provides for vertical coordination of land-use planning among
the federal ministry for regional planning and construction, Land min-
istries, and local governments, and for horizontal coordination between the
latter two levels. Another means of cooperation and coordination is
through various committees and councils, including the conference of
Land ministers of regional planning. Implementation of the goals of the
ROG is the responsibility of the Land planning process. Land law provides
for the organization of planning at the Land and local levels. Individual
land-use plans established by the Länder determine long-term goals 
and include data on population, employment, economic development,
education, transportation, etc. The ROG places particular focus on the
environment, including nature preservation. Land officials also review local
county and city plans and encourage coordination and cooperation.128
The most important elements of regional planning today focus on the
“central places,” i.e., cities and towns that have been selected by the Länder
as service providers and communication centers for their surrounding
areas.129 These centers are key instruments in achieving the goal of “equiv-
alent” living conditions, because they provide the surrounding areas with
the necessary economic, financial, medical, educational, cultural, and
other services and opportunities.130 A somewhat related activity is regional
municipal planning, such as that established by Baden-Württemberg in
1994 for the city of Stuttgart and five surrounding counties. Its activities
include regional territorial planning, traffic and commuter planning,
regional economic and tourism planning, and waste disposal planning. It
can require municipalities to formulate local zoning plans in conformity
with regional plans. The agency has been given some popular legitimacy
via an elected regional assembly consisting of eighty delegates.131
The ROG provides for the development of the territory of the Federal
Republic so that, among other goals, “uniform” or “equivalent” living con-
ditions will be achieved. As noted in Chapter 2 on the constitutional
framework of German federalism, “uniform”– it was changed to “equiva-
lent” in 1994 – did not mean equality in the sense of some kind of leveling
process.132 Rather, these terms meant then and still mean today providing
the necessary infrastructure, environmental conditions, employment
opportunities, educational and cultural services, etc., that are required of
a “social state.”133 Nevertheless, there was misunderstanding of “unifor-
mity,” in that some politicians and others interpreted the term too liter-
ally.134 After unification and the recognition of dramatic differences in the
living conditions of the eastern and western parts of Germany, it became
evident that “uniformity” was misleading at best and that the conditions
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in the eastern part of united Germany required new thinking.135 For all of
these reasons, the term “uniform” was changed in the constitutional
reform process of 1994 to “equivalent,” but it is not clear that this change
will have much effect. In the meantime there is less emphasis on either
term today and increasing use of the concept of “comparable living condi-
tions” for the eastern Länder. This discussion has led to considerable con-
troversy, however, because it raises the question of more federal assistance
to achieve “equivalent” living conditions at the cost of Land autonomy.
Joint task planning
A continuing example of federal–Land planning, which is an otherwise
generally discouraged example of “mixed administration,” can be found in
the “joint tasks” provisions of Article 91a and 91b that were described
briefly above and in Chapter 2 on the constitutional framework of German
federalism.136 Article 91a and 91b were added to the Basic Law in 1969 as
part of the larger Finance Reform of that year, because of the consensus in
the German parties that a strict separation between the federation and the
Länder in a number of areas was no longer appropriate and constitutional
reality required cooperation. Article 91a permits the federation to partici-
pate in the construction of university facilities, including medical clinics;
in the promotion of regional development; and in making improvements
in agriculture and coastal protection. It provides for federal financing of 
50 percent of university construction and regional development and 50
percent or more of agriculture improvements and coastal protection. In
practice the federation’s share has been 60 and 70 percent, respectively, for
these latter two areas.137
This cooperation requires joint planning between the federal and Land
governments, the procedures for which are provided in three federal
implementation laws passed by the Bundestag and Bundesrat. Each of the
three areas designated as a joint task has a planning committee. The
members are the federal and Land cabinet ministers responsible for the
subject matter of each committee, together with the federal finance min-
ister. The federation has sixteen votes, which must be cast as a bloc, and
each Land has one vote. A majority consists of the votes of the federation
and a majority of the Länder. The plans developed and approved are,
however, framework plans; detailed planning is left to the Länder, as are
all other executive functions connected with the joint task in question.138
Once the joint framework plans have been approved, the governments
in effect are bound to include the measures in their next budget. This, of
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course, presupposes parliamentary approval. Approval can be denied,
but there is a common trust that each government will be able to abide
by the bargain. On the other hand, a Land can refuse to implement the
actions in its territory, or it can go beyond the agreed plan as long as its
actions are not in conflict with the provisions of the plan. Budgetary
autonomy is upheld in that the amounts approved are decided by the
parliaments, but they cannot in good faith cut off funds to the extent that
action is undermined. Once the budget is approved, the Land or federa-
tion is committed. Problems can arise when municipalities have plans
that are not in conformity with the general plan, in which case the Land
may be required to interfere based on its right of legal supervision of
local actions.139
While Article 91a mandates federal–Land cooperation, Article 91b
authorizes it in the areas of educational planning and in the promotion of
research institutions and plans that are of general or national importance.
As in the case of Article 91a, Article 91b provides a constitutional foun-
dation for cooperative practices (zusammenwirken) that were already tak-
ing place. For example, the German Education Council (Bildungsrat) was
formed in 1965, while the Science Council (Wissenschaftsrat) was created
as early as 1957.140
Article 91b was added to the Basic Law at a time when there was a great
deal of confidence in and enthusiasm for planning in general. A Fed-
eral–Land Commission for educational planning and promotion of
research was formed in 1970, and it set about to create a “joint long-term
framework plan for a coordinated development of the entire educational
system” together with a joint educational budget.141 For a variety of rea-
sons, including conflicts between the national government and Land gov-
ernments, partisan conflicts, and financial considerations, the planning
process proved to be more complicated than had been anticipated in
1970. While there was agreement on a Framework Plan in 1973, it did not
result in exercising any “significant influence in controlling and coordi-
nating the political activities of the individual Länder.”142 In the meantime
economic conditions had changed in Germany, partisan conflict in vari-
ous areas increased, and general educational planning under Article 91b
ended altogether in 1982, largely for partisan and financial reasons. Once
the more conservative Christian Democrats and Liberals replaced the
more planning-oriented Social Democrats in the national government in
October 1982, the downsized Commission began serving as a forum for
discussion between the national government and the Länder rather than
as an agency for planning.143
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In the case of Article 91b, federal–Land educational planning may have
failed,144 but cooperation continues in other areas. Cooperation in scien-
tific research, which would normally be a Land responsibility, has an
important national purpose and continues unabated, as is seen, for exam-
ple, in joint support efforts for the Max-Planck Institutes and the German
Research Association (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).145 Indeed, a so-
called “Blue List” contains the names of about fifty research institutions
and museums that fall under Article 91b.146
As was noted in Chapter 2 on the constitutional framework of German
federalism and will be noted in Chapter 5 on finances, there has been a
good deal of criticism of Article 91a and 91b and the joint tasks they
authorize. Probably the most fundamental and certainly the best known
is the criticism by Fritz Scharpf, who notes that there is a tendency in joint
programs which are based on unanimous or near-unanimous decision
making to involve a “joint-decision trap” which leads to a number of
undesirable consequences, including increased expenditures.147 Other
criticisms include the argument that the Land parliaments are too little
involved; that the federation has too much say in the financing of projects;
and that the “mixed administration” involved violates the principle of
division of powers between responsibility for legislation by the federation
and for administration by the Länder. In reaction to these and other crit-
icisms, the argument can be made that planning is in principle an execu-
tive function in which the parliaments are not well equipped to participate
but can, instead, control to some extent; on the other hand, the Länder
now give their framework plans to their parliaments before presentation
in the joint commissions, and at the federal level the Ministry of Agricul-
ture shows its plans to the Agriculture Committee of the Bundestag
during the planning process so that questions regarding the framework
plan can be raised in time for some parliamentary control. One response
to the criticism that mixed administration violates the Basic Law is that
the constitution does not require a strict separation of functions between
the federation and the Länder.148
Public employees
Classification
In 1997 there were about 4.6 million public employees in Germany 
in direct administration and excluding former employees of public 
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enterprises, e.g., railway workers (Tables 3.1, 3.2). This represents a little
more than 12 percent of the total work force. Public employees are divided
into two general classifications. One is the long-established division
among civil servants (Beamte); salaried employees (Angestellten); and
blue-collar workers (Arbeiter). The other classification is the division of
the above categories into the simple (einfachen), the middle (mittleren),
the elevated (gehobenen), and the higher (höhere) service levels. For the
higher service level a university background is required, usually a law
degree but increasingly a degree in economics;149 for the elevated service,
the selective secondary school degree (Abitur) and, increasingly, a special-
ized college background (Fachhochschule) is the normal precondition.
The middle level usually requires the mittlere Reife, roughly equivalent to
an average American high school degree. There are no special educational
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Table 3.1 Basic categories of public employees in direct administration 
in Germany, 1999
Special Total
Federation Länder Municipalities counties districts
Full-time
Civil Servants/Judges/
Soldiersa (Beamte) 316,064 1,025,346 158,625 2,430 1,502,465
Salaried employees 
(Angestellte) 84,005 615,739 652,396 33,614 1,385,754
Blue-collar workers 
(Arbeiter) 79,049 125,284 251,163 17,547 473,043
Part-time
Civil servants/Judges/
Soldiers (Beamte) 6,914 231,239 17,206 170 255,529
Salaried employees 
(Angestellte) 19,231 286,600 307,539 12,474 625,844
Blue-collar workers 
(Arbeiter) 4,956 27,895 150,450 6,441 189,742
Total full and part-time 
Beamte 1,757,994
Total full- and part-time 
Angestellte 2,011,598
Total Arbeiter 662,785
Note: a Career and longer-serving soldiers only (c. 60 per cent of total Federal Beamte).
Source: Adapted from Federal Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook 2000 (Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel,
2000), p. 516.
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Table 3.2 Classification of basic categories of public employees in Germany, 1998
Municipalities/ Special
Federation Länder counties districts Total
Full and part time (%) FT PT FT PT FT PT FT PT FT PT
Civil Servants/Judges/ 318,925 4,859 1,038,010 218,418 160,653 15,428 2,415 145 1,520,003 238,850
Soldiersa (Beamte)
Higher service 30,486 867 293,799 46,615 24,869 1,635 617 39 349,771 49,156 
Elevated service 61,867 2,332 492,274 151,834 81,464 8,727 1,204 61 636,809 162,954
Middle service 184,447 1,587 243,190 19,770 53,641 5,046 554 45 481,832 26,448
Simple service 42,125 73 8,747 199 679 20 40 – 51,591 292
Salaried Employees 
(Angestellte) 88,018 17,443 661,169 228,009 684,833 262,324 31,394 9,260 1,465,414 517,036
Higher service 5,422 1,008 136,757 43,914 49,512 6,623 3,785 254 195,476 51,799
Elevated service 15,296 1,247 201,675 70,368 169,957 34,726 8,022 1,206 394,950 107,547
Middle service 65,282 14,610 309,116 110,226 445,322 212,772 18,628 7,451 838,348 345,059
Simple service 2,018 578 13,621 3,501 13,818 8,203 959 349 30,416 12,631
Blue-collar workers 
(Arbeiter) 81,767 3,913 134,265 24,309 270,367 115,389 16,765 3,948 503,164 147,559 
Note: a Career and longer-serving soldiers only.
Source: Based on Federal Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook 2000 (Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel, 2000), p. 517. 
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requirements for the simple service levels, but previous training in an
apprenticeship (Lehre) in a practical subject may be an expectation. Con-
tinuing education courses are increasingly common, especially in the first
two categories.150 There is little opportunity for promotion without hav-
ing met the educational requirements, regardless of the quality of perfor-
mance on the job – although this has changed somewhat in recent
decades. This is not much different from the private sector, where “certi-
fication” is also very important in determining opportunities for advance-
ment. It is one reason for the enormous increase in student numbers in
Germany since the late 1960s. Since the numbers of university graduates
has multiplied, there are far more applicants than available positions in
the higher service, so that graduates have moved into the elevated and
even the middle levels since the 1970s. By the 1980s a trend could be seen
toward an increase in the numbers of the two higher levels, while the mid-
dle level stagnated and the lower level was declining. Only then were efforts
undertaken to place more limits on the previously generous promotion
policies within the top two levels.151
On the other hand the proportions of civil servants, salaried employ-
ees, and workers have been relatively constant over the past decades if one
counts the blue-collar workers in the federal railway and postal services
before they were privatized in the mid-1990s. Both civil servants and
salaried employees can be in the higher, elevated, and middle services. For
example, police employees, firemen, and even locomotive engineers are
civil servants, as are teachers, professors and bureaucrats in higher
administrative positions; however, these civil servants vary in status and
pay by level of service.
The Basic Law divides the authority for regulating civil servants and the
other public employees between the federation and the Länder. If in 
the federal service, civil servants are regulated by federal law; otherwise,
the federation has only framework powers under Article 75, para. 1. In
1971 the Basic Law was amended (Article 74a) to permit the federal gov-
ernment to pass legislation regulating the pay and benefits of all civil ser-
vants. This was done with the approval of the Länder in the Bundesrat,
because they were interested in reducing the salary competition that had
emerged among the Länder in spite of the federal civil service framework
law of 1957 which left the Land parliaments little leeway in regulating their
civil servants.152 This action is cited often as an example of the Länder 
giving up voluntarily certain important powers that they once possessed. 
There has been considerable discussion during the past decades and
again today about the rationale for preserving the difference between 
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civil servants and salaried employees.153 Some politicians and others,
especially on the left of the political spectrum, would like to change the
status of certain classes of Beamten to Angestellten.154 Others defend the
current system and for a variety of reasons are strongly opposed to any
basic changes.155 Owing to their exercise of “autonomous public func-
tions” (hoheitsrechtlicher Befugnisse), the civil servants are said to have
certain characteristics that, taken together, distinguish them from other
public servants:
 The civil servants have no right to strike, which is important in times
of crisis. Civil servants may be called upon to substitute for personnel
in the other levels if and when they go on strike.
 The civil servants, owing to their positions of trust, must not demon-
strate any disloyalty to the constitutional order. 
 Civil servants are life-time public servants, whose career status pro-
vides them with independence; this does not exclude probationary
periods to determine suitability for office. Temporary positions also
exist, but they are of questionable legality or appropriateness.
 Civil servants may be expected to work overtime and must observe cer-
tain rules of behavior in their private lives.156
Loyalty expectations
Today the second characteristic noted above is much less relevant than
before the collapse of communism in East Germany and throughout east-
ern Europe. Loyalty expectations have always existed in the German civil
service as they have in other countries, but during the Weimar Republic
of 1919–33 the democratic state was confronted by many civil servants
who were not loyal to the Constitution. As a result the Basic Law specifies
in Article 5, para. 3, that while “art and science, research and teaching 
are free,” the “freedom to teach does not release one from loyalty to the
constitution.” And Article 33, paras 4 and 5, have been interpreted to
mean that those who enter the civil service must be loyal to the Federal
Republic. Thus federal laws regulating the civil service have stated that
only persons may become civil servants “who can be depended upon at
all times to stand up for the free, democratic basic order in terms of the
Basic Law.” Although there was some controversy after the establishment
of the Federal Republic concerning the employment of persons alleged to
have served the Nazis,157 it was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that
these provisions became an important public issue. It was then that 
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student radicals, heavily influenced by Marxist thought, began to threaten
to “march through the institutions” of the Federal Republic and bring
about some form of revolutionary change. To keep extremists from the
right and – especially – left from entering the civil service, Chancellor
Willy Brandt and the prime ministers of the Länder agreed in 1972–73 to
a set of principles that called for a review by the Land offices of constitu-
tional protection of every applicant for a civil service position, including
teachers. These procedures caused a great deal of controversy among the
attentive public and politicians at the federal and Land levels, criticism
from abroad,158 and massive opposition by students, very few of whom
were actually rejected.159 By the time the Wall fell in November 1989,
some of the Länder governed by the SPD had ceased participating in the
reviews entirely or in part.160 Since the collapse of communism in the East,
the reviews have been dropped and the issue practically forgotten. It is not
surprising, then, that new questions have been raised about maintaining
the differences between civil servants and salaried employees.
Political patronage
Another controversy of much longer duration and relevance today is
political patronage. The model civil servant is often seen as the compe-
tent, loyal, and allegedly neutral Prussian bureaucrat in the nineteenth
century and before the First World War. It has been pointed out, however,
that civil servants at that time were recruited with a strong bias toward
social class and conservative, pro-monarchist sentiments.161 Complaints
about party patronage in the Weimar Republic after 1919 tended to
ignore the issue of loyalty of many public officials to the monarchy rather
than to the new republic.162
In the United States the Hatch Act of 1939 prevents civil servants from
participating actively in partisan politics, and there is a long tradition of
a nonpartisan civil service in Great Britain. This has not been the German
tradition. Civil servants not only participate actively in partisan politics,
they are one of the most important groups from which elected officials are
recruited. (One should keep in mind that teachers and professors are also
civil servants in Germany, and, as in France, a large proportion of the civil
servants in German legislative assemblies at all levels are teachers.) The
involvement of German public employees in politics also raises questions
about the neutrality of the civil service. Since the 1950s, there have been
complaints about the importance of a “party book,” i.e, membership in a
political party, for securing higher-level civil service as well as salaried
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employee positions in federal, Land, and local administrative structures,
including local government commercial enterprises, public radio and
television boards, local savings and loan associations, and, of course, city
government.163 On the other hand, 
[p]arty patronage in the immediate post-war years had both moral and very
practical functions. It could be regarded as the best indicator of regime 
loyalty in bureaucratic recruitment and promotions . . . [Parties] had
already emerged as undisputably the most ‘reliable’ institutions, and 
membership of a party licensed by the Allies was the most tangible sign of
democratic commitment.164
Some German authors have also pointed to the positive binding of the
civil service to society and to democratic parties after 1945 as one reason
for politicization of the bureaucracy.165
Some critics accuse the German parties of being “patronage parties”
rather reminiscent of the American Tammany Hall model.166 However,
there are several important differences. First, the alleged corruption in
Germany is of a very different order and extent from the American model.
Another difference is that there was little ideology involved in the Amer-
ican spoils system, whereas ideology has been an element of patronage
politics in Germany. A third difference is that “the career principle was
modified (not displaced) in the interests of party control” in Germany,
that is, “neither side expects administrative rules to be broken solely for
reasons of political pressure or expediency.”167
The Tammany Hall analogy suggests itself because there is probably
more patronage at the local level than elsewhere,168 although the higher
Land levels are hardly exempt.169 Evidence suggests, however, that the
patronage at the federal level is modest in comparison to American prac-
tices. As Renate Mayntz has noted, “In Germany most high-level vacan-
cies continue to be filled by career civil servants even though it is
understood that political criteria can play a legitimate role in recruiting
outsiders to high positions in the federal bureaucracy.”170
While there is little disagreement that party membership can be a fac-
tor in gaining higher- level civil service positions at the federal, Land, and
local levels, there is disagreement about whether party patronage is really
a new phenomenon, the reasons why it exists, the extent to which it exists,
and whether this is so very objectionable. As noted above, the argument
that the Prussian bureaucracy was strictly neutral is a myth. In contrast to
the many voices condemning party patronage at the federal, Land, and
especially local levels and the argument by some constitutional lawyers
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that it is unconstitutional under Article 33,171 other scholars have noted
that there are good reasons for the practice. As noted above, civil servants
in Germany, in contrast to their American and British counterparts, may
and do participate actively in politics as members of parties, as candi-
dates, and as elected officials.172 Defenders also point out that while there
may be some abuses, civil servants have an advantage in information and
knowledge that can make it difficult for elected politicians to control
them. To compensate for this advantage, politicians seek to gain control
over the bureaucracy by insuring that persons friendly to them are
appointed to key positions. They also need cooperative civil servants in
drafting policy initiatives in conformity with their party programs, i.e.,
promises made to their voters. This is in part a result of the fact that polit-
ical executives in Germany do not have large personal staffs and must rely
on the civil servants for help.173 Questions can also be raised about the
imprecision of the concept of patronage, and it has been noted that there
is little empirical evidence for many of the general complaints made 
about patronage.174
Where evidence does exist about federal- and Land-level patronage, 
it applies above all to the highest civil service levels which consist largely
of so-called “political officials” (politische Beamte) who are mostly career
civil servants who occupy key positions and may be forced to accept 
temporary retirement for political reasons; however, only a small minor-
ity of about 10 percent are actually dismissed. Another, much smaller cat-
egory, consists of the parliamentary state secretaries, who are members of
the Bundestag and may answer questions for their minister at question
time and perform other, more political, functions. They have existed 
only since 1967, in contrast to the “political officials,” who go back to
mid-nineteenth-century Prussia.175
Public sector unions
As we saw above, civil servants, regardless of service level, are not allowed
to strike due to their status under public law as persons serving the state
in special positions of authority that require trust and loyalty. Salaried
employees and workers may strike and have done so on several occasions
since the 1950s. The significant gains made in benefits, salaries, and
employment conditions for these two groups have, of course, affected the
civil servants as well. The result was a steady increase in personnel costs 
in proportion to total public expenditures and GNP. Today personnel
costs in the old Länder average around 40 percent of their budgets. With
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growing financial stress in the public sector since the 1980s, however, the
real increase in salaries and benefits has been more modest. Nevertheless,
the resistance of the public service unions to privatization efforts suggests
that public employees are still relatively well off in comparison to the 
private sector, especially in terms of job security.176
Federal and state civil servants do have their own union: the German
Civil Servants Federation (Deutscher Beamten Bund, DBB). The DBB may
not exercise the strike weapon, but it has excellent contacts with legislators
at the Land and federal levels, many of whom are themselves former civil
servants, e.g., school teachers, university employees, judges, police, various
bureaucratic staff, etc., and have the right to return to their old positions 
if they give up their seats for whatever reason. This represents a striking
difference to the United States, where civil servants are not allowed to
engage openly in partisan politics or hold public office. Of course some
civil servants in Germany would not be considered to be part of the civil
service in the United States, e.g., school teachers and university employees.
The salaried employees (Angestellten) are represented by the German
Salaried Employees Union (Deutscher Angestellten Gewerkschaft, DAG)or
by several unions organized in the Federation of German Unions, i.e., the
Public Transportation Union (Öffentliche Transport und Verkehr, ÖTV);
the postal union; the railway workers union; or one of several competing
teachers’ unions, the Union for Education and Science. In 1961 the DAG
and ÖTV negotiated the Federal Salaried Employees Compensation Con-
tract (BAT) with the federal government, the Joint Salary Commission of
the German Länder, and the Association of Local Government Employers.
This contract, which still generally applies today, set salary schedules
and provided for various benefits that closed considerably the gap
between salaried employees and civil servants. For example, civil servants
can be relieved of their positions only for cause, and according to this
contract the same protection applies to salaried employees after fifteen
years.177 In July 2001 the largest union in the world, the united services
union, or “ver.di”, was formed by joining five separate unions: the DAG;
ÖTV; the Union for Commerce, Banks, and Insurance; the postal union;
and the media union.178
In addition to traditional union representation, civil servants and
salaried employees also have the right to elect representatives to the “per-
sonnel councils”(Personalräte) of their agencies or offices which are com-
parable to the “works councils”(Betriebsräte) in the private sector that
were introduced by a federal “codetermination” (Mitbestimmung) law in
the coal and steel industry in the 1950s. These councils are important
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bodies, because they must be consulted by management in all personnel
matters. This, of course, places certain constraints on the ability of man-
agers in the public and private sectors to make personnel decisions, but
the experience in most cases seems to be that relationships are based more
on cooperation rather than confrontation. 
Conclusion 
The “state” in Germany is either the federation or the Land, depending on
the context in which the term is used. Either can administer policies
directly. For example, the federal government is involved in administra-
tion directly and “on its own” through a number of special agencies, such
as the Federal Statistical Office and the Federal Criminal Investigation
Office. It shares with the Länder the direct administration of finances. The
Länder also have direct “own” administration through their special agen-
cies, such as criminal investigation offices, statistical offices, and finance
offices along with many others that fall under the direct authority of a
Land ministry. Either state may also delegate policies to different bodies
for indirect administration. Thus the federal government has the Länder
administer the autobahns and numerous other federal tasks; but the fed-
eral government also turns over to the Länder many more tasks that they
then administer on their own responsibility, not merely as delegated fed-
eral responsibilities. The Länder on their part delegate some tasks to the
local governments for administration and turn over a great many other
functions to the local governments for “indirect” administration on their
own responsibility as self-governing units. As a result it is estimated that
the local governments administer 75 percent or more of all laws in Ger-
many. But the federation and the Länder also turn over many responsibil-
ities to nongovernmental bodies, such as institutions, chambers,
universities, and other agencies for indirect administration.
If the policy is delegated, the “state” exercises functional and personnel
supervision over those actually implementing it. If the policy has been
turned over to others as matters of their own responsibility, only legal
supervision by higher authorities takes place. The most common exam-
ple of legal supervision is that by the Länder over their local governments,
which have the constitutional right of self-government. 
The legal persons that administer “state” functions indirectly are 
various kinds of public corporations, such as local governments, social
insurance providers, and numerous chambers; institutions, such as the
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public savings and loan associations and public radio and television net-
works; and foundations, such as those that administer certain cultural
facilities or activities.179
Indirect administration can also be carried out by private persons, as,
for example, by chimney sweeps and the technical inspection service
(TÜV). Indirect administration works against the ideal of unity of com-
mand, but centrifugal forces are countered by many formal and informal
centripetal forces.180
Even though Germany is a two-tier federation, one can speak of three
levels of administration: the federal, Land, and local levels. But most of
the Länder also have three levels – high, middle, and local – whereas
Berlin and five of the generally smaller territorial Länder have two levels
and Bremen and Hamburg have basically only one. To complicate matters
further, one should note that the rural counties and their towns and vil-
lages constitute two levels, so that the larger Länder have four levels: Land,
middle, county, and municipalities that constitute the counties. With the
federation, this brings the total number of levels to five, unless one wants
to count as separate levels the supreme and high levels, respectively, of the
federation and the Länder, which is not normally done.181
In spite of the apparent complexity of administrative structures,
administration in Germany is based on certain fundamental principles
along with numerous exceptions that apply for mostly pragmatic reasons.
The first principle is that the federal state is responsible for most legisla-
tion, the Länder for most administration. A second principle is unity of
command, i.e., the attempt to combine administrative functions in one
unit. At the supreme levels of the federation and the Länder, the Ministry
of Interior bundles together numerous functions, while the government
districts at the middle level in eight Länder serve as classic examples of
unity of command. Other classic examples are the rural counties and,
especially, the county-free cities. A third principle is decentralized admin-
istration based on the principle of self-government subject only to legal
supervision by the state. Here the classic examples are administration by
the Länder of numerous federal laws and administration by the local gov-
ernments of most federal and Land laws, many of which are based on fed-
eral laws. Examples of nongovernmental institutions carrying out federal
and Land laws on their own responsibility are social insurance providers
and chambers. A fourth principle might be seen in the Allzuständigkeit,
the general powers, of the municipalities, in contrast to the limiting prin-
ciple of ultra vires in the United States; however, the general powers of the
local governments have in fact been circumscribed by federal and Land
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laws. In any case it is possible to speak of a “system” of administration in
federal Germany – as in unitary France – to a much greater extent than in
the United States.
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Introduction
For almost forty years after the federal Constitution went into effect, 
little attention was paid to state (Land) constitutions in Germany.
Amendments were made on numerous occasions, but these were almost
always rather minor changes or technical corrections and did not arouse
much controversy. At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s,
this changed dramatically for two major reasons. A scandal in Schleswig-
Holstein in 1987 involving allegations that the prime minister (Minister-
Präsident) had been guilty of a serious abuse of power (the Barschel/
Pfeiffer affair) led to a thorough revision of that Land’s Constitution
which included both far-reaching plebiscitary (direct democracy) fea-
tures and provisions strengthening the parliament’s control over the 
government (cabinet). The reforms contained in this Constitution have
since had a significant impact not only on the new Länder in the East 
but also on Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, and Rhineland-Palatinate
in the West. 
The second cause of a strong interest in Land constitutions was, of
course, the collapse of the Wall, the re-emergence of five Länder which
had ceased to exist in 1952, and the unification of Germany in October
1990. The result was a third generation of Land constitutions following
the first generation before the Basic Law went into effect in 1949 and the
second generation which followed that event during the 1950s. The
Schleswig-Holstein Constitution of 1990 became an inspiration for the
five new Länder in the East, and their constitutions, in turn, encouraged
several of the old Länder in the West to revise their constitutions. In addi-
tion to Schleswig-Holstein, the old Länder had provided the new Länder
in their constitution making with model structures and practices proven
4
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by time; now the new Länder were providing their western counterparts
with innovative “modern” ideas for constitutional changes.1
The Basic Law and the Länder
The Constitution of the Federal Republic, called the “Basic Law”
(Grundgesetz) owing to its presumed provisional nature until unification
was achieved, not only reintroduced a democratic and federal state in the
western part of Germany but also forbade in Article 79 any amendments
“affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, the participation 
on principle of the Länder in legislation or the basic principles laid down
in Arts. 1 [concerning human dignity] and 20 [concerning democratic
principles and the rule of law].”
Like the Bismarck Constitution but unlike the Weimar Constitution,
the Länder constituting the Federal Republic are listed by name. This does
not mean, however, that the component parts of the federation are 
constitutionally guaranteed. The reorganization of the Länder through
consolidation, annexation, or redrawing of boundaries is constitutional;
however, such changes are subject to Article 29 of the Basic Law, which
presently requires popular referenda in such matters.
As in the Weimar Republic, the Länder are represented in the Federal
Council (again called Bundesrat, as in the Bismarck Reich) by delegates
appointed by the Land cabinets. However, with Prussia’s demise after
1945, four new “large” Länder emerged, two each in the North and South
of the country. These Länder were given 5 votes each in the Federal Coun-
cil; medium-size Länder with populations between 2 and 4 million
received 4 votes and small Länder 3 votes (all cast as a block).2 Govern-
ment bills are introduced in the Bundesrat before going to the Bundestag.
All bills require the approval of the Bundestag. The Bundesrat has a sus-
pensive veto and an absolute veto, the latter regarding legislation affecting
the Länder (approximately 60 percent of all bills). Bills affecting the Län-
der are those in particular that call for Land administration in accordance
with the German federal tradition. Constitutional amendments require a
two-thirds vote in both houses of parliament.3
Origins and legal framework of Land constitutions
At the Potsdam Conference in July and August 1945, the Four Allied 
Powers called for a “decentralization of the political structure and the
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development of local responsibility.”4 This provision applied to local and
regional structures. In the American, Soviet, and French zones of occu-
pation, Länder were created and constitutions adopted in 1946 and 1947.
The British delayed constitution making in their zone until the federal
constitution had been adopted.
Constitutional passage
Thus, the Constitution of Hesse, the oldest of the still existing postwar Land
constitutions, was passed by a constitutional assembly in October and by a
popular referendum in December 1946. Bavaria’s Constitution was passed
in June 1946 by a constitutional assembly and also in December by a pop-
ular referendum. A constitutional assembly passed the Constitution of the
Rhineland-Palatinate in April, which was approved by a popular referen-
dum in May 1947. Bremen’s Constitution was passed by the parliament
(Bürgerschaft) in September 1947 and by a referendum in October. While
the Saarland did not join the Federal Republic until 1 January 1957, its 
Constitution was passed by a constitutional assembly in November and
accepted by the French military government in December 1947.5
With the passage of the Basic Law in May 1949 by all of the Land parlia-
ments except Bavaria’s, the British-occupied Länder began their constitu-
tion making. Land “by-laws” were passed by the parliament in
Schleswig-Holstein in December 1949. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the
British skepticism regarding plebiscitary processes, there was no popular
referendum. Nevertheless, the Constitution of North-Rhine Westphalia,
which also was located in the British Zone, was passed by a bare majority
of the parliament in June 1950, followed by a popular referendum the
same month. But in Lower Saxony, the “temporary” Constitution was
passed by the parliament in April 1951 with no referendum, and the Con-
stitution of Hamburg was passed in June 1952, also with no referendum.
In both of these cases, however, approval in parliament was overwhelming. 
The most recent of the “original” West German constitutions is that of
Baden-Württemberg, adopted in November 1953 by a constitutional
assembly but without a referendum, after it was agreed to consolidate
Baden, Württemberg-Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern. The first
Constitution of Berlin in 1946 was the work of the Allied command. Fol-
lowing the East–West split, a new Constitution for West Berlin was pre-
pared by Germans and approved by the West Berlin parliament and
Western Allies in 1950.
Once the five reconstituted Länder of the former GDR joined the 
Federal Republic in October 1990, their parliaments adopted temporary
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constitutions and, except for Thuringia, established constitutional com-
missions to draft new permanent constitutions. They then devoted much
of their efforts between 1991 and 1995 to debating, drafting, and approv-
ing new constitutions. By the end of August 1992, Brandenburg, Saxony,
and Saxony-Anhalt had completed their constitution making.6 Saxony and
Saxony-Anhalt relied on a two-thirds vote in their parliaments for final
approval of their constitutions, while Brandenburg and the new Länder
that followed held referenda. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’s constitution
went into effect in May 1993, although a popular referendum that
approved it was not held until June 1994. Thuringia followed at the end
with its constitution in October 1993, but a confirming referendum was
not held until a year later at the time of the federal parliamentary election.
A new Constitution for Berlin, which, because of the prior existence of
West Berlin, is not considered to be among the “five new Länder,” was
approved by referendum in October 1995. Given the strong possibility of
a merger between Berlin and Brandenburg, this Constitution was expected
to be short-lived; however, the failure in 1996 of the referendum proposal
to consolidate the two Länder has changed that assumption.
The strong focus on constitution making in the East, together with the
impact of the new Schleswig-Holstein Constitution of 1990, led to con-
siderable discussion of constitutional issues throughout Germany, at least
among legal experts, so that several of the “old” West German Länder
began considering revisions or even new constitutions. Thus, Lower Sax-
ony implemented, in effect, a new constitution in May 1993, and several
other old Länder began considering constitutional changes thereafter. 
To summarize the constitution making processes used by the sixteen
German Länder in the fifty years after 1945, it can be seen that four 
procedures were used for accepting constitutions: first, approval by a 
constitutional assembly followed by a referendum (Bavaria, Hesse, and
Rhineland-Palatinate); second, approval by the Land parliament followed
by a referendum (Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, North-Rhine Westphalia, and Thuringia); third, approval
by a constitutional assembly only (Baden-Württemberg and Saarland);
fourth, approval by the parliament only (Hamburg, Lower Saxony, 
Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Schleswig-Holstein). Thus, all of the consti-
tutions were passed first either by a constitutional assembly or by the 
parliament, and nine of the sixteen constitutions were approved as well in
popular referenda.7
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Basic differences and similarities
Perhaps more significant than the ratification procedure was the “gener-
ation” of the constitution. The five Länder that passed the constitutions
before the Basic Law went into effect in 1949 wrote “full constitutions”
containing organizational structures as well as the whole array of politi-
cal and social provisions, including basic human rights. Three of these
constitutions – those of the Rhineland-Palatinate, Bavaria, and the Saar-
land – were influenced strongly by Christian thought in reaction to the
value-neutral Weimar Constitution and the total disregard of Christian
principles by the Nazi regime. The other two Länder – Bremen and Hesse
– were affected more by socialist ideas that rejected the economic con-
centration that allegedly bore some responsibility for the rise of the Nazis.
The second generation of constitutions prepared after 1949 in Baden-
Württemberg, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, North-Rhine Westphalia, and
Schleswig-Holstein, consisted of documents that were focused more on
organizational principles, since the Basic Law provided for basic human
and individual rights. The third generation of constitutions in the new Län-
der followed the western models in large part, but they were also far more
influenced by “modern“ values, including social rights and state goals.8 The
old Länder that have changed their constitutions since 1990 could also be
said to have been influenced by the third- generation “modern” values. 
In spite of these generational differences, there is a fundamental con-
stitutional “homogeneity” between the federation and the Länder and
among the latter. As in the United States, they all provide for the same
basic political system – in this case, a single-chamber parliamentary sys-
tem (Bavaria’s Senate was eliminated by referendum in 1998). They all
must abide by the fundamental rights provided by the Basic Law. They
tend to react to the same underlying societal trends, as in the case of
demands for certain state goals such as environmental protection. And,
above all, they are under the influence of national political parties that are
generally well organized, disciplined, programmatic, and in control of
Land governments and parliaments.9
Amendments
All of the older Land constitutions were amended between 1946 and 1995,
ranging from three times in Hesse to thirty-two times in the Rhineland-
Palatinate. From the beginning of 1995 through 1997, there were one or
more amendments to the constitutions of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria,
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Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Rhineland-Palatinate, and the
Saarland. The Basic Law has been amended fifty times.10
There is no common method of amendment among the Länder; how-
ever, no amendments are possible without action by their parliaments.
Some Länder follow the example of the federal Basic Law which calls for
an amendment process requiring a two-thirds vote of the Bundestag and
Bundesrat, with the difference that the Länder have only one legislative
chamber. In others, voters at large are involved in the amending process
through initiatives and/or referenda. No Land constitution gives the peo-
ple sole authority to amend. Legal challenges to amendments can be taken
to the Land constitutional court before a referendum is held.
The focus of amendments has been on adjusting Land law to federal
law, just as most amendments to the Basic Law have been concerned with
German federalism. Amendments to Land constitutions have served to
bring their texts into conformity with Federal Constitutional Court deci-
sions. However, several Land constitutions contain provisions which are
not in conformity with the federal Basic Law and, therefore, have been
superseded by the Basic Law‘s supremacy clause in Article 31.
Many changes in Land constitutions have been responses to demands to
strengthen the parliament through petition committees, investigative
committees, or through other means of parliamentary control. Some more
recent amendments reflect newer concerns, such as protecting the envi-
ronment or personal privacy and liberty by restricting the dissemination
of data.11
The legal framework for Land constitutions
According to German legal theory, the Länder are “states” that enjoy con-
siderable legal autonomy within the German federal system. They are not
derived from the federation but rather are recognized by it.12 They are not
“states” in the sense of international law,13 even though they do have lim-
ited powers in certain areas of foreign policy.14 As states, the Länder have
constitutional autonomy, namely, the right to create their own constitu-
tions.15 But this autonomy is exercised within a legal framework provided
by the federal Basic Law;16 that is, Land autonomy exists simultaneously
with the necessity of federal “homogeneity.”17 Thus, Article 28, para. 1,
requires the constitutional order in the Länder to conform to the princi-
ples of a republican, democratic, and social state of law. While federalism
and, therefore, multiple Länder are guaranteed by Article 79, para. 3, indi-
vidual Länder are not. Thus Article 29 provides for boundary changes,
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which could include the consolidation of Länder, but only by federal law
that is confirmed by a popular referendum in the areas affected. In con-
trast to the American Constitution, at least until 1925 and after, the Län-
der are also required by Article 79, para. 3, to accept as their own all
federally protected basic rights contained in Articles 1–20. They may,
however, add new or other rights that do not violate the federal constitu-
tional rights. There is also, of course, a federal supreme law-of-the-land
clause, Article 31, which can serve as a barrier to Land constitutional pro-
visions. Finally, Article 93, para. 1, sentence 4a, provides for an individual
constitutional complaint before the Federal Constitutional Court which
could be used to challenge a Land constitution.18
While these various restrictions are rather formidable, but hardly 
surprising in their content, they do not prohibit the Länder from engaging
in some degree of experimentation and, as we shall see below, creating
some controversy.
Land parliaments and legislation
Land parliaments
Since a referendum in 1998 eliminated Bavaria’s corporative Senate,
which was composed of various professions, crafts, and social groups, all
parliaments in the German Länder have one house. These are called the
Landtag in the territorial states, Abgeordnetenhaus in Berlin, and Bürger-
schaft in Bremen and Hamburg. Seven Land constitutions prescribe 
the size of the parliament, which varies from fifty-one members in the
small territorial Land of Saarland to 231 in the most populous Land,
North-Rhine Westphalia. The Land parliaments are now mostly elected
for five years; however, in Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, and Saxony-Anhalt the term is for four years. Except for
Baden-Württemberg and Bremen, the parliamentary period can end 
earlier by self-dissolution or, in a few cases, by popular referendum at the
inititative of the prime minister or parliamentary president. 
Most voters probably look to the Land parliaments as the major instru-
ment for reflecting the public will. All elections to the Land parliaments
must be “general, direct, free, equal and secret,” in accordance with the
Basic Law. In all Länder elections are based on a system of proportional
representation with a minimum of 5 percent of the total vote required in
order to obtain seats in parliament. This strongly favors political parties,
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which are mentioned explicitly in Article 21 of the Basic Law and in some
Land constitutions. 
Parliamentary law making
While Land parliaments are responsible for law making, the extent of
their legislative powers depends largely on the powers granted to them by
the federal Basic Law. At first glance, these powers appear to be extensive.
As we saw in Chapter 2, Article 30 (somewhat like the US Constitution’s
Tenth Amendment) states that the Länder are responsible for the exercise
of government powers unless the Basic Law provides otherwise. Article 70
also confers legislative powers on the Länder except where such powers
are given to the federation. Federal powers are then listed in Article 73,
concurrent powers in Article 74. The federal parliament also has the right
to pass framework or skeleton laws that the Länder must then “fill in.”
Given that the federal government has acted in virtually all areas of con-
current powers, thus excluding Land actions through the federal
supremacy clause in Article 31, and has also taken advantage of its frame-
work powers, there is not a great deal of legislative activity left for the Län-
der to pursue independently. They do retain autonomy in the areas of
culture (e.g., education, electronic media, museums, and support for the
performing arts, etc.), police, and local government law, and they engage
in numerous economic activities including various activities abroad.19 Of
course, where they have some leeway, they adapt federal laws, including
especially framework laws, to local regional conditions for administration
by the Land bureaucracy.
In 1992 and 1993 a Joint Constitutional Commission met to discuss
proposals for changes in the Basic Law as a result of unification. One focus
was German federalism. With respect to the legislative powers of the Län-
der, Article 72, which deals with concurrent powers, was made more pre-
cise in order to limit federal preemptions to specific laws rather than to
allow the federation to absorb a broad function based on a partial pre-
emption. Another change was to alter the language of Article 72, para. 2,
to grant the federation power to pass legislation for the maintenance of
equivalent rather than uniform living conditions in the country. Article
75, which provides for federal framework laws, was revised to make more
precise the language that grants the federation powers to pass framework
legislation regarding higher education. 
Other changes relevant to German federalism were made in Articles 24
to grant the Länder the right to transfer with approval of the federal 
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government certain sovereign powers to transnational border authorities
for the purpose of dealing with common problems. Also Article 28 was
changed to provide local governments with more autonomous financial
responsibility20 and to grant voting rights in the local elections to citizens
of member states of the EU living in Germany.
Direct democracy21
All German constitutions declare the people sovereign, as in “[a]ll state
[government] authority derives from the people” (Article 20, para. 2 of
the Basic Law). But this provision of the Basic Law continues to state that
“[i]t shall be exercised by the people by means of elections and referenda
and by specific legislative, executive, and judicial organs.” There is no pro-
vision for referenda in the federal Basic Law, except in Article 29 which
refers to the reorganization of Land boundaries. There was a heated dis-
cussion about the old Article 146 of the Basic Law and whether it required
a referendum on a new or revised federal constitution before or after uni-
fication (in fact, there was no referendum, and the five new Länder joined
West Germany by accession under the old Article 23). However, with
these exceptions, the Federal Republic’s Basic Law, like the United States
Constitution, provides for a representative republic. 
In contrast, most of the Länder provided from the beginning for some
form of popular initiative and referendum. In accordance with British
tradition, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, and Lower Saxony did not (but
Schleswig-Holstein’s new Constitution of June 1990 now contains the
most far-reaching plebiscitary features of any “old” Constitution). By
1997 all Länder had constitutional provisions for referenda.22
One of the most vigorously discussed features of the new constitutions
in the East following unification has been their provisions for direct
democracy, although this exists in the old Länder as well. One reason for
the debate was the effort by the political left to introduce some plebisci-
tary features into the federal Basic Law. These efforts were rejected in 1993
by the government coalition parties, the Christian Democrats (CDU and
CSU) and the Free Democrats (FDP), and were dropped as a result.23 (An
attempt by the SPD–Green coalition government to gain a two-thirds
majority in the Bundestag and amend the Basic Law to allow direct
democracy failed in the summer of 2002, owing the opposition by the
CDU/CSU and a majority of the FDP.)24 But another reason has to do
with the low thresholds in the East for initiating petitions and referenda
and for approval of the latter. 
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There are two-step and three-step procedures in the Länder that have
plebiscitary features. The older constitutions generally had two steps only:
the Volksbegehren (petition for a referendum) and the Volksentscheid (ref-
erendum). The new constitutions in the East, except Thuringia, follow the
thoroughly revised 1990 Constitution of Schleswig-Holstein by providing
for three steps. First, there is a provision for a “people’s initiative”
(Volksinitiative or, in Saxony, Volksantrag, and, in Thuringia, Bürger-
antrag), a petition to place certain items or a specific proposal on the Land
parliament’s agenda for consideration. The new Schleswig-Holstein Con-
stitution requires only 20,000 signatures for an initiative, or slightly less
than 1 percent of the eligible voting population, which is considered to be
very low. This set the stage for Brandenburg’s identical requirement of
20,000, Saxony’s requirement of 40,000, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’s
requirement of 15,000 signatures, the latter two of which constitute
slightly more than 1 percent of the population. Saxony-Anhalt’s require-
ment of 35,000 signatures is about 1.6 percent of its population.25 These
low requirements have been criticized by some for their potential abuse by
extremist groups or even by opposition parties.
If the parliament does not act on the proposal within a certain period
(e.g., three–six months), interested citizens may complete a petition
(Volksbegehren) for a popular referendum on a specific bill. Here the sig-
nature requirements are much higher (though still considerably lower
than in most West German Land constitutions, where they are generally
between 10 and 20 percent), ranging from 80,000 in Brandenburg (about
4 percent of eligible voters) to 450,000 or 12.5 percent in Saxony. If the
parliament does not accept the proposal within a set period (e.g., two
months), then, third, a referendum will be held on the bill (an alternative
bill might be added by the parliament). In striking contrast to the United
States, qualified majorities are required for approval of legislative refer-
enda (e.g., a majority of those voting but at least one-fourth of eligible
voters in Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt, a majority and one-third in
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Thuringia, but only a majority of those
voting in Saxony). In the western constitutions, approving majorities 
for referenda must constitute typically one-fourth or one-third of the 
eligible electorate. 
It should also be noted that in contrast to the United States, no petitions
or referenda are permitted that deal with judges, constitutional decisions,
the bureaucracy, or with budgets, taxes, public employee salaries, political
finance, or other financial matters. It has been argued that it is hypocriti-
cal to deny the people the right to vote in a referendum on questions of
150 The Länder and German federalism
chap  4  27/5/03  11:54 am  Page 150
finance, since most public policy issues today involve public finances.
Some voices are also skeptical of direct democracy in general, because of
the belief that most issues of public policy are too complicated to be settled
by public referenda.26
Others suggest that the provisions for direct democracy in the consti-
tutions of the Länder really have the effect of encouraging the political
parties to take up the issues raised and place them on the parliamentary
agenda. According to this view, plebiscitary features serve to promote
public discussion. Some fears have been expressed that plebiscitary fea-
tures may also lead politicians to avoid difficult decisions in favor of ref-
erenda, thus undermining the representative system. There is no evidence
so far, however, that this is likely to happen.27
Legislative control
Some observers argue that a more important function than law making
exercised by Land parliaments today is control of the executive, in partic-
ular the government (cabinet). The nature and extent of this control vary
by Land constitution.
In the city-states the parliament elects the entire cabinet: in Berlin, first
the lord mayor, then the cabinet; in Bremen and Hamburg, first the Senat
(cabinet), which then elects the lord major. In six Länder the parliament
elects only the minister-president (prime minister), whose cabinet
appointees then require parliamentary approval. In seven Länder the par-
liaments do not control the prime minister’s formation of the cabinet,
which is also the case at the federal level. In all of the Länder, the govern-
ments can call for a vote of confidence. Except in Bavaria, the parliaments
can also initiate a vote of no-confidence by majority vote of the members.
In such cases a government falls only if a majority of parliament can select
a new minister-president. This is called a “constructive” vote of confi-
dence, which applies at the federal level as well. In Schleswig-Holstein the
government can dissolve parliament if it calls for and fails to receive
majority support. Berlin, Hesse, the Rhineland-Palatinate, and the Saar-
land have a “destructive” vote of confidence, that is, the parliament must
provide an alternative within a certain period or be dissolved. Bavaria
makes parliamentary control of the government difficult in that the par-
liament can force the minister-president to resign only indirectly through
the state constitutional court.
Of course, routine control of the executive also exists through parlia-
mentary scrutiny of the budget (a key control device), question time for
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ministers, petition committees, and investigative committees. However,
the strong party discipline in German parliaments can frustrate efforts,
especially by the opposition, to control government actions. This occurs
despite the fact that all German constitutions proclaim parliamentary
delegates to be free in their decisions and not subject to mandates.
Land executives, judiciaries, and social institutions28
The executive
Governments (cabinets) stand at the apex of the executive branch in the
German Länder. In seven Länder, for example, the prime minister alone
appoints and dismisses the other cabinet ministers. In contrast to the gen-
eral bureaucracy, the ministers have political leadership responsibilities.
The constitutional powers of the minister-president are weakest in the
three city-states and stronger in the territorial states, especially Schleswig-
Holstein. In that Land and in Berlin, the head of government may also
continue in office beyond the legislative term, although in practice the
lord mayor of Berlin resigns at the end of that period. In twelve Länder the
minister-president is constitutionally responsible for general policy
guidelines (Richtlinienkompetenz); in the other four Länder the principle
of ministerial responsibility and collegiality obtains.
Constitutional provisions regarding administration of the Länder are
generally brief. In Bavaria ministries of the cabinet are listed; in other
Länder ministries are determined by law or need. As noted above, the
Länder administer most federal laws on their own responsibility. While
this aspect of German federalism is outlined in some detail in the federal
Basic Law, the Land constitutions are silent on the subject. Most consti-
tutions contain brief, general provisions regarding the rule of law, democ-
racy, obligations of public servants, salary, and the like, and the
constitutions of all territorial states have sections that guarantee the right
of local self-government. They also contain provisions regarding Land
finances, including the financing of local governments.
The judiciary29
Land constitutions do not say much about the organization of courts. This
has been left to legislation. The major exception concerns rather detailed
provisions regarding the Land constitutional courts (Staatsgerichtshof
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or Verfassungsgerichtshof).30 All courts of first instance, excepting the 
Federal Patents Court, are Land courts. These are divided among local and
regional courts, labor courts, administrative courts, finance courts, 
and social courts (for various social insurance and welfare cases). Land
courts of appeal on the facts exist for regular courts as well as for labor,
administrative, and social courts. Federal courts for each of these general
categories of law are courts of final appeal on points of law. The most
important and best known is the Federal Constitutional Court in Karl-
sruhe, which has decided many cases dealing with German federalism.31
In accordance with the Continental tradition, virtually all judges in 
Germany are career judges, or, in some federal courts and Land constitu-
tional courts, professors of law rather than former attorneys as in Anglo-
Saxon countries.
Institutions of society
All of the new constitutions contain the traditional protection of certain
institutions of society (Einrichtungsgarantien), such as marriage and fam-
ily; churches and religion; and vocational training, education, schools,
and universities. In some constitutions these are included in the sections
on basic rights, in others they are contained in separate sections. 
Although constitutional references to institutions of society are usually
routine and noncontroversial, Brandenburg insisted on provisions pro-
tecting both marriage and the family as well as “other permanent forms
of common living arrangements.”32 The new Constitution of Berlin also
contains this clause.33 Some critics have argued that this creates a legal
contradiction and probably violates the Basic Law, which protects mar-
riage and the family,34 while others, though recognizing problems of def-
inition, were more positive in their assessment. This dispute seems to
have been resolved in July 2002, when the Federal Constitutional Court
upheld the law passed by the SPD–Green coalition government in 2001
allowing homosexual marriages. 
Basic rights, social rights, and state goals
Classical basic rights
As indicated above, the Länder are bound by the basic rights contained in
Articles 1–20 of the federal Basic Law. For that reason some Länder have not
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bothered to include these rights in their constitutions and have merely indi-
cated that the rights of the federal Constitution apply to them as well. Thus,
Article 4 of the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Constitution states that “Law
making is bound by the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,”
and there is no list of conventional basic rights. The other new Länder and
Berlin have more or less repeated the rights listed in the Basic Law.
While the Länder are bound by the Basic Law, they are not prohibited
from adding to the list of federal rights.35 Examples can be found in all the
new constitutions in the eastern Länder, the most common of which are
data protection and protection of the environment. Environmental pro-
tection was added recently to the federal Constitution, while data protec-
tion is provided by federal statute law and constitutional interpretation.
In Article 39 of the Brandenburg Constitution, which deals with the
environment in considerable detail, the final paragraph states that Bran-
denburg will work toward preventing the development, manufacture, or
storage of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. In Article 40, para. 5,
the Constitution commits Brandenburg to working toward returning mil-
itary installations to civilian use. These are questionable provisions, given
that the federal government has legislative responsibility for such activi-
ties.36 Several other rights have also been added by individual Land consti-
tutions, such as equality provisions for the handicapped or for those who
have a different “sexual identity” (Brandenburg) or “sexual orientation”
(Thuringia).37 Some constitutions also protect animals against inhumane
treatment or avoidable suffering, and Brandenburg even mentions plants
as worthy of respect.38 Not only are art, science, research, and teaching
mentioned in all of the constitutions as objects of protection; art and 
culture, as well as sport, are to be promoted by public funds. 
While additions to the basic rights provided by the federal Constitution
are clearly acceptable in principle, the weakening of federal rights is more
problematic. An example is provided in the Constitution of Branden-
burg, which contains a provision (Article 31, para. 2) that permits statu-
tory restrictions on research that is injurious to human dignity or
destructive of the natural foundations of life. This implies restrictions on
gene technology and nuclear research and probably violates Article 5,
para. 3 of the Basic Law.39
Social rights and state goals
The most controversial provisions of the constitutions in the new Länder
concern social rights and state goals.40 Both can be found in the Basic Law
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and in constitutions of the old Länder, but the vigor with which they were
pursued in the East raised numerous questions.41 Social rights, both in the
old and the new constitutions include, for example, the right to employ-
ment; the right to unemployment compensation; the right to worker 
protection; the right to education and training; the right to public sup-
port in case of illness, old age, or emergency; the right to social security;
and the right to housing.
Some combination of these social rights can be found in all of the 
new constitutions; however, in contrast to the older constitutions of 
the West, they are often expressed as “state goals.” The two can thus be
distinguished more easily in form than in content.42 However, some pro-
visions are more obviously state goals than social rights, such as the right
to death with dignity43 and the protection against physical or psychologi-
cal force in marriage, in the family, and in other living arrangements
(Brandenburg Constitution). 
Social rights and state goals, unlike the classical basic rights, are not
generally enforceable in a court of law.44 To the extent that the new con-
stitutions, Brandenburg’s in particular, did not make this clear,45 some
legal experts have predicted that the courts will be busy in the future try-
ing to decide what is and is not legally enforceable. This carries with it the
potential of turning over policy making to judges and removing it from
the legislatures.46
As can be seen from the examples above, social rights concern entitle-
ments of the modern welfare state that must be included in state budgets
(which will remain critically tight in the East for decades to come) and
paid for from taxes. These are matters for governments and legislative
bodies, not for the courts.47 State goals usually consist of social rights as
well; but they may also refer to other matters, in particular protection of
the environment, gender equality, culture, and the aged and handi-
capped. If expressed as state goals, the new constitutions sometimes qual-
ify their implementation by wording indicating that the Land “is
obligated, within the limits of its ability, to realize (or bring about or pro-
mote)” (Brandenburg); “contributes toward” (Mecklenburg-Vorpom-
mern); “recognizes the right of each person to” (Saxony); “works within
the limits of its powers” (Saxony-Anhalt); or “has the obligation, accord-
ing to its abilities and within the limits of its powers, to bring about the
state goals listed in this constitution” (Thuringia). 
Social rights and state goals – and even classical rights – are often mixed
together; however, in some constitutions (e.g., Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
and Saxony-Anhalt), the first two are clearly separated from classical rights.
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As noted above, the constitution of Brandenburg in particular has been
criticized severely by legal experts for failing to make a clear distinction
between the enforceable classical “negative” rights and, according to their
supporters, the “more modern” “positive” rights. 
Some critics dismiss social rights and state goals as mere populist
rhetoric to make people feel good. More serious criticisms are that they
are too vague, that they ignore the supremacy of federal law, that they are
left-wing efforts to make good real or imagined deficits in the Basic Law,
and, above all, that they raise unrealistic expectations by making promises
that cannot be kept.48 Pointing to Brandenburg’s guarantee of the right to
employment, one constitutional expert shows how difficult and unrealis-
tic this promise is in a free-market society. He argues that such state goals
are “time bombs” waiting to explode when the promissory note comes
due, and he refers to them as “current fashions” that have the effect of
weakening the responsible legislative bodies.49
However, some commentators have been very sympathetic to these
social rights and state goals. One common view is that in spite of the inad-
equacy of the actual services and benefits promised in the German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR) constitutions, often provided at below standard if
at all, many East Germans after unification longed for the security which
they felt they enjoyed under the communists. Huge job losses and grow-
ing claims for the return of property confiscated or appropriated by the
communists in particular led to demands for the right to employment
and housing. The new Länder emphasized more than their western coun-
terparts social rights and state goals in order to deal with the concerns and
calm the fears of their populations50 and, in the process, bring the consti-
tutions closer to the people.51 Another view is that the modern state has
to deal with new challenges, such as environmental protection, that were
ignored in the past,52 and it must focus on more than the classical rights
that grant freedom from the state; instead, the state today helps to create
and secure the conditions of freedom. Regarding the right to employ-
ment, for example, “so long as appropriate work cannot be found, there
is a claim to job training, further education, and financial support. All of
the provisions of the Brandenburg Constitution make clear without illu-
sions that the state has no power to create jobs and that there exists no
individual legal claim . . . against the state.”53
One problem with this view is that there are indeed people who have
illusions about social rights and state goals. In both Mecklenburg-Vor-
pommern and Thuringia, the reformed Communist party (PDS) led a
campaign against the Constitution before the popular referendum on the
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grounds that it did not guarantee sufficiently the right to employment
and housing.54 In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 40 percent of those voting
(65 percent of eligible voters) cast their ballots against the Constitution,55
and in Thuringia about 30 percent of those voting (75 percent of eligible
voters) opposed the Constitution.56
Other rights and duties
Alongside rights provided by Land constitutions are provisions concern-
ing duties. Citizens have the duty to attend school, raise their families,
seek employment, lend assistance in emergencies, serve on juries, be loyal
to the democratic state, and, in some cases, serve the common good while
participating in the economy.
The role of the Länder in cultural, economic, and welfare activities is
also reflected in Land constitutions. Provisions concerning primary, sec-
ondary, higher education, and adult education can be found in some con-
stitutions. Religious instruction is usually protected. Performing arts are
to be protected and promoted in some Länder. Several constitutions
devote a section to the economic and social order. While economic liberty
is guaranteed, there may be provisions protecting the middle class and
agriculture. Socialization and land reform are also mentioned in some
constitutions. 
Constitution making in the new Länder
In spite of the focus in the constitutions of the new Länder on social 
rights and state goals, their constitutions are similar to those of the 
“old” western Länder. All provide for democratic, parliamentary systems.
The one-house legislature is elected every five, rather than four, years in
Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia. These same states mention explic-
itly the opposition, as did Schleswig-Holstein when it revised its Consti-
tution in 1990. The Brandenburg constitution also calls for public
meetings of its committees, which is not typical in German parliamentary
bodies, and it provides for a minimum committee membership for all
party groups in the parliament. In Brandenburg a majority of deputies
can withdraw confidence in any minister, whom the minister-president
must then remove from office. This and other provisions of the Branden-
burg constitution have been criticized by West German legal scholars.57
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Conclusion
Just as all American state constitutions provide for a similar political 
system with a directly elected governor and a two-house legislature (with
the exception of Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature), all of the
German Länder have provided for single-chamber parliamentary sys-
tems. In some Länder the constitution was approved by a qualified vote of
the parliament, in others by a referendum, and in still others by both a
parliamentary vote and a referendum. In the first generation of Land con-
stitutions before the Basic Law “full constitutions” were written, while in
the second generation after 1949 less attention was paid to the basic rights
which had been provided by the Basic Law and which included the Län-
der. The third generation of constitutions in the five new Länder were
influenced more by “modern” values such as social rights and state goals,
which aroused a good deal of controversy at least among constitutional
scholars in the West. While direct democracy was authorized in several of
the older Länder, this alternative has become more available since the
revisions of the constitution of Schleswig-Holstein in 1990 and the pas-
sage of the constitutions of the five new Länder which largely followed the
Schleswig-Holstein model. As a result more “plebiscitary” democracy,
whether in the form of referenda, the direct election of mayors, or other
applications, has become a focus of discussion and controversy since the
beginning of the 1990s. Some other differences are less dramatic. For
example, just as in the American states the powers of the governors vary,
in Germany the heads of government of the city states have somewhat
fewer powers than their counterparts in the territorial Länder. In some
German Länder elections are held every four years, in others every five
years. The number of cabinet ministers varies, as do their titles and areas
of responsibility. In spite of all these and other differences, the autonomy
the Länder possess is exercised within a legal framework provided by the
Basic Law, which requires a considerable degree of “homogeneity.” 
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Introduction
According to the official English translation of Article 20, para. 1, of the
Basic Law, the Federal Republic of Germany is a “democratic and social
federal state.” A better translation might be “a democratic and federal
social welfare state.” “Social” in German usually means socially fair, or
just, and generally equal. Therefore, this concept provides a constitu-
tional basis for the German welfare state. A European-type welfare state
is under strong unitary pressures, because government programs for old
age pensions, disability, medical insurance, nursing home care, unem-
ployment insurance, child support, and other social services must be
offered on a national basis in order to avoid regional differences and meet
nation-wide expectations of fairness and equality. Even such programs as
public assistance (Sozialhilfe), which is implemented and financed by
local governments, is regulated by federal law so that there are hardly any
differences among the localities. The Basic Law still speaks of preserving
or securing “uniformity of living conditions” in Article 106, para. 3. This
goal was modified somewhat in the 1994 constitutional reform process to
read “equivalency of living conditions” in Article 72, para. 2 (Article 106
was not changed, because it was anticipated that it would be replaced by
a new section on financial arrangements). In any case these “conditions”
are not only those provided by the welfare state but also include a variety
of services such as education, cultural activities, youth services, police
protection, hospitals, sports facilities, etc. They also include the infra-
structure that goes with such services, such as schools, roads, bus, and rail
services. Total expenditures for all of these and other public services and
facilities amounted to 50.8 percent of GDP in 1995 and 50.6 percent in
1996, but declined to 48 percent in 1998 (United States = 31.6 percent 
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in 1997). Taxes for all levels were 22 percent and various social insurance
charges 18.5 percent for a total of 40.5 percent of GNP (however, individ-
ual social insurance charges in 1998 were 41.8 percent of wages and
salaries, which is significantly higher than in the United States).1 It is clear
that pressures are strong for a national welfare and tax system that can
raise efficiently and effectively the revenues needed to support the many
state functions in Germany.
On the other hand, the Basic Law provides for a federal system that,
along with the concept of the “social” state, is guaranteed in Article 79,
para. 3. How to secure and preserve a highly developed social welfare state
with a variety of public services available to all citizens and simultaneously
maintain a functioning federal system with autonomous Länder is a ques-
tion Germans have had to wrestle with since the Basic Law went into effect
in 1949. To put it somewhat crassly, “power is where the money is.” If the
federal government has control over revenues, it is going to be difficult to
sustain a meaningful federal system. As we will see below, the federal gov-
ernment does not “control” the tax system, but the federation does. What
this means is that the government and its majority in the Bundestag can
pass tax legislation that also binds the Länder, but the Bundesrat, which
represents the Land governments, must approve such legislation as long as
the tax revenues accrue at least partially to the Land or local governments.
The result is that the Länder – that is, the Land governments that make up
the Bundesrat majority – have about as much power collectively as the fed-
eral government and its majority in the Bundestag in passing finance leg-
islation, but the individual Länder, especially if they are in the minority,
have little influence. The Land parliaments, which are not represented in
the Bundesrat, have even less to say. 
Historical development2
In the Bismarck Reich of 1871, the Constitution gave the federation the
right to collect customs duties and revenues derived from postal and tele-
graph services as well as various excise taxes on salt, tobacco, and sugar. The
states (they were not called Länder until the Weimar Republic) were given
the general power to pass tax legislation, and the Reich was dependent on
the states for contributions based on population. These contributions were
approved annually by the Bundesrat, which then as now is composed of
unelected delegates from the states. They were not adequate to meet the
needs of the federation, which had to borrow heavily as a result. 
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The Weimar Republic that emerged after the First World War brought
about fundamental changes in the tax system. The constitution gave the fed-
eration general authority for tax legislation, and the Länder had little power
to shape federal tax policy. The only limitation on the federation was that it
had to preserve the capacity of the Länder to survive, which was a nebulous
restriction at best. The new constitution provided the basis for a uniform
Reich administration of finances and for the finance and tax reform intro-
duced by Finance Minister Matthias Erzberger shortly after 1918. The sep-
arate taxes of the previous Reich were replaced by a system of joint taxes. The
most important taxes, the income tax, corporation tax, and turnover (sales)
tax, were assumed by the federation, which then transferred a certain per-
centage of each to the Länder. Since the revenues the Länder received from
the income and corporation taxes depended on the local yield, considerable
differences in tax resources emerged among the Länder. These were made
up to some extent by transfers among the Länder and federal grants.
If the Weimar Republic became more like a decentralized unitary state
than a federal state, the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler was a centralized 
state with no pretense of regional autonomy. In January 1934, a year after
Hitler took power, a law was passed according to which the Länder ceased
to exist as meaningful federal units, and the local administrative units that
came into being were financed by grants from the central government.
During the occupation in West Germany after 1945, politically active
German finance experts debated the future of their country’s tax policy.
They divided basically into two camps: one oriented strongly by principle
toward a federal solution that favored the Länder more or less along the
lines of the Bismarck Reich, and one that was more unitary in orientation
for pragmatic and largely economic reasons. Those who focused on eco-
nomic and social policies, especially the Social Democrats, tended to sup-
port the more unitary solution, but federalists and centralists could not
always be identified with any particular party. 
In the years immediately following the 1945, significant differences
emerged among the newly created Länder in their fiscal capacities, with
those receiving the largest numbers of refugees from the East suffering the
most. Controversy developed among the Länder over some kind of fiscal
equalization measure which demonstrated their desire to arrive at a reso-
lution of the issue; however, this was hardly possible without some kind
of central authority. The “poor” and “rich” Länder were divided among
themselves, sometimes in spite of common political party ties. As we shall
see, the Basic Law and its provisions for tax legislative authority at the 
federal level brought about a dramatic change of the situation. 
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The issue of taxes in the drafting of the Basic Law3
In June 1948 the Western Allies encouraged the Germans in their three
zones to draft a democratic and federal Constitution and to call for a con-
stitutional convention by 1 September 1948. Though many Germans were
reluctant to take a step that was sure to exacerbate tensions between the
Western Allies and the Soviets and therefore place unification at risk, a
group of constitutional experts was invited to participate in a conference in
August at Herrenchiemsee, a palace on a lake island in Bavaria. The Bavar-
ians introduced a draft constitution that was basically confederal in nature
and which gave the Länder taxation powers modeled after the Bismarck
Reich. Other participants looked more at the Weimar Constitution as a
more unitary model for a federal state. After the opening debates about
confederation versus federation, this issue was turned over to committee
for further deliberation. 
Given these two very different positions on the nature of the future
political system, it is not surprising that the participants of the Her-
renchiemsee Conference were provided with some dramatically different
models of financing. They were also ambivalent about which alternatives
to follow, because of the uncertainty over the future financial needs of the
federal, Land, and local governments. The result was a set of rather dis-
appointing recommendations for the Parliamentary Council, which was
to draft the official document. 
The Parliamentary Council met on 1 September 1948 as the first par-
liamentary-like body to include representatives of all three Western zones.
The political parties generally sent their leading members, some of whom
were also constitutional experts. Although the majority of votes was con-
trolled by the middle-class parties – CDU/CSU, FDP, and DP – the SPD
was confident of victory in the coming elections and decided to concen-
trate on broad legislative powers for the Bundestag rather than attempt-
ing to have certain economic and social provisions included in the new
Constitution. The middle- class parties, in turn, focused on a federal sys-
tem that could serve as a barrier to future socialist economic policy that
might be introduced by a social democratic government. 
When the finance committee of the Parliamentary Council met, the
discussions were dominated by an expert, Hermann Höpker-Aschoff
from the FDP, rather than the representatives of the large parties. The
committee did not follow the American example of fiscal autonomy for
the states, because this allowed for differences in tax systems, revenues,
and thus public services that the Germans thought they could not afford.
Dr. Höpker-Aschoff explained that
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[o]ur poverty and the high level of our tax rates will not permit us the lux-
ury of an entirely unregulated scramble for tax sources between two com-
petitors. In the United States it may be possible for the federation to levy and
collect its own income tax and the states to levy and collect their income
taxes – the same with inheritance taxes and so on. For us, it would be entirely
unworkable.4
The goal was to create a system of finances in which neither the federal nor
the Land level would be dependent on the other, as was the case, respectively,
in the Bismarck Reich and the Weimar Republic. The solution presented
was to have certain taxes set aside for each level but to have the two levels
share the most important taxes. Statutory law would then provide for a 
distribution of the shared or joint taxes in such a way that the needs of the
poorer Länder would be addressed. It was also agreed that the Länder via the
Bundesrat would have the right to veto the tax legislation proposed by the
federal government. Only the administration of the finances remained
unsettled. Unfortunately for the finance committee, however, the Allies – 
in particular, General Lucius Clay – indicated they would not accept these
provisions, because they were not sufficiently federal.5
The Allies insisted that the Constitution provide for a dual tax system in
which the federation and Länder each had legislative authority over only
those taxes it needed to meet its responsibilities.6 The Allies also rejected
the proposed system of fiscal equalization payments by the richer to the
poorer Länder, which not even the Germans in the Economic Council in
the Bizonia had approved at that time. They saw a system of grants-in-aid
on the American model as a better solution that would not make the Län-
der so dependent on the federation for their taxes. The Land governments,
on the other hand, took the opposite position that their autonomy would
be threatened by a system of federal grants but protected by the proposal
to require approval of finance legislation in the Bundesrat.
While Konrad Adenauer and the CDU seemed willing to compromise
with the Allies, the SPD leader, Kurt Schumacher, and his party were
adamant in insisting on tax legislation authority for the federation. The
SPD believed that a strong welfare state in West Germany would be attrac-
tive to East Germany and discourage communist elements in their efforts
to undermine the West German republic. Only a financially strong feder-
ation could meet this challenge. Too great a focus on federal principles
would make it more difficult to offer the necessary social services equally
and nation-wide.
It is not a little ironic that just as the Allies notified the Parliamentary
Council toward the end of April that they would accept a broad federal
legislative authority in tax matters and a joint administration of finances,
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the SPD was also indicating its willingness to compromise with the Allies
on various issues. Agreement on the constitutional draft between the
Allies and Germans was therefore reached without much difficulty.
Turnover (sales) taxes were given to the federation, and the income and
corporation taxes were given to the Länder; however, the right of the fed-
eration to tap into these taxes made them in effect joint taxes, in spite of
the fact that the Allies had rejected the proposal for federal–Land joint
taxes. Concurrent powers were broadened so that the SPD no longer
feared the federation would not have sufficient authority to pass the kind
of economic and social legislation it desired. Though not provided for
directly, the constitutional draft also made it possible to create a system of
fiscal equalization among the Länder. The constitution, called Basic Law
because of its alleged temporary nature until unification, went into effect
on 23 May 1949.
The finance reforms of 1955 and 19697
Once the Basic Law went into effect, much, but not all, of the German 
system of finance had been determined. The proportions of the income
and corporation taxes that were to go to the federation and Länder had to
be set each budget year, and each year the federal government and the
Länder struggled over these in the Bundesrat. That this was more a feder-
alism issue and not just a partisan struggle could be seen in the fact that
the CDU/CSU-dominated federal government, which had a majority in
both chambers, could not count on all of the CDU-governed Länder to
support it. Connected to the question of the proportions of the income
and corporation taxes that each level would receive was the issue of fiscal
equalization and the transfer of funds to the poorer Länder. The first law
passed by the Bundestag and Bundesrat regulating the proportions each
level was to receive gave the federation 27 percent for the fiscal year 1951;
between 1951 and 1954 the federal share was raised to 38 percent. The
demands of the federal government for a still larger share led to consider-
able tension between the federal government and the Länder and demon-
strated clearly that the finance provisions in the Basic Law were
unsatisfactory, especially for the poorer Länder. 
A second continuing controversy raged between the poorer and richer
Länder over the issue of fiscal equalization payments among them. The
poorest Länder, Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, and Bavaria, in that
order, were especially burdened by large proportions of refugees; these
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same Länder were more rural than industrial and simply did not have the
tax resources enjoyed by the more industrialized territorial Länder and
city-states; and some Länder, for example, those in the French zone, had
higher occupation costs. The richer city-states of Hamburg and Bremen
had suffered severe bomb damage and were reluctant to share their rela-
tive wealth with their neighbors because of their own burdens; the richer
territorial states, especially North-Rhine Westphalia, insisted on the
importance of maintaining Land autonomy in a federal system. Based in
part on a study commission’s recommendations, a modest fiscal equal-
ization law was passed in February 1951. It was promptly challenged
before the Federal Constitutional Court by two of the richer Länder, but
the law was upheld. Nevertheless, the poorer Länder remained frustrated
in their efforts to pursuade their richer counterparts to approve a law that
would provide meaningful transfers of funds.
In the meantime the federation and the Länder had become commit-
ted by a change in the Basic Law to pass a finance reform act by the end of
1955. Two bills were involved: one was in effect an amendment to the
Basic Law specifying which major taxes were to belong to which level and
distributing the proportions of the income and corporation taxes
between the federation and the Länder; the other concerned the transfer
payments among the Länder designed to achieve more fiscal equality. The
conflict over the provisions of this legislation between the federal govern-
ment and, to a considerable extent, the poorer Länder, on the one hand
and the richer Länder, on the other hand was severe, and it revealed fun-
damental differences between these two groups about the federal order.
For the majority of Länder, especially for the richer Länder, their ability to
manage their own affairs and their essential autonomy were at stake,
while for the poorer Länder their ability to provide essential services and
meet the constitutional requirement of uniform living conditions
required assistance from the federal and other Land governments. In the
meantime the federal government continued to demand a greater share of
total revenues in order to meet its needs, which now included a newly
established military force.
Finally, in December 1955, a compromise was reached and approved by
both chambers. The turnover (sales) tax was retained as a federal tax, and
the income and corporation taxes remained with the Länder with federal
shares set at first at 33.3 and then at 35 percent after 1958. The new pro-
visions for transfers among the Länder and federal supplementary grants
were to bring the fiscal resources of the poorer Länder to within 87.5 per-
cent of the Länder average. As in the period of the late 1940s and early
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1950s noted above, the conflict over the finance reforms in 1955 was not
partisan, although party loyalty had some relevance. 
Unfortunately, the Finance Reform of 1955 did not bring about the sta-
bility that everyone had hoped to achieve. The federation became more
intrusive in its dealings with the Länder, gaining ever more authority via
federal grants to the Länder, a process that was occurring also in the
United States. At the same time the Länder were required to administer –
and to finance – more and more federal legislation. In theory the Bun-
desrat could have been more of a barrier against these federal activities,
but partisan considerations combined with the fact that most of the Län-
der thought it politically unwise to reject federal help usually made it dif-
ficult to oppose the government.8 Criticism grew that Land tasks were
being financed by the federation and federal policies by the Länder, that
federal grants were undermining Land autonomy, and that there was too
much imbalance in the development of federal and Land budgets.9
On the other hand, the law on fiscal equalization among the Länder
which was debated and changed in 1959, brought considerable relief to
the Länder. The amounts by which the resources of the poorer Länder
were to be raised were increased to 90 percent of the average of all the Län-
der in 1958 and 91 percent after the beginning of 1959. Länder with
above-average fiscal capacity were to transfer 75 percent of the amount
between 100 and 110 percent to the pool for the poorer Länder. In general
these changes were to the advantage of the poorer Länder and came
largely at the expense of North-Rhine Westphalia and Hamburg.10
In March 1964 the government of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and the
Land prime ministers agreed to form a commission to recommend a
comprehensive finance reform. This became known as the Troeger
Commission, named after its chairman, a former minister of finance in
Hesse.11 Both the SPD and CDU/CSU were represented, which was nec-
essary because any constitutional amendment to reorganize the system
of finances would require a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag and
Bundesrat. The Commission issued its final report in March 1966. The
concept of “cooperative federalism,” borrowed from the American term
that suggested cooperation rather than competition or conflict between
the federal and subnational levels, was a theme that ran throughout the
comprehensive recommendations of the report. This implied a reduc-
tion of Land autonomy in favor of joint tasks. Later this positive view
toward cooperation was given particular expression in Article 104a, para.
4, which authorizes federal grants in very broad language, and in the
“joint tasks” of Article 91a and 91b, which called for the federation to
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participate in the financing and planning of three areas that had been
Land responsibilities.12
In the meantime the Erhard government was severely weakened by
eroding economic conditions and strains between the two partners in the
government coalition, the CDU/CSU and the FDP. When this coalition
fell apart, a Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD was formed in
December 1966. One of its announced goals was a finance reform that the
previous government under Chancellor Erhard had begun but not com-
pleted. Dissatisfaction with the Finance Reform of 1955 remained high:
severe conflict remained over fiscal equalization; there had been an
increase in “mixed financing” that was in a constitutional “gray zone”;
and federal grants for various projects were a tempting “golden harness”
(Goldener Zügel) that led to distortions in Land priorities, which meant
that tasks not aided by federal government were neglected.13 But the Län-
der demonstrated again that they were unable to come to an agreement
among themselves without the intervention of the federal government.14
The new government introduced a bill in March 1967 based closely on
the Troeger Commission report. It asserted in its draft legislation that the
people no longer accepted significant differences in services and burdens
as the price of a general autonomy for the Länder in policy making.15 But
federation–Land differences arose immediately and threatened to under-
mine the reform even though the Grand Coalition government had an
overwhelming majority in both legislative chambers. The underlying
problem in efforts to achieve any kind of finance reform was that the fed-
eral government and the rich and poor Länder, respectively, always agreed
that someone else should pay. For the poor Länder, dependence either on
their richer counterparts or on the federation was unsatisfactory.16 For the
rich Länder, their autonomy was at stake. The federation always claimed
to need more funds. 
But there was agreement that the uncontrolled growth (Wildwuchs) of
commonly financed programs should be straightened out by placing
them into separate areas. For example, the federation should restrict itself
to programs, including joint tasks, that involved responsibilities that
crossed Land borders and were expensive. In such programs there should
be joint financing and planning. However, controversy emerged regard-
ing the number of joint tasks that should be included in the reform pack-
age. In the end three were accepted, and it was agreed that as a rule the
federation would provide 50 percent of the funding.17 The localities
should share in the joint taxes, partly from the Value-Added Tax (VAT)
and partly from the personal income tax. In the case of the income tax,
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the federal government wanted to give localities the right to set different
rates. But it did not push for a general local government finance reform 
at that time.18
An important debate occurred over the taxes that were to become joint
taxes – that is, the income, corporation, and turnover (sales) taxes. In
1968 the VAT was introduced as a new European Community-wide
turnover tax. Conflict arose immediately over the distribution of its rev-
enues, over joint taxes, need-based distributions, and Land autonomy.19
In March 1968 the federal government introduced a draft of a finance
reform bill that went to the Bundesrat in April. It proposed several changes
in the previous system of finance, including the addition of Article 91a and
91b and Article 104a to the Basic Law. Joint taxes were to consist of the VAT
as well as the income and the corporation tax. The business tax for the local
governments was in effect – though not officially – a joint tax, because 40
percent of the revenues were to be shared with the Land and federal levels.
The localities would participate in income tax revenues, but they would not
set tax rates.20 After considerable controversy, especially between rich and
poor Länder, final agreement was reached and a considerable number of
important changes in the system of finance, usually referred to as the
Finance Reform of 1969, went into effect on 1 January 1970. 
Fiscal equalization measures in 1970 brought about a range in the
adjusted fiscal capacity of the Länder from 95.6 percent to 104.7 percent
of the average. Article 104a and the joint tasks put an end to the uncon-
trolled growth of federal grants. The federation now sat in committees
with all the Länder, and bilateral agreements ceased. Federal grants were
now based on Bundesrat approval. In federal–Land planning committees
for joint tasks, each Land was given one vote and the federation was given
votes equal to the total number of Länder; decisions were made with a
three-fourths majority. The “supply-side dictatorship” (Angebotsdiktatur)
created by federal grants basically disappeared. The federation no longer
had the option of offering a single Land funds or of withdrawing an offer.21
The expert whose book on German finance from 1948 to 1990 has been
the source for this historical review concluded, among other things, that
the constitutional finance reform of 1969 which 
strengthened the trend toward a broader unitary system under the slogan of
“cooperative federalism” did not lead to a strengthening of the federation
vis-à-vis the Länder in general. On the contrary, as a result of the increase in
central decision-making at the federal level with a strengthened participa-
tion of the Bundesrat, or, in other words, through more “joint and inter-
twined decision-making” (Politikverflechtung), the Länder as a whole gained
additional influence in federal policy-making. One should not overlook the
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fact, however, that the individual Land more likely lost an autonomous
room for maneuver.22
The Finance Reform of 1969 did not, of course, resolve all of the con-
flicts between the rich and poor Länder and between these and the feder-
ation. Significant changes in the fiscal capacity of Länder took place in the
1970s. As a result of the oil crises in the early and late 1970s, Lower Sax-
ony benefited strongly from its oil production. To the great annoyance of
the Länder that had to transfer equalization funds to Lower Saxony, these
oil revenues were not counted in fiscal equalization. Owing to the steel
and shipbuilding crises, North-Rhine Westphalia, Bremen, and Hamburg
became much less affluent, and the Saarland became even poorer. On the
other hand, Bavaria rose to about average in fiscal capacity. It was alleged
with some reason that the CDU/CSU–FDP coalition government favored
the CDU/CSU Länder in financial matters. Several SPD Länder took the
fiscal equalization law to the Federal Constitutional Court, which ruled
much of it unconstitutional in 1986 and set the criteria for a new law. One
of these criteria concerned changing the basis of the calculations for
transfers from the richer to the poorer Länder to fiscal capacity rather
than tax capacity. Thus, Lower Saxony could not exclude its oil revenues
after 1986.23
No sooner was the reform implemented in response to the 1986 deci-
sion of the Federal Constitutional Court than several SPD Länder com-
plained again before the Court in 1988. In the meantime a new conflict
arose over federal grants for public assistance, for which the Länder and
their localities are responsible. This conflict was resolved in December
1988 via a compromise that was to provide the Länder with DM 2.5 bil-
lion in “structural funds” grants over a ten-year period.24 This change had
barely gone into effect when the Wall came down in November 1989. Ger-
man unification, which came eleven months later, meant that new and
far-reaching changes in the German system of public finance were now
required. But while experts were wrestling with these challenges, the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court’s decision in 1992 in response to the SPD chal-
lenge in 1988 led to the provision of additional federal funds for the
purpose of reducing the debt of Bremen and the Saarland. 
Basic principles of German fiscal federalism25
All constitutional provisions regarding finances are contained in Section X
of the Basic Law, which consists of Articles 104a to Article 115. These 
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Articles and legislation dealing with finances are called the “financial con-
stitution” (Finanzverfassung). They are supplemented by Article 28, para. 2,
which provides certain guarantees of fiscal autonomy to local governments,
and Article 91a and 91b which provide for federal–Land “joint tasks.”
The federation, that is, the federal government (cabinet) together with
the Bundestag and Bundesrat, has most of the taxing authority (Article
105). It has exclusive jurisdiction over some taxes and concurrent legisla-
tive powers over most other taxes. In German constitutional law, the exer-
cise of a concurrent power by the federation excludes any Land legislation
on the matter. The Länder have the authority to pass legislation concern-
ing local excise and consumer taxes, but this legislation usually allows
their local governments to raise the taxes.
The term used by German economists to reflect the distribution of rev-
enues between the units of the German federal system is Finanzausgleich.
It has a basic meaning of fiscal balance among levels of government and
is perhaps best translated as “fiscal equalization.” Nevertheless, it can have
somewhat different specific meanings. “Vertical fiscal equalization” (ver-
tikaler Finanzausgleich) refers to the distribution between different levels,
while “horizontal fiscal equalization” (horizontaler Finanzausgleich)
refers to transfers within the level.
The five stages of fiscal equalization26
Stage one: vertical distribution of separate and joint tax revenues
Article 106, discussed below, deals with vertical fiscal equalization, some-
times also referred to as “primary fiscal equalization.” The vertical fiscal
equalization goes a long way toward providing the federation and Länder
with the funds necessary to carry out their responsibilities. Indeed, Article
106, para. 3, says that the federation and Länder have an equal claim to cur-
rent revenue to cover their necessary expenditures and that necessary
expenditures of each level are to be coordinated in such a manner as to
achieve a fair balance, avoid an overburdening of taxpayers, and provide
uniformity of living conditions in the territory of the federation. Never-
theless, given the differences in the economies of the German Länder and
the autonomy of their governments, vertical or primary distributions of
revenues do not bring about equality of resources.27
The Germans distinguish between a Trennsystem, or separate taxes
accruing to one or another level, and a Verbundsystem, joint taxes shared
by the various levels. The American practice which is mostly one of sepa-
rate taxes for each level but which allows the different levels to tap the
174 The Länder and German federalism
chap  5  27/5/03  11:55 am  Page 174
same source, as in the case of federal and state income taxes or federal and
state gasoline or tobacco taxes, is unknown in Germany. The general rule
is that any one source of funds can be taxed by only one level.28 However,
there is some discussion today of allowing the Länder and their local gov-
ernments to set their own rates on the income tax within certain limits.
Separate federal taxes are listed in Article 106, para. 1.29 They include
taxes on the “finance monopolies,” now only brandy; customs duties, most
of which go to the EU; excise taxes, such as tobacco, sparkling wine, coffee,
and gasoline taxes; income and corporation surtaxes for expenses attrib-
uted to unification; and taxes raised within the framework of the EU. Sep-
arate taxes for the Länder, provided by Article 106, para. 2, include a wealth
tax (no longer being raised); inheritance tax; motor vehicle tax; property
acquisition tax; beer tax; and betting and casino gambling taxes. They 
also have a tax for the purpose of fire protection, and they raise additional
revenues through lotteries.30
Local governments are included in Article 106 of the Basic Law, but
most of the details regarding their limited tax authority are provided by
federal and Land statutory law. Separate local taxes include consumer or
user taxes on such items as entertainment, nonalcoholic beverages, dogs,
hunting and fishing, and licenses for the sale of beer. These are minor taxes
that account for around 1–4 percent of local revenues,31 about the same
proportion as in the United States. The most important separate taxes are
the Realsteuern, which include taxes on municipal property (Grundsteuer
B) and agricultural land and forests (Grundsteuer A). The latter consist of
most of the land that surrounds the village or town and is included within
its jurisdiction,32 that is, there is little land in Germany that is not incor-
porated. Property taxes accounted for about 12 percent of local tax rev-
enues, or DM 11.1 billion, in 1994.33 Realsteuern also include the
Gewerbesteuer, a tax on business enterprises in the municipality. This tax
used to be divided into three kinds: a tax on gross profits, a tax on capital
assets, and a payroll tax. The latter two taxes were eliminated in 1998 and
1979–80, respectively. The remaining business tax (Gewerbeertragssteuer)
is a tax placed usually on around 5 percent of net profits. The munici-
palities are allowed within limits to set their own assessment rates on 
the different Realsteuern.34 The Gewerbesteuer is an important tax for 
most municipalities; however, it varies widely in yield based on the rate
assessed by the localities and on the nature and location of the busi-
ness enterprises.35 In the 1970s the localities shared 40 percent of their
business tax revenue with their Land and the federation; today the amount
assessed is about 20 percent in the old Länder, about 25 percent of which
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goes to the federation. The assessment in the new Länder, which do not
pay a supplementary contribution to the German Unity Fund, is about 10
percent.36
The most important taxes in Germany are not the separate taxes listed
in table 5.1, but the joint, or shared, taxes authorized in Article 106, para.
3. These are the income tax, the corporation tax, and the turnover tax
(since 1968 the VAT, a sales tax applied to each stage of production).
Together they make up about 72 percent of total tax revenues and about
88 percent of Länder revenues.37 The local governments receive 15 percent
of the income tax and since 1998 2.2 percent of the VAT after the federa-
tion has received 5.63 percent for old age pensions. The federation and
the Länder each receive 42.5 percent of the income tax and 50 percent of
the corporation tax. The proportion of the VAT received by each level is
set by federal law and can change when developments in revenues and
expenditures at the federal and Land levels so demand. In 1998 VAT rev-
enues – the VAT was set at 16 percent of the sale of goods and services in
1998 – were divided between the federation, Länder, and municipalities
as indicated in table 5.1. 
Stage two: horizontal distribution of joint tax revenues38
Article 107, para. 1, first grants the Länder their “primary” revenue share
yielded from the personal income tax and corporation tax according to
the residency principle, the same “local yield” (örtliches Aufkommen)
principle that is applied to the municipalities’ share of the income tax. In
other words, the revenues from personal income taxes go to the munici-
pality (up to an amount specified by law) and Land in which the taxpayer
has his or her residence. The corporation tax revenues go to the location
of production facilities, not to where the firm headquarters are located.
The “local yield” principle has always been a source of controversy
between the “richer” and “poorer” Länder. The former see the right to
keep revenues generated in their own territory as a function of their
autonomy, while the poorer Länder argue that funds should be distrib-
uted on the basis of need or population. 
In contrast to the “local yield principle,” the distribution of 75 percent
of the Land share of the VAT is based on population. This provides for 
an element of equalization of revenues based on an “abstract” general
need39 and, more technically, according to certain assumptions of “final
consumption.”40
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Table 5.1 Own source taxes/revenues and distribution of 
joint tax revenue, 1999
Federation Länder Localities
Insurance premium tax Personal wealth taxa Real property tax A
Bill of exchange tax a Motor vehicle tax Real property tax B
Domestic investment taxa Beer tax Second home tax
Road freight taxa Inheritance tax Licensing tax
Capital transfer/ Property acquisition tax Entertainment tax
transaction taxa Racing and lottery tax Hunting & fishing tax
Customs duties Casino gambling tax Dog tax
Gasoline tax Fire protection tax Local beverage tax
Coffee tax Business taxb
Sparkling wine tax
Tobacco tax
Brandy tax
Solidarity tax surcharge
Joint taxes %
Turnover tax (VAT = 
a form of sales tax)c Special Distribution Federation 5.63
earmarked for old age 
pensions
Municipalities 2.2
compensation for 
elimination of capital 
business tax
Remainder (92.17) Federation 50.5 
Länder 49.5
Corporation tax Federation 50
Länder 50
Personal Income tax and payroll tax Federation 42.5
Länder 42.5
Municipalities 15
Local business tax (Gewerbesteuer)b This is a municipal tax, but 
some of it is shared with the 
Land and federal governments. 
The amounts shared depend 
on a number of factors that 
make it difficult to generalize.
Notes: a These taxes are authorized but are no longer being raised; b The business tax is legally a
local tax, but de facto it is a joint tax; c figures for 1999. 
Sources: “Unsere Steuern von A-Z,” Ausgabe 1997 (Bonn: Bundesministerium der Finanzen),
pp. 44–45; Thomas Lenk, “Länderbericht Bundesrepublik Deutschland” in Föderalismus – Hält
er noch, was er verspricht? edited by Hans Herbert von Arnim, Gisela Färber, und Stefan Fisch
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2000), pp. 241–248; BMF, Finanzbericht 1999, 144.
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Stage three: horizontal distribution based on tax capacity
At the third stage those Länder whose total share of revenues from the
personal income tax, corporation tax, business tax, the 75 percent of the
VAT distributed on the basis of population, and Land tax revenues is
below the per capita average receive supplementary funds from the
remaining 25 percent of the Länder share of the VAT. This “secondary”
distribution brings the poorer Länder up to 92 percent of the average per
capita revenue of all Länder.41
Stage four: horizontal fiscal equalization among the Länder
Same-level transfers from richer to poorer Länder are designed to provide
more differentiated assistance.42 These transfers are sometimes called fis-
cal equalization “in a narrower sense.”43 The federal law that provides for
transfers among the Länder requires approval by the Bundesrat. 
Horizontal fiscal equalization among the Länder is a further refine-
ment with the purpose of giving all Länder the means to provide virtually
the same services. This is derived from the “federal principle of standing by
one another,”44 which in turn is a form of federal comity. The further
adjustments to produce even more equalization are considered necessary
to secure for the poorer recipient Länder the budget autonomy they 
need and to meet the goal of equivalent living conditions throughout the
country. 
Horizontal fiscal equalization is based on a complicated scheme that
contrasts the tax revenues a Land should have (fiscal needs) with those it
actually has (fiscal capacity). Both indicators are calculated on the basis of
average tax revenues, including 50 percent of the municipal tax revenues
(excluding their minor taxes), but each is subject to certain modifications.
Fiscal needs include consideration of the size and density of population
of municipalities. In accordance with the so-called “Brecht–Popitzsches
principle” first enunciated in the 1920s, it has been assumed that the larger
the population and the greater the population density of a municipality,
the higher are the per capita expenditures. Thus, the population of a town
of 5,000 is factored in at 100 percent, but for a city of 500,000 it is 130 
percent; density figures of 1,500–2,000 inhabitants per km2 are worth 
2 percent, while for 3,000 inhabitants per km2 they are worth 6 percent. 
In recent years questions have been raised in the literature and in the 
Federal Constitutional Court about the empirical evidence for this 
principle.45
Another adjustment is made for the city-states, Bremen, Hamburg, and
Berlin. Their real populations are multiplied by 135 percent, with the result
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multiplied in turn by the fiscal capacity of the city-state. Thus, by this 
procedure in 1993 the population of Hamburg (1,690,000) was increased to
2,280,000, which then raised Hamburg’s equalization index figure from
DM 7.161 billion to DM 9.347 billion (see table 5.2). The justification for
this adjustment is that the city-states provide many services for people in
the metropolitan area who live outside the city-state boundaries.46
Fiscal capacity includes the total tax revenues of the Länder, special
levies (e.g., on oil production in Lower Saxony), 50 percent of the total
volume of municipal revenues based on the average assessment rate for
property and business taxes, and harbor burdens. Thus the federal Fiscal
Equalization Law allows Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
(Rostock), and Lower Saxony (Emden) to deduct from their fiscal capac-
ity DM 142 million (Hamburg) to DM 18 million (Lower Saxony).47 If the
financial need is greater than the fiscal capacity, the Land receives transfer
funds. If the fiscal capacity is greater than the fiscal need, the Land must
transfer funds to the recipient Länder.
As table 5.2 demonstrates, the calculation of the amounts to be trans-
ferred from and to the various Länder begins with the fiscal capacity of the
individual Länder. This figure is then multiplied by the proportion of 
the Land population to total population in Germany to produce the
equalization index figure. The fiscal capacity figure is then divided by the
equalization index figure which results in a percentage indicating whether
the Land is above or below average. The equalization index is subtracted
from the figure for fiscal capacity to arrive at the surplus or deficit of each
Land in comparison to the average. 
The next step is for the Länder that are above average (payer Länder) to
transfer to the recipient Länder 37.5 percent of any missing amount
between 92 and 100 percent; this brings their fiscal capacity to 95 percent
of the average. The Länder that have a higher figure for fiscal capacity than
for their equalization index must transfer 15 percent of their “surplus”
that lies between 100 and 101 percent, 66 percent of their surplus that lies
between 101 and 110 percent, and 80 percent of any surplus above 110
percent. In case these transfers do not achieve their purpose of bringing
all of the recipient Länder to 95 percent of the average, additional trans-
fers might take place from the surpluses above 101 percent. 
The Länder that are above average and transfer funds to the poorer Län-
der have varied over the years. In the first decades of the Federal Republic,
for example, Bremen and North-Rhine Westphalia were later joined by
Baden-Württemberg as perennial “payers,” whereas Schleswig-Holstein,
Lower Saxony, Bavaria, and Rhineland-Palatinate were recipients. In the
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Table 5.2 Fiscal equalization in the old Länder, 1993
NW BY BW NI HE RP SH SL HH HB Total
Fiscal capacity measure (FC) 74358.00 50113.00 44705.00 29148.00 28020.00 14646.00 10662.00 3893.00 9170.00 2931.00 267646.00
Compensation measure (CM) 74542.00 49157.00 42404.00 31717.00 24790.00 16223.00 11171.00 4537.00 9347.00 3758.00 267646.00
CM/actual inhabitants 4216.00 4176.00 4178.00 4186.00 4186.00 4180.00 4169.00 4185.00 5535.00 5479.00 4240.00
FC in proportion to CM in % 99.75 101.94 105.43 91.90 113.03 90.28 95.44 85.81 98.11 78.01 100.00
Surplus/Deficit –185.00 956.00 2301.00 –2569.00 3230.00 –1576.00 –509.00 –644.00 –177.00 –826.00 0.00
Fiscal equalization (FE) 69.00 0.00 –1009.00 983.00 –2122.00 765.00 191.00 417.00 66.00 639.00 0.00
FC after FE 74427.00 50113.00 43696.00 30131.00 25898.00 15412.00 10853.00 4310.00 9236.00 3570.00 267646.00
FC after FE in proportion to CM 99.84 101.94 103.05 95.00 104.47 95.00 97.15 95.00 98.82 95.00 100.00
FC in DM/inhabitants 4210.00 4258.00 4306.00 3976.00 4373.00 3971.00 4050.00 3976.00 5469.00 5205.00 4240.00
in % of average 99.28 100.40 101.54 93.77 103.12 93.65 95.51 93.76 128.98 122.75
in DM/weighted inhabitants 4210.00 4258.00 4306.00 3976.00 4373.00 3971.00 4050.00 3976.00 4051.00 3856.00 4185.00
in % of weighted average 100.59 101.73 102.87 95.01 104.48 94.88 96.77 94.99 96.80 92.13
Inhabitants (millions) 17680.00 11770.00 10150.00 7580.00 5920.00 3880.00 2680.00 1080.00 1690.00 690.00 63.12
Weighted inhabitants 17680.00 11770.00 10150.00 7580.00 5920.00 3880.00 2680.00 1080.00 2280.00 930.00 63.95
Source: Dieter Carl, Bund–Länder–Finanzausgleich im Verfassungsstaat (Baden–Baden: Nomas Verlagsgeslischaft, 1995), p. 64.
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1970s and 1980s the decline of smokestack industries had a very negative
effect on North-Rhine Westphalia and the Saarland, and the decline of ship-
building hurt Bremen. In the meantime Hesse and Baden-Württemberg
prospered, and for the past few decades there has been a North–South gap
in Germany that began to include Bavaria in the fiscally stronger group in
1989. Populous North-Rhine Westphalia returned to the payer or provider
column in 1989 but was a recipient of transfer funds in 1993 and 1994. It has
since returned to the provider column. With the accession of the five new
Länder in the East, an even greater East–West gap has been superimposed
on the North–South gap.48 Data for 1995–2000 are provided in table 5.3.
Stage five: federal supplementary grants49
After the transfer of funds from the richer to the poorer Länder, which
bring the poorer Länder to 95 percent of the average fiscal capacity of all
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Table 5.3 Fiscal equalization among the Länder, 1995–2000 (million DM)
1995 1996 1997 2000
Transfer Payment Länder (-)
North-Rhine Westphalia 3,449 3,132 3,033 2,201
Bavaria 2,532 2,862 3,079 3,749
Baden-Württemberg 2,803 2,521 2,423 3,873
Hesse 2,153 3,240 3,130 5,354
Hamburg 117 482 264 1,099
Schleswig-Holstein 141 – 5 –
Recipient Länder (+)
Lower Saxony 452 553 672 1,113
Rhineland-Palatinate 229 231 305 780
Schleswig-Holstein – 16 – 358
Saarland 180 234 203 329
Bremen 562 635 351 872
Berlin 4,222 4,336 4,425 5,521 
Saxony 1,773 1,965 1,896 2,328
Saxony-Anhalt 1,123 1,241 1,162 1,407
Thuringia 1,019 1,127 1,110 1,320
Brandenburg 864 1,035 976 1,263
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 771 856 835 983
Total +11,195 +12,229 +11,934 +16,274
Sources: BMF, Finanzbericht 1999, p. 154; for 2000, Das Parlament 21 (18 May 2001), p. 11.
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Länder, the federation again enters the picture with federal supplementary
payments (Bundesergänzungszuweisungen, BEZ) designed to raise the
average fiscal equalization deficits from 95 percent to 99.5 percent. In this
process, special burdens carried by the recipient Länder may be consid-
ered. These include federal payments for above-average costs of operating
the political system, e.g., legislative and executive salaries. These payments
range from DM 219 million for Berlin and Rhineland-Palatinate to DM
126 million for Bremen. Other Länder receiving such funds are Branden-
burg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saarland, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-
Holstein, and Thuringia. Special burdens grants also go to eastern Länder
for municipalities with especially low fiscal capacity and for burdens asso-
ciated with the division of Germany. Berlin and the five new Länder receive
funds that range from DM 3.658 billion for Saxony to DM 1.479 billion for
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. These payments are to be continued until
2004. In recognition of disproportionate burdens, several western Länder
also receive federal grants which ranged in 1995 from DM 507 million for
Lower Saxony to DM 80 million for Bremen and the Saarland. Rhineland-
Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein also received DM 451 and DM 227 mil-
lion, respectively. These grants are to be reduced 10 percent each year after
1995. In addition Bremen and the Saarland received DM 1.8 billion and
DM 1.6 billion in 1995–98 for the purpose of debt reduction and impor-
tant investments designed to improve the economies of these Länder.50
They will receive decreasing amounts until 2003. 
While from an American perspective fiscal equalization measures in
Germany may appear to reduce the autonomy of the poorer Länder by
making them partially dependent on the federation and the richer Län-
der, the German view, especially in the poorer Länder, has been that it is
precisely the general fiscal equalization among the Länder that makes it
possible for them to carry out all of their functions autonomously and to
meet the constitutional requirement of providing equivalent or uniform
living conditions (Article 72, para. 2, and Article 106, para. 3). Equiva-
lent living conditions do not mean the elimination of all differences in
living conditions throughout Germany, but the concept does suggest
generally equivalent public services and standards that only an adequate
funding of all government units throughout the country can provide.
The goal of equivalent living conditions is anchored in the principle of
the sozialer (social welfare) state, the state of law (Rechtsstaat), and the
federal state (Article 20, para. 1). Its specific application, however, is 
subject to interpretation.51
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Unification and the Solidarity Pact of 1993
When it became increasingly clear in the months following the opening
of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 that Germany would be united
again after more than forty years (but without the eastern territories lost
to Poland and Russia after 1945), some attention began to be paid to the
many financial problems that unification would bring – although these
were underestimated. One of the most difficult of these was the question
of providing “uniform” living conditions in a country that now had a
huge gap in productivity, housing standards, infrastructure, and general
standard of living between East and West. Two very different social and
economic systems were to be integrated, although the eastern part had
less than one-third of the per capita GDP of the western part. This was
then reflected in a statistical reduction of about 15 percent in average per
capita income for the united Germany. The result was that “from a state
which had become poorer, more services were now demanded.”52
Beginning in 1990, huge transfers of funds have flowed from West to
East. The annual amounts have generally been estimated at around DM
150 billion annually; however, there is disagreement about the calcula-
tions of the transfers. Depending on what is counted, they range for 1992
from DM 100 billion to DM 234 billion. One expert suggests after a care-
ful analysis that the net transfer in 1992 was between DM 162.5 and DM
183 billion, or about 6 percent of the West German GDP. This represented
about 60 percent of the GDP of East Germany.53
In May 1990 the two Germanies signed a treaty in preparation for the
currency, economic, and social union to go into effect on 1 July 1990. In
order to finance the anticipated East German deficits through 1994, a
“German Unity Fund” was created. At that time it was thought that this
deficit could be financed one-third each by East Germany, the federation,
and the old Länder. The German Unity Fund was to contain DM 115 bil-
lion for payments through 1994, with the federation commiting DM 20
billion through savings from previous expenditures connected to the
division of the country (e.g., subsidies for border areas and West Berlin)
and the federation and the old Länder providing DM 47.5 billion each
from loans. Although it was argued that the federation was fiscally
responsible for unification costs, the old Länder agreed to assume a heavy
loan burden to avoid having to meet the demand by the federation that its
share of VAT revenues be increased dramatically.54
At the end of August 1990, the East and West Germans signed the Uni-
fication Treaty. Article 7 of this Treaty dealt with the financing of united
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Germany from 1991 through 1994. In principle the East was to be inte-
grated into the system of public finance in the Federal Republic. Thus,
the provisions of Article 91a and 91b, which provided for certain grants
to the Länder based on mixed financing, and the provisions of Article
104a that authorized the federation to give grants to the Länder for a
variety of purposes, were to be applied to the five new Länder as of 1 
January 1991. It was soon apparent, however, that the investments
derived from these provisions were inadequate to meet the needs in the
East that were proving to be much greater than had been anticipated.
This led to an agreement between Chancellor Kohl and the prime minis-
ters of the new Länder to establish an investment fund (Aufschwung Ost),
that provided an additional DM 12 billion each for the years 1991 and
1992. Another investment program (Aufbau Ost) providing DM 6.6 
billion annually was established in 1993 that went into effect in 1995 and
is to expire in 2004.55
Until 1994 there were also some important exceptions in the East to the
general rules of the financial system of the Federal Republic. The distrib-
ution scheme of VAT revenues to the Länder was not applied at first in the
eastern Länder, and they did not participate in the transfer of funds from
richer to poorer Länder. The eastern Länder were so much poorer that all
of the recipient Länder in the West except Bremen would have had to
make sizable transfers to the East.56 This was, of course, unacceptable 
to the old Länder. The “German Unity Fund,” which was originally estab-
lished to cover East German debts but was revised in the Treaty on 
German Unity to provide the new Länder with transfer funds based on
population, was to serve as a substitute for these exceptions. But it soon
became apparent that these measures were inadequate as well. The bud-
get pressures in the new Länder forced them to borrow heavily, and it was
clear they needed additional funds. After 1 January 1991, the new Länder
began receiving their full share of VAT revenues based on population, and
the contributions of the old Länder were increased. The federation gave
up the 15 percent portion of the German Unity Fund that it planned to
use for “central purposes” and turned it over to the new Länder. As a
result of these actions, the new Länder received an additional DM 10 bil-
lion, and the German Unity Fund was increased from DM 115 billion to
DM 161 billion.57 By the end of 1991 the VAT on goods and services 
was increased from 14 to 15 percent (in part because of the EU) and the
Länder share of VAT revenue was increased from 35 to 37 percent. A 7.5
percent temporary surcharge on income and corporation taxes was also
imposed between 1 July 1991 and 30 June 1992. 
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In 1991 and 1992 the federation as well as the old and new Länder were
borrowing so heavily that many observers became alarmed. This was not
only because of conventional economic arguments regarding the accu-
mulation of excessive debt, but also because of the convergence criteria set
by the EU for qualifying for the common currency, the “Euro.” It became
apparent that the financial arrangements for meeting the fiscal challenges
of unification were inadequate and would have to be changed signifi-
cantly when these arrangements elapsed at the end of 1994. Voices were
heard demanding an overall finance reform that would be incorporated
into the package of constitutional changes being considered in 1993 and
1994 by a joint committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat. However, a
comprehensive finance reform was not taken up by this committee for
several reasons, including the fact that there was no consensus on a gen-
eral framework or concept of reform and, as a result, a lack of will to
spend so much time and effort on a reform that would interfere with and
delay other deliberations on constitutional change.58
The result of the strong pressures for revision of the fiscal equalization
system was the Federal Consolidation Program (“Solidarity Pact”) of
1993 that provided the changes in the system of finances that have applied
with only minor alterations since 1 January 1995. Change of some kind
was made absolutely necessary by the fact that the temporary measures
described above were to elapse at the end of 1994. Given the economic
conditions in the East, the heavy burdens on the federation, and the real-
ization by the old Länder that admitting the new Länder to the West 
German system of fiscal equalization would have devastating conse-
quences for them, it became clear that a new financing system would have
to be devised before 1995, when the new Länder were scheduled to join
the the equalization system as regular members. As a result of these pres-
sures, the finance ministers of the sixteen Länder formed in September
1991 a working group, “Finance Reform 1995.” This group met regularly
until the spring of 1993, during which time the larger, mostly richer, Län-
der proposed reforms generally opposed by the mostly smaller, poorer,
Länder. The new Länder were, of course, interested in being included as
soon as possible in the fiscal equalization measures, but no model of
reform could garner a majority.
Disagreements between the federation and the Länder were also a 
barrier to reaching consensus on a reform model. This encouraged the
Länder to work together in order to counter the federal government’s
efforts to push through reforms that the Länder saw as disadvantageous to
them. After many months of wrangling between the federal government
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and the Länder and among these as well, agreement was reached in 
May 1993. 
Starting in 1995, the Solidarity Pact provided annual transfers of DM
56 billion for ten years to the East along with billions in loans for housing
construction, infrastructure, environmental cleanup, and business pro-
motion. It also provided DM 40 billion for old Eastern debts. The feder-
ation’s contribution is financed as of January 1995 in large part by a 7.5
percent “solidarity surcharge” on personal income taxes and corporation
taxes, a tax which had gone into effect briefly after unification but
dropped again in 1992. By the late 1990s it had become very unpopular
and politically controversial, at least in western Germany, owing in part to
the incorrect belief held by many West Germans that East Germans do
not have to pay the surcharge. The five new Länder were included in the
horizontal equalization scheme, which, as we saw above, requires large
transfers from the old to the new Länder. In compensation, the Länder
share of VAT revenues was raised from 37 to 44 percent. In 1996 this was
changed again to 49.5 percent for the Länder.59 The federation accepted
the burden of giving up a large chunk of its share of VAT revenue and at
the same time agreed to transfer large sums to the eastern Länder in order
to bring their fiscal capacity up to 92 percent (stage three) and then,
finally, from 95 percent to 99.5 percent of the average (stage five). 
When compared to what the federal government had proposed initially
for the solidarity pact, the Länder appeared to emerge as the victors in the
struggle over a revised system of finances.60 Others argue that if one con-
siders the costs incurred before the Solidarity Pact, the old Länder come
up short.61 The federation conceded that it was responsible for most of the
burdens of unification, although the Land share, which is only about 10
percent, is still very sizable. On the other hand, the new Länder have
become far more dependent on the fiscal equalization procedures and on
federal grants than the poor Länder in western Germany ever were. This
adds fuel to the argument that the Länder have too little fiscal autonomy
and need more own source revenue. Nevertheless, the solidarity pact rep-
resents incremental reform; it is not a major departure from the system in
operation since the Finance Reform of 1969. 
Other federal grants to the Länder
One could easily conclude that the large federal transfers to the Länder
within the framework of the fiscal equalization scheme might exhaust the
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possibilities for revenue distribution. But outside this scheme the federa-
tion has the constitutional authority to provide numerous other grants for
investments in the Länder. Article 104a, para. 4, permits federal grants to
the Länder and local governments (municipalities and counties) for “espe-
cially important investments” designed “to avert a disturbance of the over-
all economic equilibrium or to equalize differing economic capacities
within the federal territory or promote economic growth.” Details must 
be provided by statutory law subject to approval by the Bundesrat. 
Article 104a, para. 4, does not give the federation a general right to pro-
vide direct grants to the Länder and indirect grants to localities, but the
Article’s provisions are not very specific. After all, determining what “a
disturbance of the overall economic equilibrium” is cannot be based on
precise calculations but rather on whether there is a stagnating or declin-
ing economy in the region. Any investments that would seem to help
counter this decline would be appropriate. In contrast to this Article,
Article 91a and 91b provide for more long-term aid. Some of the goals of
Article 104a, para. 4, and Article 91a are the same or similar, but Article
91a is more “specialized,” because it calls for the participation of the fed-
eral government in a particular planning procedure and a predetermined
financial scheme. But above and beyond the provisions of these Articles,
the federal government has no right to participate in the selection of indi-
vidual projects. It can only exclude projects that do not fit the provisions
of the federal law.62
The Länder and especially their local governments are responsible for
about 80 percent of all investments, which have a strong impact on the
economy as a whole. The federation was therefore given indirectly a good
deal of responsibility for the economy when Article 104a was introduced
in the Finance Reform of 1969. In the case of federal financial grants under
Article 104a, para. 3, if 50 percent or more of the project to be funded is
paid from federal funds, the project is administered by the Länder on
behalf of the federation. If the Länder contribute more than 25 percent, the
program must be approved by the Bundesrat. Grants must be for projects
with a broad purpose, not just for local or regional concerns. In 1994 fed-
eral aid included urban renewal (federal share = 33 percent); public hous-
ing (about 50 percent); local public transportation (60–75 percent); local
streets (90 percent); public commuter transportation (90 percent); and
others.63 A special investment program for the eastern Länder (Aufbau
Ost) was established in 1995 under Article 104a as well. This program
includes project grants worth DM 6.6 billion annually for ten years. The
federation may not interfere in the Land or local planning for these 
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measures, nor is it responsible for the way the money is spent. It can, how-
ever, determine whether the funds are spent according to the law.64
Article 91a and 91b, also introduced by the Finance Reform of 1969,
provide the Länder with additional funds for investing in “joint tasks.”
Thus, the federation may participate in Land responsibilities when these
are important for the general population and federal participation is nec-
essary to improve living conditions. Three such areas are listed in Article
91a: expansion and construction of university buildings, including uni-
versity clinics; improvement of regional economic structures; improve-
ment of agricultural structure and coastal preservation. Joint tasks are
regulated by federal law approved by the Bundesrat. The laws include pro-
visions for joint planning for grants that must have the approval of the
Länder to which they apply. For the construction of university buildings
and for regional economic structures, the federation provides one-half of
the funding for the project; for improvement of agricultural structure and
coastal preservation the federation covers at least half of the cost for each
Land. For universities and university clinics, plans called for DM 1.8 bil-
lion for the period 1998–2001; for regional economic structures, plans
included investments of DM 5.7 billion in the new Länder and of DM 700
million in structurally weak regions of western Germany, with each level
contributing 50 percent. For improving agriculture and preserving coastal
regions, the plans called for a total of DM 3.22 billion, with the federation
paying 60 percent for agricultural improvements and 70 percent for
coastal preservation.65
Article 91b provides for cooperation between the two levels in the area
of educational planning and in promotion of research institutions and
research projects with broad impact. Educational cooperation exists, but
it is not nearly as widespread or intrusive as originally planned during the
“planning euphoria” of the late 1960s and early 1970s when the Finance
Reform of 1969 was being debated. In the area of research institutions and
research projects, including the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft scientific insti-
tutes and the German Research Association (DFG), federal assistance has
become essential.
Fiscal equalization within the Länder
Horizontal fiscal equalization takes place not only among the Länder but
also between them and their local governments. Article 106, para. 7,
requires the Länder to share a percentage of their joint tax income with
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their local governments. Land laws are also to determine whether and to
what extent the Land taxes are to be shared with the localities in order 
to equalize to a considerable degree the finance capacity of the local 
governments. The percentage shared varies by Land, but in 1996 the total
of all grants by the Länder to their counties, cities, towns, and villages was
DM 95.3 billion. 
There are two general categories of grants: general-purpose formula
grants and special-purpose categorical or project grants. General-pur-
pose grants are designed to provide local governments with the financial
means to meet their general obligations and are not tied to any specific
tasks.66 Most general-purpose grants are provided in the form of formula
grants, distributed primarily on the basis of population; however, some
general-purpose grants are provided on the basis of need. “Need” can
apply to towns that have been designated “central places” that provide
many services for surrounding towns, or they can be towns that have spas
or military installations. Special needs may also result from the amount
of public assistance the municipalities are providing to those who do not
qualify for unemployment compensation.67 Population size is determined
not only by a real count but also by size of municipality. Thus, the larger
the municipality, the more each person “counts,” e.g., the population of a
town of 5,000 may be multiplied by 100 percent, while the population of
a town of 10,000 may be multiplied by 110 percent.68 As noted earlier, this
practice is based on the view that larger towns and cities provide many
services to the region and on the theory mentioned in an earlier section
that the greater the population density, the higher the per capita costs.69
Special-purpose grants are designed to finance all or part of certain
functions. These include grants that compensate local governments for
implementing specific delegated tasks, including grants that pay for vari-
ous direct transfers of money and grants that help pay for schools, streets,
and commuter transportation. Investment grants for infrastructure, like
project grants in the United States, are awarded on the basis of application
from the local units of government. They normally require financial par-
ticipation by the applying unit. As in the United States, they are frequently
criticized for distorting the priorities of local governments and thus lim-
iting to some extent their local autonomy. But they make up only a small
part of the total income of the localities and hardly play a significant role,
so that, at least in the view of some experts, any measurable effect of Land
investment grants on local priorities is unlikely.70
Even in comparison to the Land and municipal governments, the
counties have few taxes of their own; indeed, only about 1 percent of their
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income is from their own tax sources.71 On the other hand, as noted at 
the beginning of this section, the Länder are required by the Basic Law to
provide their local governments, which include the counties, with a pro-
portion of their joint tax income, the percentage to be determined by each
Land parliament. These revenues are then shared with the counties
through formula grants as described above.72
In addition to the formula grants received by the counties, they also
receive transfer payments from the towns and villages that comprise the
county (there is very little unincorporated territory in Germany) via a
county assessment (Kreisumlage). Originally conceived as a complemen-
tary source of funds for the counties, the county assessment funds are
now their most important source.73 The details of the county assessment
procedures are found in Land legislation. As in the case of the fiscal equal-
ization procedures for transfers between the Länder, the assessment is
based largely on the fiscal capacity of the municipalities within the
county. This consists of their income from property taxes and business
taxes, i.e., Realsteuern; their share of the income tax; and the formula
grants they received from the Land. The county council then decides on
the standard rate to be assessed against the municipalities that make up
the county. In some cases this rate might be made more progressive for
the more affluent municipalities. Some Länder also take into considera-
tion financial advantages or disadvantages that accrue to a municipality
owing to certain facilities located in its jurisdiction.74 There seems to be
agreement that the assessment rate is not to exceed 50 percent of the fis-
cal capacity of the municipalities, since a higher rate would undermine
municipal autonomy. Some experts argue that 25 percent is the maxi-
mum that should be allowed,75 but a few Länder are above even the 50
percent level.
Current pressures for reform
As we have seen from the sections above, conflict between the federation
and the Länder and between the rich and poor Länder has accompanied
the German system of public finance from the beginning. The growing
centralization of taxing powers over the decades has left the Länder with
virtually no tax autonomy and the municipalities with a limited auton-
omy derived basically from their right to set assessment rates for property
and business taxes. Almost 80 percent of Land expenditures are financed
by federally regulated taxes and grants over which the Länder have no
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influence except in the Bundesrat.76 The federation is always demanding
more funds for its needs, while at the same time the poorer Länder are
never satisfied with the financial resources available to them for meeting
the constitutional requirement of uniform or equivalent living conditions
for their inhabitants. The richer Länder, on the other hand, remain frus-
trated in their attempts to retain a larger proportion of the revenues they
receive from their above-average fiscal capacity. In spite of several legisla-
tive reforms and some important decisions of the Federal Constitutional
Court, the system of vertical and horizontal fiscal equalization has never
been organized to everyone’s satisfaction. 
Today perhaps even more than in previous decades this system is being
challenged from a number of directions. The most general argument is that
from the beginning, a majority of postwar Germans who were in positions
of authority were confronted by the alternative of more autonomy for the
Länder and thus the acceptance of regional differences, or a focus on uni-
form or equivalent living conditions and thus the demand for a degree of
egalitarianism throughout the country.77 The second position prevailed.
But as an American observer has noted, “independence” or autonomy for
an American state usually means being “left alone.” In Germany autonomy
has tended to mean giving the Länder the ability to achieve the goal of
equivalent living conditions through a “fair” distribution of total tax rev-
enues and not being forced to turn over tasks to the federation because of
insufficient fiscal capacity.78
Nevertheless, one especially common argument is that the current 
system serves to reduce or weaken the fiscal autonomy of the Länder and
therefore weakens the federal system. While the Länder do participate in
the Bundesrat in passing most financial legislation, they can still be said to
lose autonomy when they are a minority in the Bundesrat or when they
prefer a certain action and cannot act on their own owing to their lack of
legislative power in raising own source revenues. In other words, the Län-
der have no autonomy for raising taxes or experimenting with new tax
sources, because they do not have what the Germans call “the right to find
taxes” (Steuerfindungsrecht). This means among other things that the Land
governments and parliaments cannot raise or lower their most important
taxes in order to pursue policies that may have popular support, i.e., they
are not “fiscally responsible” for their actions. In the meantime there has
been increased discussion among many prominent Germans, including
former Federal President, Roman Herzog,79 about the need to secure for
the Länder and local governments some fiscal autonomy and ability to
engage in some degree of “competitive federalism.”80
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While they have little autonomy on the revenue side, the Länder do
enjoy considerable autonomy on the expenditure side. But here, too, there
is a strong federal presence in many social policies, such as individual rent
subsidies or the federal regulations pertaining to public assistance which
is financed by Land and local governments.81 There is also a common
complaint that the federal grants provided under Article 104a and the
funds for joint tasks under Article 91a and 91b sometimes have the effect
of manipulating or distorting Land plans and projects. This also produces
more uniformity in expenditure policy, because the federal grants tend to
be for more general than for narrower Land-specific purposes. Further-
more, the Länder agreed in 1971 to a constitutional amendment (Article
74a) to give the federation the concurrent legislative power to regulate the
salaries of all civil servants (Beamte) in order to prevent differences in
salary scales that could lead to a self-destructive salary competition
(which was a problem at the time). The local governments, in turn, add
to this list of complaints by noting that the federation – as well as the Land
governments – continue to devolve various activities to them without
providing the funds. The latest example is children’s nursery schools,
which federal law now requires and regulates but for which it provides no
financial support.82 This issue is, of course, virtually identical to the issue
of federal mandates in the United States that led in 1995 to passage of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.83
Another set of arguments concerns the transfer payments from the
richer to the poorer Länder. We have seen in the brief historical review
presented above that even in the late 1940s there was tension between the
Länder that had above- and below-average financial strength. Since unifi-
cation, with the addition of five new Länder which all share extraordinary
fiscal weaknesses, the gap between the rich and poor Länder has grown
significantly. If one takes seriously the constitutional command regarding
equivalent living conditions, there has to be a massive transfer of funds to
the new Länder. This is in fact occurring, but, one can argue, at a high cost
of dependency of these Länder on the federation and richer Länder. In
contrast to the original optimistic predictions that took as a model for the
new Länder the “economic miracle” of West Germany in the late 1940s
and early 1950s, it now looks as though the eastern Länder will lag behind
western Germany for a long time, probably several decades. What effect
during this time the dependency of the eastern Länder on transfers from
the western Länder and federation will have remains an open question. If
it becomes a permanent condition, it is not difficult to predict increasing
conflict among the Länder.
192 The Länder and German federalism
chap  5  27/5/03  11:55 am  Page 192
In the meantime stage three of the fiscal equalization process which
distributes 25 percent of the VAT to the poorer Länder to bring them to
92 percent of the average of per capita revenues, the horizontal transfers
in stage four between the Länder that raise their capacity to 95 percent,
and, finally, the supplementary federal grants in stage five that bring the
poor Länder to 99.5 percent of average fiscal capacity, taken together, have
come under increasing criticism. Article 107, para. 2, speaks of an “appro-
priate” equalization of the different fiscal capacities of the Länder. Critics
argue that 99.5 percent is not just inappropriate, it is egalitarian “leveling”
which the Federal Constitutional Court has rejected.84 The practical
results, among other things, are said to include continuing tensions
between the richer and poorer Länder, disincentives for the poorer Län-
der to govern more frugally and efficiently, and disincentives for the richer
Länder to introduce cost-saving measures. Thus neither the provider nor
the recipient Länder will do much to increase their own source revenues.85
Indeed, conflict has been apparent. Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg,
the latter a permanent “provider” of transfer funds over the decades,
decided in 1997 to go to the Federal Constitutional Court with a com-
plaint which they filed in July 1998 that the current system of fiscal equal-
ization is unconstitutional.86 Hesse joined them several months later. The
Bavarian minister of finance suggested somewhat provocatively that the
recipient Länder enter negotiations with the provider Länder in order to
avoid the uncertainties of a Court ruling against them;87 however, as
noted in an earlier section, the Länder among themselves have never been
able to agree on a major reform of the distribution of tax revenues.88 The
federal government and the Federal Constitutional Court have always
been necessary elements in financial reform efforts. The question arises,
however, whether German politicians do not turn too often to the Court
to resolve what are really political questions.89
The finance ministers of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg90 argued
that the current system has gone beyond the constitutional requirement
of an “appropriate” fiscal equalization (Article 107, para. 2) to an exces-
sive “leveling” and that it is “absurd” that these two financially strong
Länder and Hesse end up at the bottom of the ranking of Länder fiscal
capacity (positions 16th, 15th, and 12th, respectively, at the time they
brought their case to the Court) after all of the transfers of funds from the
federation and richer Länder have been completed. The complaint asked
that the richer Länder be allowed to retain at least half of their “surplus”
above the general Land average of fiscal capacity. It alleged that the cur-
rent system serves to penalize those richer Länder which, because of their
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supposedly more cautious spending habits and efforts to promote eco-
nomic development, have higher fiscal capacity. It also implied that the
system serves to permit “big-spender” Länder with bloated bureaucracies
and ineffective economic development policies to continue their behav-
ior while others pay the bills but have no voice.91
It is important to note that some experts reject the implications of table
5.4 and believe that the charges leveled by Bavaria and Baden-Württem-
berg are spurious, because the funds received by the recipient Länder
include grants for special burdens that the provider Länder do not have.92
The best example is the special burdens carried by the new Länder for the
costs related to unification.93 But there are also funds that are not counted
in the determination of fiscal capacity, e.g., 50 percent of the revenues of
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Table 5.4 Comparison of per capita fiscal capacity before and after fiscal
equalization transfers among the Länder and federal supplementary 
equalization grants (BEZ), 1995
Per capita tax revenues Per capita fiscal capacity in 
of the Länder in 1995 afterfiscal cqualization 
1995, % of the between the Länder and BEZ, 
Länder average Ranking % of the Länder average Ranking
Hamburg 236 1 120 7
Hesse 132 2 89 16
Bremen 125 3 197 1
North-Rhine 
Westphalia 120 4 91 12
Baden-
Württemberg 116 5 90 15 
Bavaria 112 6 90 14
Berlin 98 7 141 2
Schleswig-
Holstein 91 8 94 10
Saarland 90 9 135 3
Rhineland-
Palatinate 86 10 94 11
Lower Saxony 83 11 91 13
Brandenburg 43 12 120 8
Saxony 40 13 117 9
Saxony-Anhalt 36 14 121 5
Mecklenburg-
Vorpom. 36 15 122 4
Thuringia 35 16 120 6
Source: Heinz Laufer and Ursula Münch, Das föderative System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn:
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1997), p. 174.
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the local governments and the financial burdens associated with har-
bors.94 One critic suggests that the complaint by the south German Län-
der is analogous to the millionaire who, after taking all of his numerous
tax deductions, gives his taxable income as the standard for his wealth.95
Another powerful argument is that expenditures for public assistance,
which is provided to those whose unemployment insurance payments
have expired or to those who do not qualify for unemployment compen-
sation, vary significantly among the Länder. Most public assistance is paid
by local governments from their share of funds distributed by the Länder.
Differences among the Länder are not due to profligate spending habits
but rather are based on federal law, which the municipalities must imple-
ment. These expenditures amount to as much as 20 percent of the fiscal
capacity of Bremen and 14 percent of the Saarland but to only about 7.5
percent of the fiscal capacity of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. A sim-
ilar case could be made for the financial consequences of implementing
other federal laws as well.96
Needless to say, the recipient Länder do not accept the critical analysis
of their situation and have rejected the attempt to negotiate a settlement
between richer and poorer Länder.97 They argue that the assumption that
the poorer Länder are somehow responsible in part for their condition
owing to wasteful spending habits, inappropriate economic development
policies, or other shortcomings conveniently ignores the reality of funda-
mental economic factors over which the poorer Länder have virtually no
control. For example, the decline of smokestack industries, the ship-
building crisis, changes in agricultural conditions, or the collapse of
whole industries in the eastern Länder have little to do with Land eco-
nomic policies. In their view federalism in Germany cannot consist
merely of competitive elements. Of course the Länder have policies
designed to attract business from other Länder and therefore do engage in
competitive practices. But this requires fair starting chances, e.g., in infra-
structure, that are now provided by the current system of fiscal equaliza-
tion.98 Some experts argue it is “absurd” to speak of competition among
the Länder when the gap between eastern and western Länder is as great
as at present. A serious decline in fiscal transfers that would bring about
real differences in living conditions could be socially explosive.99
In spite of such arguments, the Kohl government reacted positively to
the initiative by the two southern Länder, suggesting that it had warned in
the past against too much egalitarian leveling (Nivellierung). On the other
hand, a spokesman for the SPD said the initiative was an attack against the
new Länder, which receive 87 percent of the funds transferred to the
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poorer Länder. Some other Länder accused the southern Länder of attack-
ing the fiscal equalization system for partisan election campaign pur-
poses, while still others rejected the implication that Germany should
return to a hodge-podge of separate, little independent states.100
In the summer of 1998 the federal minister of finance proposed a num-
ber of potentially far-reaching changes in the system of fiscal equaliza-
tion.101 He suggested that the responsibilities or tasks of the federation
and Länder be redistributed along with the system of vertical financial
equalization. The numerous examples of “mixed financing” should be
reduced sharply; this could be accomplished by ensuring that each level
has it own tax autonomy. This might occur by giving the federation the
revenues from the VAT, while the Länder would receive the income and
corporation taxes.102 This was a rather remarkable proposal in that it
seemed to offer a return to what was once thought to be an unsatisfactory
tax distribution scheme that existed before the Finance Reform of 1969.
Another alternative offered by the finance minister was to grant the Län-
der the right to set their own rates for the income and corporation taxes
they share with the federation.103
The proposals raised suspicions among some Land finance ministers
that one of the goals of the federal minister was really to provide the fed-
eration with a greater share of funds. After all, one of the reasons for the
introduction of joint taxes in the Finance Reform of 1969 was the idea
that the risks of rising and declining revenues from the different taxes
would be shared. Thus, the revenues from the VAT are not affected nearly
as much by the state of the economy as are the revenues received from
income and corporation taxes. It is not surprising, then, that the federa-
tion wants to keep the VAT for itself in redistributing the various taxes
between the federal and Land levels.104 Another criticism of the reform
proposals by the federal government rests on the fear that tax autonomy
for the Länder would lead to a competition to set the lowest rates; this
would put the new Länder at a strong disadvantage, because they need all
the revenue they can get to meet their obligations. Furthermore, the fed-
eral government has insisted on more tax conformity in the EU in order
to prevent unfair tax competition among the member states. This is a
position that seems at odds with the advocacy of more tax autonomy 
for the Länder.105
These proposals and reactions became major news items in the late
1990s, but they were not new in principle. For many years there has been
a discussion of changes that would give the Länder taxing powers, even if
this might mean less focus on uniform or equivalent living conditions.106
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Some observers, however, suggest that a general financial autonomy
would probably not be acceptable, because of the problems that would
arise between Länder, particularly in border areas, over tax avoidance
schemes. This problem already exists in the EU and is considered a major
nuisance. It is for this and other reasons, e.g., the relatively small yield of
the taxes that might be raised, that led some critics to argue that such taxes
could not pass any cost-benefit test. Owing to these and other problems,
it does not seem to be very realistic to advocate a comprehensive tax
autonomy for the Länder.107
Another proposal that has been made many times in the past and was
repeated by the federal finance minister at the beginning of August 1998
is to give the Länder and local governments the right to decide themselves
within certain limits on the taxes they want to raise. More concrete pro-
posals have been to allow them to set assessment rates on the income tax
or VAT within a range set by federal law.108 This would avoid dramatic dif-
ferences among the Länder while making it possible for Land and local
politicians to take somewhat more responsibility for taxes. This, it is
alleged, would also make the people more aware of the consequences of
public spending policies and make the elected officials more cautious in
their spending proposals.109 It would also serve to strengthen the role of
Land parliaments and to reduce the dependence on the federation for var-
ious investments and “mixed financing.”110 Yet another benefit would be
a slight reduction of the exaggerated leveling that occurs in the fiscal
equalization process.111
The fear has been expressed that more fiscal autonomy and competi-
tion might lead to as a “race to the bottom” in order to attract invest-
ment,112 as has often happened in the United States.113 One reaction to this
argument is that there are already differences among the Länder in tax
breaks, e.g., the opportunities for major tax deductions for investing in
the eastern Länder or different tax assessment rates for the local business
tax; or, in the past, one could point to special tax breaks for investing in
West Berlin and in the border regions between East and West Germany.
These measures seem not to have had a major impact in influencing pri-
vate investment strategies. Nor does it seem likely that there would be a
strong temptation for individual tax payers to change residency from one
Land to another, any more than to change residency from one country to
another, except perhaps in the cases of the very wealthy.114
A “race to the bottom” in the area of services also seems unlikely in 
Germany, because of general ethnic and cultural homogeneity and the
strong tradition of equality which leads to such constitutional requirements
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as “uniform living conditions” and the highly developed social welfare
state. The immediate reaction by many Germans that differences of almost
any kind are “unsozial” and therefore really unacceptable is probably an
important check on too much Land autonomy. This set of attitudes in the
political culture makes it very difficult to believe that most Germans would
be comfortable with conditions in the various Länder that differ by more
than a small margin from the average.115 Thus, more competition among
the Länder in any serious sense might become as or even more controver-
sial than the status quo. On the other hand, numerous voices, for example,
former Prime Minister Kurt Biedenkopf of Saxony, have urged that Ger-
mans learn to accept more differences among the Länder in order to
strengthen the idea of federalism and ease the pressure to provide uniform
living conditions.116
All of these arguments, of course, revolve around the issue of “compet-
itive federalism,” which would necessarily lead to a de-emphasis on equiv-
alent living conditions. The FDP made a major point of promoting
competitive federalism in a report produced by its Friedrich-Naumann
Foundation in the summer of 1998.117 This may come as no surprise for 
a classical liberal party, but a special committee associated with the 
SPD also called for separate taxes and functions for the federal and 
Land levels.118 In response to the growing intensity of the discussion 
about fiscal federalism, the newly elected government of Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder agreed on 17 December 1998 with the prime ministers
of the sixteen Länder to form a commission to study a reform of the 
German system of fiscal equalization after the current system elapses 
in 2005.119
This commission came under even more pressure to offer reform 
proposals after the Federal Constitutional Court decided in November
1999 that in the case brought before it in 1998 by Bavaria, Baden-
Württemberg, and Hesse the current system of fiscal equalization had to
be changed in its broad principles by the end of 2002 and in its legislative
details by the end of 2004. The Court ruled that German legislators and
the Bundesrat must decide just what changes should be made, but it indi-
cated that the regular equalization payments may not exceed 95 percent
of the average, in contrast to the current 99.5 percent; nor may the recip-
ient Länder end up with a higher rank order in their financial capacity
than the provider Länder after all transfers have taken place.120 While
many observers seemed to think that this decision would force the politi-
cians to come up with some creative changes in the system of fiscal equal-
ization and quite possibly encourage a meaningful devolution of powers
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to the Länder, a careful analysis of the decision and its implications for
change suggested caution and even skepticism that German federalism
would look very different after 2005.121
The commission’s deliberations did not lead to a consensus among the
Länder, and by the third week in June 2001 it looked as though the sixteen
prime ministers would not be able to come to an agreement. But on June
23 Chancellor Schröder stepped in to break the Gordian knot by offering
to have the federation pay the price for agreement. The maximum pay-
ment the richer Länder make of 80 percent of above-average tax revenues
to the equalization fund will be reduced to 72.5 percent, and Länder that
enjoy an increase in tax revenues over the previous year will be able to set
aside 12.5 percent before it is counted in the amount owed for the fiscal
equalization transfer. These changes will cost the federation DM 1.5 bil-
lion annually, and they will save the richer Länder between DM 200 and
400 million (102–204 million Euros) annually.122
In addition the new Länder will continue to receive heavy subsidies
under a new solidarity pact that goes into effect in January 2005 follow-
ing the expiration of the ten-year pact negotiated in 1993. The federation
agreed to pay two-thirds of the DM 306 billion package the East is to
receive between 2005 and 2019 in installments that are to be reduced
every year after 2009. This means that the payments in the first years 
will be considerably higher than the current DM 20.6 billion. In 2020 spe-
cial aid to the East is supposed to cease for good, but the unpopular soli-
darity surcharge on German tax payers will have to continue until then.123
The issue of Länder consolidation
The system of fiscal equalization in Germany has probably produced
more uniform living conditions throughout the country than in any other
major European state, including unitary states such as Great Britain and
France. Even the new Länder, whose per capita income is about half of the
average of the old Länder, are able today to provide a level of services and
infrastructure that is not significantly lower than in the western Länder.
This is the obvious strength of the system. But criticism and dissatisfac-
tion are growing, and the demands for change are strong. 
It seems apparent that the major problem in the fiscal equalization 
system lies in the gap in fiscal capacity between the richer and poorer Län-
der. With the exception of Lower Saxony, the poorest Länder – Bremen
and the Saarland in the West and Berlin and the five new Länder in the
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East – are the smallest in population. Hamburg is the exception among
the richer western Länder. One of the arguments against more autonomy
for the Länder in their present form is that the small and poor Länder are
simply in no position to take advantage of greater fiscal autonomy. If they
are to continue to offer reasonably uniform or equivalent living condi-
tions, they must have financial support from the federation and/or their
richer counterparts. Thus, there is really little prospect of granting the
Länder real fiscal autonomy. This is precisely why, according to some 
German critics, Article 29, para. 1, of the Basic Law says that the Länder
“can” be consolidated (before 1976, Article 29 read: “The federal territory
is . . . to be newly constituted”) in order to guarantee that they have the
size and capacity to carry out their tasks effectively. Some experts who are
opposed to the excessive emphasis on egalitarian leveling through
increased centralization of tax legislation and fiscal transfers argue that if
the Länder were to be given more fiscal autonomy, their populations
would soon notice the difference in the ability of the Land government to
provide the services they want and would, as a result, be amenable to a
consolidation of their Land with a richer neighbor.124 A federal system
with seven–ten Länder would mean the creation of Länder that would be
more autonomous fiscally; would have lower costs per capita for numer-
ous services, personnel, and institutions, e.g., ministers, parliaments, and
courts; and also be able to provide the equivalent living conditions that
the public apparently demands.125 A “Europe of the Regions,” in which
the EU Commission and Council of Ministers can devolve certain activi-
ties according to the subsidiarity principle, also requires fiscally and
administratively strong Länder.126
The pro-consolidation case thus presents a persuasive argument which
draws on discussions that reach back to the early days of the republic;127
on the analogy of comprehensive county and municipal boundary
reforms that were carried out in all of the territorial Länder in the late
1960s and early 1970s in the western Länder and took place the new Län-
der in the the 1990s;128 on the results of a comprehensive, highly detailed
expert commission report in 1973129 on reorganizing Land boundaries;
and on a massive scholarly literature that has appeared over the
decades.130 But Bernhard Vogel, the former prime minister of Rhineland-
Palatinate and the current prime minister of Thuringia, noted in 1990
that “now is the time,” and if action to consolidate the Länder does not
take place early after unification, it will be far more difficult to act later.131
Unfortunately for the advocates of Land boundary reform, there are
also persuasive arguments against their position as well as practical diffi-
200 The Länder and German federalism
chap  5  27/5/03  11:55 am  Page 200
culties of achieving reform.132 Article 29, para. 1, speaks not only of reor-
ganizing Land boundaries in order to guarantee that they have the size and
capacity to carry out their tasks effectively; it also says that in the process
due regard shall be given to regional identities, historical and cultural ties,
economic expediency, and the requirements of regional and Land plan-
ning. Thus, any large scale redrawing of boundaries would inevitably be
rejected by large numbers of people who have developed feelings of iden-
tity with their Land.133 Even the people in the former East Germany, who
lived in a highly centralized state that eliminated any pretense of being a
federation in the early 1950s, apparently preferred creating five new Län-
der,134 which had at least some historical basis, to continuing to live in one
territory that would have been roughly equivalent in population to North-
Rhine Westphalia in the West. A related argument is that smaller Länder
are “closer to the people” and perhaps therefore more responsive to the
political and cultural wishes of the population.135 The small states,
provinces, and cantons in the United States, Canada, and Switzerland,
respectively, are not constantly targeted as obsolete and in need of being
consolidated with surrounding neighbors, so why should small Länder 
in Germany be considered so dysfunctional? Of course, the proponents of
reform in Germany would argue, among other things, that the Länder
have functions unique to German federalism, i.e., implementing with
their local governments most federal legislation with the responsibility of
financing most of the expenditures incurred.136
Perhaps even more formidable in overcoming the resistance to bound-
ary change are the provisions of the Basic Law. Article 29, para. 2-8, that
call for a complicated referendum process. This process begins with a 
federal law which must be approved by a majority vote in a referendum in
all of the Länder whose territory is affected. If a majority in one Land does
not approve, it can be overridden by a two-thirds vote in the territory that
is directly affected (unless a two-thirds majority of the Land reject the ref-
erendum). Based on the American experience with referenda on the con-
solidation or annexations of local government units, these provisions
probably make Land boundary changes unlikely if not impossible. An
obvious example already exists in the defeat in May 1966 by voters in
Brandenburg of the proposal that was approved by Berliners – at least
West Berliners – and all of the major political elites in the two territories
to merge the City of Berlin with the surrounding Land of Brandenburg.
Again, proponents of reform may argue that this referendum was affected
by too many extraneous matters, such as resentment by Easterners against
their former capital city and the much richer West Berlin. But others
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would suggest that if a fusion of these two obvious candidates cannot
pass, there is little hope for other efforts. In any case, there are no current
efforts to consolidate any Land territory in any part of Germany. 
Conclusion
We have seen that several themes have been prominent in the discussions in
Germany about fiscal federalism since the late 1940s. One theme has been
the locus of the major taxing powers, i.e., the states, as in the Bismarck
Reich, or the national government, as in the Weimar Republic. A system of
shared taxes, which was finally adopted officially in the Finance Reform of
1969, seems to be a perfectly reasonable compromise; however, no clear
consensus has ever developed over the proper distribution of the tax rev-
enues. A second theme has been the richer vs the poorer Länder. From the
period of Allied Occupation to the present time, the poorer Länder have
expressed their dissatisfaction with their fiscal status, in spite of very signif-
icant transfers of funds to them from both the federation and the richer
Länder. This suggests a third theme, which is the fiscal equalization pay-
ments made by the more affluent to the less affluent Länder. Tinkering with
the amounts and procedures for equalization has been a preoccupation of
some public finance experts and politicians over the years, especially from
the poorer Länder. And, finally, a theme running throughout the discussion
has been the proper relationship between the Länder and the federation. 
The highly complex, systematic – and even perfectionist – nature of
German fiscal equalization measures that have emerged from these years
of controversy and compromise stands in sharp contrast to the far more
laissez-faire and ad hoc American practices. Dual federalism in the United
States, according to which the federal and state governments operated
separately in different functional areas until the “cooperative federalism”
of the New Deal, did not lead to the expectation that the states would have
to pay for their own programs. Indeed, there are relatively few program
areas today in which the federal, state, and/or local governments do not
share financing, a practice which in Germany is generally frowned upon
and authorized only to a limited extent under Articles 91a and 104 of the
Basic Law. We have seen that in Germany the process begins with a verti-
cal equalization that involves the distribution of joint taxes between the
federal and Land levels. To ensure more balance in fiscal capacity, the fed-
eration distributes 25 percent of the revenues derived from the VAT to
bring the financially weaker Länder up to 92 percent of the average per
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capita revenues among the Länder. To reduce this gap even further, there
is a horizontal transfer of funds from the richer to the poorer Länder, so
that the poorer Länder are brought up to 95 percent of average per capita
revenues. The federation then steps in to provide even more equity by dis-
tributing supplementary grants that raise the fiscal capacity of the poorer
Länder to within 99.5 percent of average per capita revenues. The Länder
are then required to share their portion of joint tax revenues with their
local governments, i.e., counties, cities, towns, and villages. The various
municipalities receive these funds in the form of general-purpose formula
grants and special-purpose categorical or project grants. The counties
receive general-purpose formula grants from the Länder, but an even
more important source of income is the transfer of funds to them from
the towns and villages that constitute the county. As we have seen on
numerous occasions, the basic reason for this elaborate system of finance
is the general idea of uniformity or equivalence of living conditions
throughout the country, the individual Länder, among the cities, and
throughout the counties. A 1998 OECD report raises the question
whether this goal of equivalent living conditions has assumed a higher
place in the scale of values than economic incentives;137 others ask
whether it has not weakened the autonomy of the Länder and municipal-
ities and served to undermine German federalism. Indeed, some experts
have noted over the years that those who believe everything ought to be
equal everywhere should be honest enough to admit that they have no
interest in a federal organization of the country.138
A decision by the Federal Constitutional Court in November 1999 
led to some important, but not fundamental, changes in German fiscal
federalism that were worked out by a special commission. These changes,
beginning in 2005, will come largely at the expense of an already finan-
cially strapped federal government and do not deal to the satisfaction 
of many critics with the issue of “competitive federalism” and more
autonomy for the Länder. 
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Historical development
In the Kaiserreich of 1871–1918, the Constitution gave the central govern-
ment only a brief catalogue of powers, with all other powers reserved for
the states; however, the central state also had concurrent powers and
implied powers. Over time the national government assumed more pow-
ers through constitutional changes and legislation which also had to be
passed by a second chamber, the Bundesrat, that represented the mostly
monarchical governments in the states. The state parliaments had no voice
in these developments or in the many cooperative agreements signed by
the state governments to bring about more uniformity in the country.1
In the Weimar Republic of 1919–33, the monarchical governments in
the states (now called Land (singular) and Länder (plural)) were replaced
by governments dependent on majorities in the Land parliaments (Land-
tage). But these democratically legitimated governments now faced a cen-
tral government with more domestic powers than its predecessor had
enjoyed. In contrast to 1867 and 1871, the state parliaments had no role
in approving the Constitution in 1919. Rather, a nationally elected
National Assembly ratified the Constitution after having given the central
government a much longer list of powers, including concurrent powers,
than under the Reich Constitution of 1871. The reordering of public
finances also had a unitary effect, made necessary in part because of the
heavy burdens of the First World War. As a result, the budgetary powers
of the Länder were almost completely undermined. In the Reichsrat,
which replaced the Bundesrat of the Kaiserreich, the Land governments
acted on the basis of political party policy, not on views expressed by the
Land parliaments (although, of course, the governments had to have
majorities in the parliaments). Conferences of various Land officials with
6
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the goal of providing for more uniform Land legislation also helped
undermine the Land parliaments.2
With the accession of Adolf Hitler to power in January 1933, the Land
governments were soon authorized to bypass the Land parliaments by
passing laws through “simplified legislative procedures.” Following the
national elections of 31 March 1933, first Communist, then Socialist,
seats were denied in all parliamentary bodies. In April the Land parlia-
ments lost the right to pass votes of no-confidence, and in October 1933
the state parliaments were dissolved along with the national parliament,
the Reichstag. Exactly one year after Hitler came to power, 31 January
1934, the Land parliaments were officially disbanded.3
The Land parliaments as legislatures today
Land parliaments and the Basic Law
Local and Land governments were the first to be established after the Sec-
ond World War. The first elections were held in 1946 and 1947, depending
on the occupying power. The governments and legislatures formed then
became the building blocks for the establishment of the Federal Republic
in 1949, and then as now they were important training and recruiting
grounds for national office. From the beginning, all of the Länder have 
had only one chamber, called the Landtag in the thirteen territorial Län-
der, Bürgerschaft in Bremen and Hamburg, and Abgeordnetenhaus in
Berlin. The one exception was Bavaria, which had a corporatist Senat as a
second chamber with limited powers until it was eliminated by a popular
referendum in 1998.
We have seen in previous chapters that according to Article 30 of the
Basic Law, the Länder are responsible for “governmental powers” unless
the Basic Law provides otherwise. Article 70 then states that “the Länder
have the right of passing legislation insofar as this Basic Law does not
grant legislative authority to the federation.” The Basic Law provides for
three kinds of national legislation: exclusive, concurrent, and framework.
Article 73 enumerates exclusive legislation, including defense and foreign
affairs, currency, customs, citizenship, immigration, postal services, etc.
Areas of concurrent legislation are found in Article 74 and include civil
and criminal law, public welfare, economic affairs, nuclear energy, labor
relations, transportation, etc. An especially controversial provision is
found in Article 72, which gives the federal government the right to pass
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concurrent legislation in favor of promoting equivalent living conditions
throughout the country “if required.” This very general provision, which
covered a wide range of activities,4 was tightened somewhat in the consti-
tutional amendments of 1994 by substituting “if required” for “if
needed.” Unlike concurrent legislation in the United States, where the
national government prevails only in cases where specific national and
state provisions are in conflict, federal concurrent legislation in Germany
preempts all Land legislation in the area of regulation.
Framework legislation is the third area, and it concerns regulation of 
all public employees, general principles of higher education, regional
planning, registration of residence, etc. Federal laws in this category are
supposed to leave details to the Land parliaments, which are obliged to act
within a reasonable period of time. In general, however, the provisions of
the framework laws do not leave the Land parliaments much leeway.5
As a result of these many exceptions to Article 30 and Article 70, the
national organs, i.e., government, Bundestag, and Bundesrat, are respon-
sible for most legislation, while the Länder are generally responsible for
administration under Article 83. This is “the essential characteristic of
German federalism”6 and is generally what is meant when references are
made to “dual federalism” in Germany.
This does not mean that the Länder have no influence on federal legis-
lation. We have seen that the Bundesrat, the chamber of the Länder, has an
absolute veto over more than half of the legislation passed by the Bundestag
and a suspensive veto over the rest. The influence exerted by the Länder in
the Bundesrat is, however, exercised by the Land governments, not the
Land parliaments.
The party group
The party group (Fraktion) or parliamentary party (in the United States,
“caucus”), is legally a parliamentary organ and is publicly financed.7 It the
key institution for the German office holder at all levels of government. It
is his or her “home” in parliament, and little can be accomplished unless
one is a member of a party group. The introduction of bills requires the
support of a certain number of deputies, which is the same as the mini-
mum number of deputies required to form a party group. Thus bills are
introduced through the party group, which also determines the speakers
in debates. The party groups decide among their own members who will
serve on the various committees, including investigative committees. The
leaders of the party groups form an executive committee to determine the
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agenda of the parliamentary meetings and the time for debate.8 Party
groups form working groups based on committee assignments, and most
of the parliamentary work done by the deputies is done in or for these
groups. Thus parliamentary activity is primarily party group activity.9
A minimum number of deputies, usually 5 percent of the total member-
ship, is required in order to form a party group. This is generally not a prob-
lem, because in the German proportional representation system a party
normally needs 5 percent of the total vote in order to enter parliament. The
exception is for candidates who win a direct seat in a single-member dis-
trict. In this case the candidate would enter parliament, but unless he or she
joined a party group, the deputy would be a lone figure unable to partici-
pate effectively in the affairs of parliament. Since Germany is a “party state,”
independent candidates are rare, and they have no chance of winning a
direct seat. At the federal level a party may secure representation in the Bun-
destag and even benefit from the features of proportional representation in
spite of failing to meet the 5 percent vote requirement by winning three or
more direct seats. Not until the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the
successor to the East German Communist Party (SED), won four direct
seats in East Germany in the federal elections of 1990 and 1994, did any
party enter the federal parliament under this rule.
German party groups, like their counterparts in most other European
parliamentary systems, demonstrate a high degree of unity in both com-
mittees and in the plenary meetings. Normally the party group takes a
position in support of the recommendations of its working groups. Frak-
tionszwang, or coercion, is not allowed under Article 38 of the Basic Law
for the federal level or under similar provisions in the Land constitutions
for the Land parliaments and local councils. But Fraktionsdisziplin, or dis-
cipline, is assumed, and members of the party group rarely deviate from
the “party line,” which is really the party group position based on delib-
erations among the members of the party group.10 On important issues
the leadership, of course, exercises a good deal of influence. This is espe-
cially the case if the party is supporting the government and feels oblig-
ated to back its own ministers in their actions and policies. Sometimes a
deputy may find it difficult to maintain unity, as in the case of territorial
reforms of local government boundaries that were introduced in the late
1960s and 1970s throughout the West German Länder.11 In such cases,
which are rare, the deputies may be allowed to abstain.12
The party groups are, of course, closely related to the extra-parliamen-
tary political party, but they are part of the parliament, that is, they are
“state” institutions that receive generous funding from the Land budget.
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They are not allowed to use these funds for campaigns or other strictly
party purposes, but the line may be difficult to draw on occasion. They are
supported by the parliamentary advisory service staff, and they may hire
additional staff at their own expense. As is the case with committee staff
members in the United States, the parliamentary advisory staff assist
party group members in many ways and are an important part of the
working groups, committees, and the legislative process in general.13
The party group leader is usually the most prominent member and the
spokesperson for the party in parliament. He or she may be overshadowed
by the prime minister or some ministers if the party is supporting the gov-
ernment, but if the party is in opposition the party group leader is in effect
the Leader of the Opposition and a probable candidate for prime minister
in the next election. The party group leader is also responsible for main-
taining unity in the group, since any evidence of disunity is seen by oppos-
ing groups as a sign of weakness and disarray. Everyone in the party group
knows that the group’s effectiveness depends in part on unity, which
encourages discipline all the more.14 The party group leader is assisted by
a general manager, who may or may not be a member of the parliament.
As a kind of chief of staff, this person may gain considerable influence and
use the position as a springboard for high positions in the future.15
The decline of Land legislative powers
Before one begins any discussion of a decline of Land legislative powers,
it should be noted that complaints about loss of powers have existed 
since the Basic Law was promulgated; however, it would not be correct to
conclude that the Land parliaments were not given or have not retained
some important legislative powers of their own. These include responsi-
bility for their own organization, including such areas as electoral law 
and budgets; cultural areas, including not only the arts but also universi-
ties, schools and training facilities; church law; much of police law,
including construction and water rights; planning and nature conserva-
tion; local government law (but within limits of the guarantee of local
self-government); radio and television (excluding technical aspects); and
a few concurrent powers not assumed by the federal government.16 It can
certainly be argued, though, that the Land parliaments had their days of
glory in the period between 1946 and early 1950s,17 before the national
government existed18 or had begun to act in areas of concurrent legisla-
tion that the Länder had already dealt with. The last great hurrahs of the
western Land parliaments may have been the educational reforms and
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territorial reorganizations19 of the late 1960s and early-to-mid-1970s,
while for the new Länder in the East important legislation was passed after
unification in the mid-1990s. One can also point today to various admin-
istrative reorganization schemes and reforms being discussed or carried
out that are designed to increase efficiency and reduce personnel
(Schlanker Staat). Attention is also being given to changes in the budget
process and control instruments.
But for several decades it has been a kind of conventional wisdom that
there has been a decline of Land legislative powers, and those making this
case are informed and knowledgable observers.20 On the other hand,
there have been some dissenters and others who suggest that the standard
complaint begs the question. Thus a few voices have suggested that based
on statistics on Land legislation, there has been no loss of legislative func-
tions – either in number or in importance.21 Others have suggested that
the quantity of Land legislation has not really declined so much as its
quality.22 In another line of argument, Alois Glück, the party group leader
of the CSU in the Bavarian Land parliament, has rejected in parliament
and elsewhere the thesis that the Land parliaments are less important
today due to a loss of legislative powers, because new tasks have been
added.23 The assertion that they have been reduced to the level of local
governments is “absurd.”24 Indeed, one recent study suggests that the
conclusion that there has been a loss of legislative powers depends on the
issue area and/or on particular legislative functions (legislative, articula-
tion, control, and public information) as performed separately by the
government parties and Opposition. For example, if one does a careful
empirical examination of Land legislation concerning illegal drug poli-
cies, one finds that over the years since 1968 the Land legislatures were
active in varying degrees in performing articulation, control, public
information, and innovation functions but were barely active in the law-
making arena. Thus government parties were more engaged in informa-
tion functions and the Opposition in control, and, to a lesser extent,
innovation functions.25 Still another view is that the focus on Land leg-
islative powers seems to confuse the greater legislative functions of a leg-
islature in a presidential-type system and the different functioning of a
parliament in a parliamentary system which is based more on the rela-
tionship between the government and its supporting majority in parlia-
ment versus the Opposition. The government majority carries the
responsibility for the exercise of power, including legislative initiatives 
of the cabinet, and the Opposition has the role of controlling that power
in public.26
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Nevertheless, most observers continue to argue that the legislative
powers of the Land parliaments have been weakened dramatically over
the years for a variety of reasons. One simple explanation is that the most
important laws have been passed, and today the Länder are concerned
above all with modifying and amending their earlier legislation, filling in
the details of federal framework legislation, and providing for the imple-
mentation of federal laws that the Länder administer.27
It is frequently noted that the constitutional amendments passed since
1949 which enhanced federal powers were approved by the Länder in the
Bundesrat, and that they did so voluntarily.28 A common reason given for
the willingness of the Länder to approve such changes from the early 1950s
to the mid-1970s, including the preemption of Land legislative powers
through federal concurrent legislation, the joint tasks under Article 91a
and 91b, and the financing arrangements under Article 104a, has been the
pressure by the media, the political parties, and various interest groups for
more uniform living conditions throughout the country.29 In the mean-
time there has been much criticism of this justification, not only because
of the growing difficulty of financing measures deemed appropriate to
promote more uniformity but also because of the undermining of feder-
alism that it implies. As noted in Chapter 2, Article 72 was amended in
1994 in order to make its provisions less sweeping. Thus the “need” to pass
concurrent legislation was changed to “essential” or “required” in order to
promote “equivalent” rather than “uniform” living conditions. But the
tradition and generally strong popular acceptance of the welfare state, and
the public expectations related to a wide variety of public services, make it
difficult to maintain differences in these policy areas.30 While this has
always been a challenge since the Second World War in the West, unifica-
tion in 1990 with the former and much poorer Eastern territories has
helped create severe strains in the welfare state. This has implications for
federalism, because there is little support in the East for differences in ser-
vice levels in the name of Land autonomy.
Not only have the Land parliaments lost powers to the federation. The
focus of attention is on the prime minister and his government,31 and in
virtually all legislative bodies, especially in parliamentary systems, com-
plaints have long been heard about the dominance of governments over
the legislatures in the legislative process.32 Executive dominance over the
parliament is a common theme in almost every textbook on French and
British government, and even in the United States, where the national and
state legislative bodies are comparatively powerful, it is frequently
observed that “the Administration proposes and the legislature disposes.”
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In a parliamentary system, the governments usually control the agenda,
even if – as in the United States – they cannot always control the results.
But in a parliamentary system with strong party discipline, which is typi-
cal of Germany, the parliamentary majority is generally bound to follow
the proposals of the government. Internal disagreements within the
majority party or coalition may lead to compromises or changes of various
kinds, but the government usually prevails in a parliamentary vote. The
result, of course, is a weakening of the parliament vis-à-vis the government
and an undermining of separation of powers; in effect, separation of pow-
ers exists in the relationship between the government and its majority in
parliament on the one hand and the Opposition on the other. It is the role
of the parliamentary Opposition or sometimes of groups outside of par-
liament, such as the student protest movements and the citizens’ initiatives
in Germany in the 1970s, to criticize the government openly and offer
alternatives. Some German Land deputies may complain about the restric-
tions imposed by party discipline when they are in the majority and about
the general futility of their criticisms when they are in the Opposition, but
these conditions seem inherent in a functioning parliamentary system.
A more complicated explanation for the weakening of Land parliaments
is the development of cooperative federalism. Though Konrad Hesse
pointed to the emergence of a “unitary federal state” in Germany at the
beginning of the 1960s,33 cooperative federalism did not begin “officially”
until after the Finance Reform of 1969, which provided for joint taxes as
the most important sources of revenue; for joint planning and financing of
a variety of activities that were formerly the sole responsibility of the Län-
der (Article 91a and 91b); and for federal grants under Article 104a, para-
graph 4, that required Land financial participation. Especially from the
1950s to the 1970s, the federal government assumed increasing legislative
powers through constitutional change and preemption of Land powers
through concurrent legislation. The Länder were compensated to the
extent that the Land governments had the right to joint decision making
in these legislative arenas in the Bundesrat (at least if they were in the
majority) and in their authority in many cases to issue regulations that
bypassed the Land parliaments. The Land governments also engaged
increasingly in numerous cooperative arrangements with other Länder
through a wide variety of conferences and committees ranging from the
conferences of Land prime ministers, Land ministers – e.g., the Conference
of Education and Culture Ministers (KMK) – and numerous conferences
and meetings of bureaucrats that produced much pressure for uniformity
throughout the country, in large part through model legislation.34 The
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governments’ majorities in the Land parliaments are reluctant to reject
decisions made in these conferences,35 so the governments generally have
a free hand unless there are disagreements within the majority party or
coalition. (Though rare, there have been instances when a majority party
did reject a government’s decision made at a conference with officials of
other Länder, thereby forcing changes to be made.36) The concept of Poli-
tikverflechtung – roughly equivalent to the American concept of intergov-
ernmental relations – reflects this web of joint planning, joint decision
making, and shared financing between the federal and Land governments
and the wide-ranging voluntary cooperation and coordination among the
Länder themselves that have been characteristic of German federalism
since at least the late 1960s.37 Indeed, some observers believe that cooper-
ation and coordination between the federation and the Länder and among
the latter via the numerous conferences and meetings raise a question of
whether the practical effect is not an unconstitutional undermining of
Land parliament powers.38 In any case the political weight of the Länder is
based more on the Land governments than on the parliament, which is one
reason why some observers speak of “executive federalism” in Germany.39
Another important reason for the loss of legislative powers by Land par-
liaments that is rarely mentioned in the literature is the accumulation of
large debts by the Länder. The high interest payments, not to mention the
principal, have lessened considerably the parliamentary room to maneuver
in various policy arenas. In some Länder, such as the Saarland and Bremen,
the parliaments can hardly think responsibly of new policy initiatives.40
In addition to the various domestic pressures that have served to
weaken the Land parliaments, the EC/EU has enacted numerous regula-
tions affecting Land powers. Indeed, the federal government was able in
the past under the old Article 24 of the Basic Law to transfer sovereign
powers, including Land powers, to international organizations. This
meant that the federal government could vote on measures in the EC
Council of Ministers in Brussels affecting exclusive Land powers, such as
education, training, and culture, over which it had no authority in Ger-
many.41 For this and other reasons, the Länder insisted on and finally, in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, succeeded in gaining rights of consultation
and participation via the Bundesrat in decisions affecting their powers
(see Chapter 7).
In constitutional terms, the weakening of the Land parliaments can
only go so far, even though some observers would argue that the limits
have been reached. Article 20, para. 1, of the Basic Law says that Germany
is a “democratic and socially conscious federal state,” and Article 79, para.
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3, prohibits amendments “affecting the division of the Federation into
Länder.” The Länder are considered to be “states” – though not in the
sense of international law – which means they must retain an essential
core of responsibilities. These include Land parliaments with a minimum
of exclusive legislative powers.42 It is sometimes argued that the Länder
have been compensated for losses of parliamentary powers by increased
participation of the Land governments in the Bundesrat and various
forms of cooperation with the federal government and other Land gov-
ernments. Most constitutional scholars reject this view, pointing out that
the Land parliaments have no right to direct the governments in their
decisions in the Bundesrat, which is a federal organ, and they note that the
parliaments are generally ignored in decisions made in the wide variety of
conferences between their governments and the federal and other Land
governments.43 On the other hand, modest changes were made in the
Basic Law in 1994 which should help to protect the Land parliaments
from further erosions of their powers, and the consultation and partici-
pation rights gained by the Länder via the Bundesrat with respect to the
EU might even serve to strengthen the Länder in the process of European
integration. But any further loss of Land legislative powers, which has
been an issue since the early years of the Federal Republic,44 could affect
the legitimacy of the German federal system.45
Functions of the Land parliaments today
Walter Bagehot and Max Weber suggested long ago that parliaments have
multiple functions besides legislation, and it is no surprise that close
observers of the Land parliaments also see them as performing several
functions.46 In addition to the legislative function, one can distinguish
among an electoral and recruitment function, that is, the election of the
prime minister and his or her cabinet (only in seven Länder can the prime
minister select his or her cabinet without parliamentary approval); a
political control function, which serves as a check on the executive branch
and overlaps with a public information function; a debating function,
which has to do with educating the public as well as with information and
communication; and a representation and articulation function, which
serves as a means of expressing a plurality of public wishes, expectations
and concerns in the policy making process. Finally, perhaps as a part of
the previously named function, one can point to a service function, which
is so important in the United States but sometimes ignored in the 
German literature on Land parliaments.
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Legislative functions
Given the strong role of legislative bodies in the United States, most Amer-
icans naturally think of these as having legislation as their main function.
But even in the United States legislatures have other functions, such as
controlling the executive through legislative oversight, confirming the
appointments of various officials, and performing numerous representa-
tion and service functions. In parliamentary systems governments depend
on majority support in parliament in order to remain in office, but there
is also a strong tendency, especially in disciplined political party systems
such as the German and British, for the majority party or coalition to sup-
port government policies with relatively little open criticism. Legislative
initiatives come largely from the government, and though some changes
in government bills may be made in committee or behind the scenes, the
parliamentary majority is expected to support the government’s agenda.
Nevertheless, laws cannot be passed without the parliaments, so that at
least formally they retain ultimate power in the legislative process.47
According to one close observer of Land parliaments, legislation today
takes up little time in the Landtage – about one-sixth of the plenary 
sessions.48 As noted above, their legislative powers have been weakened
during the past decades by constitutional changes, cooperative adminis-
trative arrangements with the federal government and other Länder, and
encroachments by the EU. As a result, many critics have suggested that the
Land parliaments are largely superfluous bodies with only limited powers
of any significance. Even in those areas over which they have retained
some powers, the majorities are constrained by the need to support the
government, and the Opposition forces have little or no chance to prevail.
At best they may exercise some influence in committee deliberations
hardly noticed by the general public.49 As noted above, this view is not
accepted by all observers.
Electoral and recruitment functions
In a parliamentary system the electoral and recruitment functions are
often more important than the legislative function. The prime minister as
well as the Opposition candidate for chief executive in the previous elec-
tion usually emerge from the Land parliament50 or a previous Land cabi-
net (or, sometimes, from a federal cabinet post), and he or she generally
has the strongest role in selecting the cabinet ministers. This is especially
the case in the seven Länder where the prime minister appoints individ-
ual cabinet members without parliamentary interference, but even then
the wishes of and pressures from the parliamentary party and/or coalition
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partner must be taken into consideration. Pre-election agreements can
also limit the prime minister’s influence.51
There are some differences among the Länder in the role of the parlia-
ment in selecting cabinet ministers. For example, in the city-states the
parliament elects the entire cabinet: in Berlin, first the lord mayor, then
the cabinet; in Bremen and Hamburg, first the Senat (cabinet), which
then elects the lord mayor. In six of the territorial states, the parliament
elects only the minister-president (prime minister), whose cabinet
appointees then require parliamentary approval. In seven Länder the par-
liaments do not control the prime minister’s formation of the cabinet,
which is also the case at the federal level. But in almost all cases ministers
are recruited from the parliaments. “Outsiders” do become ministers on
occasion, but they usually have some political experience elsewhere if not
in the parliament.52 Only in Bremen and Hamburg is there a rule of
incompatibility between executive and legislative office.53 The parliamen-
tary majorities are also involved in the appointment of key civil service
positions, such as state secretaries, possibly some department section
chiefs (who, however, are usually career civil servants), and directors of
government districts (Regierungsbezirke) who are considered to be “polit-
ical bureaucrats.” Parliamentary deputies sometimes seek these positions
themselves. In the city- states leadership positions in public enterprises
are also important patronage posts, and there are frequent complaints
about the party patronage (Filzokratie) that is often associated with
them.54 Finally, Land deputies elect judges to their state constitutional
courts, and every five years they select – mostly from among their own
members – half of the electors of the Federal Assembly which elects the
Federal President as ceremonial head of state.
Political control functions
A third major function of the Land parliaments is control of the govern-
ment and bureaucracy. Indeed, given the importance of the Länder in
administering most laws,55 this is seen in much of the literature as their
most important function.56
The instruments of control include parliamentary questions, both oral
and written; the right to demand that responsible ministers respond to
questions personally and that ministers submit reports to the parliament
(Zitierrecht and Berichtsersuchen), which may be taken up either in the
plenary meeting or by committees; the current-issues question time
(Aktuelle Stunde) for short questions and answers; resolutions, which can
deal with a general question without specifying a particular address, for
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example, the Land parliament condemns the actions of skinheads against
asylum seekers, or demands that are legally nonbinding calling on the
Land government take certain actions; a vote of no-confidence, which, of
course, is the sharpest control instrument but is rarely used;57 control via
committees of various kinds, including investigative committees; parlia-
mentary control commissions, e.g., the commission responsible for over-
seeing the office of constitutional protection, and special persons, such as
the personal data protection commissioner; informal controls, e.g., dis-
cussons in cabinet meetings, majority party group meetings which are
also attended by a minister, or meetings between leaders of coalition par-
ties, etc.; parliamentary control via the courts, where the minority parties
have the right to bring matters before the Land or federal constitutional
courts to determine the constitutionality of some action; and parliamen-
tary control of government actions, such as review of state contracts, Bun-
desrat matters, EU questions, results of subject minister conferences, and
planning decisions.58 Of course the quality of the review of government
actions taken in horizontal conferences of prime ministers and subject
ministers (“third level”) and in vertical conferences of bureaucrats
(“fourth level”) depends on the relationship between the government, the
majority and minority parties; the time and information available; the
feasibility of taking action when informal commitments have already
been made, etc.59 Such conferences are what Frido Wagener was referring
to when he spoke of vertikale Ressortkumpanei and vertikale Fachbrüder-
schaften (vertical ministerial cliques and vertical subject brotherhoods,
respectively).60 While Wagener’s terms carried critical and negative con-
notations, it has also been noted that such conferences are important
mechanisms of coordination and information management between and
among levels.61
As in the British House of Commons, legislative control activities, for
example, through the increasing number of written and oral questions,
now take up far more time in plenary sessions than legislation. Indeed,
one former Land prime minister suggested to the author that too many
deputies see their active participation in question time as a means of
keeping busy and of justifying their full-time status at the expense of the
time and energy of the civil servants who serve the government ministers
and must gather the information to answer the questions.
As the above suggests, it is useful to distinguish among various kinds of
control. Herbert Schneider, for example, has divided types of controls into
policy direction, administrative performance, and specialist categories. In
the question times set aside in parliament, “major questions” (Große
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Anfragen) are usually reserved for sessions devoted to policy issues; “small
questions” (Kleine Anfragen) and individual questions from deputies are
generally associated with administrative performance; and the more rou-
tine specialist control is exercised mostly in parliamentary committees.62
Other authors have noted the distinction between formal controls, e.g.,
those performed especially by the Opposition in public sessions through
question time, and those that take place behind the scenes in the cabinet,
internal party group meetings, party committees, etc.63
Parliamentary controls have different functions. The three most
important are securing information,64 exercising influence on govern-
ment actions and proposals, and promoting critical publicity. In addition,
one can see control functions as serving to occupy a theme, to set the stage
for a government pronouncement, to demonstrate to the public that the
Land parliament is acting on some matter, and to make points against the
other parties.65
Germans often distinguish between “working parliaments, ” e.g.,
American legislatures, and “talking parliaments,” e.g., the British House
of Commons. German parliaments are both, but the “working” function
is stronger. This is reflected above all in the time and effort devoted to
committee work.66 Ministers and high-level civil servants spend a good
deal of time in committee meetings, and the result is that deputies can
develop considerable expertise in the subject matter and gain respect and
influence in return. The committees meet usually from Tuesday through
Thursday – except in Bavaria, Brandenburg, Rhineland-Palatinate, and
Berlin usually in closed meetings – during special weeks set aside for that
purpose, while plenary meetings of the parliament are held generally on
the same days during one week a month for seven–ten months per year.
While closed meetings may be problematic in terms of the transparency
of committee actions, most German legislators are convinced that confi-
dentiality is necessary to ensure serious work rather than public postur-
ing and to limit interest group influence.67 Another problem arises,
however, when some committee actions or deliberations in the mostly
nonpublic meetings are not communicated in plenary sessions of the par-
liament, so that noncommittee members may not be as well informed as
they should be and there is less public information about the commit-
tees.68 The case for opening committee meetings to the public and press is
often made, but it has not had much impact.69 On the other hand, it
should be noted that the parliamentary petition committee in each Land
receives all kinds of citizen complaints and requests and serves an
ombudsman function quite effectively.
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Parliamentary control of finances is limited, as in most other parlia-
mentary bodies, by the large proportion of expenditures that are fixed by
law and not subject to political manipulation. In practice joint task
expenditures made under Article 91a and 91b or Article 104a, para. 4, of
the Basic Law are also not subject to revision by the Land parliamentary
majorities because of their reluctance to refuse federal matching funds or
reject actions of their own government. On the other hand, the deputies
do receive reports of the Minister of Finance, and they can rely to a con-
siderable extent on the Land general accounting office for ensuring cost-
effective administration, the director of which is named by the Land
government.70
As noted in other chapters, most federal laws are administered by the
Länder. One of the problems Land parliaments face in their control of the
administration of these laws is the lack of information. The best-informed
civil servants may be in the federal ministries that drew up the legislation,
and neither they nor their ministers can be made to appear before the Land
parliaments to answer questions.71 The Land civil servants who actually
implement the federal laws can always point to their federal origin (on the
other hand, much legislation is changed to some extent in the Bundesrat,
which is the domain of Land civil servants). Nevertheless, some questions
raised in the Land parliaments refer to federal actions, sometimes even
including foreign and defense policy. Of course these have no legal effect.72
A common complaint heard for the last few decades is that cooperative
federalism – and more specifically, the joint and interlocking decision
making by experts associated with the Politikverflechtung concept – largely
removes the Land parliaments from a good deal of decision making and
opportunities for control. Decision making in parliaments is more trans-
parent than in governments, and when Land ministers and bureaucrats
meet together in a wide variety of specialized conferences, and Land and
federal officials meet to engage in joint planning efforts under the joint
tasks of Article 91a and 91b, increased transparency and public informa-
tion levels are not the result. Yet effective parliamentary control should
result in making political responsibility visible. In cooperative federalism,
however, decisions are largely the result of negotiated compromise by 
governments with little opportunity for parliamentary participation.73
The debating function
This function is concerned with political education, but even more with
communication with constituents and party supporters. Debates are far
less a means of persuading deputies on the other side than of scoring
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points and of confirming the views and wishes of and speaking to sup-
porters with the aid of the media that report on activities in the Land par-
liament. This is especially important as elections approach.
Debates follow government declarations, major questions raised in
question time, and bills that have been introduced. The Opposition has the
obligation of pointing to contradictions, weaknesses in conception, prob-
lems of financing, and alternative provisions. Speakers for the majority
party or coalition parties reflect the views of the government and not nec-
essarily the real divisions that may exist internally. This, of course, can
make the debates all too predictable and therefore boring.74 Some issues,
such as the education and territorial reforms of the late 1960s and early
1970s already mentioned, enjoy considerable public interest. Most, how-
ever, do not. Even the introduction of the “Current-Issues Discussion”
(Aktuelle Stunde) has done little to arouse public interest, perhaps in part
because of the style and nature of the debates as well as the lack of public
information and often limited press coverage.75 There is probably little dif-
ference, however, between Land parliaments and state legislatures in the
United States in the generally low level of public interest in their activities.
Debates are usually not as sharp in the Land parliaments as in the Bun-
destag, because their smaller size makes it possible for the delegates to
know one another personally, and because Land parliaments enjoy a
more collegial atmosphere.76 On the other hand, this does not prevent
occasional sharp exchanges based on both ideological and personal dif-
ferences.
Representation and articulation function
Representation can take on different meanings, depending on the context
in which it is used. Alan Rosenthal, in his book on American state legisla-
tures, distinguishes between political representation, deliberative represen-
tation, and descriptive representation.77 Political representation refers to
such factors as reapportionment and redistricting of representative single-
member districts in order to provide equality and fairness. Deliberative
representation has to do with the legislative process, information-gather-
ing, legislative skills, linkage between issues, bargaining and compromise,
and responsibility for decisions made. Descriptive representation suggests
a mirror image of the voters in terms of income, occupation, age, race or
ethnic group, and gender. No legislative body in the democratic world con-
forms to this image of representation, which would be achieved better by
drawing lots than by holding elections. This is not to say that the increases
in representation of women and minorities or changes in occupational
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backgrounds of legislators are not important or do not make a difference.
But these new members are also not typical of the electorate they serve.
Whether they can be said to “refine and enlarge the public views,” as
claimed by James Madison in Federalist no. 10 (1787), may depend on the
time, place, issue, and perspective of the observer. Finally, a fourth kind of
participatory representation, based on citizen initiatives, legislative initia-
tives and referenda, recall, etc., along with a greater focus on public opin-
ion polls, is another alternative which has aroused great controversy in
both the United States and Germany.78
In Germany parliament reflects the diversity of interests in the Land 
better than the prime minister or the cabinet, which is one reason why the
argument is made that the weakening of parliaments vis-à-vis the govern-
ments must be resisted.79 This does not, of course, prevent some groups
from maintaining that they are not represented. A good example is the
environmentalists in the 1970s, who formed citizen initiatives in competi-
tion with elected bodies at both the local and Land levels. Since the early
1980s, however, these elements have formed and have been generally
absorbed by the Greens, who have gained representation in all of the Land
parliaments in the West (but none in the East!) and large numbers of local
governments.80 Environmental concerns have also been picked up to a
much greater extent than before by the older, established parties.
Parliamentary debating and articulation functions are closely related.
Debating functions are shared with the media, and articulation functions
are shared with interest groups. Group interests are, of course, also
reflected in debates, and they are articulated in nonpublic committee
meetings.81 The petition committees, mentioned above, should also be
noted as instruments for connecting public concerns and demands with
the Land parliaments.
Service function
This is a key function in the United States, where it involves a wide vari-
ety of constituency services. The amount and nature of service provided
varies among the states, based largely on the amount of staff support the
legislator has at his or her disposal.82 In Germany the service function is
often ignored in the literature as a specific function of legislators, proba-
bly because Land legislators generally do not have staff other than perhaps
a part-time secretary to assist them with such activities. On the other
hand, they do have office hours in their constituencies or home towns,
and they are often visited or contacted by individuals, groups, and local
government officials who have various requests and concerns.83 They also
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receive numerous telephone calls in their homes from constituents, some
of whom seem to pay little regard to the timing of their call. Furthermore,
deputies would point to the many group meetings, festivals, ceremonies,
etc., that they are expected to attend back home. The petition committee
mentioned above should also be mentioned as a means of providing 
service functions.
“Laboratory” function
The German Länder are not in as strong a position as American states to
perform a laboratory function in terms of new policy initiatives, such as
the experiments carried out by several American states in the 1990s in the
area of welfare reform. On the other hand, elections in the Länder may 
be seen at times as tests for the parties at the federal level, as in the case 
of Hesse in February 1999 where the CDU and FDP won an unexpected
victory only months after the federal election in September 1998 which
the SPD and Greens won clearly. Land elections also offer opportunities
for new parties to demonstrate their seriousness and potential. Examples
on the left would be the Greens in the 1980s and, after unification, the
PDS in the eastern Länder; on the the far right, parties such as the Repub-
likaner in the late 1980s and the German People’s Party (DVU) in the
1990s have had some limited success. The formation of new Land gov-
ernment coalitions in the 1990s, such as the SPD and the Greens in Ham-
burg, Bremen, and Hesse, could be seen as the precursor of the
SPD–Green coalition in Bonn in September 1998; whether the SPD and
the PDS coalition in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern will become any kind of
model for future coalitions in other Länder and perhaps even for the fed-
eral level remains to be seen. These examples in addition to the introduc-
tion of personal data protection procedures in Hesse and the vote for
sixteen-year-olds in local elections in Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony,
and Hesse (changed again to age eighteen by the new CDU/FDP govern-
ment in Hesse in summer 1999) have led some to conclude that “the Land
level today is in spite of all unitary tendencies within certain limits a field
for political experimentation.”84
Land parliaments and governments
As noted above, there is a tendency in all democratic systems, and espe-
cially in parliamentary democracies, for the executive to take major
responsibility for setting the legislative agenda and for pushing its bud-
getary, fiscal and other policy proposals through the legislature.85 In all
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democratic systems the broader agenda is the result of increased govern-
mental responsibilities in social, economic, transportation, environmen-
tal, educational, and other policy areas, while the success rate in passing
agenda items is based on varying degrees of party discipline and size of
the majority. In parliamentary systems it is also due to the interconnec-
tion between the government and the majority party or coalition in the
parliament and the reluctance of this majority to challenge government
policy and therefore weaken the government or even force the calling of
new elections which would be difficult for the majority to contest if it was
itself responsible for the downfall of its own government.
In Germany the institution of the Bundesrat, a federal organ which
allows Land governments to participate in the federal legislative process,
has contributed to what some observers call a system of “executive feder-
alism.” This is a system in which the federal government and its majority
in the Bundestag can pass a majority of its legislative proposals – and 
usually the more important ones – if the Bundesrat, composed of Land
government representatives, grants its approval. We have noted above that
the federal government has assumed major responsibility for legislation
in the German federal system as a result of a series of constitutional and
other changes since the Basic Law was adopted in 1949. As will be seen in
Chapter 11, the influence of the Land governments has also increased in
recent years as a result of constitutional reforms providing the Bundesrat
with additional powers in decision making concerning the EU. It is also
clear that the influence of the Land governments increases under condi-
tions of divided government, as in the 1990s and since 2000.
The problem with these developments from the perspective of the Land
parliaments is that they have not benefited from the increased participation
of their governments in federal decision making; indeed, the increase in
Bundesrat legislative initiatives in the past few decades is in part a reflection
of the loss of legislative powers in the Land parliaments.86 While Land gov-
ernments do have an obligation to keep their parliaments informed, and
parliaments may make recommendations to their governments, proposals
to make Land government votes in the Bundesrat dependent on approval by
Land parliaments have been rejected as both unconstitutional and imprac-
tical. They are unconstitutional because the Bundesrat is a federal organ
over which the Land parliaments have no authority, and impractical
because of time pressures and information levels. This results in the wide-
spread complaint that the Land parliaments have been the real losers in the
increased legislative powers of the federal government and the growth in
participation of the Länder in many federal decisions via the Bundesrat.87
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Not only are the Land parliaments left out of decision making in the
Bundesrat; they have also been bypassed when the federal government
passes concurrent legislation that calls on the Land governments to issue
regulations for implementation without parliamentary action,88 a practice
that was revised somewhat in favor of the Land parliaments in the consti-
tutional amendments in 1994.89 The horizontal meetings of the Land
prime ministers and of subject ministers (the so-called “third level”) also
lead to numerous agreements that, in theory, are subject to parliamentary
scrutiny and approval; however, in fact the parliamentary majority is
unlikely to reject its own government’s actions, not only because of party
discipline but also because of a lack of information.90 Model legislation
may also emerge from such meetings. In addition, hundreds of specialized
meetings involving higher civil servants of the Länder and meetings of fed-
eral and Land experts result in a large number of recommendations that are
not legally binding but that in fact lead to a high degree of cooperation and
coordination. These may be formally subject to Land parliament approval,
but they have a unitary effect. Meetings of federal and Land bureaucratic
officials (sometimes referred to as “the fourth level”) may also lead to 
federal–Land agreements that can have an effect on laws or create bodies
that do not affect the Land parliaments directly.91 It is not clear, however,
just what the “proper” role of the Land parliaments should be in these 
circumstances, given the logic of the parliamentary system which calls for
support of the government by the majority party or coalition parties.
The role of Land parliaments
In summary, the complaint that the Land parliaments have been weak-
ened over the last few decades is, at least to some extent, a questionable
proposition. If one looks only at the legislative functions they perform,
they surely have been weakened; however, if one looks at other functions,
their weakness is not so apparent.
Even if the Land parliaments have been weakened in their legislative
function, it can be argued that they continue to perform other important
functions, such as the election and recruitment, control, debating, repre-
sentation, and service functions discussed above. Part of the problem the
Land parliaments face in exercising these functions, however, is that their
exercise often requires considerable expertise on the part of individual
deputies, they take place in relative obscurity, and they appear generally
to be less interesting to both the media and the public. The fact that it s
above all the role of the Opposition to exercise effectively many of 
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the control functions – and in the process usually be easily defeated –
makes it more difficult to keep the media and public interested in routine
legislative sessions.
Also when compared with parliamentary systems in other countries, it
might be argued that it is not really so clear that German Land parlia-
ments have lost significantly more power in general terms than parlia-
mentary bodies elsewhere. If one looks at the role of governments in
Great Britain or in any number of parliamentary systems in setting the
agenda and relying on party cohesion to push through their policy initia-
tives, one could also point to a relatively passive law making role as per-
formed by the parliament. One can also point to the general weakness of
the French National Assembly or even the British House of Commons for
comparative purposes. A strong legislature, after all, suggests an ability to
defy the government in committees and in plenary sessions, to set its own
agenda, and to act independently in general, not only in cases of divided
government but even when the same party controls both the executive
and legislative branches, as in the United States. But these are character-
istics of a presidential or separation of powers system, not a parliamen-
tary system in which the government and its supporting party or coalition
parties are interconnected. The highly individualistic American model
might mean that the legislature is more “responsive,”92 but it also suggests
a less “responsible” party system and a less “responsible” government,
because the voters cannot generally hold weak parties, divided govern-
ment, or government with uncertain party support as such accountable
for their actions. Even some Land parliament deputies who have com-
plained to the author about the inability of their institution to act more
independently of the government seemed unaware of the change to a sys-
tem of separation of powers and weakened parties that a powerful Land
parliament would imply.
This raises the question of whether at least some of the concern
expressed about the weakening of Land parliaments is based on a misun-
derstanding of the parliamentary system. As one observer of the political
scene in Germany has noted, the “loss” of power to the federal level and,
increasingly, to the EU level, seems inevitable, and it helps little to whine
about it; besides, the Länder are primarily concerned with administration,
which is a key concern of the people, and therefore it is important for the
Land parliaments to focus on control functions. This observer also notes
that in a party democracy, such as Germany’s, the natural obligation of the
majority party in parliament is to support the government in implement-
ing its proposals and program, but this calls for control measures both
232 The Länder and German federalism
chap  6  27/5/03  11:55 am  Page 232
within and outside of parliament, e.g., the press.93 Another observer sug-
gests that a parliamentary system “is basically a flagrant violation of the
separation of powers, because the parliament and government . . . are con-
nected in a special way that is important to the functioning of parliament
. . . Therefore, in answering the question of what the Land parliaments can
and should do, the principle of separation of powers has little relevance.”94
Studies have shown, however, that most Germans believe that separation
of powers is or should be a characteristic of their parliamentary system and
that there is a widespread misperception of the roles of government and
opposition parties in supporting and opposing the government and the
leading role of the government in the legislative process.95 These studies 
are not very different in principle from studies that show that many 
Americans also do not understand their state legislatures, and, like many
Germans, have unrealistic and contradictory expectations regarding legis-
lators and the policy making process. It is no surprise that, as a result, they
are supercritical.96
The organization of the Land parliaments
Like legislative bodies in the American states, each Land parliament has
an administrative staff to assist the deputies in various aspects of their
work. This administration is supervised by the President of the Landtag
and led by a Landtagsdirektor. It is not a part of the executive branch; the
staff are Land civil servants appointed by the President. From small num-
bers of higher-level civil servants and lower-level employees in the early
1950s, the total staff has grown to several hundred in the larger Länder.
About half of the higher civil servants are employed by the parliamentary
advisory service, which is concerned with numerous technical legislative
services such as legislative bill drafting.
As in the United States, the size of the administrative staff has increased
over the years as a result of improvements made in the levels and kinds of
services provided; the increased work of the parliaments; the addition and
growth of professional legislative services, due in part to the growing
complexity of legislation; and the addition of press and information as
well as visitors’ services.97 The staff has the responsibility of supporting
the parliament, its President, the committees, the party groups, and the
deputies. It is divided into two sections: one concerned primarily with the
preparation, implementation, and assessment of plenary, committee or
commission meetings and the parliamentary petition office and public
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information; the other section is involved primarily with classic adminis-
tration, such as payroll and record keeping.
The parliamentary services section98
Legal services
The main function of this office is to provide legal advice. This includes
advice not only regarding legislation, constitutional issues, reports, and
so forth, but also concerning rules of procedure. Legal advice for investi-
gating committees can be especially important.
The petitions office
This office serves as a kind of parliamentary ombudsman for the many 
citizens who send requests or complaints to the parliament. The small staff
check whether the petitions are admissible, organize meetings of the peti-
tions committee or, in Lower Saxony, the standing committees, and plan
visits by deputies to the locations of some complaints for a first-hand view
of the situation. Recommendations are made by the petitions committee or
other committees for relief or action by the bureaucracy or parliament.99
The plenary meeting and committee service
Here staff are responsible for preparing the regular committee meetings,
the plenary meetings, and the meetings of the praesidium (executive
committee) which sets the agenda and decides how much time should 
be available for discussion of each item. The staff assemble and print all
relevant documents required for the plenary and committee meetings.
Stenographic services
Each parliament has several stenographers who have the task of recording
every word spoken in the plenary sessions, including questions raised that
interrupt the speeches and comments made by hecklers. They rotate
about every five minutes, and their reports are printed about fourteen
days after they were written. The record is not entirely verbatim, since
small and obvious corrections are made. For committee meetings notes
are kept rather than word-for-word accounts.
Public relations and media services
This is a more recent addition, and it has four areas of activity: the press,
publicity, political education, and visitor services. The staff keep the press
informed about parliamentary developments and the deputies informed
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about press reports concerning them and parliament. Each party group
also has a press office of its own.
The administration section100
Protocol
One civil servant has the responsibility to prepare for foreign visitors, 
official receptions, and other events. He or she also prepares visits of 
the parliamentary president and deputies to foreign countries, especially
for the purpose of visiting regional legislative bodies such as selected
American state legislatures.
The administration office
This office is responsible for administering the budget of the parliament,
including payments of salaries to the deputies and staff, support pay-
ments to the party groups, printing costs and building maintenance. The
deputies also have their own part-time secretaries paid from the budget.
Payment of party group staff is the responsibility of the party groups
themselves. There is also a small staff of technical personnel who main-
tain the building.
The information service
This service includes the library – which is some Länder is very good –
archives, data collection, and so forth. The role of computers has become
increasingly important in this area.
The parliamentary advisory service101
The purpose of this service is to advise and assist the party groups and the
member deputies. The chair of the party group decides how to use the
personnel assigned to the party group. They are selected by the parlia-
mentary president in consultation with the party group, but they become
public employees who must meet the civil service standards for the posi-
tions they occupy. Since they are civil servants, they cannot be released
even if the party for whose parliamentary group they work no longer
gains sufficient votes in parliamentary elections (i.e., 5 percent of the
total) to be admitted to parliament. In this case they have to be assigned
elsewhere. If the party groups hire persons not authorized in the budget,
these persons do not become civil servants.
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Conclusion
Land parliaments were established before the federal parliament in 1949,
and Article 30 and Article 70 of the Basic Law seem to suggest that they
have very important legislative functions. But the Basic Law also grants the
federation broad legislative powers, concurrent powers, and the authority
to pass framework legislation. These provisions, constitutional amend-
ments, and Federal Constitutional Court decisions that have expanded 
the legislative powers of the federation, the growing role of the Bundesrat
which increases the influence of Land governments rather than Land
parliaments, the growing regulative activities of the EU, and Politikver-
flechtung in general, have had the overall effect of reducing the legislative
powers of the Land parliaments.
On the other hand, Land deputies exercise many functions besides 
law making, including electoral and recruitment functions, control func-
tions, debating functions, representative and articulation functions, ser-
vice functions, and, to some extent, “laboratory” functions. Of these, the
most time-consuming for most deputies is the service function per-
formed especially for the home district. The deputies, who have few or no
staff, serve as a link between citizens and the government, including
administrative offices, and thereby help to bring government “closer to
the people.”
It could be argued that the decline of legislative powers of the Land par-
liaments is also to some extent a reflection of the operation of the parlia-
mentary system. This system calls for the majority party or parties to
support the government in order to give it the legitimacy it needs to gov-
ern and to provide political stability. A legislature that can and does defy
the head of government or competes with him or her and the cabinet for
control of the agenda and the power to pass legislation that may not be
supported by the cabinet suggests a different political model, namely the
presidential system, characterized by separation of powers and checks
and balances. There is some evidence that many Germans seem to expect
more of a separation of powers than the parliamentary system provides
and do not understand or accept the conventional roles of government,
majority, and opposition in this system; nor do they respect the politi-
cians who operate within the system.102 To the extent this thesis is correct,
it is no wonder that there is widespread Politikverdrossenheit (alienation
from or annoyance with politics) in Germany.
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Introduction
When one reads of European parliaments and their members, one nor-
mally thinks of the national level. This is understandable with respect to
the mostly unitary political systems, which have only national parliaments.
But some of these states, such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and 
Belgium, are federal systems, and some others, such as Spain, have a semi-
federal territorial organization. In these systems far more parliamentarians
are members of regional parliaments than of the national parliament. 
Nevertheless, since the regional parliamentarians receive much less media
coverage and relatively little public attention in general, less is known
about them than about their counterparts in the national capital. In 
Germany there is some newspaper coverage of the Land parliaments and
their members, but very little attention is paid them by television. On cer-
tain occasions there may be a development or incident in a parliament
which receives considerable public attention, but in general politicians at
the Land level are not in the public eye and are not all that well known.
Nevertheless, one issue that has been discussed to some extent by the atten-
tive public is legislative salary and various benefits along with the question
of whether the Land politicians are overpaid and underworked.
The deputies: who they are
As of summer 2002 there were 1916 Land deputies in the thirteen territo-
rial states and three city-states, ranging in number from fifty-one in the
smallest territorial state, the Saarland, to 231 in the largest territorial state,
North-Rhine Westphalia. The Christian Democrats (in Bavaria, the CSU)
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had the largest overall number, 815, while the SPD had 719. Among the
small parties, the Greens had 107, the FDP ninety-three, the PDS 148, and
others thirty-four. The Greens were represented in every West German
Land parliament except for the Saarland, whereas in the new eastern Län-
der they had no seats except in Berlin. The FDP had representation in nine
Länder, but in only one of the new Länder, and the PDS was confined to
the five new Länder and Berlin. On the far right, the Republicans lost their
last seats in Baden-Württemberg in 2001, but the German People’s Union
(DVU) had five seats in Brandenburg, and one in Bremen (Bremerhaven).
The DVU lost all of its sixteen seats in Saxony-Anhalt in April 2002.
Each of the Land parliaments publishes a handbook with brief biogra-
phies and statistics about the deputies, including occupational and other
data. Unfortunately, the organization of the data and categories are not
standardized, and some of the handbooks provide more information
than others. Indeed, some of the biographical information on occupa-
tional background is very limited. In 1994 Werner Patzelt sent a ques-
tionnaire to the 2,800 European, federal, and Land parliament deputies,
about one-third of whom responded.1 Of the respondents, 639 were Land
deputies. The largest single group (21.6 percent) consisted of teachers,
and all public employees together accounted for 45.3 percent of the
deputies. The next largest group (15.4 percent) were employees in indus-
try and trade. However, data collected by the author on deputies in the
East show that a high proportion are or were employed in state-owned
industry and trade firms and that many are or were engineers of various
kinds. Different kinds of teachers also made up a significant proportion
of the Eastern deputies, but otherwise public employees are a much
smaller proportion of parliaments in the East than in the West (Table 7.1).
Patzelt found relatively few deputies who said they were still practicing
their occupations on a full-time basis; indeed, on a five-point scale, about
70 percent selected points 4 or 5, i.e., they were engaged in their occupa-
tions very little or not at all. A sizable plurality of 44.5 percent considered
themselves to be in the middle of a five-point scale on social class back-
ground. The average age was early fifties, and three-fourths of the
deputies were male. A little more than 28 percent said they had served
more than twelve years in office (20.4 percent said seven–twelve years).2
Based on the statistics collected by the author for half of the Länder, the
proportion of women in the Land parliaments ranged from 21 percent in
Bavaria to 39 percent in Bremen. The Greens consistently have the largest
proportion of women (40–57 percent), the Christian Democrats the
smallest (11–32 percent). The average age of the deputies is between
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forty-five and fifty. The Greens generally have the lowest average age,
while the CDU and SPD are about the same.
Based again on data from about half of the Länder, a number of gener-
alizations can clearly be made. In terms of occupation, a large majority of
the delegations of the SPD and Greens are white-collar employees. Some
of the SPD deputies are from the private sector, but relatively few Greens
have worked for private employers. A large proportion of SPD and Green
deputies, and a smaller but still sizable proportion of CDU deputies, have
positions in the public service. Most of these are Beamte, i.e., persons
holding positions in the public sector with some degree of responsibility
at the Land and local levels. It is often asserted that most of the Beamte are
school teachers and others involved in education, but the data suggest
that this group is generally a sizable minority of the public employees who
are deputies and from 5 to 30 percent of the total party delegation,
depending both on the party and the Land. The SPD has from one to five
union employees in its delegations, and both of the large parties and the
Table 7.1 Parliamentary seats in the Länder, 1998–2001
Total 
Land (Year of Last Election) seats SPD CDU FDP Greens PDS Other
Baden-Württemberg (3/2001) 128 45 63 10 10 – –
Bavaria (9/1998) 204 67 123a – 14 – –
Berlin (10/2001) 141 44 35 15 14 33 –
Brandenburg (9/1999) 89 37 25 – – 22 5b
Bremen (6/1999) 100 47 42 – 10 – 1b
Hamburg (9/2001) 121 46 33 6 11 – 25c
Hesse (7/1999) 110 46 50 6 8 – –
Lower Saxony (3/1998) 157 83 62 – 12 – –
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (9/1998) 71 27 24 – – 20 –
North-Rhine Westphalia (5/2000) 231 102 88 24 17 – –
Rhineland-Palatinate (3/2001) 101 49 38 8 6 – –
Saarland (9/1999) 51 25 26 – – – –
Saxony (9/1999) 120 14 76 – – 30 –
Saxony-Anhalt (4/2002) 115 25 48 17 – 25 –
Schleswig-Holstein (2/2000) 89 41 33 7 5 – 3d
Thuringia (9/1999) 88 21 49 – – 18 –
Total 1916 719 815 93 107 148 34
Notes: a Christlich Soziale Union (CSU); b Deutsche Volksunion (DVU); c Party for Rule of Law
Offensive (PRO); d Südschleswigscher Wählerverband (SSW).
Sources: Wahlergebnisse in Deutschland, 1946–1998 (Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1998); 
Karl-Rudolf Korte, Wahlen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung, 1998); www.wahlrecht.de/landtage with links.
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Greens often have employees of local public enterprises in their party
groups. Frequently these three parties also have one or more political
party employees in their delegations. The important point is that most
deputies are economically dependent employees. This has consequences
for compensation practices, which are said to reflect the lack of financial
independence of the deputies. On the other hand, public employees are
guaranteed the right to return to their positions, for example, as teachers,
if and when they leave the parliament before retirement age.
A minority of deputies are self-employed. Lawyers are fairly well repre-
sented, though they constitute a small minority of the total and are a far less
important occupational group than in many US legislative bodies. House-
wives and an occasional househusband are represented in small numbers,
and a few students are deputies, especially in some Green delegations.
Retirees are small in number.
The deputies: what they do
In the early 1990s an intensive study was made of the deputies of the par-
liament of Lower Saxony. On the basis of personal observation of plenary
meetings, committee meetings, party groups and their specialized subject
working groups; lengthy interviews and discussions with deputies and
staff; accompanying selected deputies during one week’s activities; a ques-
tionnaire focusing on time spent on various activities during a particular
month; and visits to constituencies with deputies, a comprehensive pic-
ture was developed of the activities of the then 155 deputies in Hanover.3
One result of the study was that the average work week for deputies was
76.7 hours, which conforms with the results of studies done earlier in
Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-Holstein.4 Excluding the hours
worked in occupations in which some deputies were still engaged, the
average number of hours in the workweek of a deputy was 62.1. The dif-
ferences among party groups in hours worked in various occupations
outside of parliament were significant: CDU deputies worked on average
15.9 hours; FDP 13.3 hours; and the SPD 10.4 hours. None of the Greens
worked at another occupation while they were deputies. The range in the
workweek as deputies was between 49.7 and 103 hours. There were minor
differences between men and women, party leaders and backbenchers,
newcomers and veterans, and those directly elected and those elected over
the party lists. There were also few differences between deputies of the
large parties, SPD and CDU, at 77.4 and 75.4 hours, respectively, while the
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much smaller FDP and Green delegations claimed to put in 81.2 and 83.9
hours, respectively. This was due in large part to the extra demands placed
on their smaller numbers.5
Another important and even more thorough academic study, based on
interviews in Bavaria in 1989 of representatives in the Land, federal, and
European parliaments, was published in 1993. A second book by the same
author, based on the same data but organized differently and designed
more for the general reader, appeared in 1995.6 The author, Werner
Patzelt, concluded that Land deputies worked on average about 60 hours
per week.7 A third study, conducted by the same author in 1994 was based
on the results of a mailed questionnaire of 2,800 deputies at the European,
federal, and Land levels.8 During the weeks when parliament met, which
in most cases included committee meetings, the respondents from the
federal and Land levels put in about 65 hours on average, excluding travel
time, work in other occupations, etc. During weeks when the parliament
did not meet and the focus was on the home district, the average was
about 54 hours. According to the respondents, about one-half of their
total working time was spent on parliamentary matters, about one-third
on district activities and service.9 Even if one is skeptical of the claims of
some of the deputies, there can be little doubt that most of them have a
very long work week.
What do they do that takes up so much time? There are three sets of
activities in which all of the deputies engage: activities related directly to
parliamentary work; activities in the election district, even if elected over
the party list; and activities related to their political party. A fourth set of
activities which takes up a good deal of time of most deputies is connected
with an elected office at the municipal and/or county level.
Parliamentary work
With respect to parliamentary work, the deputies attend party group
meetings and meetings of specialized party working groups in which party
initiatives and positions related to their committee assignments are dis-
cussed and occasional trips are made to places within the Land to gather
information and make contacts; these make up the core of parliamentary
activity for the deputies, and it is in the working groups that they spend the
most time, including reading and preparation. All deputies participate in
committee meetings, which, depending on the committee, meet normally
from once to seven or eight times a month. In contrast to other Länder that
have special petition committees, the committees in Lower Saxony receive
The Land parliament deputies in Germany 247
chap  7  27/5/03  11:56 am  Page 247
complaints, concerns, and inquiries from citizens that are related to the
subject matter of the committees. These communications are checked first
by parliamentary administrative staff who then direct them to the appro-
priate committees for action. Of course the activity most familiar to the
general public is the plenary meeting of parliament; however, full meetings
take place only for three successive days every month except in late 
summer for a total of about thirty days during the year. They can be time-
consuming for party leaders and those who are making prepared speeches,
but even these are seen as largely staking out party positions for public
consumption, especially for the press, and for gaining some publicity back
home. The plenary sessions are especially tedious for the Opposition
deputies, who can achieve few concrete results against the majority party
or coalition. The tendency to raise a large number of rather minor ques-
tions during question time is also time-consuming and tedious. Few
deputies are willing to sit for any length of time through the speeches,
questions and routine actions that do not interest or concern them
directly, especially when they have many other things they would rather be
doing. But from the gallery, of course, the public sees many empty seats,
not the delegates who are actually meeting and talking with constituents,
other deputies, interest groups, and others outside in the hallways or
lobby.10 The belief by the general public that the work of their deputies is
or should be done in the legislative chambers is also a problem in the
United States, where disappointed citizens often see from the visitors’
gallery mostly empty seats and a few inattentive legislators.11
In contrast to the public view, legislators themselves see the plenary
meetings as relatively unimportant. When asked to indicate the impor-
tance of various parliamentary activities, 95 percent of the respondents in
Patzelt’s 1994 study said committee meetings were important, 92 percent
pointed to party group meetings, 91 percent listed specialized party work-
ing groups, and only 50 percent said plenary meetings were important.
Seventy percent thought that informal contacts with members of their
own party were important, 43 percent thought the same about contacts
with members of coalition parties, and only 25 percent felt that contact
with Opposition members were important; 57 percent thought contacts
with journalists were important.12
District work
The second set of activities, which deputies see as crucial for reelection
purposes, is their work in the district.13 This consists of contacts with local
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citizens, local administrative offices, local businesses, groups of all kinds,
and, of course, the local press. This work is not only a process of meeting
people and remaining in contact; it also involves an ombudsman func-
tion,14 including telephone calls at virtually all times of the day. These
activities take up an average of one-third of the working time for the
week. (In the study in Bavaria about 37 percent of the deputies suggested
that more than 50 percent of the total time they spent on political work
was connected with their districts.15) Not only do the deputies hear the
wishes and concerns of their constituents; they also have an opportunity
to express their views and the position of their party on relevant issues.
Thus the deputy serves as the “transmission belt” between the district and
the state capitol, possibly even assisting in gaining grants for local projects
– although that is unlikely for an Opposition deputy. A common strategy
is membership in or close contact with various local groups, for example,
attendance at two or three functions or meetings every week and meeting
with local politicians. One of the most damaging accusations against a
deputy is that he or she is “distant” and “absent” or unconcerned about
district voters and their views and wishes, and therefore deputies feel
obligated to accept virtually every invitation to attend the various func-
tions in their district. A study of deputies in the five new Länder, however,
has shown that they were spending far more time on legislative than dis-
trict activities in comparison to their counterparts in the West, at least in
part due to the need to pass large amounts of legislation that had been
passed in the western parliaments over several decades. On the other
hand, the PDS, which, given its opposition status, carried much less par-
liamentary responsibility for this legislation, was focusing more attention
on district work.16
Still, there are party differences among the deputies, e.g., the deputies
from the small parties are generally unable to spend as much time in the
district as their large party counterparts, and the Green deputies are less
concerned with local “lobbying” activities for ideological reasons. The
study in Lower Saxony also found differences between the governing
party, SPD, and the Opposition CDU deputies, who were somewhat more
likely to concentrate on district work than on parliamentary activities for
the obvious reason that most of their parliamentary work was for naught.
On the other hand, there were significant differences in approach to dis-
trict work within both large parties.17
Deputies maintain contacts with the district population not only
through attendance at various functions but also through personal com-
munication. Telephone calls to the homes of deputies are common,
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including on Sundays. Some deputies hold office hours in the district as a
service to their constituents. A majority of deputies in the Lower Saxon
study, however, did not, arguing in part that their experience showed that
many constituents felt uncomfortable about going to an office to discuss
their concerns and preferred individual contact, including home visits.
On average deputies made two or three such visits each week.18
Given the amount of time deputies at all levels devote to their districts,
it is not surprising that most of the responding deputies (53 percent) in
Patzelt’s 1994 study believed their views reflect those of their constituents,
while only 6 percent were doubtful.19 Unfortunately, polling data have
suggested that only 23 percent of the population believed Land deputies
are well informed about the views of their constituents, and 35 percent
assumed they are poorly informed. Only 13 percent said it is easy to meet
with a deputy, and 21 percent even thought it was nearly impossible.20
Needless to say, these are depressing figures for deputies who put so much
effort into making and maintaining contacts at home.
While 39 percent of the deputies thought citizens in their districts
would give them good grades for their work, 8 percent suspected they
would get bad grades; however, 70 percent thought they would be graded
favorably by the politically interested citizens. Most felt their constituents
had positive views about them individually, but they recognized that cit-
izens generally had negative assessments of parliament as a body, which
76 percent said they found troubling (belastend).21 The contrast in the
public views regarding their individual representative on the one hand
and the legislature as an institution on the other is also well known in the
United States, where polls commony indicate that citizens like their own
congressman but are contemptuous of Congress.
Political party work
A majority of Land deputies hold one or more offices in their political
parties at the local, regional and/or Land level. Party work is essential for
several reasons. There must be contact and cooperation between the
extra-parliamentary party and parliamentary party group. For example,
the deputy reports in local party meetings on developments in the parlia-
ment and receives feedback from the regular members. Holding party
office helps to integrate the deputy into the party organization and main-
tain contact with local party leaders. This is another means by which the
deputy serves as a “transmission belt” between local party members and
the parliamentary party group. Party office also increases the deputy’s
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influence over party policies and personnel matters. Finally, party office
is an important means of retaining support for renomination as the
party’s candidate for the next election. Holding a party office and simul-
taneously serving in the Land parliament can lead to a variety of tensions,
from complaints about party policy at the Land and federal levels for
which the deputy is supposed to answer to envy from others in the party
with whom the deputy has had a close relationship in the past.22
Local council offices
For the typical deputy, the list of activities does not end with parliamen-
tary, district, and party work, but is complemented by office holding in
local councils at the municipal or county level and, not infrequently, at
both local levels. The practice of holding multiple offices is probably best
known in France, where, in order to secure their local political base,
deputies in the National Assembly and even ministers are often mayors or
important officials in their communes. While members of the Bundestag
rarely hold multiple offices, it is a common practice for Land deputies.
This is because deputies usually serve at the local level before being nom-
inated as a candidate for the Land level, and local office helps to provide
the deputy with a political base in the home district; second, it is an
important means of keeping the deputy in touch with the problems and
concerns of local governments, which are an important responsibility of
the Land parliaments. According to the personal bibliographies in the
Handbook of the Lower Saxon parliament, 73 percent of the SPD and 60
percent of the CDU deputies served in a municipal council in the mid-
1990s, while the percentage serving in county councils was 41 and 51 per-
cent, respectively. Some had served in the past, but not while they were
members of parliament. In some American state legislatures, a majority
of the legislators may also have held a local government or party office,
while in others the proportion with previous experience may be consid-
erably less;23 in any case they are not allowed to hold a local government
office while they are members of the legislature.
In addition to the activities described above, most deputies are also
members of various private and public boards, including charitable 
organizations; committees; and organizations, for example, local pub-
lic savings and loan associations and public enterprises. Particularly
from an American perspective, it is interesting that 4.5 percent of the
CDU, 59 percent of the SPD, and 31 percent of the Green deputies 
in Lower Saxony were members of unions in the mid-1990s. Many of
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the SPD deputies were actively engaged in activities related to their
union membership.
Taken together, the four general areas of activity of Land deputies
require an inordinate amount of time, and it is not surprising that the
deputies report an average workweek of over 60 hours excluding any time
spent on activities not related to their work as office holders. But as with
other professions, including academia, it is often difficult to explain the
work load to outsiders who simply do not see the many obligations of
deputies beyond their participation in plenary sessions, from which they
absent themselves during much of the time when issues that do not inter-
est or affect them are being discussed. This may be a problem that is com-
mon to legislators in all democratic societies. In Germany it is
complicated by relatively high salaries and benefits, which can and do cre-
ate considerable resentment and controversy.
The deputies: what they earn
The salaries and benefits of Land deputies are described in some detail in
the “The Law Concerning Deputies” (Abgeordnetengesetz) contained in the
respective Land parliamentary handbooks. The Law is divided into
numerous sections, including “Compensation,” “Reimbursement of
Expenses,” “Transition Payments,” “Health Insurance,” “Pensions,” and so
forth. Until the famous “compensation decision” (Diätenurteil) rendered
by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1975,24 most Land deputies were
part-time with modest compensation packages. But the Court held that if
deputies are full-time, they should be paid a full salary commensurate with
the status and responsibilities of the office.25 As a result the compensation
for deputies in the Länder was increased dramatically.26 Even though the
Court revised the Diätenurteil in 1987,27 the Land parliaments continued
to increase compensation packages by significant amounts.
There are two parts to the compensation package received by the
deputies. One part is literally “compensation” (Entschädigung), which
includes base salary, transition pay, pension benefits, and assistance in
meeting the costs of illness, births, and deaths. The other is the reim-
bursement of expenses (Aufwandsentschädigung), which is designed to
cover office expenses, telephone and postage, travel and hotel expenses,
public transportation, and office help. The legislative assembly of the city
state of Hamburg used to be the exception to this two-part compensation
package, since it perceived itself as a part-time body and provided only
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reimbursement of expense;28 however, it now has a two-part package in
spite of its continued self-perception as a part-time assembly.29
The base salaries of the deputies vary considerably from Land to Land.
Salaries in the sixteen Länder in the mid-1990s ranged from DM 4,457 in
Bremen (under certain circumstances supplemented by reimbursements
for absences from regular work) to DM 1,1266 in Hesse (figured at
$1.00/DM=1.60 – about the average exchange rate in the second half of the
1990s – this is $7041 per month!). The average in the old territorial states
was DM 8,828 ($5330), in the new territorial states DM 6,633 ($4146).
These are full-time salaries designed for full-time deputies, but some
deputies, depending on the Land, do continue to work part-time as public
employees or as self-employed persons in business or law.30
In addition to the base salary, Entschädigung includes transition money,
i.e., full salary payments made to deputies who leave office for any reason,
whether because of electoral defeat or voluntary departure for another
job. Transition payments are made for one–three months to those who
have served for as little as one year and for a maximum of twelve–thirty
months for service of ten–twenty-two years. The total maximum payment
could amount to DM 53,484 in Bremen to DM 214,500 ($134,063) in
Schleswig-Holstein.31 These payments have come under considerable
attack, and they were reduced in recent years at the federal level.
A third major part of the Entschädigung consists of the retirement 
benefits. Lifetime retirement benefits amount to 25–35 percent of full
salary for the minimum service of eight–ten years beginning at sixty years
of age; these payments increase 3–5 percent each additional year of service
to a maximum of 75 percent of salary beginning at age fifty-five in most
Länder for long-time office holders (thirteen–twenty-three years). In 
four of the new Länder there are even provisions for modest pensions 
for deputies who served only one term in the first parliaments after 
unification. In addition to these very generous retirement benefits,
deputies receive assistance for health care as well as birth and death 
payments.32
Ministers who still have their seats in the Land parliament receive a
higher compensation; some even receive double payments, e.g., 50 per-
cent of the deputy salary in addition to their ministers’ salary in Bavaria,
Berlin, North-Rhine Westphalia, and Saxony, and 70 percent in Baden-
Württemberg. In the other territorial states the ministers receive 25–35
percent of the deputy salary. In Lower Saxony, however, there is no dou-
ble payment, and in Bremen and Hamburg incompatibility rules prevent
double office holding. Double payments also exist for pensions, e.g., full
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deputy pension plus one-half of a minister’s pension. In Lower Saxony,
again, only the higher of the two is paid.33
The second part of the total compensation package, as noted above, is
reimbursement for expenses. This includes travel, hotel, and meals as well
as free use of office space, government cars, telephones, and free public
transportation. Two systems of payment are employed: lump sum and
separate billing. The lump-sum payment is provided by Bavaria (DM
4711) and Berlin. Critics charge that some of this amounts to income,
because payments are higher than actual expenses, especially for deputies
who live near the capital, have no district offices, etc. The second system
of payment is by separate billing for travel, hotel, and meals. The remain-
ing range of partial lump sum payments for other expenses is from DM
769 in Bremen to DM 2,191 in North-Rhine Westphalia. According to
two studies, these payments are also in excess of actual expenses.34 Minis-
ters and state secretaries also receive partial lump-sum payments that can
range from DM 500 in Lower Saxony to DM 3,533 in Bavaria. In some
Länder ministers even receive a lump-sum payment as deputies in spite of
their chauffeured cars and other amenities.35
Given the high degree of regulation in German society and the “flood of
legislation” that is the focus of many complaints among German legisla-
tors, it is surprising that some areas that are rather closely regulated in the
United States have been ignored in Germany. A good example is the lack
of regulation of private donations to legislators. In contrast to donations
to political parties, there is no requirement of publicity for donations to
individual politicians who may use the money received in any manner they
wish, although they are most likely to pass it on to their party for campaign
purposes. The only requirement at the federal level is that the deputy
inform the President of the Bundestag of any donation of DM 1,000 or
more. For donations of DM 20,000 or more to a political party, the donor
must be named; that provision applies to individual legislators as well,
according to the new party finance law of 1992. Only in Lower Saxony and
Bremen is it illegal for a deputy to be paid a retainer by his firm or serve as
a consultant while in office.36
It is clear from the above why the compensation packages received 
by office holders in the Länder – and at the federal and EU levels – have
been so controversial in recent years.37 And it certainly does not help
when a report appears in the press about an SPD Land deputy from
North-Rhine Westphalia who, in spite of a very generous salary and
reimbursement package of about DM 12,000, was discovered to be
receiving an additional DM 3,000 per month in unemployment 
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compensation on the grounds that his regular job before he entered 
parliament had been eliminated!38
By international comparison, even politicians at the Land level in 
Germany are well paid. They are also very well paid in comparison with
“professional,” full-time American state legislators, e.g., in New York or
California.39 But given the sixty-hour- plus weekly work loads of Land
deputies, it can be argued they are not overpaid, especially when compared
with high-salary employees in the private sector. This argument also
applies to other Western democratic industrial societies, some of which,
for example, Great Britain, pay their politicians far less than Germany. 
In fact, one reason why such a large proportion of the deputies are public
and private employees, rather than more from the self-employed ranks 
as in the United States, is that the generous total compensation packages
provide the office holders with higher incomes than they would receive in
their regular positions, e.g., school teachers and other mid-level civil 
servants and private employees. This, together with the added prestige and
social status – in spite of Politikverdrossenheit (alienation from or annoy-
ance with politics) and the criticism directed toward the “political class”
today in Germany – help explain why there is a tendency for office holders
to cling to their positions. But this is a phenomenon observable among the
more professionally oriented state legislators in the United States as well.40
It is possible for legislators in Germany who entered parliament from the
public service to return to their old pre-legislative positions, a prospect
most seem to find uninviting; however, there is little tradition of moving
to a well-paid, relatively high-status position in the private sector as is
common in the United States. German “professional politicians” are more
likely than many of the more financially independent American state leg-
islators to live “off” politics, and, one might argue, as a result a larger pro-
portion of Germans from the broad middle class rather than the middle to
upper middle class are recruited into the legislature.
While it is clear that deputies in Germany are well paid, it should also
be pointed out that they have high expenses. Like American politicians,
they are not only invited to speak at and attend many functions and group
meetings in their districts; they are also expected to contribute to the
cause in many cases. Sizable contributions are especially expected – and
required – by the political parties. Rarely, if ever, is anyone elected who is
not a member of a party. This membership is not merely nominal, as is
usually the case in the United States. Rather, “card-carrying” membership
is the norm, which means monthly dues ranging from a dozen or so DM
per month to hundreds of DM in the SPD, which has a dues structure
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graduated by income. In the past deputies were expected to contribute
sizable funds to their party groups, while today this practice is supposed
to have been banned with the party groups being funded generously by
the public treasury. Nevertheless, some funding by deputies continues.
Above all the deputies are expected to provide the parties with monthly
donations amounting to DM 1,000 (about 500 Euro) or more, often
referred to as a “party tax.” The Greens pay an especially high party tax.
This “tax” can be seen as a hidden form of party financing, especially
given the provisions of the tax law that give private citizens a 50 percent
tax credit and the party a 50 percent bonus designed to encourage private
donations.41 Deputies also give sizable amounts of money to their parties
for election campaigns, since these are organized and fought by the par-
ties, not by individual candidate organizations. One deputy told the
author that he gives voluntarily about DM 20,000 to his party each year.
All in all, there is a considerable gulf between the often sharp criticisms
of deputies and their salaries and benefits on the one hand and the views
of the deputies themselves. Given the number of hours they devote to their
work related directly and indirectly to parliamentary activities, to their
districts and the services they perform, to the local government offices
most of them occupy, and to their party activities, which are necessary
both to maintain contact with supporters and retain the nomination 
for their seat in parliament, and the pressures these numerous and time-
consuming obligations place on their family and private lives, most
deputies believe they earn too little rather than too much.42 Interviews
which the author conducted with selected deputies in Lower Saxony also
suggest they are resentful of charges that they are overpaid.
The deputies: part-time, full-time, or what?
In his influential essay, “Politics as a Profession,” Max Weber distin-
guished among three kinds of elected office holders: the professional, the
part-time, and the occasional politician.43 Professionals can be distin-
guished further between those who live “off” of politics and those who
live “for” politics. The former are dependent on the salaries they receive
as office holders, the latter have independent sources of income.
In the United States, relatively high salaries, length of session, and staff
support are the three variables that determine the degree of “professional-
ization.” Most state delegates have traditionally been part-time politicians;
however, in recent decades professional politicians have come to dominate
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the legislatures of at least nine states, with New York and California in the
lead. Most of the legislators in these nine states with “professional legisla-
tures” are full-time and live “off” politics, although some of the more
affluent delegates live “for” politics. The salary range of these legislatures
in 1997–98 was between $75,600 in California (raised to $99,000 in Janu-
ary 1999) and $35,000 in New Jersey, and the average annual duration of
the legislative session in 1996–97 ranged from 365 calendar days in Wis-
consin to 133 in Illinois. Legislative staff ranged from 3,899 in New York to
552 in Ohio. At the other end of the continuum, the legislatures in about
sixteen American states can be categorized as “citizen” legislatures, with
salaries ranging from $15,000 in West Virginia to $200 in New Hampshire,
which also has the largest state legislative body with 400 delegates. Need-
less to say, few legislators in these states could live “off” politics, but not all
of them are part-time. While the average annual duration of the session in
1996–97 was, as one would expect, shorter than for the professional legis-
latures, the range was from thirty-six days in Wyoming to 256 days in
Rhode Island, which pays its legislators only $10,250. Staff support in these
legislatures ranged from 742 in Georgia to fifty-eight in Vermont. The leg-
islatures in about twenty-five states in between these two extremes are cat-
egorized as “hybrid,” with salaries ranging from $32,000 in Hawaii to
$1,040 in Alabama and an average annual duration of session ranging
from 177 days in Delaware to fifty-two in Kentucky.44 Staff support in the
hybrid state legislatures ranged from 2,420 in Texas to 164 in Delaware.
Most of the delegates in these hybrid states probably live “for” politics;
nevertheless, many of them in both the citizen and hybrid legislatures, and
particularly those with major responsibilities such as speakers, committee
chairs, and party caucus leaders, are really full-time politicians.45
In Germany most Land deputies are full-time professionals who live
“off” politics. The exception is perhaps the Hamburg assembly, which in
law, if not in practice,46 is part-time. The change from part-time to full-
time professional took place after a Federal Constitutional Court decision
in 1975 suggested – but did not require, as some Land deputies seemed to
think47 – that they should receive a full-time salary commensurate with
their responsibilities. This has always been a controversial decision,
because it served as the basis for very generous salary levels and benefits
for Land deputies that approach or, in a few cases, are even roughly com-
parable to federal-level salaries. Some critics believe the compensation
packages are not only unjustified; they are also the result of a sinister “self-
service” in which deputies conspire to provide themselves economic 
benefits through legislation they pass without effective outside controls.48
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There are, of course, various arguments pro and con regarding full-
time professional status and part-time status for Land deputies. For the
part-time option it can be argued that the work of the Land parliaments
is fundamentally different from the federal parliament, that they do not
have the powers and authority of the Bundestag and are not, therefore, the
center of attention. Land deputies should be “closer to the people” and
need to maintain close contact through an occupation. Being a profes-
sional politician at the Land level is too small a base for a deputy whose
roots are only local, and clinging to office creates resentment in the elec-
torate. Some critics readily admit that the deputies work long hours, but
they counter that much of that work is “busy work” in parliament and,
especially, in the districts designed to justify their salaries. The parlia-
mentary example usually chosen is the large number of “kleine Anfragen,”
or written questions, that are said to have the effect mostly of tying up the
ministerial bureaucracy with unnecessary and picky questions. There are,
of course, many examples taken from district work, suggesting that the
deputies could do a lot less. The critics are not impressed by the many
hours put into party activities by deputies, nor do they consider local
office holding an excuse for the burdens of Land office.49
While even some deputies agree to some extent with some of these 
criticisms,50 they and others would also point to the importance of the
parliament primarily as an instrument of control rather than of law mak-
ing and the need to acquire expertise through legislative experience to
exercise this control effectively. They would note the necessity of spending
as much time in the district as possible in order to maintain close contacts
with citizens, serve as ombudsmen, and retain or gain crucial popular
support for the next election, and they would rebut strongly the argument
that only part-time politicians with normal occupations are close to the
people.51 They would cite the importance of maintaining party support
for renomination and for connecting the extra-parliamentary party and
the party group in parliament. And they would certainly argue that local
government office holding is an important source of political information
and experience as well as an important political base. All of these func-
tions also serve an important “transmission belt” function for the citi-
zenry, and, in spite of Politikverdrossenheit, many citizens take it for
granted that “their” deputy will hear their concerns and, to the extent pos-
sible, go to bat for them. In other words, there is an argument to be made
for the quality of democracy in any discussion of these functions.52 As we
have seen above, it can also be argued that Land deputies, even if the sixty-
hour week they claim to work on average is somewhat exaggerated, have
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too much to do to serve part-time. This is especially true in the larger Län-
der. The growth of the public sector and the need for deputies to serve as
ombudsmen impose time demands on most deputies that exceed part-
time capabilities.53 It is precisely the alleged decline of the Land parlia-
ments that requires professionals to prevent even further losses; according
to this view, part-time status would reduce the parliamentary meeting
time and therefore the control of the government. It would also mean less
time spent on service functions for constituents. Some also insist that if
deputies are not provided a decent salary, they will become more subject
to the influence of lobbyists. One might add that without a decent salary,
many potential candidates would also be discouraged from running for
office, especially if legislative service takes too much time away from the
occupation on which the person relies for an income. A further argument
notes that the role of the bureaucracy is likely to increase under part-time
deputies. There are also incompatibility rules for various public employ-
ees which would make it impossible for the many civil servants who are
deputies – including many teachers and some university employees – to
serve on a part-time basis.54 Many Green deputies have no other employ-
ment,55 and some deputies in the East are otherwise unemployed. Addi-
tional arguments, also common in the United States would include the
need for legislative expertise in many fields that can be gained only
through experience and the time spent in leadership positions, through
service in committees, and participation in other meetings. American
data also suggest that deputies in the more professional and full-time 
legislatures spend more time with their constituents.56
One observer has suggested that the belief that part-time deputies
would be more broadly representative of the general population is based
on a “thinking error” (Denkfehler). He points out that the Land parlia-
ment, like other democratic parliaments, is not designed to represent all
social and economic groups. The office of a Land deputy has developed
into a full-time position not unlike other positions, with various oppor-
tunities for advancement, recognition, etc. What the deputies did before
in an earlier occupation is much less important than the political skills
and effectiveness of the deputy in office.57
Conclusion
Like their counterparts in other countries, parliamentary deputies in 
Germany – whether at the federal or Land level – are not a representative
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sample of occupation, education, income, gender, and other character-
stics; however, the proportions of women in German legislative bodies
have increased significantly in all party groups in recent decades, especially
with the advent of the Greens in 1979. In a politically more relevant sense,
the deputies are representative of the broad currents of political views in
the society, from the leftist PDS in the East and Greens in the West to the
rightist Republikaner in the West and DVU in East and West. The vast
majority of deputies, however, represent the center left SPD or the center
right CDU (in Bavaria, the CSU). The proportional electoral system is a
crucial factor, of course, in promoting this kind of political representation.
Even though it is often argued that the powers of the Land parliaments
have declined over the decades, the Land legislatures do retain important, 
if limited, powers in certain areas such as education and culture, local 
government, law and order, and internal organization. And while their law
making function may have declined, the deputies are still actively involved
in committee meetings and party work groups associated with the parlia-
ment, in a variety of service and ombudsman functions in the home dis-
trict, in political party activities, and, in most cases, in local government
office holding. Studies suggest that the deputies work on average about
sixty hours per week, excluding any hours they may have worked in their
regular occupations as lawyers, businessmen, etc. American state legislators
are also active in legislative and district work, but relatively few of them
would have the added burden of political party work, and none of them
would hold one or even two time-consuming local government offices.
Salaries and benefits for the Land deputies are relatively generous, espe-
cially if compared to the typical American state legislator. Only the legis-
lators in the six or seven highest-paying American states are in a roughly
equivalent situation. The benefits that German politicians take for
granted that would undoubtedly raise the most questions in the United
States are the transitional payments received when the deputy leaves
office for almost any reason and the retirement benefits received after a
relatively short period of time in office. Whether the deputies are over-
paid, given the decline of legislative powers in recent decades, is a contro-
versial question. On the one hand, it seems clear that they work long
hours. The question some critics raise is whether all the work in which
legislators engage is really productive or necessary. In response, deputies
would point to their time-consuming work in various kinds of activities
related to legislative and control functions, and to the importance of the
linkage function between the population on the one hand and the Land
government and administration on the other hand.
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The discussion above also relates to the question of whether the deputies
should or could be part-time. This debate has to do not only with assess-
ments of the work load of the deputies and their salary and benefits, but
also with attitudes concerning the political system in general and the
“political class” in particular. As in the United States,58 these attitudes are
often quite negative.59 For those who are contemptuous of politicians, it is
doubtful that they could accept the very notion of full-time, reasonably
well-paid “professional” politicians at the Land level.60 Certainly it can be
argued that the salary and benefits for some legislators are overly generous,
but it is less clear that they are excessive for the majority of deputies.
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Introduction
In every federal system there is a national party system which, in spite of
certain commonalities, is likely to be somewhat different from the
regional and/or local party systems. In the United States there are two
dominating, loosely organized, personality- and candidate-oriented,
generally weakly disciplined parties with no single universally recognized
national party leader except perhaps the president. They are financed by
various private interest groups and individuals, including many support-
ers who are not members in any formal sense and pay no dues. In part
because of these general characteristics, some differences can and do exist
between the national and state parties and between various state parties
and regions.1 Thus the national party leadership may be more in confor-
mity with the ideological or policy foci of the leading party personalities
in one certain region or state than in another, for example, New England
versus the South or Southwest. 
The American party system stands in sharp contrast to the German
parties, which, in spite of regional party organizations of varying
strength, are hierarchically organized and member-based, programmatic,
disciplined, and led by leaders, usually the Chancellor, certain prime min-
isters of the Länder, or other well-known office holders, who are elected
by party organs for that purpose.2 The parties are financed by a mixture
of private and public funds, the latter of which are very generous by inter-
national standards.3 Much of the private funding comes from the large
dues-paying membership or supporters who, also in contrast to the
United States, receive significant tax benefits for their contributions.
While there is considerable evidence that German parties are changing,
e.g., through declining membership and weakening ideology, and that
8
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there are some significant differences between parties in east and west
Germany,4 it is still the case that German and American parties represent
rather starkly contrasting models. 
Given the nature of the German party system, many questions arise
about the relationship between federal and Land politics, including vot-
ing behavior in national and regional elections.5
Relationships between federal and Land politics
As in the United States, the subnational political systems in Germany are
basically the same. All of the Länder have parliamentary systems with a
government supported by a single party parliamentary majority (but in
Saxony-Anhalt, the SPD governed alone as a minority party from April
1998 to April 2002) or, in a majority of cases, by a coalition of two and on
rare occasions three parties, with one or more opposition parties. Each
Land has one popularly elected chamber, called the Landtag in the thir-
teen territorial states, the Bürgerschaft in Bremen and Hamburg, and the
Abgeordnetenhaus in Berlin. The legislative bodies vary in size from fifty-
one in the Saarland to 231 in North-Rhine Westphalia. The party systems
are also basically the same, although this is less true now than before uni-
fication, and the “establishment” Land parties are very similar to the
national parties.6 Of course each Land has a somewhat different history,
tradition, culture, geography, and economy, but state politics are shaped
to a large extent by the party political positions at the national level.7
The nature of the German party system, together with the penetration
by the parties of much of the bureaucracy and public institutions and
enterprises, explains in part the close relationship between the national
and state parties. But constitutional provisions calling for the creation of
uniform or equivalent living conditions; close interrelationships between
the national, state, and local office holders and civil servants in the Ger-
man federal system, often referred to as Politikverflechtung; the relatively
small physical size of the country (about the size of Montana); the density
of the population (over 80 million); the extensive German welfare state;
and popular attitudes that favor equality over regional autonomy or
diversity, have all contributed to strong centralizing tendencies, to what
has been referred to as the “unitary federal state.”8 The question, then, is
whether Land elections are just another form of federal elections, reflect-
ing current public views of the government policy, personalities, or events
at the national level.9 This question is raised in different ways, e.g.,
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whether Land elections are a kind of mid-term election, i.e., whether they
are “barometer elections”; whether they are in effect Bundesrat elections,
the results of which can and often do determine whether this Länder
chamber will generally support or oppose the federal government and its
majority in the popularly elected Bundestag; whether they serve as protest
elections that have no direct effect on the national government but send
a message; or whether they have much relevance to Land or regional pol-
itics at all. We will return to this subject in Chapter 9.
Parties and elections in the Länder
Parties in the Länder
The major German parties today are the Social Democratic Party of Ger-
many (SPD); the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian
sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), together often referred to
as the Christian Democrats or the Union parties; the Free Democratic
Party (FDP); the Bündis 90 (Alliance 90)/Greens; and the Party of Demo-
cratic Socialism (PDS). Smaller parties that sometimes appear on the
scene and even win a few seats, depending on the time and place, include
the three radical right parties: the Republicans (Reps), the German Peo-
ple’s Union (DVU), and the National Democratic Party of Germany
(NPD). Numerous other smaller parties – sometimes more than twenty –
take part in state elections, but they rarely receive more than 1 or 2 per-
cent of the vote, if that much, and almost never win any seats. On the
other hand, certain “flash parties” that form around personalities or
movements expressing sentiments of protest have been quite successful in
Bremen and Hamburg in recent years, the latest and best example being
the law and order PRO party in Hamburg elections led by Judge Schill in
the fall of 2001.
The Social Democratic Party of Germany is the oldest and traditionally
largest social democratic party in Europe.10 It was formed and developed
in the latter half of the nineteenth century as an anti-capitalist, socialist,
but non-revolutionary Marxist working- class party. It was outlawed by
Bismarck in 1878 but allowed to re-emerge legally in 1890. Bismarck, in
spite of his strong conservatism, introduced the first far-reaching social
welfare reforms in the 1880s, such as health insurance and old-age pen-
sions, at least in part as a means of securing the loyalty of the working class
to the state and to weaken the appeal of the social democratic movement.
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In spite of their leading opposition role after 1890 as a democratic but left-
ist reform party that had numerous fundamental differences with the
domestic and foreign policies of the Kaiserreich, the Social Democrats did
vote for the credits to finance Germany’s entrance in the First World War.
Though in part a result of the desire of the leadership to demonstrate its
loyalty to the German state, this support came back to haunt the party in
many forms, one of which was its breakup into three parties after the First
World War. The most important and permanent offshoot of the SPD was
the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). In spite of a bitter and compet-
itive relationship with the communists, the SPD remained the key party of
the left in the Weimar Republic until it and other parties were outlawed by
Hitler in 1933. After 1945 it was “relicensed” by the Allies as a democratic
party, and it immediately became the leading left-wing party in West 
Germany. In its Godesberger Program of 1959, the party rejected Marxist
dogma and became more of a center-left reformist party that was more
interested in promoting a progressive capitalist welfare state on the
Swedish model than in traditional socialist state ownership of the major
means of production. In contrast to its successful transition in West 
Germany to one of the two leading parties that was capable of assuming
government office at all levels,11 it was soon undermined in East Germany
after 1945 by the pro-Soviet communists and forced to merge with them
to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in 1946.12
The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was formed after 1945 as suc-
cessor to and for a few years as competitor with the old, almost entirely
Catholic, Center Party (Zentrum).13 The Christian Democrats, while still
supported mostly by Catholic voters, broadened the party’s appeal to
Protestants. While essentially a moderately conservative party that
appealed not only to Catholics and practicing Protestants, the middle
class, and voters in small towns and villages, it also had a special section
that appealed to workers. Thus the CDU became the first catch-all, or
“peoples’ party” (Volkspartei) in Europe and soon forced the SPD also to
broaden its appeal in its Godesberg Program of 1959.14
The FDP is the classical liberal party of Germany and the successor of
two liberal parties in the Weimar Republic.15 It combines two often com-
peting traditions in classical liberalism, a focus on free enterprise and
property rights and a focus on civil liberties, legal equality, and separa-
tion of church and state. Known as a classical liberal democracy, the
United States has two major parties, the Democrats and Republicans,
which are derived from the same classical liberal traditions. One might
argue, therefore, that basic elements of both major American parties can
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be found in the “economic liberal” right and the “social liberal” left
wings of the FDP.
The FDP (it refers to itself as F.D.P.) is a “pivotal” party in the German
party system that has served as a coalition partner of both the CDU and
SPD over the past decades. It was the most likely coalition partner of the
CDU at the national, Land, and local levels in the first decades after 1945,
when the economic and national focus in the party was prevalent. In the
late 1960s it joined a coalition with the SPD in North-Rhine Westphalia,
and in 1969 it joined in a coalition with the SPD at the national level with
the more international and civil liberties and equality wing of the party
having gained the upper hand. In the fall of 1982 the economic wing of
the party again become predominant, and the FDP left the national gov-
ernment under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and joined the CDU/CSU in
a new coalition government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl. When the
SPD formed a coalition with the Bündnis 90/Greens after the federal elec-
tions of September 1998, it was the first time the FDP was not in a coali-
tion at the federal level since 1969.16 In the meantime the party remained
in coalition with the SPD in Rhineland-Palatinate and with the CDU in
Baden-Württemberg and joined the CDU in a coalition government 
in Hesse in 1999. It was not involved in more coalitions in the states
because it had failed to win seats in all of the eastern and in several west-
ern Land parliaments until 2001 and 2002, when it gained entry into the
parliament of Berlin and Saxony-Anhalt, respectively.
The problem for the FDP today is that its existence depends on coali-
tions.17 Its focus is much less on ideology or program than on participat-
ing in government with leaders who are government office holders.
Whether the party enters a coalition with the CDU or SPD at the Land
level can be a signal of change at the federal level, and a change in partners
at the federal level inevitably holds consequences for future partnerships at
the Land level. The importance of coalitions makes changes of government
and public statements during elections about coalition preferences of cru-
cial importance for the party. By indicating preference for the CDU or
SPD, the party tries to appeal to the voters of the favored party to help it
with the second vote (explained below). It must exercise great caution in
changing partners, because in 1969 as well as in 1982, when it did change
national government partners, the FDP lost a significant proportion of its
members and supporters who did not like the change in government. This
means, of course, that it must pay attention to its voters, who are typically
politically flexible higher-status white-collar, civil servants, urban, upper-
income, well-educated, non-Catholic, and non-union. 18
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The Greens, who in 1993 combined with the East German Bündnis 90
(Alliance 90), are a classic postmaterialist “new politics” party which
emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s.19 It stresses the environment,
human rights, pacifism, social justice, and gender issues. It is to the left of
the SPD on the political spectrum, although it is not as radical as it was in
the 1980s, when it was deeply divided between “realists” (Realos) and
“fundamentalists” (Fundis). The party saw itself at first as a “movement”
or at most an anti-party party, and the fundamentalist wing was adamant
in its insistence that there would be no collaboration with the establish-
ment parties.20 The party did join the SPD in a coalition in Hesse in 1985,
but the coalition broke up in 1987 before the legislative term had ended.
Later the party joined the SPD in other Land government coalitions,
which were also controversial until most of the fundamentalist wing left
the party. Today the party is divided between the “realists” who support
coalitions with the SPD, and the left-wing elements who are less willing to
compromise principles as a price for governing.21 Since the Greens refuse
to consider coalitions with the CDU, except at the local level, it is a much
less flexible coalition party than the FDP. But, then, as a strongly pro-
grammatic party, governing is not its main goal.22
The Greens have always seen themselves as a grassroots (basis-
demokratisch) party, and their most eager founders and adherents were
idealistic, relatively affluent, well-educated young people with a mission
to change the world. Needless to say, their strongholds have always been
university towns. They have always taken seriously internal party democ-
racy and are known for their meetings which often feature bitter open
debate and discussion. As a result the Land parties are very jealous of their
position in the party organizational hierarchy, and they enjoy a high
degree of autonomy legally and in fact.23
The PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) is the successor to the SED,
the East German Socialist Unity Party that officially was united with the
SPD in 1946 but which in fact was the Communist Party. With the col-
lapse of the East German regime in November 1989, reform communists
formed the PDS, hoping to save what they could of the old Marxist ideas
and ideals.24 The party has done well in the five new Länder and in the for-
mer East German part of united Berlin, receiving on average about 20
percent of the vote, but like the old West German Communist Party
(DKP) formed in 1963, the PDS has not been able to gain more than 1–3
percent of the votes in western Germany. The party appeals mostly to for-
mer East German officials, many of whom lost power and prestige with
unification, to farmers who fear they may lose land they gained from the
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Soviet-imposed land reform of 1948, to people who have lost or fear loss
of their jobs, and in general to the “losers” of unification. It has become
the third party in the three-party system in eastern Germany in contrast
to the four-party system in western Germany that excludes the PDS.
There are three radical right parties that sometimes compete against 
each other and sometimes cooperate by having one party withdraw from
electoral competition to help the other. The first of these, the National
Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), was formed in 1965 and flourished
for a few years as a right-wing protest party during the grand coalition of
CDU/CSU and SPD from 1966 to 1969.25 Its counterpart on the left was the
extraparliamentary opposition (APO), which did not form as a party but
was a significant and powerful student-led movement. It helped bring about
many reforms, but it also caused considerable disruption of university life
as well as general political turmoil. Extremist elements in this movement
became the core of the German terrorist movement. Of course the NPD
profited from APO excesses, won seats in some of the Land parliaments 
and barely missed reaching the 5 percent barrier in the federal elections of
1969. Since then its successes have been very modest and limited.
Though first established in 1983, the Republicans (Reps) first received
widespread attention with a sensational victory (in the sense of gaining
more than 5 percent of the vote, i.e., 7.5 percent) in Land elections in West
Berlin in 1989 and in elections for the European Parliament later in the
same year (7.1 percent).26 The party’s founder and leader, Franz Schönhu-
ber, had resigned from the Bavarian CSU out of opposition to the party’s
support for loans to East Germany. He had been a popular television talk
show host and had volunteered to serve as an enlisted man in the SS dur-
ing the Second World War. His book on his personal experiences during
the War appealed to some veterans and nationalist anti-communist ele-
ments, and he appealed also to those who were concerned and upset about
what they perceived to be a flood of unwanted refugees, asylum seekers,
and illegal immigrants who had overwhelmed Germany’s capacity to
absorb them. The Reps suffered a series of setbacks after the collapse of the
Wall and unification, including a palace revolt against Schönhuber, but 
the party continues on occasion to win seats in local and a few Land 
parliaments in the south of Germany, namely Baden-Württemberg.
The German Peoples’ Union (DVU), is a party that is largely the 
creation of Gerhard Frey, a wealthy Hamburg publisher of right-wing
newspapers and materials. The party has virtually no organization or
members and exists only because of the financing and organizational
input of its founder.27 It is arguably the most right-wing of the radical right
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parties and, at the moment, the most successful. It won one seat in Bremen
Land elections in June 1999, while it won sixteen seats in the 1998 elections
in Saxony-Anhalt and five seats in the 1999 elections in Brandenburg. It
appeals above all to disgruntled young males who are attracted by the
party’s strong opposition to the influx of foreigners in Germany. These are
seen as a threat to German culture, jobs, and the welfare state which they
are seen to be bankrupting. 
The German party system changed at the national level from a multi-
party system in the late 1940s and 1950s to a “21⁄2”party system of
CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP by the end of the 1950s. In 1983 the Greens
gained seats for the first time in the federal parliament, thus creating a
four-party system. In 1990 the PDS joined the party system, benefiting
from special provisions for that year’s federal election that did not require
5 percent of the total German vote as a condition for entering the parlia-
ment. Since that time a five-party system has developed; however, not all
five parties are capable of forming coalitions. The PDS is not acceptable
to any of the other parties as a partner, and the differences between the
Greens and the CDU are so deep that a coalition of these two parties 
is most unlikely. Given the potential effects of changes in the German
economy and society, there are also some lingering questions about the
long-term prospects of the FDP, Greens, and PDS. 
The situation is quite different at the Land level. Here the FDP is rep-
resented in only eight of the Land parliaments, all in western Germany
except Berlin since September 2001 and Saxony-Anhalt since April 2002.
The Greens are generally comfortably above the 5 percent level and thus
have seats in the western Länder, except in the Saarland, but they are not
represented in any of the parliaments in the new Länder. In contrast, the
PDS is the third party in the new Länder and even the second strongest
party in Thuringia, Saxony, and Saxony-Anhalt, while it has no represen-
tation in any Land parliaments in western Germany. The radical right
parties are represented in two Land parliaments, with five seats in Bran-
denburg and one in Bremen (Bremerhaven).
Thus there are two party systems at the Land level: a four-party system
in the old Länder, consisting of the larger CDU (CSU in Bavaria) and SPD
and the smaller Bündnis 90/Greens and FDP; and, at least until the recent
successes by the FDP, a three-party system in the new Länder, consisting of
the CDU, SPD, and PDS. Given the strength of the PDS (usually 20 
percent or more) in Land elections, one can speak of three large parties in
the new Länder and Berlin.28 As at the national level, the CDU and Greens
are unlikely coalition partners in the western Länder, and the PDS is not
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generally acceptable as a coalition partner for the CDU and SPD in the
eastern Länder. This has changed recently, however, in that the SPD agreed
in 1994 and 1998 to form a minority government in Saxony-Anhalt with
the toleration of the PDS in parliament, and in the summer of 2001 the
SPD formed a minority government in Berlin also with PDS toleration. 
In 1998 the SPD and PDS formed a regular government coalition in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and they formed a regular coalition in Janu-
ary 2002 after the new Land elections in October 2001. These concessions
by the SPD have aroused considerable controversy,29 not only between
SPD and CDU/CSU, but also within the SPD. But these and other coali-
tion arrangements do demonstrate the limited influence of the national
parties on Land party coalition formation as well as the view that the Land
parties should have more flexibility in forming coalitions than would be
acceptable at the federal level.
At the end of the 1990s it was clear that the SPD had more opportuni-
ties than the CDU to form coalition governments in the Länder. It could
form a grand coalition with the CDU in both the old and new Länder, a
coalition with the Greens or the FDP in the former and a coalition with
the PDS in the latter, at least in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony-
Anhalt. The CDU, in effect, was limited to forming a grand coalition or,
in the West only, a small coalition with the FDP (however, in the fall of
2001 it formed a coalition with the FDP and the law and order “flash
party,” PRO).
The occasional success of a party outside the respective party systems,
e.g., by one of the radical right parties, does not justify adding them to the
two different party systems described above. Their success is too unpre-
dictable even in those Länder in which they have shown the greatest
strength. In any case the radical right parties are not acceptable coalition
partners for any of the established parties, and as a result they have never
held any government responsibility in any of the Länder. On the other
hand, a middle class populist “flash party” in Hamburg (STATT-Partei)
did join a coalition with the SPD from 1993 to 1997. A disgruntled work-
ing class voter group (AFB) was also able to gain temporary representa-
tion in Bremen from 1995 to 1999. And, as indicated above, the PRO
party, led by Judge Schill, achieved success with almost 20 percent the of
the vote in Hamburg in the fall of 2001. This was the largest vote ever
received by a “flash party” in Germany.
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Electoral systems in the Länder
German electoral systems are known for their complexity. Though less
known, the electoral systems at the local level are especially complicated by
American or British standards.30 At the Land level, Bremen, Hamburg, and
the Saarland have a simple proportional representation (PR) system,
according to which voters cast one vote for a party list. Any party that
receives at least 5 percent of the vote receives seats approximately in pro-
portion to the proportion of votes it received, i.e., percent of votes = 
percent of seats, as determined by a particular mathematical scheme for
calculation. Seven Länder use the d’Hondt method of calculation, nine use
the Hare/Niemeyer method which is also used to calculate seats in the 
federal parliament.31
All other Länder have a personalized PR system (which British authors
often call the “additional member system”). In North-Rhine Westphalia
and Baden-Württemberg, voters have one vote that they cast for a direct
candidate. The votes cast for all direct seat candidates are then totaled in
order to determine the proportional distribution of total seats. In the
other eleven Länder, voters have two votes, one for a direct candidate on
the left side of the ballot, and one for a party list on the right side. The
direct candidate represents a single-member district, and the candidate
with the most votes (not necessarily an absolute majority) wins the seat,
just as in the United States or Great Britain. But the system is basically a
PR system, because the parties receive seats in proportion to the second
votes cast. This means that small parties that receive 5 percent of the vote
but not enough votes in any single district to win a direct seat still gain
seats based on their proportion of the vote. On the other hand, the larger
parties that did win direct seats have these deducted from the total they
received based on their proportion of the vote. If they win more direct
seats than they “deserve” based on their proportion of the vote, they get
to keep these surplus seats (Überhangsmandate). This is why parliaments
sometimes contain more members than the law would normally provide. 
In order to qualify for the distribution of seats based on the proportion
of votes received, a party must normally have a minimum of 5 percent of
the vote (an exception is made in Schleswig-Holstein for the Danish
minority party). At the federal level a second means of qualifying for this
distribution is to win at least three direct seats. Thus the PDS won only
4.4 percent of the total German vote in 1994, but it won four direct seats
and therefore entered the federal parliament with a total of 30 seats. If it
had not won at least three direct seats, it would not have received any seats
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over its party list. If it had won only one or two direct seats, it would have
entered parliament with that number. In Bremen, Hamburg, or the Saar-
land, the PDS would not have entered parliament, because there are no
direct seats to contest in those Länder.
In Bavaria the voters select a direct candidate with the first vote, but
with the second vote they may vote for the party list in their election dis-
trict or select a particular candidate on the list (“personalized PR with
open lists”). Both the first and the second votes count in determining the
total distribution of seats for a party. Bavaria is divided into seven dis-
tricts, which are the same as the government districts (Regierungsbezirke),
with an equal or an almost equal number of direct and list seats per dis-
trict, e.g., upper Bavaria has 33 district seats and 32 list seats, Lower
Bavaria has ten of each. 
In the federal parliament one-half of the deputies are elected directly
and one-half enter based on the party lists. In the Länder the ratio of
direct seats and party list seats varies. As a rule there are more direct seats,
but they are equal in number in Brandenburg, Hesse, Saxony, and
Thuringia. 
Frequency of elections
As in the United States, some Land elections are held simultaneously with
federal elections, while others are held sometime between federal elec-
tions, some soon afterwards, some soon before, but most at “mid-term.”
A major difference with the United States, however, lies in the fact that
some of the Länder hold elections every four years, like the federal parlia-
ment, while others hold them every five years. An increasing number of
cities are also holding council elections every five years, the basic idea
being that parliaments and the governments they support must have suf-
ficient time to develop and carry out their policies before they have to face
re-election pressures. Table 8.1 shows the distribution of Länder accord-
ing to their election calendar.
These are, of course, the official or normal cycles. If for some reason a
government loses the support of a majority of the parliament, usually
because of the collapse of a coalition, and it cannot or does not wish to
form a minority government which exists only on the tolerance of one or
more nongovernment parties in the parliament, then new elections will
be called at a date different from the one scheduled. While this does not
happen often, it has happened on numerous occasions over the past
decades. Calling new elections in the Länder is made easier than at the
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federal level by provisions in all of the Land constitutions which allow
Land parliaments to dissolve themselves under certain circumstances.
Voter turnout
Voter turnout in Germany has always been high in comparison with the
United States, which is at the bottom or close to the bottom of any list
which provides voting turnout figures in democratic countries. Registra-
tion is virtually automatic in Germany, which means that almost all eligi-
ble voters may vote. Germans do not have the problem found in the
United States of having to decide whether to use all eligible voters or only
those that have registered to vote as a statistical base. This can make a sig-
nificant difference in the United States, because only about two-thirds of
all eligible voters are registered. The most common practice in the United
States is to use eligible voters as a base, which depresses the voting turnout
statistics but which makes the figures more comparable to German and
most European data.
As in the United States, voter turnout in federal elections is higher than
in Land elections, the major difference being that the turnout at all levels
in Germany is considerably higher than at comparable levels in the
United States. The election in Germany most comparable to turnout fig-
ures for American presidential elections is the election for the European
Parliament; however, in recent years turnout in some Länder has dropped
to these levels as well. As in other democracies, the voting age in Germany
at all levels is eighteen. This is also the minimum age for holding office,
although some Länder have made twenty-one the minimum for office
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Table 8.1 Election cycles in the Länder
Four-year election cycle Five-year election cycle
Bremen Baden-Württemberg (as of 1996)
Hamburg Bavaria (as of 1998) 
Hesse Berlin (as of 1999)
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Brandenburg
Saxony-Anhalt Lower Saxony (as of 1998)
North-Rhine Westphalia
Rhineland-Palatinate
Saarland
Saxony
Schleswig-Holstein (as of 2000)
Thuringia
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holding. In an effort to increase the interest of young people in politics
(and to increase their percentage of the total vote), some SPD and Green
politicians have pushed for a further reduction of the voting age to six-
teen. In 1996 Lower Saxony reduced the voting age to sixteen for local
elections, and Schleswig-Holstein has made it possible for sixteen-year-
olds to participate in local planning projects.32
It is clear from Tables 8.2 and 8.3 that voter turnout in most elections
has been generally declining over the years.33 The decline has been dra-
matic at the European level and significant in most of the Länder, with the
exception of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern which has seen a considerable
increase in turnout since 1990 and Saxony-Anhalt, where turnout declined
in 1994, surged in 1998, and declined again in 2000. The most common
explanation for this decline is that there is a general alienation from poli-
tics (Politikverdrossenheit) at all levels. This is reflected not only in lower
voting rates but also in declining membership in political parties, unions,
and other organizations. If Politikverdrossenheit is a reason for the decline
in voting participation, it certainly is not confined to Germany. Dissatis-
faction with politics seems to be common to all developed democracies, so
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Table 8.2 Voter turnout in European Parliament and 
Bundestag elections, 1984–99
Year EU Parliament Bundestag
1984 56.8 –
1985 – –
1986 – –
1987 – 84.3
1988 – –
1989 62.3 –
1990 – 77.8
1991 – –
1992 – –
1993 – –
1994 60 79
1995 – –
1996 – –
1997 – –
1998 – 82.2
1999 45.2 –
2002 – 79.1
Average 56.1 80.5
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Table 8.3 Voter turnout in Land elections, 1984–2002
1984 71.2 – – – – – – – – – – – – –
1985 – – – – – – – 75.2 – 85 – – – – –
1986 – 70.3 – – 79.6 – 77.3 – – – – – – – –
1987 – – – 75.5 – 80.3 – – 77 – 76.6 – – – –
1988 71.8 – – – – – – – – – 77.4 – – – –
1989 – – 79.6 – – – – – – – – – – – –
1990 – 65.9 80.8 – – – 74.6 71.8 – 83.2 – 67.1 64.7 72.8 65.1 71.7
1991 – – 72.2 66.1 70.8 – – 73.9 – – – – – –
1992 70.2 – – – – – – – – – 71.7 – – – –
1993 – – – – 69.6 – – – – – – – – – –
1994 – 67.9 – – – – 73.8 – – 83.5 – 56.3 72.9 58.4 54.8 74.8
1995 – – 68.6 68.6 – 66.3 – 64 – – – – – – –
1996 67.5 – – – – – – – 70.8 – 71.8 – – – –
1997 – – – – 69.5 – – – – – – – – – –
1998 – 70 – – – – 73.8 – – – – – 79.4 – 71.7
1999 – – 65.9 60.1 – 66.4 – – – 68.7 – 60.1 – 61.1 – 59.9
2000 – – – – – – – 56.7 – – 69.5 – – – –
2001 62.6 – 68.1 – 71 – – – 62.1 – – – – – –
2002 – – – – – – – – – – – – 67.9 – 56.5
Average 68.7 68.5 72.6 69.1 71.16 70.95 74.9 66.925 71 80.1 73.4 61.2 71.2 64.1 63.9 68.8
Source: www.wahlrecht.de/landtage.
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that the alleged specific German reasons are not very persuasive by them-
selves. Another problem is that disappointment and dissatisfaction are
highest in the East, yet Mecklenburg-Vorpommern had the highest, Bran-
denburg the lowest, turnout in the most recent Land elections. It seems
apparent, then, that factors other than dissatisfaction with parties and pol-
itics are also at work. One of these was probably the timing of the elections,
i.e., Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony-Anhalt both had elections in
1998, and these were undoubtedly affected by the federal elections that
year and the increased public focus on political issues.
Voting behavior34
In all advanced democracies the political parties depend on certain
demographic, religious, occupational, regional, ethnic and other groups
as foundations of electoral support, and the existence of such support
provides stability to the party system and a certain predictability of elec-
tion outcomes. A brief look at voting behavior in Land elections shows
there are both similarities and differences between voting behavior in
national and Land elections and between the old and the new Länder. The
reader should be cautioned, however, that some generalizations are more
persistent than others and that, for example, there is frequently a differ-
ence in voting patterns from one election to another in the same Land as
well as changes over time. 
Age has always been an important factor in voting behavior. The CDU
tends to appeal more to older voters, while the SPD is generally given
above-average support by younger voters. On the other hand, as suggested
above, in some Länder, e.g., in the 1997 Hamburg elections, the SPD did
best among voters over sixty. Also in some eastern states the CDU and SPD
have done better with older groups and the FDP and PDS with middle-age
groups. In some regions, though, support for the PDS increases with age.
The SPD used to receive more votes from younger people than it does
today, but since the 1980s many younger voters have given their votes to
the Greens. Indeed, the Greens have relied heavily on younger voters; half
of their voters have been under thirty-five and three-fourths under forty-
five. However, in the most recent Land elections the Greens have lost 
support in the youngest group of eighteen–twenty-four. In the East the
radical right has done especially well with the youngest voters.
Gender is not as important today as in the past, when the CDU tended
to appeal more to women and the SPD more to men. In recent elections
the CDU, CSU, Greens and PDS have received slightly more female than
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male votes, the FDP somewhat more male votes, and the SPD about the
same number of female and male votes. Combining age and gender, the
CDU receives a lower proportion of votes than the SPD from women in
the youngest age groups but a higher proportion than the SPD in the 35
and older groups. In the East the CDU receives more votes from women
than men, but it receives its lowest percentage of votes from younger
women and its highest percentage from women over 60. A dispropor-
tionate number of younger women vote for the Greens, with that vote
generally declining with age. The CDU does better than the SPD among
younger men, while the Greens in the West and especially the radical right
parties in East and West receive a large proportion of their votes from
younger men. 
In both the old and the new Länder, religion is a key determinant of
voter behavior. In the West there is a strong relationship between
Catholics and the CDU/CSU, although there are some exceptions such as
the Saarland, which has a three-fourths Catholic population but has given
the SPD strong support since 1980. Church-going Catholics are especially
strong CDU/CSU voters, but the proportion of those attending church
regularly is declining. Protestants in the West are more likely to vote for
the SPD or FDP. In the East both the Catholic and Protestant population
strongly favor the CDU, although Protestants are more likely to vote SPD
in Brandenburg. The Greens and the PDS are strongly favored by unaffil-
iated voters; indeed, the PDS has its weakest support among church-
affiliated voters who are almost immune from voting PDS.35 However, a
serious problem for the CDU in the new Länder is that the unaffiliated
make up about two-thirds of the population, which tends to favor the
SPD, PDS, and the radical right.
Occupational differences are also important factors in explaining vot-
ing behavior. Workers have always tended to support the SPD, and union-
ized workers have been the party’s staunchest supporters. Exceptions
occur primarily when heavy cross-pressures exist, e.g., among strongly
Catholic workers. In the new Länder a majority of workers voted for the
CDU in the 1990 Land elections, and the CDU still receives above-aver-
age support from workers in Saxony and Thuringia, and, in 1999, in
Berlin. The SPD has made strong gains among workers since 1990 in the
other new Länder. In the old Länder the CDU has generally received
above-average support among civil servants, but the SPD has done better
among white-collar workers. The PDS has received below-average sup-
port from workers but above-average support from civil servants and
white collar workers. The CDU and FDP receive significant support from
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the self-employed, and especially in the West the CDU is generally sup-
ported by farmers. Unionized workers in the new Länder have given
strong support to the SPD and PDS, while non-unionized workers have
given above-average support to the DVU. The DVU has also received
strong support from manual apprentices. Both the DVU and PDS have
done well among the unemployed in the new Länder. Generally the less
educated give above-average support to the SPD, the better educated to
the CDU, FDP, and PDS. The Greens receive a large proportion of their
support from the better-educated young people.
A good deal of attention has been paid in Germany to those voters who
support the far right and far left parties, i.e., the NPD, Reps, and DVU or
PDS. It was noted above that younger voters, especially younger males, are
more likely to vote for the far right parties. Politikverdrossenheit is obvi-
ously one reason for the dissatisfaction of young male voters, but ideology
is also important.36 Religious affiliation has been noted above as a key 
factor in support for the PDS, but ideological conflict in the East is also a
factor. It is most clearly reflected between voters of the PDS and the CDU.
CDU voters in the East reject the PDS, but they also reject the attempt on
the part of the CDU in the West to isolate the PDS, as in the “red socks”
campaign in the federal elections of 1994. Even more PDS voters reject 
the CDU. This places the SPD in the middle in the East, whereas the basic
conflict in the West is between the SPD and the CDU/CSU.37
Direct democracy
As noted in Chapter 4, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic, like the
United States Constitution, does not provide for direct democracy. The
one exception is Article 29, which deals with the rearrangement of Länder
boundaries. In contrast, all Land constitutions today provide for direct
democracy. The older constitutions generally had a two-step process
which involved a petition for a referendum (Volksbegehren) and the refer-
endum (Volksentscheid). The Constitution of Schleswig-Holstein in 1990
provides for three steps: an initiative, i.e., a petition to place an item on
the Land parliament’s agenda; if that fails to produce action, a petition
(Volksbegehren) for a popular referendum on a specific item; and, if the
parliament does not act within a set period of time, a referendum. Four
of the new Länder followed the example of Schleswig-Holstein, but sig-
nature requirements for the first two petitions and percentage thresholds
required for approval of the referendum vary from Land to Land in both
eastern and western Germany. 
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The changes in the Constitution of Schleswig-Holstein not only
encouraged the new Länder to follow; it also raised the interest of many
political activists in the West to reconsider their constitutional arrange-
ments and to think also about the adoption of some other aspects of
direct democracy, including the direct election of mayors. In general the
1990s were a period when there was a sharp increase in the discussion of
various features of “plebiscitary” democracy, including the direct election
of the prime ministers of the Länder.
Initiatives, petitions for referenda, and referenda are hardly everyday
occurrences in the Länder. Between 1946 and 1992 there were only
twenty-three referenda, including referenda on seven Land constitutions
in the American and French occupation zones in 1946–47 and in North-
Rhine Westphalia in 1950. There were also three special referenda in these
early years: one in Hesse on socialization of industry; one in Rhineland-
Palatinate on schools; and one in Bremen regarding co-determination.
There were three referenda in Bavaria dealing with voting age in 1970;
with the electoral law in 1973; and with the addition of environmental
protection to the Land constitution in 1984. There were four referenda in
Hesse: on the election law in 1950; on the voting age in 1970; on the direct
election of mayors and country managers in 1991; and on the protection
of the environment as a state goal in 1991.38
There have been several legislative initiatives. In Bavaria there was a
petition and a referendum on schools, in 1973 a constitutional change
regarding television and radio, and in 1991 a petition and referendum on
waste collection. In each case the Land parliament passed a competing
proposal for the final referendum which was close to the original initia-
tive and which then succeeded. In North-Rhine Westphalia in 1978 the
CDU, the Catholic Church, and parents’ groups stopped a school reform
proposed by the SPD. The SPD government dropped the legislative bill
after 30 percent of the electorate signed a petition for a referendum.39
A parliamentary dissolution was attempted in Baden-Württemberg 
in 1971 by those opposed to the local government territorial reforms, but
it failed because the 50 percent threshold of eligible voters required for 
passage was not reached. In 1981 unofficial petitions for the dissolution of
the West Berlin city parliament were signed by more than 18 percent of the
voters (20 percent were required for an official, formal petition), and in
response the parliament dissolved itself.40
In the 1990s there were referenda in three of the new Länder (1992 and
1994) and in Berlin (1995) on their constitutions. Bremen held a referen-
dum on a partial reform of its Constitution in 1994, Hesse on lowering the
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age for voting in 1995, and Bavaria on introducing referenda at the local
level in 1995. There were also examples of the Land parliaments taking
action under the threat of popular action. In North-Rhine Westphalia the
SPD-controlled Land parliament agreed to a law providing for the direct
election of mayors after the CDU had collected 50,000 signatures for a
petition in favor of the change. In Lower Saxony the Land parliament
added a statement referring to God in the preamble of its 1993 constitu-
tion after a citizens’ initiative collected 120,000 signatures for a petition
calling for this change. In the Rhineland-Palatinate the SPD/FDP govern-
ment revoked its legislation on human organ transplantations after the
CDU Opposition took steps to initiate a petition against the law. In Baden-
Württemberg the grand coalition government dropped its intention in
1995 to eliminate Whit Monday as a holiday to help finance the new 
nursing home insurance program, after 30,000 signatures were collected
for an initiative petition.41
In the meantime a referendum was held in Berlin and Brandenburg in
1996 in which the merger of the two territorial units was rejected, and ref-
erenda were held in Bavaria in February 1998 on eliminating the second
chamber, the Senate, and in March 2000 on schools. In 1998 Schleswig-
Holstein held a referendum on the very controversial spelling reforms
(Rechtsschreibreform) introduced by all of the Land governments, Austria,
and Switzerland. To the consternation of the government, the reforms
were rejected, and for a while it looked as though Schleswig-Holstein
would be the only German-speaking region that would not introduce the
reforms in its schools as the new standard German spelling. But in 1999
the parliament reversed the referendum decision, a highly controversial
act that the Federal Constitutional Court refused to hear.
Conclusion
In spite of basic similarities among the American states in their political
systems, there are differences among them in terms of the powers exer-
cised by the governors, the number of state-wide officers elected directly
by the voters, the party constellations in the two legislative chambers
(except for the unicameral Nebraska Senate), the degree of competition
for state-wide officials as opposed to state legislators, and so forth. In Ger-
many there is also a basic similarity in the political systems of the Länder,
but there are also some differences in the powers of the prime ministers
of the territorial Länder and lord mayors of the city-states, in the degree
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of competition among the parties, in the strength of certain parties
(Greens and FDP in the West, PDS in the East), in the frequency of elec-
tions, and so forth. Germany’s federal system is politically more compli-
cated in the sense that there is a multi-party system in all of the Länder
(generally consisting of four parties in the West and three parties in the
East), supported and encouraged by an electoral system of PR (often
combined with a number of directly elected candidates), which leads to
the necessity of forming coalition governments which vary in member-
ship from Land to Land. 
This means that the Länder can and do often have very interesting gov-
ernments that are quite different from the federal model. For example,
though the CDU and SPD are usually strongly divided on most important
issues at the federal level, they may be partners in a coalition government
in a Land, as they were at the turn of the twentieth century in Branden-
burg, Bremen, and Berlin (until June 2001). Such coalitions can and do
have considerable influence on the Bundesrat, the policy positions of
which can be crucial to important legislation passed by the government-
dominated Bundestag, because it is likely that these coalition governments
will abstain in cases involving controversial legislation. Land govern-
ments may also be especially interesting because of coalitions that would
not be acceptable at the national level, e.g., the SPD–PDS coalition in
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin or even the toleration of the
SPD–Green government by the PDS in Saxony-Anhalt. Furthermore,
Land elections can serve as indications of dissatisfaction regarding certain
policies or conditions owing to the success of certain protest parties, espe-
cially the parties of the far right in both West and East Germany and the
PDS in East Germany. 
Generalizations are often made about voting behavior in Land elec-
tions. Age is one obvious factor, with the CDU/CSU and FDP generally
appealing to older voters and the SPD and, especially Greens, appealing
to younger voters. The CDU used to appeal more to females, and it still
does so among older women voters; however, the CDU today appeals
more to older women and the Greens to younger women. The CDU tends
to do better with younger male voters, but young males are especially
important to the Greens in the West and to the far right parties in the East.
Strong religious affiliation makes voters virtually immune from voting
PDS in the East, whereas in the West the Catholic voters tend to support
the Christian Democrats and the Protestants the SPD and FDP. Union-
ized workers are strong supporters of the SPD, while the CDU and FDP
have usually received the votes of most of the self-employed. The CDU
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also does well with civil servants and farmers, while the SPD has picked
up support from white-collar workers. The PDS does better with white-
collar workers and civil servants than with workers. But caution must be
exercised in drawing generalizations from one Land, one region, one elec-
tion, or only a few election cycles, because voting behavior has not been
entirely consistent over the years. 
Direct democracy was rejected by the German founding fathers for the
national level exept for changing Land boundaries, but advocates have
turned it into an increasingly important topic in recent years. During the
1990s there were numerous changes at the Land and local levels expand-
ing the opportunities for initiatives and referenda, and many examples
can be cited when some form of direct democracy was put into play in a
variety of Länder.
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Introduction
Five phases can be distinguished in the development of political parties in
the Länder. The first phase, from 1945 to 1953, was the period during
which older parties were reestablished, e.g., SPD, and new parties were
founded, e.g., the refugee party (BHE), CDU, and FDP (although the
CDU has its roots in the old Center Party [Zentrum] and the FDP could
be traced back to liberal parties of the Empire and Weimar Republic). The
second phase, from 1953 to 1969, saw the developing concentration of
parties culminating in the three- (or “21⁄2”)-party system of CDU/CSU,
SPD, and FDP. The third phase, from 1969 to 1983, was the period of
three-party dominance, while in the fourth phase, from 1983 to 1990, the
Greens emerged as a fourth party. Finally, following a reorientation after
unification in 1990, a five-party system has developed at the national level
with the rise of the PDS which, however, has a special regional character,
and in Land elections has been confined to the new Länder and Berlin in
the East just as the Greens and FDP have been successful only or mostly
in the West.1
In order to provide the reader with some of the flavor and spice of
Landtag elections, and to assess better some of the hypotheses about
Land elections and parties that were mentioned in the previous chapter
(pp. 267–273), a very brief overview of political developments in the
Länder since 1945 is presented below. This overview also contains a sum-
mary of the major issues, personalities, and events associated with the
most recent Land elections.
9
Elections
in the Länder
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The old Länder
Baden-Württemberg
Baden-Württemberg is an industrialized region with important sectors in
engineering, automobiles (Daimler-Benz and Porsche), and many indus-
trial suppliers. It also boasts many renowned educational and scientific
institutions.2 The last Land to be formed from previous Länder in 1952 –
this time by the Germans themselves rather than by the Allies – Baden-
Württemberg held its first parliamentary (Landtag) election in 1952. Since
then the CDU has been the leading party. Nevertheless, the first govern-
ment was made up of a coalition of SPD, FDP/DVP, and GB/BHE (a refugee
party that played an important role in the politics of several Länder after
1945 until the early 1960s), and the first prime minister (Ministerpräsident)
was from the FDP. By 1953 the CDU had joined the coalition to form an all-
party government. From that time until 1972, the CDU provided the prime
minister in a variety of coalition governments with changing partners from
the parties above. After 1972 the CDU controlled the government alone.
During this time the SPD ranged from 29 to 37 percent of the vote, while
the liberals (FDP/DVP) sank from 18 towards 5 percent. But this picture of
stability was shaken by the success of the radical right parties, the NPD in
1968 and the Republicans in 1992, and the Greens in the 1980s and 1990s.
In 1992 the CDU suffered a major loss to 39.6 percent and formed a grand
coalition with the SPD, which had sunk below 30 percent. The “Reps” and
the Greens had received 10.9 percent and 12.1 percent, respectively, which
then complicated coalition formation,3 because the Reps were not consid-
ered by the other parties to be acceptable coalition partners and the CDU
and Greens did not consider seriously sharing governmental power.
In 1996 the most important questions were whether the CDU and SPD
would be forced to continue their grand coalition and whether the FDP
would receive the required 5 percent of the vote to gain seats in the Land-
tag. As it turned out, the FDP got a surprising 9.6 percent, which made it
possible for it to form a coalition with the CDU. The Greens also
increased their vote, and the Reps were pleased with the surprising 9.1
percent they received. The SPD was the big loser, receiving only 25.1 per-
cent of the vote and only one of the 70 direct seats. Since the CDU won
only 41.3 percent of the vote but 69 direct seats, it ended up with a sur-
plus of 18 seats (Überhangsmandate). As a balance, the other parties were
given 17 additional seats, so that the parliament after 1996 had 155
instead of the official 120 seats.4
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In spite of the positive trends in the polls for Chancellor Schröder and
his government, the decline in popularity for the Christian Democrats
since the party financial scandal centering around former Chancellor
Kohl became an issue at the end of 1999, and increasingly favorable
polling results for the SPD and its leading candidate, Ute Vogt, the Land
election in 2001 went well for the CDU. It received 44.8 percent of the
vote, 3.5 percent more than in 1996. This was due apparently to the pop-
ularity of the prime minister, Erwin Teufel, and his government during
the five years since the last election. Nevertheless, the SPD made unusu-
ally large gains and received 33.3 percent or 8.2 percent more than in
1996. In spite of its partnership with the CDU in a successful coalition
government, the FDP went from 9.6 percent to 8.1 percent. The Greens
had trouble mobilizing their voters, many of whom went over to the SPD,
and received 7.7 percent in comparison to 12.l percent in 1996. The
Republicans, who received 9.1 percent of the protest vote in 1996,
declined to 4.4 percent in 2001 and were no longer in the parliament. In
contrast to many other Länder, the CDU received substantially more sup-
port than the SPD among workers and voters with modest educations.
The SPD led the CDU in support among civil servants and educated
women (especially the younger categories), and picked up support
among younger women in general at the cost of the Greens (figure 9.1).5
Figure 9.1 Election results in Baden-Württemberg, 1952–2001
Source: www.wahlrecht.de/landtage
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Bavaria
Politics in Bavaria are different from the other Länder in some important
ways. First, Bavaria is more rural, much more Catholic, and less union-
ized than elsewhere. All of these factors favor a Christian–conservative
party. Second, there is a widespread political–cultural consciousness
favoring political independence and cultural uniqueness. Third, eco-
nomic modernization came late and without the baggage of old conflicts
associated with industrialization. Fourth, these background elements
brought about an asymmetric party system established in the 1960s, with
the Christian Social Union (CSU, the sister party of the CDU) as the hege-
monial party vs an opposition with no real chance of dislodging the CSU
from government. The CSU won an absolute majority of seats in the
Landtag in 1962, and it has won an absolute majority of votes since 1970.
The SPD was a government party only between 1954 and 1957 in a four-
party coalition. The FDP has failed to pass the 5 percent barrier on sev-
eral occasions: 1966, 1982, 1986, 1994, and 1998.6 Characteristic of the
CSU’s hegemony is its single-party rule since 1966, its presence in all
aspects of society, and its penetration of the state apparatus and mass
media, all of which lead to a tendency to identify the party with the Land.7
The CSU has responded to this identity with Bavaria with a nebulous
ideology, because its policy positions are a mix of free-market economics,
social democracy, catholic–clerical traditionalism in cultural and family
policy, and a conservative domestic policy. The SPD has been unsuccess-
ful in its attempts to offer an appealing alternative, and it suffers along
with the Greens and FDP from a variety of problems, including organiza-
tional weakness, recruitment of elites, little influence with the federal
party, and competition with “flash parties” on the right and left.8
Given the date of the election on 13 September 1998 just before the fed-
eral election two weeks later, the CSU stressed its distance from the Kohl
government and emphasized its various successes under the leadership of
its prime minister, Edmund Stoiber. These were contrasted to the alleged
failed policies of the SPD’s Chancellor candidate, Gerhard Schröder, as
prime minister in Lower Saxony and the SPD’s federal party chair, Oskar
Lafontaine, as prime minister in the Saarland. The SPD and Greens tried
to identify the CSU with the CDU’s Chancellor Kohl, who had become
increasingly unpopular, and to focus on the nation-wide political climate
that favored change at the federal level.9
The results of the election were very positive for the CSU. It received 
an absolute majority again (52.9 percent), which was about what it
received in 1994, while the SPD and Greens suffered slight losses and
declined to 28.7 and 5.7 percent, respectively. Only these three of nineteen
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parties received more than the required 5 percent of the vote to enter 
parliament.10
The CSU received above average support (58 percent) from Catholics,
below- average support among Protestants (47 percent), and only 28 per-
cent of the non-affiliated vote. It received 77 percent of the frequent
church-goers among Catholics, 60 percent among Protestants. Since two-
thirds of the voters are Catholic, the CSU has a strong electoral advantage
in this population. But the traditionally high percentage of church- goers
is declining, and in 1998 only 19 percent of the voters said they attended
church every Sunday. The CSU is also the strongest party in all occupa-
tional groups and, of course, in rural areas.11
The CSU’s very slight gain in 1998 over 1994 was the first since its high-
point in 1974, when it received 62.1 percent of the vote. This success was
attributed to the appeal of the prime minister, Edmund Stoiber, who was
able to attract uncommitted voters and younger voters. In spite of high
unemployment, concerns about the influx of foreigners and asylum seek-
ers, concerns about the environment, and a general disillusionment with
politics (Politikverdrossenheit), Stoiber was able to point to numerous pos-
itive developments in the Land. As a result, polls suggested that the CSU
more than the SPD enjoyed the confidence of voters in the ability to deal
with key issues such as the economy and crime.12 This election seemed to
rebut the thesis that Land elections are basically partial federal elections,13
as has been suggested by Georg Fabritius (see p. 327).
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Figure 9.2 Election results in Bavaria, 1946–98
Source: www.wahlrecht.de/landtage
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Hesse
For the first twenty-five years after the war, Hesse had the reputation of
being “red,” i.e., SPD. In the 1974, 1978, and 1982 elections the CDU
received relative majorities, but the SPD formed a coalition government
with the FDP in the 1970s and tried to muddle through as a minority gov-
ernment after 1982. However, failure to pass its budget led to early elec-
tions in 1983. The SPD gained votes in these elections, the CDU lost more
than six points, the Greens entered the parliament for the second time,
and the FDP returned again, having failed to clear the 5 percent barrier in
1982. At first the SPD formed a minority government that was “tolerated”
by the Greens in parliament; then, in 1985, the first Red–Green coalition
government at the state level was formed. However, tensions between the
SPD and Greens within the government led to the calling of elections six
months early in April 1987. The result was that for the first time the CDU
and FDP were able to gain a majority of seats and remove the SPD from
forty years of uninterrupted rule.14
In the election of 1991, held only seven weeks after the federal election
which the SPD and Greens lost badly, the SPD and Greens both gained
votes and were able to replace the CDU and FDP coalition government
with a coalition of their own.15 In 1995, even though the CDU received a
narrow relative majority, its 39.2 percent of the vote was not enough to
form a coalition with the FDP. The FDP was nevertheless very relieved
with its success at gaining 7.4 percent, since it had failed to gain the
required 5 percent of the vote for representation in parliament in the last
nine Land elections and the European elections. With a two-seat major-
ity in parliament, the SPD, with 38 percent, and Greens, with 11.2 per-
cent, were able to continue their governing coalition under the leadership
of Hans Eichel.16
The election in Hesse in February 1999 was not only of great interest
due to its timing as the first Land election following the SPD–Green vic-
tory in the September 1998 federal elections; it turned out also to be the
first in a series of state elections that shocked and seriously damaged the
new national government. The press had judged harshly the first 100 days
of the Red–Green government in Bonn, and the same coalition of parties
in Hesse had been only moderately successful. Hesse had the highest per
capita income, and it was the largest net payer in the system of fiscal
equalization among the states. But it was unable to balance its budget, and
many of the government’s goals remained unmet. Also the SPD prime
minister, Hans Eichel, did not enjoy the same degree of personal support
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often accorded the Landesvater, although he had more personal appeal
than his lesser-known CDU challenger.17
The CDU started with the issues of education and crime, but during
the campaign it picked up another theme as a main focus: the federal gov-
ernment’s plans to reform the citizenship laws for foreigners. The CDU
and CSU started a national campaign to gather signatures for petitions
against the dual-citizenship proposals, and the CDU in Hesse initiated its
own successful campaign in Hesse three weeks before the election. The
SPD, but especially the Greens, objected to the CDU signature campaign,
while the FDP sought a compromise formula. Though most voters were
also critical of the CDU campaign, even more were critical of the national
government’s proposals.18
The CDU emerged with an unexpected victory, receiving 43.4 percent
of the vote to 39.4 percent for the SPD. The Greens lost 4 points and
ended up with 7.2 percent. The FDP also lost votes, but it still remained
barely above the 5 percent clause. As a result the CDU and FDP were able
to form a coalition for the second time since 1987 with a bare majority of
56 to 54 seats in parliament. In spite of the agreement by the far-right
German Peoples’ Union (DVU) to withdraw from the race in favor of the
Republicans (Reps), the far right received only 2.7 percent of the vote.19
The loss of the election by the SPD–Green coalition in Hesse was not
only the first of several embarrassing losses in 1999; it also meant the 
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Figure 9.3 Election results in Hesse, 1946–99
Source: www.wahlrecht.de/landtage
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loss of the federal government’s majority in the Bundesrat. This did not
mean that the Opposition had gained the majority, however, because 
several states had grand coalitions or SPD–FDP coalitions which were 
generally neutral on controversial issues in the Bundesrat. A second direct
consequence of the election for the national government was that it revised
its plans for changing the citizenship law and adopted in principle the FDP
compromise proposal according to which a foreigner born in Germany
would become a citizen at birth but would have to choose between 
German and foreign citizenship at age twenty-three (figure 9.3).20
Lower Saxony
After a seventeen-year period of rule, the SPD proposed a candidate in
1976 to replace the governing SPD prime minister in the middle of the
1974–78 legislative term. To the surprise and consternation of the SPD,
their candidate failed to gain the requisite absolute majority of secret
votes in the parliament, in spite of a one-vote SPD–FDP coalition major-
ity in the parliament. The CDU, under the leadership of Ernst Albrecht,
first formed a government alone and later a coalition government with
the FDP.21 For fourteen years Albrecht remained a highly influential
prime minister until his defeat by Gerhard Schröder in 1990.
Schröder and the SPD won re-election in 1994 with virtually the same
percentage of the vote as the party received in 1990; however, their Green
coalition partner received almost 2 percent more than in 1990. In spite of
having received an absolute majority of the vote together, the Red–Green
coalition was not renewed; instead, the SPD, with its one-vote majority in
parliament, formed a government alone.22
The election of March 1998 was special, because it was the first test
election before the national election of September, and because it featured
Gerhard Schröder again not only as the SPD’s candidate for prime minis-
ter of Lower Saxony but now also as a leading candidate for the federal
chancellorship. Schröder said before the election that he would not be a
candidate for chancellor if the SPD lost more than 2 percent of the vote
received in 1994. This was a risky condition, because the party had lost
between 2.8 and 6.8 percent in all of the state elections since 1994. The
SPD also had to answer for bad economic data in Lower Saxony, includ-
ing higher-than-average unemployment and a large budget deficit. But as
state issues receded into the background and federal themes became more
prominent during the campaign, polling data for the SPD improved.
Most voters saw the federal government as being more responsible for
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unemployment than the state government, and Schröder’s name recogni-
tion and personal appeal made him more popular than his party. Voters
also realized the importance of the election to Schröder’s candidacy for
the chancellorship, and this consideration also affected their vote. Indeed,
the election was perceived by many as a kind of primary.23
The results of the election were very satisfactory from the perspective
of Schröder and the SPD, which received its highest share ever (47.9 per-
cent) in Lower Saxony. The CDU lost less than 1 percent, but that left it
with the lowest percentage it had received since 1959. The Greens lost
slightly (7.4 to 7 percent), while the FDP gained votes but at 4.9 percent
barely missed clearing the 5 percent hurdle.24 Another important result
for Schröder in particular was that he was now the unchallenged chancel-
lorship candidate for the SPD, in spite of previous strong support among
party office holders around the country for the prime minister of the
Saarland, Oskar Lafontaine (figure 9.4).
North-Rhine Westphalia
For the first two decades after the war, the CDU was the strongest party in
North-Rhine Westphalia, but the 1960s and 1970s were periods of strong
competition between the CDU and SPD. The SPD has been the governing
party since 1966, and it governed alone from 1980 to 1995 with an absolute
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Figure 9.4 Election results in Lower Saxony, 1947–99
Source: www.wahlrecht.de/landtage
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majority of seats in the parliament. Starting with the 1980 election, it
looked as though the economically distressed areas of the Rhine and Ruhr
had become as strongly SPD as the economically prosperous areas of
Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria were entrenched strongholds of the
CDU and CSU. In 1995, however, the SPD lost its absolute majority and
formed a shaky coalition with the Greens. This coalition was destined 
for trouble, especially because of a fundamental disagreement from the
beginning over the issues of surface coal mining, highway construction,
and airport noise.25
Like Schleswig-Holstein, North-Rhine Westphalia was expected to turn
toward the CDU in the elections of 2000. The SPD’s long-serving popu-
lar prime minister, Johannes Rau, had become Federal President in the
summer of 1999, and the new prime minister, Wolfgang Clement, did not
yet have the kind of broad-based personal appeal enjoyed so many years
by Rau. The conflicts between the Red–Green coalition parties during the
1995–2000 legislative period had not left a positive impression of govern-
ment competence, unemployment remained high, and the Schröder 
government’s policies were not popular. To complicate matters for the
SPD, it was revealed that government ministers had received free air
flights and other benefits in past years from a publicly owned bank.
Having won a series of Land elections and the European elections in
1999, and having emerged as the winner of local elections in September,
the CDU was in a strong position to make substantial gains or perhaps
even challenge the SPD for leadership in the election of 14 May 2000. But
the party finance scandal that erupted at the end of 1999 concerning in
particular former Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the CDU leadership in
Hesse changed the political atmosphere dramatically, and the CDU can-
didate for prime minister, Jürgen Rüttgers, did not help his image with his
campaign against the federal government’s plan to issue “green cards” for
foreign computer experts. The Greens had not gained public confidence
as a result of their participation in the government in coalition with the
SPD, and they no longer appealed in particular to young voters. The FDP,
under the leadership of Jürgen Möllemann, profited from the weaknesses
of the other parties and their leaders and was the only party to gain vot-
ers from every category of age and vocation.26
The SPD emerged with its smallest proportion of votes since 1958,
declining by 3.2 points to 42.8 percent, while its coalition partner, the
Greens, lost 2.9 points and ended up with 7.1 percent. The results of the
election were unusual in that the opposition CDU failed – because of the
party finance scandal involving former Chancellor Kohl – to gain against
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the government parties in spite of the widespread dissatisfaction with
these parties at the national level, receiving 37 percent, or 0.7 percent less
than 1995. The only winner was the FDP, which received a sensational 9.8
percent, up from a mere 4 percent from 1995 when the party failed to
enter parliament. Voter turnout, at 56.7 percent, was among the lowest
ever in a state election since the war.27
In theory the SPD had three coalition alternatives: CDU, Greens, and
FDP. Even though there was considerable speculation about an SPD–FDP
coalition that Prime Minister Clement reportedly favored, the SPD
agreed in June to stay with its partner of the previous five years, the
Greens, under the continued leadership Wolfgang Clement (figure 9.5).28
Rhineland-Palatinate
The CDU dominated the electoral scene in Rhineland-Palatinate for
forty-four years beginning with the first election in 1947, and it received
absolute majorities in 1975, 1979, and 1983. It was able to govern alone
from 1971 to 1987. But the CDU suffered serious losses in 1987 and was
forced to form a coalition with the FDP. This led to a considerable loss of
authority for the long-serving CDU prime minister, Bernhard Vogel (now
prime minister of Thuringia), who then became the object of internal
party conflict. In November 1988 Vogel lost his party chairmanship and
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Figure 9.5 Election results in North-Rhine Westphalia, 1947–2000
Source: www.wahlrecht.de/landtage
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resigned as prime minister a short time later. Unfortunately for the 
CDU, this did not end internal divisions, and the party entered the 1991
elections with weak leadership and a frustrated membership. The SPD
became the strongest party in local elections in 1989, and in the 1991
Land election it gained an additional 6 points to reach 44.8 percent of 
the votes.29 The CDU lost more than 6 points and dropped to its lowest
percentage ever, 38.7 percent. The result was a coalition between SPD 
and FDP led by the SPD’s Rudolf Scharping30 and the loss of the Kohl 
government’s majority in the Bundesrat.
In 1994 prime minister Scharping became the SPD’s candidate for the
chancellorship in the federal elections, after which he moved to the Bun-
destag as party group leader. His successor was Kurt Beck, who assumed
office in October 1994 and continued the coalition with the FDP. In the
1996 election, which marked the end of the first five-year term for the
state, the SPD lost 5 points and dropped to 39.8 percent, but the CDU was
unable to benefit from this loss and remained at 38.7 percent. The FDP,
which was concerned not only about remaining in the government in
coalition with the SPD but even about passing the 5 percent barrier, actu-
ally gained 2 percent and had its best result since 1963 with 8.9 percent.
The Greens gained slightly, but the SPD and FDP remained in coalition
under the leadership of Prime Minister Beck.31
In contrast to the political climate in 1999, when elections first in
Hesse and then several other Länder led to gains for the CDU, the 2001
elections in Rhineland-Palatinate were held under conditions that
favored the SPD. The CDU was still reeling from the party finance scan-
dal surrounding former Chancellor Kohl, Chancellor Schröder had
reshuffled his cabinet and gained considerable popularity through his
policies and personality, and Prime Minister Beck had proven to be a
capable and popular leader. The SPD gained an impressive 4.9 percent
over 1994 to reach 44.7 percent, while its coalition partner, the FDP, lost
1.1 percent but still remained well above the 5 percent clause at 7.8 per-
cent. The CDU lost another 3.4 percent from 1994 and received its low-
est percentage ever in the Land elections, 35.3 percent. With 5.2 percent,
barely above the 5 percent minimum, the Greens also lost votes com-
pared to their 6.9 percent in 1994. In spite of the lowest voter turnout ever
(62.1 percent), the SPD picked up voters from both the CDU and the
Greens and enjoyed especially strong support among workers and voters
with modest educational backgrounds. It also increased its support
among the better educated and the youngest and oldest voters (especially
women) (figure 9.6).32
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Saarland
In 1945 the Saarland was not only occupied by the French; it was incor-
porated economically into France which had the intention of annexing it
later as it had done three centuries before with Alsace-Lorraine. However,
as after the First World War, the voters in the Saarland chose in a referen-
dum in 1955 to remain with Germany, and the Saarland was reincorpo-
rated into Germany as a separate state in 1957.
In the first state election in 1955, the CDU received a relative majority
of the votes with 25.4 percent, and the party’s share increased rapidly
thereafter to place the CDU in a dominant position until 1980, when it
was eclipsed slightly by the SPD. The SPD gained votes every election
from 1955 until 1994, when it still emerged as the strongest party with
49.4 percent. Its high mark of 54.4 percent was reached in 1990. Given the
fact that three-fourths of the population of the state is Catholic and except
for Saarbrücken and Neunkirchen basically rural and small-town – fac-
tors that generally favor the CDU – the CDU should be the dominant
party. But severe economic problems, especially the decline of the coal
and steel industry, have made the economy the main issue for decades and
given the advantage to the SPD. Much of the SPD’s success was due also
to the popularity of the prime minister, Oskar Lafontaine, the former
mayor of Saarbrücken and a more traditional socialist with populist 
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tendencies. Lafontaine became the SPD national party leader in Novem-
ber 1995, when he defeated Rudolf Scharping for that post, and he joined
the Schröder government as Minister of Finance after the September 1998
federal election. Lafontaine was succeeded by Rudolf Klimmt, who
became a popular figure soon after assuming office. But Lafontaine’s res-
ignation in February 1999 from his ministerial and party posts in oppo-
sition to Schröder’s economic policy direction and the changed political
climate in the country in 1999 had a very negative effect on the SPD’s
standing in the Saarland.33
The CDU had gained votes in the 1994 elections over its 1990 results,
but with 38.6 percent it still remained far behind the SPD, which had lost
5 percent. The CDU’s candidate for prime minister, Peter Müller, was also
less popular than prime minister Rudolf Klimmt. The Greens had cleared
the 5 percent barrier in the Saarland for the first time in 1994, but the FDP
had failed in 1994 to enter the parliament. The FDP had failed to clear the
5 percent hurdle in seven of the last eight state elections, it had lost almost
half of its members, it had no strong personalities to offer, and it had few
loyal supporters.34
With a voter turnout of 68.7 percent, a decline of 15 percent from 1994
and the lowest turnout in the state since 1955, the results were dramatic.
The CDU became the strongest party with 45.5 percent, barely defeating
the SPD which received 44.4 percent. The CDU increased its percentage
by a stunning 6.9 percent over 1994 (an increase of 12.1 percent since
1990), while the SPD lost 5 percent (10 percent since 1990). The Greens
failed to return to parliament, and the FDP, though gaining 0.5 percent,
received only 2.6 percent of the vote. With an absolute majority in parlia-
ment of 26 seats to 25 seats for the SPD, the CDU formed a new govern-
ment, and Peter Müller replaced the very short-term Rudolf Klimmt as
prime minister. In spite of his criticism of the federal government during
the campaign, the former SPD prime minister entered the federal cabinet
as the Minister of Transportation35 but was later forced to resign due to a
financial scandal involving his government while he was prime minister
(figure 9.7).
Schleswig-Holstein
In the first elections after the war, the SPD received the most votes in this
northernmost German state known for shipbuilding, fishing, and agri-
culture. However, the party’s total vote was reduced sharply in the 1950s.
This was due largely to the influx of refugees and expellees from the East
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who became a significant proportion of the population and formed their
own refugee party, the BHE. As the refugees slowly became assimilated,
they tended to turn to the CDU, which was the governing party from 1950
to 1988, in coalition with other parties until 1971, alone from 1971 to
1987. In the meantime the SPD steadily increased its percentage of the
vote, due in part to the crisis in the shipbuilding industry and in agricul-
ture, bypassing the CDU in 1987 for the first time.
Just as the 1987 election campaign was beginning, the CDU Prime
Minister, Uwe Barschel, was involved in an airplane accident in which he
was the only survivor. Seriously injured, Barschel did not become active
in the campaign until four weeks before the election date. Then one week
before the 1987 elections, it was revealed that the SPD’s candidate for
prime minister, Björn Engholm, was being followed by two private detec-
tives and that an anonymous charge had been made that Engholm had
cheated on his taxes. The CDU government, under Prime Minister
Barschel, denied all charges implicating it, but hours before the election it
was revealed that a close associate of Barschel had signed a statement
according to which Barschel had been advised of the plan to accuse Eng-
holm with tax fraud, to have Engholm followed, and to engage in other
practices that would embarrass the Opposition. Barschel rejected these
revelations as lies, and the suspicion arose that because of its timing and
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reputation, Der Spiegel, the news magazine that printed the exposé, had
itself engaged in highly questionable behavior.36
The results of the election were a tie in seats for the CDU and FDP vs
the SPD and Südschleswigscher Wählerverband (SSW), the Danish minor-
ity party that does not have to receive 5 percent of the vote to enter par-
liament. Only two weeks after the election, during negotiations with the
FDP and SSW to form a new government, Prime Minister Barschel
resigned from office. The tumult surrounding him refused to subside, and
he left for a vacation in Switzerland. On 12 October he was found dead in
his hotel in Geneva.37 Whether it was murder or suicide has never been
determined with certainty. Given the circumstances, the CDU, FDP and
SPD agreed to hold new elections in May 1988.
Not surprisingly, the “Barschel affair” completely dominated the spring
campaign, and the vote received by the CDU declined from 42.6 percent in
1987 to 33.3 percent in 1988. The SPD, on the other hand, increased its
vote from 45.2 percent to its first absolute majority of 54.8 percent. The
FDP, which had hoped to gain votes in comparison with 1987, failed to
pass the 5 percent barrier, as did the Greens. Björn Engholm became the
first SPD prime minister in thirty-eight years.38
By the time the election of 1992 was held, the SPD could no longer
expect to benefit from the “scandal bonus,” and it received 46.2 percent.
This figure was still historically very high and enough to give the party an
absolute majority of the Landtag largely because the Greens, with 4.97
percent, barely missed passing the 5 percent barrier. In spite of the SPD’s
losses, the CDU did no better than in 1988 with 33.8 percent. Engholm,
who had assumed a national leadership role in the SPD, became prime
minister again, but a year later he and one of his ministers were forced to
resign owing to additional revelations concerning the “Barschel affair.”
The Minister of Finance, Heidi Simonis, replaced Engholm as prime
minister, and by the time the 1996 elections were held she had made quite
an impression as a successful and ambitious “Powerfrau.”39 While far
more popular than her challenger from the CDU, she could not prevent
her party from receiving only 39.8 percent of the vote while the CDU
gained 3.4 percent to reach 37.2 percent. The Greens increased their pro-
portion of the vote to 8.1 percent, and the FDP entered the Landtag again
with 5.7 percent. These results meant that a coalition government would
be necessary, and only the SPD had a realistic chance of forming a gov-
ernment. With some reservations owing to a number of differences in
policy positions, especially regarding highway construction, the SPD
joined with the Greens.40
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Toward the end of 1999, it looked as though the CDU would have a very
good chance of becoming the strongest party again after twelve years in
opposition and recapturing the prime ministership with its leading candi-
date, former defense minister Volker Rühe. The SPD and Greens had lost
a significant percentage of votes in a series of Land elections following the
federal election of September 1998, and there was no reason to believe the
losses sustained elsewhere would not occur in Schleswig-Holstein as well.
But the party finance scandal involving former Chancellor Helmut Kohl
broke in December 1999, and the favorable prospects of the CDU sud-
denly turned bleak. The elections in Schleswig-Holstein were the first Land
elections to take place after the scandal broke, so a great deal of attention
– even from American newspapers – was devoted to the elections.41
The CDU lost votes, but not as many as expected, receiving 35.2 per-
cent as opposed to 37.2 percent in 1996. The SPD received 43.1 percent,
3.3 percent more than its proportion of the 1996 vote (39.8 percent). The
FDP improved its position also by almost 2 percentage points, receiving
7.6 percent in contrast to 5.7 percent in 1996. The Greens dropped from
8.1 percent in 1996 to 6.2 percent in 2000, which was the same percentage
loss as the FDP’s gain. The Danish minority party, SSW, improved its
position rather dramatically, receiving 4.1 percent as opposed to 2.5 per-
cent in 1996 which was also more than it normally receives. Neither the
PDS on the far left nor the NPD on the far right received significant 
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support (1.4 and 1.0 percent, respectively), and three other small splinter
parties received a total of 1.5 percent. Thirty days after the election, the
SPD and the Greens formed a new coalition government headed again by
Heide Simonis, still the only female prime minister in the sixteen German
Länder (figure 9.8).42
The city-states
Bremen
Bremen (which includes Bremerhaven), an old Hanseatic League city-
state like Hamburg, is the smallest in population of the sixteen German
Länder. It is also one of the three former West German Länder (together
with Hamburg and Bavaria) that existed long before 1933, when the then
existing German states were dissolved by Hitler. For more than four
decades after the war, the SPD was the hegemonic party. Not until the
1990s did it become merely the strongest party, in part because of the
emergence of the Greens. In 1991, when it lost 12 percentage points, it was
forced to form a coalition government. It did so with both the Greens and
the FDP, which had received 11.4 and 9.5 percent, respectively.43
Owing to strong conflicts within the cabinet, particularly between FDP
and Greens,44 new elections were called for under the newly revised con-
stitution. The results of the May 1995 elections were that the SPD received
slightly more, the CDU slightly less, than one-third of the vote, the Greens
gained almost 2 points to reach 13.1 percent, and the FDP failed to clear
the 5 percent barrier. On the other hand, a new party, “Jobs for Bremen
and Bremerhaven” (AFB), formed only a few months before the election
by leaders who were interested in promoting a nonpartisan coalition to
deal more effectively with the serious economic and fiscal problems 
confronting the city, received a remarkable 10.7 percent.
The Lord Mayor, Klaus Wedemeier, resigned the day after the election
and was succeeded as the result of an unprecedented selection by vote of
party members by former Minister (Senator) of Education and Justice,
Henning Scherf. Negotiation between SPD and CDU then led to the for-
mation of a grand coalition between the two parties. Each party received
four ministers in the cabinet, and both parties agreed to the necessity of
reducing the extemely high public debt and bringing some order to the
city state’s finances.45
In spite of the closing of a major shipbuilder in 1996, Bremen achieved
above- average economic growth after 1995, success in reducing the debt,
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and success in attracting new business to the city; however, high unem-
ployment remained a serious issue. Still, the population had become
more optimistic, and the prospects of the AFB had declined dramatically
by the time the September 1999 elections were held. Though his party
preferred an SPD–Green coalition, Scherf made clear he wanted a renewal
of the grand coalition with the CDU. The CDU had demonstrated gov-
ernment competence in the ministries it controlled, and polls showed the
voters liked Scherf and the SPD but thought the CDU was more compe-
tent in dealing with some of the major issues, especially the economy. The
CDU campaigned for a renewal of the grand coalition, while the SPD
hoped for an absolute majority.46
In spite of the lowest voter turnout (60.1 percent) since the Second
World War, the results of the election were an increase of over 9 percent
for the SPD to 42.6 percent and of 4.5 percent for the CDU to a high of
37.1 percent.47 The Greens campaigned against a grand coalition and for
an SPD–Green coalition and lost clearly, receiving 8.9 percent. The FDP
warned precisely against such an alliance in its campaign and still received
only 2.5 percent, about the same as the AFB.48
Although a Red–Green coalition would have been possible, Scherf
announced on the evening of the election that the grand coalition would
be continued with the goal of “saving” Bremen from those who would like
to see it consolidated into Lower Saxony. The SPD and CDU agreed to
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reduce the size of parliament from 100 to 80 over the next four years and
to continue to focus on the economy and city finances (figure 9.9).49
Hamburg
As in Bremen, the SPD has been the dominant party in Hamburg since
the end of the war; however, the CDU has been able on three occasions
(including 1953, when it was part of a larger alliance) to gain more votes
than the SPD, though, unlike the SPD, never an absolute majority. In June
1982 and June 1986 the CDU received 0.5 percent and 0.2 percent more
than the SPD but was unable to form a coalition; the SPD was also unable
to form a coalition with either the CDU or the Greens.50 In each case new
elections had to be called in which the CDU lost votes and the SPD
regained a relative majority. In 1991 the CDU declined further to 35.1
percent, and the SPD gained more votes to reach 48 percent. After the
1991 election, a CDU member, Markus Wegner, complained before the
courts that the CDU had been nominating its candidates in an undemo-
cratic and therefore illegal manner, and in 1993 the Hamburg Constitu-
tional Court agreed. The parliament was forced to dissolve itself, and new
elections were called for September 1993.51
Following his success in court, Wegner announced that he would form
a new voter group that would be against the party-dominated politics of
the past. Common sense and citizen expertise rather than party dogma
and discipline would be stressed. Thus he named his new group the
STATT-Partei, literally the “instead-of-party.” Its slogan was “Citizen
responsibility instead of party power.” There was no need to take stands on
controversial issues, such as the city debt, housing, crime, or unemploy-
ment; solutions to such problems would be found by engaging normal
citizens in the political process, including measures of direct elections and
direct democracy.52
The CDU, of course, was on the defensive as the party whose practices
had led to the early election which a majority of people opposed. As
expected, its fortunes declined sharply, and it lost 10 points, reaching an
all-time low of 25 percent. The SPD also lost 7.6 percent, down to 40.4
percent. The Greens, led by a candidate who had defeated her more left-
wing female opponent, increased their vote by 6.3 points to 13.9 percent.
The FDP failed to clear the 5 percent barrier, but the new STATT Party
entered the parliament with 5.6 percent of the vote.53
While a variety of coalition options for the SPD were available, the
Lord Mayor, Henning Voscherau, made it clear he preferred a coalition
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with the STATT Party. His party, however, favored a coalition with the
Greens, and Voscherau was forced to enter negotiations with them.
Unable to reach agreement with the Greens on fundamental issues, nego-
tiations with the STATT Party were begun and a cooperation agreement
reached according to which the STATT Party would not join a coalition
but would receive two cabinet positions for independents with expertise.
It also received promises by the SPD to introduce a number of direct
democratic practices, cuts in expenditures, and a reduction in the num-
ber of cabinet positions.54
After the new government was formed in 1993, there were, as
expected,numerous conflicts between the SPD and the STATT Party. In
1996 the parliament gave up its formal part-time status and, like all of the
other Land parliaments, became a full-time professional parliament. One
result, of course, was considerably more compensation for the deputies.
By 1997 the economy was somewhat better than average in Hamburg, but
unemployment and crime were persistent problems. Only about one-
third of the electorate expressed satisfaction with government perfor-
mance, and the SPD–STATT Party cooperation agreement was not
viewed with favor. Indeed, voters preferred either a Red–Green or a grand
coalition, not another agreement with the STATT Party.55
Some saw the September 1997 election in Hamburg as a test election
for the national level a year later, and both the CDU and SPD had high
hopes that they could give their parties a boost. Mayor Voscherau retained
majority support in the polls, but only about one-third of the voters were
satisfied with government performance. The results of the election were
not particularly favorable for either party. The SPD lost a little more than
four points to 36.2 percent, the CDU gained 5.7 points to 30.7 percent,
still far below their results in 1991 or the 1980s. The Greens continued to
improve their standing, but only slightly, to 13.9 percent, the highest per-
centage the Greens had received in any state or national election to that
time. The STATT Party failed to pass the 5 percent barrier, as did the FDP
and the numerous small parties that participated in the election. With 4.9
percent the right-wing DVU barely missed clearing the 5 percent hurdle;
however, together with the Reps and NPD the far-right parties received a
total of 6.8 percent of the vote, even though they failed to gain any seats.
Accepting responsibility for the SPD losses, Henning Voscherau resigned
as lord mayor. Ortwin Runde succeeded him and formed a coalition with
the Greens.56
Those who thought the failure of the STATT Party to win any seats in
1997 meant the return to political party “normalcy” were shocked on 23
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September 23 2001, when a brand new party, the “party for a rule of law
offensive” (PRO, i.e., Partei Rechtsstaatliche Offensive), emerged suddenly
in the city election to win almost 20 percent of the vote, the most ever
received by a “flash party” in Germany. This party, founded by a local
judge, Ronald Schill, promoted itself as the “law and order” alternative to
the political establishment which had allegedly failed to protect the citi-
zens of Hamburg from growing crime, drugs, and violence and a feeling
of general insecurity, especially after the 11 September terrorist attacks in
the United States. The SPD received 36.5 percent, about the same per-
centage as in 1997, but this was not enough to form a majority coalition
government with its former partner, the Greens, who saw their vote
reduced from 13.9 to 8.5 percent. On the other hand, the CDU, in spite of
dropping from 30.7 percent in 1997 to 26.2 percent, was nevertheless able
to think about forming a coalition with the FDP, which had re-entered the
city parliament with 5.1 percent, and the upstart “Schill Party.” The CDU
rejected the idea of a grand coalition with the SPD.57
So, in spite of its rather poor showing, the CDU, under the leadership of
Ole von Beust, was able to form a government with the FDP and Ronald
Schill without the SPD, which had been the leading party in all coalitions
in Hamburg for forty-four years.58 Whether the “Schill Party” is a strictly
temporary Hamburg phenomenon or whether it will be able to spread to
other areas of Germany as it hopes to do remains to be seen (figure 9.10).
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Berlin
Berlin differs from most other Länder not only because it is one of three
city-states but also because it combines the former West Berlin and East
Berlin, which were very separate and divided cities during most of the
period from 1948 to 1990. West Berlin was especially isolated and cut off
from its surrounding territory by the infamous Berlin Wall which was
constructed in 1961 to prevent the flow of people from East Germany to
the West via Berlin. In 1990 not only were East and West Germany united,
but also East and West Berlin. The result was that politics in Berlin
changed dramatically, and it was no longer possible to generalize from
previous experience. In some respects, Berlin has become a microcosm of
the two-party systems described above, i.e., one party system in the for-
mer West Berlin, another in the former East Berlin.
From 1946 to the 1970s, the SPD was the dominant party in West
Berlin. Starting in 1975, the CDU gained at first a small lead over the SPD,
and then an ever-larger lead until 1989, when the two parties received vir-
tually the same percentage of the vote. The decline in support for the SPD
was due in large part to the rise of the Greens, whereas the CDU suffered
a sharp decline in 1989 owing to the sudden success of the far-right
Republikaner, who received 7.5 percent of the vote but never gained more
than 3.1 percent after that year. From 1990 to 1999 the CDU and SPD
formed a grand coalition, with the CDU as senior partner.
The election in 1999 was supposed to bring about a change in Berlin
just as the federal election in 1998 had brought change at the national
level. It had been difficult for the SPD to join a coalition with the CDU in
1995, at which time the SPD received its lowest percentage of votes ever in
the postwar era. But with the CDU and Greens too far apart and the PDS
not acceptable as a coalition partner, there was no alternative to a grand
coalition. The conflicts in the coalition between the parties and the
numerous problems confronting the city led to considerable public dis-
satisfaction with the performance of the government in spite of its suc-
cesses, for example, in putting its finances in order and introducing
territorial and administrative reforms along with implementing a reduc-
tion in the size of parliament. But several major projects were not realized,
e.g., the construction of a new airport and consolidation with the sur-
rounding state of Brandenburg; unemployment remained high, and eco-
nomic growth was the lowest in all of Germany.59
The continuing deindustrialization of Berlin has resulted in a decline in
the traditional base for the SPD. The SPD also suffered from its reputation
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as a party of patronage and personal favoritism. Nevertheless, the SPD had
reason to hope for more support after its success in the national elections
in 1998. But the change in the political climate in Germany by the begin-
ning of 1999 and mistakes during the campaign led to the party’s lowest
percentage of the vote (22.4 percent) in a Land election since 1950 and 
failure to win a single direct seat.60
The CDU not only benefited from the change in the national political
climate but also from the popularity of the Lord Mayor, Eberhard Diep-
gen. Diepgen enjoyed the support of a unified party, while the SPD was
divided by personality, by the participation of the party in a grand coali-
tion with the CDU which made it difficult for it to be too critical of the
cuts its own finance minister had made to consolidate the city’s finances,
and by attacks from unions and the leftist PDS. The CDU received 49.3
percent in West Berlin but only 26.9 percent in the East for a total of 40.8
percent of second votes.61
The Greens also suffered from the changed political climate. There was
considerable dissension in the party over German involvement in Kosovo,
but the party focused its campaign on its leading female candidate and
ended up receiving 9.9 percent of the vote, or 3.3 percent less than in 1995.
The FDP’s efforts to get CDU voters to give it their second vote were
largely ignored, and the Reps did not play a major role in the campaign in
spite of the withdrawal of the DVU in its favor. Neither party received the
requisite 5 percent. The PDS, next to the CDU the major victor in the 1999
elections, gained 17.7 percent of the vote, up 3.1 percent from 1995.62
In West Berlin after unification in 1990 the CDU enjoyed generally sta-
ble support of around 50 percent , while the Greens and the PDS
improved their standings by a few percentage points. The SPD and FDP
lost about 4 or 5 percent each. In East Berlin the CDU gained about 5 per-
centage points, while the SPD dropped from about one-third to less than
one-fifth of the vote. The FDP and Greens also suffered sharp declines.
The PDS increased its vote from about one-fourth to almost 40 percent,
becoming the largest party in the East. By the election of 1999 the results
for Berlin as a whole were that the FDP was no longer in the parliament,
while the PDS, with increasing numbers of seats, was not a viable coali-
tion partner for either the SPD or CDU, and the Greens could hardly coa-
lesce with the CDU. This left a grand coalition between the CDU and a
reluctant SPD as the only alternative for a functioning government.63
However, in June 2001 the SPD withdrew from the grand coalition owing
to a financial scandal involving a publicly owned bank in Berlin that was
managed by a member of the CDU. After joining with the Greens and
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PDS against the CDU in a vote of no-confidence, the SPD, under the lead-
ership of Klaus Wowereit, formed a minority government with the Greens
with the toleration of the PDS. Soon thereafter the parliament agreed to
call for new elections on 21 October 2001.64
The results of the election for the CDU were disastrous. It received 23.8
percent, or a loss of 17.1 percent from its best result ever in 1999, the
largest loss it had ever suffered in a Land election since 1945 and the
largest any party has suffered since 1950. It lost its only 2 direct seats in
East Berlin and most of its direct seats in West Berlin, where it had dom-
inated during the 1990s. Its leading candidate, Frank Steffel, had ranked
a distant third, behind the SPD’s Klaus Wowereit and the PDS’s Gregor
Gysi, when the public was polled about their choice for mayor. Though in
a coalition government with the SPD until June of 2001, the CDU was
blamed far more than the SPD for the severe financial problems of the
city, which at the end of 2001 had a debt of DM 80 billion (about 40 
billion Euros).65
The SPD gained 7.3 percent and ended up with 29.7 percent. The PDS
also gained 4.9 percent, which, at 22.6 percent, was only about 1 percent
less than the CDU’s total. In East Berlin the PDS came close to an absolute
majority, and it enjoyed widespread support among young people and the
better educated. With 9.9 percent, the FDP was also a big winner, return-
ing to the parliament which it had failed to enter for the past six years. The
Greens received 9.1 percent which, while only a slight reduction from 1999,
was the seventeenth electoral loss in a row for them in Land elections.66
The question after the election was what kind of coalition government
should be formed. An SPD–CDU coalition would have a majority in the
parliament, but the SPD and its mayoral candidate, Klaus Wowereit, were
no longer willing to share power with the CDU. That left two alternatives:
a so-called “traffic light coalition” (Ampelkoalition) made up of the SPD
(Red), FDP (Yellow), and Greens, or a Red–Red coalition of SPD and PDS.
The charismatic leader of the PDS, Gregor Gysi, argued that only with its
participation could the deep division of the city be overcome. In the mean-
time the national leadership of the SPD, including Chancellor Schröder,
made known their preference for a Red–Yellow–Green coalition.67
By the beginning of December 2001, it was clear that a traffic light coali-
tion would not be formed, because the FDP rejected tax increases favored
by the SPD and Greens. Especially the Greens and the FDP disagreed
sharply on other issues as well. As a result the SPD began negotiations
with the PDS, and the SPD national leadership signaled its approval in
spite of its doubts about the PDS position on various issues, including its
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opposition to German participation in the international military actions
against terrorism. Though eager to join the SPD in governing the city, 
the PDS was faced with the problem of having to share responsibility for
cutting the budget deficit of around DM 10 billion and reducing the city’s
debt of DM 80 billion (figure 9.11).68
The five new Länder
Brandenburg
Before the Wall fell in November 1989, conventional wisdom held that the
SPD would be the strongest party in any free election in the former East
Germany. This assertion was based on voting history before 1933, espe-
cially in the industrialized areas of the East around Berlin and Saxony, and
on the presumably leftist political culture inculcated by the East German
regime for forty years. As it turned out, the CDU emerged as the strongest
party in the first and only elections for the East German parliament (Volk-
skammer) in March 1990 – except in East Berlin – and as the strongest
party in the Land and federal elections in the Fall of 1990 following uni-
fication. The one exception was the Land election in Brandenburg in
1990, when the SPD won by about 9 points.
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Manfred Stolpe, a former high official of the Lutheran Church in East
Germany, became the prime minister in 1990. In spite of charges raised
by the CDU opposition and others – but never proved – that he had col-
laborated with the Communist regime, Stolpe became immensely popu-
lar in Brandenburg. This was due in part without doubt to his
identification with the East, in contrast to his counterparts in the other
new Länder, and his reputation as a fighter for Eastern interests even, if
necessary, against his own national party.69 In 1994 the SPD under
Stolpe’s leadership increased its lead by more than 15 points to over 54
percent, while the CDU and PDS tied at 18.7 percent.
Nevertheless, the popular assessment of the Stolpe government before
the elections in 1999 was mixed. In spite of government efforts to improve
economic conditions, unemployment remained high (17.4 percent in
summer 1999). The poor economy had undoubtedly contributed to anti-
foreigner incidents. Popular programs such as the 1000 DM “welcome
money” for each newborn child had to be cancelled, but the bloated
bureaucracy was not cut. Consolidation with Berlin had been rejected in
a referendum in 1996 in spite of Stolpe’s support,70 and no progress was
made on major infrastructure projects, such as the new airport for Berlin
and Brandenburg. There had been considerable turnover in the cabinet,
and controversy surrounded Welfare Minister Regine Hildebrandt’s 
management of money. The Education Minister pushed through a “life-
formation, ethics and religious studies” course that replaced the conven-
tional religious instruction classes in the public schools in spite of the
vehement opposition of the Catholic and Protestant Churches and the
CDU.71 The Minister was forced to back down in the summer before the
September 1999 elections, and she resigned. But Stolpe enjoyed the ben-
efit of an ineffective opposition by the CDU and PDS, and the CDU had
received the lowest percentage of the party’s vote in any Land in the 1998
national election.72
In spite of the past support for Stolpe, most voters indicated before the
election that they favored change, including if necessary a grand coalition
of SPD and CDU. The SPD had received only 2.5 percent more votes than
the CDU in the June 1999 European Parliament elections (with only 30.1
percent voter turnout, the lowest of all the Länder!). The change in the
political climate since the national elections in 1998 also made the SPD
defensive a year later, having to fight a two-front battle against the CDU
on the right and the PDS on the left. In the latter case the SPD had also to
decide during the campaign whether to exclude the PDS from a possible
coalition, which was an internally divisive issue. Stolpe refused to commit
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himself one way or the other, but Welfare Minister Hildebrandt said a
coalition with the CDU would be unthinkable for her.73
The result of the election of September 1999 was a continuation of the
trend toward a concentration of the many parties that had run. A three-
party system was evident, with the PDS receiving more than 20 percent
for the first time. The SPD lost almost 15 percent but still emerged as the
strongest party with 39.3 percent, and the CDU increased its vote by
almost 8 points to 26.5 percent. The DVU, which as a “phantom party”
had campaigned with slogans but hardly with candidates or an organiza-
tion, received somewhat more than the required 5 percent for gaining
seats in the parliament. Both the FDP and Greens received less than 2 
percent.74
Following the election, Stolpe held negotiations with both the CDU
and PDS, but he rejected the PDS offer because he said the goals of the
PDS could not be financed. After strenuous negotiations with the CDU, a
grand coalition was formed; however, Regine Hildebrandt refused to
accept any position in the cabinet and even gave up her seat in parliament
in opposition to the CDU’s participation in government.75 Manfred
Stolpe, of course, remained prime minister until he stepped down in a sur-
prise move in June 2002. He was replaced by the mayor of Potsdam and
former Brandenburg cabinet minister, Matthias Platzeck (figure 9.12).76
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Figure 9.12 Election results in Brandenburg, 1990–99
Source: www.wahlrecht.de/landtage
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Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
The elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern were held on the same day as
the federal elections in both 1994 and 1998, so there can be little doubt
about the influence of federal politics and themes in these elections. In
1990 the CDU won a plurality of the votes with 38.3 percent, followed by
the SPD with a mere 27 percent. While the FDP gained entry into the par-
liament with 5.5 percent, the Greens did not. The PDS was the third most
popular party with 15.7 percent. The combined seats of the CDU and
FDP were matched by those of the SPD and PDS, so neither a coalition of
CDU and FDP nor SPD and FDP would have had a majority. Then an
unhappy SPD deputy joined the CDU party group, so a shaky CDU–FDP
coalition was formed. However, a series of personnel problems soon
plagued the CDU and the government: several CDU deputies lost their
seats owing to their activities on behalf of the communist regime before
unification; more than half of the cabinet ministers were relieved of their
posts; the prime minister, Alfred Gomolka, was replaced in midstream by
Berndt Seite; and the CDU state party chair, Günther Krause, was
replaced by Angela Merkel, who was finally able to discourage the inter-
nal conflicts within the party. In the meantime the SPD, under its leader,
Harald Ringstorff, presented a picture of relative unity and seriousness.77
In 1994 the CDU lost slightly but still retained a plurality with 37.7 per-
cent. The SPD gained 2.5 percent, and the PDS gained 7 points. The FDP
and the Greens failed to pass the 5 percent barrier. The leader of the SPD,
Ringstorff, had indicated before the elections that he might be interested
in the “Magdeburger Modell,” i.e., the example set in Saxony-Anhalt
where an SPD minority government was being “tolerated” by the PDS in
parliament. He even held exploratory talks with the PDS after the election
simultaneously with the CDU. But in the end, in spite of considerable ten-
sion between the two parties and, especially, between Seite and Ringstorff,
the CDU and the SPD formed a grand coalition for the period 1994–98
with Seite as prime minister.78 Relations between the parties were not
good, and Ringstorff renewed discussions with the PDS, only to have the
national party leaders intervene against any kind of coalition with the for-
mer communists. The result was that the CDU–SPD coalition limped
along under a climate of “mutual contempt.”79
By the summer of 1998 the national SPD leadership had decided to give
Ringstorff a free hand, and the PDS made it clear that it was willing to
cooperate with Ringstorff. The CDU was in a difficult situation, since on
the one hand Prime Minister Seite tried to point to coalition successes,
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while the CDU party group leader focused on the differences with the
SPD and its power-hungry leader. The CDU was also hurt by the general
climate in the country at the time that favored the SPD and change. The
state was known as the “poor house of the republic” and had an unem-
ployment rate of 20 percent and in some regions over 30 percent. In addi-
tion, the CDU had to ward off charges that it wanted to repeal the land
reforms that had taken place under Russian occupation between 1946 and
1948 and return land to the former large land owners. Warning against
the “SPDS” did not have much effect. Ringstorff and the SPD could
emphasize the need for change and the need to create jobs, while the PDS
could appeal to the need for “full employment before profit.”80
It was no surprise that the results of the election favored the SPD,
though less than one might have expected. The SPD received 34.3 percent,
the CDU 30.2 percent, and the PDS 24.4 percent. No other parties cleared
the 5 percent hurdle. After the election the SPD took up negotiations with
the CDU and PDS, but it was soon clear that it favored a coalition with the
PDS. The PDS made certain concessions, such as agreeing to a signed
statement that political forces that do not recognize the Basic Law should
have no influence on state policy making and admitting that the SED 
(the Communist Party of the former East Germany) was responsible for
political injustice in the old German Democratic Republic (GDR). The
SPD, in return, agreed to stop checking backgrounds of public servants for
connections with the old regime (figure 9.13).81
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Figure 9.13 Election results in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 1990–98
Source: www.wahlrecht.de/landtage
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Saxony
In spite of its reputation gained during the Weimar Republic of being a
socialist stronghold, Saxony was the only state in the East to give the CDU
an absolute majority in the 1990 elections. Kurt Biedenkopf, a longtime
member of the Bundestag and state legislature in North-Rhine West-
phalia, General Secretary of the CDU in the mid-1970s, and state party
chair, had gone to the University of Leipzig as a guest professor in March
1990 and become the CDU candidate for prime minister in the October
1990 state elections. His leadership proved decisive then and later.82
Being matched in popularity only by Prime Minister Manfred Stolpe
in Brandenburg, Biedenkopf and the CDU could face the elections in
1994 with confidence. Indeed, the CDU’s 58.1 percent was the highest
percentage of the vote ever received by the CDU in a state election and
was exceeded only by the CSU in Bavaria in the mid-to-late 1970s and
early 1980s. The SPD lost 2.5 points and dropped down to 16.6 percent,
while the PDS gained 6.3 points to tie the SPD. Neither the FDP nor 
the Greens received the required 5 percent to return to the parliament.83
As in 1990, the CDU formed a government alone with Biedenkopf as
prime minister.
The CDU did not do so well in Saxony in the federal election of Sep-
tember 1998, but it rebounded in the European elections in June 1999. At
the time of the state elections in September 1999, the CDU was at a high
point and the SPD at a low point because of the national political climate.
The state CDU, the “Saxon Union,” could point to several successes as
well: Saxony was in fourth place nation-wide in the number of jobs per
1,000 inhabitants; no other state had so many self-employed or so few
public employees; and it had the fewest people receiving public assistance.
The only question was whether the SPD or the PDS would come in sec-
ond. The CDU victory, with 56.9 percent of the vote, was expected; how-
ever, the success of the PDS in gaining another 5.6 points to reach 22.2
percent and the decline in support for the SPD from 16.6 to 10.7 percent
were not expected. This was the lowest percentage of votes for the SPD in
any state election since 1949. In spite of the influence of federal politics on
the outcome, it was clear that Prime Minister Biedenkopf had been a key
factor in the “Saxon Union’s” victory.84
But Biedenkopf turned 70 in 2000, and he appeared to resist the idea of
a “crown prince.” Indeed, internal conflict between Biedenkopf and oth-
ers plagued the CDU in 2000 and 2001. Nevertheless, Biedenkopf was
succeeded in May 2002 by Georg Milbradt, a long-serving CDU minister
of finance in Biedenkopf ’s cabinet (figure 9.14).85
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Saxony-Anhalt
Politics in Saxony-Anhalt have been more tumultuous since 1990 than in
any of the other new or old states. In the first election in 1990, the CDU
received a plurality with 39 percent of the vote and formed a coalition
with the FDP, which had received 13.5 percent.86 The SPD had received 26
percent, the Greens 5.3 percent, and the PDS 12 percent. Less than a year
after the coalition government was formed under Prime Minister Gerd
Gies, who had emerged from the pre-unification East CDU, Gies was
replaced by Werner Münch, who had been serving as finance minister and
was from the West. Two years later Münch and his cabinet resigned over
charges that he and several cabinet ministers had arranged excessive com-
pensation packages for themselves. In November 1993 Münch was
replaced by the CDU party group leader, Christoph Bergner, while the
SPD and Greens demanded new elections. The FDP was divided over new
elections, but soon after Bergner was elected prime minister in December
with FDP support, elections were called for June 1994 before, rather than
after, the summer vacation time.87
With a decline of 10.3 percent to 54.8 percent, the lowest voter turnout
figure in any state election in Germany since the war, the CDU still received
a plurality with 34.4 percent, followed closely by the SPD with 34 percent.
The Greens squeaked through with 5.1 percent, whereas the FDP lost
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Figure 9.14 Election results in Saxony, 1990–99
Source: www.wahlrecht.de/landtage
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almost 10 points and fell to 3.6 percent. The PDS was able to gain almost
8 points to reach 19.9 percent. On the morning after the election, both
Bergner and the SPD’s leading candidate, Reinhard Höppner, laid claim to
the right to form a cabinet. A minority government seemed inevitable,
since the SPD ruled out a grand coalition with the CDU and the CDU had
no other potential coalition partners. The SPD, like the CDU, also rejected
the idea of a coalition with the PDS. That left the possibility of a minority
SPD government with the Greens tolerated by the PDS, which had 
indicated its willingness to play such a role. A coalition government with
Höppner as prime minister was formed, and the CDU became the 
opposition party with Christoph Bergner as party group leader.88
The state election in April 1998 took place under unusual circum-
stances in that for the first time since the war a government was up for re-
election that had not had a majority throughout the legislative term but
had depended, instead, on the toleration of the PDS. This had become
known as the “Magdeburg Model,” named after the state’s capital city.
This had inspired the CDU to initiate a campaign in 1994 against the
SPD–PDS “red socks,” but the campaign was not very effective. The
SPD–Green government had been unable to do much to reduce unem-
ployment, which was the highest in the country, and it had accumulated
a huge debt, the largest on a per capita basis in Germany. The Greens were
frustrated over their limited influence in the government and divided
over the proper course to follow. The CDU had been obstructionist dur-
ing the first two years of the legislative term, but then it realized its strat-
egy merely encouraged more cooperation between the government and
PDS. After discussions with the government, the CDU took a somewhat
more cooperative stance after 1996 and actually supported the govern-
ment on some occasions. A CDU-sponsored vote of no confidence was
rejected by all three of the other parties. The PDS had demonstrated its
dependability by tolerating the government in parliament, but it also
ignored any sense of fiscal responsibility by demanding increased funds
for teachers and local government social services.89
Since the election was only five months before the national elections in
September, many prominent federal politicians appeared during the cam-
paign, the main theme of which was unemployment. The CDU tried to
tie unemployment to the “Magdeburg Model,” but the polls showed that
most dissatisfaction about the economy was directed at the federal gov-
ernment under Helmut Kohl. The CDU rejected a new “red socks” cam-
paign, but it did focus on cooperation between the SPD and PDS. Prime
Minister Höppner rejected the idea of a grand coalition after the election
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as well as a coalition with the PDS. But he also rejected demands by the
Greens and PDS that he drop his economics minister who had good rela-
tions with the CDU. The PDS could not really campaign as a normal
opposition party, because it had tolerated the government thoughout the
legislative term. This had apparently led to some confusion in the party.90
The results of the election were dramatic. Not because the CDU lost
more than 12 points and received only 22 percent of the vote, not because
the Greens failed to return to parliament and the FDP again failed to pass
the 5 percent barrier, not because the SPD gained a little less than 2 points
at 35.9 percent, and not because the PDS remained stagnant with 19.6
percent. The sensational and unexpected development was the explosion
of votes for the far-right DVU, which jumped from 1.3 percent in 1994 to
13.6 percent in 1998. The party’s massive campaign spending in the last
few days before the election had obviously paid off. With slogans such as
“German Workplaces for German Workers,” “Expel Criminal Foreigners
Immediately,” and “Save the D-Mark!” (a reference to the Euro), the DVU
appealed as a protest party to a young, especially male, xenophobic pro-
letariat in spite of a mere 1.8 percent foreign population in the state.91
This success was less attributable to CDU voters switching to the DVU
than to a significant increase in voter turnout (54.8 to 71.7 percent),
which stands in sharp contrast to Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia.
Indeed, 28 percent of all new voters gave their votes to the DVU.92
It was again apparent that a single party could not form a majority gov-
ernment, and it was apparent that the new party in parliament, the DVU,
was even less acceptable as a coalition partner for the SPD – or CDU –
than the PDS. After unsuccessful talks with the CDU, Prime Minister
Höppner again rejected both a grand coalition93 and a coalition with the
PDS, which left as the only option a return to the simple toleration of an
SPD government by the PDS. Attacked by the CDU for being soft on the
PDS, Gerhard Schröder, the Chancellor candidate for the SPD in the
upcoming federal elections, tried to get Höppner to form a grand coali-
tion, but Höppner refused, thus increasing his popularity in the state. The
SPD was in a stronger position than before, because as long as the PDS
abstained, it could outvote the CDU and DVU together. This was seen as
an inducement for the CDU to be more cooperative, since it did not want
to be associated in fundamental opposition with the DVU.94
In 2002 elections were again held in Saxony-Anhalt five months before
the federal elections, and with devastating results for the SPD. Voter
turnout was 56.5 percent, down more than 15 points from 1998, and nei-
ther the previously successful DVU, the Greens, nor the “Schill Party”
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received the 5 percent required for admission to the parliament. But the
FDP did gain seats, with a sensational 13.3 percent, and the CDU saw its
support rise from 22 to 37.3 percent. The SPD, on the other hand,
dropped from 35.9 to 20 percent, mirroring the CDU’s loss in the previ-
ous Land election in Berlin. The PDS experienced a slight gain of 0.8 per-
cent to 20.4 percent, which put it in second place, as in Saxony. The SPD
blamed its loss on its leader, Reinhard Höppner, high unemployment,
and the “Magdeburg model,” while the CDU saw its success tied to the
dissatisfaction with the policies of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, high
unemployment, and the SPD’s party finance scandal in Cologne which
pushed the older scandal involving former Chancellor Kohl into the back-
ground. In any case the results were a very bad omen for the SPD in the
upcoming federal elections, and, more to the point, the SPD lost its work-
ing majority in the Bundesrat with the gain of four votes for the
CDU–FDP coalition government led by Wolfgang Böhmer (figure 9.15).95
Thuringia
Like the other new Länder, excluding Brandenburg, the CDU received the
most votes in the first state election in 1990; however, only in Thuringia
and Saxony did the CDU remain the leading party in 1994 and 1999. 
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Figure 9.15 Election results in Saxony-Anhalt, 1990–2001
Source: www.wahlrecht.de/landtage
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Following the 1990 elections, the native East German, Josef Duchac,
formed a coalition government with the FDP. Duchac was prime minis-
ter for only fourteen months, however, owing to revelations of his past
involvement with the Communist regime. In 1992 he was replaced by
Bernhard Vogel, who was the former CDU prime minister of Rhineland-
Palatinate and the only state prime minister since 1945 to hold that office
in two different states. In 1994 the FDP and Greens both failed to receive
the required 5 percent of the vote, and, as in the other eastern Länder, a
three-party system emerged with the CDU, SPD, and PDS gaining seats 
in the parliament. Though by far the largest of the three, the CDU needed
a coalition partner, and it formed a government with the SPD from 1994
to 1999.96
In contrast to Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the grand coalition in
Thuringia was not controversial. The SPD leadership never considered
either a toleration model or a coalition with the PDS, relations between the
two coalition partners remained relatively good, and the PDS faced a united
cabinet and a relatively quiet legislative session. Favored by geography over
some of its counterparts, Thuringia enjoyed the strongest economic growth
of all the new states from 1991 to 1998. Together with Saxony, it had the
most industrial jobs, and its unemployment rate of 15.1 percent in July
1999 was the lowest in the East. Its public debt, on the other hand, was
above average for the states. Nevertheless, concerns about the economy,
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Figure 9.16 Election results in Thuringia, 1990–99
Source: www.wahlrecht.de/landtage
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jobs, social justice, education, crime, and traffic were major issues. Accord-
ing to the polls, Vogel and the CDU enjoyed more public confidence in their
competence to deal with these issues than did the SPD or PDS.97
As in Brandenburg, the SPD suffered in the 1999 Land elections from
the declining popularity of the SPD–Green government in Bonn, it
could not criticize effectively the government of which it had been a
partner, and its leading candidate could hardly challenge seriously the
popular CDU prime minister. The result was an absolute majority of
votes for the CDU, which won all 44 direct seats. The SPD lost 11 points,
fell below its 1990 vote, and, for the first time in one of the new Länder,
received fewer votes than the PDS. The PDS, with 21.3 percent, gained
almost 5 percent over 1994. No other party cleared the 5 percent barrier
(figure 9.16).98
Summary
Since elections in one or more of the Länder take place every year, only a
kind of temporary snapshot of the array of leading parties and govern-
ments can be made at any particular time. Table 9.1 presents the govern-
ing parties and prime ministers of the Länder as of summer 2002. The
Christian Democrats governed alone in four Länder, together with the
FDP in three Länder, and with the FDP and PRO in one Land. The SPD
governed alone in only one Land and together with the CDU in two Län-
der, with the Greens in two Länder, with the FDP in one Land, and with
the PDS in two Länder.
These variations show clearly both the volatility of Land elections and
the “promiscuity” of the two major parties in forming governments.99
Are Land elections “partial” federal elections?
As in other federal systems, a recurring question in Germany is the extent
to which the elections in the Länder reflect more the popular assessment
of political developments and policies of the individual Länder govern-
ments or of the federal government. In the United States one general
school of thought centers around the idea that state gubernatorial elec-
tions are basically national referenda which express approval or disap-
proval of the sitting president and his policies, especially in terms of the
economy. Another school suggests that voters focus on the performance
of the incumbent governor and the state of the regional economy. In any
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case state contests are affected by news media which focus on national and
international events, and the national political parties exercise some
influence in the states through their funding and assistance in state cam-
paigns. It also seems clear that evaluations of the president and the
national and international environment can lead to a form of referendum
voting in the states. On the other hand, incumbent governors, like incum-
bent politicians in Congress, are not easily defeated.100
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Table 9.1 Governments in the Länder (as of November 2002)
Länder governed by the Bavaria since 1996 Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber
CDU or CSU alone: Saxony since 1990 Prime Minister Kurt Biedenkopf
(since 5/2002, Georg  Milbradt)
Saarland since 1999 Prime Minister Peter Müller
Thuringia since 1990 Prime Minister Bernhard Vogel
Länder with CDU/FDP Baden-Württemberg Prime Minister 
coalition governments: since 1996 Erwin Teufel
Hesse since 1999 Prime Minister Roland Koch
Saxony-Anhalt since Prime Minister Wolfgang 
2002 Böhmer
Lower Saxony since Prime Minister Christian Wulff
2003
Länder with CDU/FDP/ Hamburg since 2001 Lord Mayor Ole von Beust
PRO coalition 
government:
Länder with SPD/CDU Bremen since 1995 Lord Mayor Henning Scherf
coalition governments: Brandenburg since Prime Minister Manfred Stolpe 
1999 (since 6/2002, Matthias
Platzeck)
Länder with SPD/Green North-Rhine Prime Minister Wolfgang 
coalition governments: Westphalia since Clement (since 11/2002,
1995 Peer Steinbrück) 
Schleswig-Holstein Prime Minister Heide Simonis
since 1996
Länder with SPD/FDP Rhineland-Palatinate Prime Minister Kurt Beck
coalition governments: since 1991
Länder with SPD/PDS Mecklenburg- Prime Minister Harald 
coalition governments: Vorpommern since Ringstorff 
1998
Berlin since 2002 Lord Mayor Klaus Wowereit
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Rainer Dinkel, who has studied the relationship between Land elec-
tions and federal influences, found that in sixty-five of sixty-seven Land
elections the federal government coalition received less support than
expected based on federal election results. He also cited polls showing
that public support for the federal government tended to be higher
shortly after and shortly before federal elections, i.e., the federal coalition
parties were likely to lose votes in the Länder especially at mid-term. The
reduced support was due especially to floating voters who expressed their
judgment of federal policies by voting against the federal coalition in
Land elections. Lack of support of the federal coalition might also be seen
in the lower voter turnout in Land elections. He did not find, in contrast
to some other scholars,101 that Land elections could be seen as a barome-
ter that measured the strength of the federal government and opposition
parties. It is clear, however, that Land elections, like European Parliament
elections, are barometer elections in so far as they can and do send signals
to the federal government.102 Dinkel’s general conclusion was that both
federal and Land politics were factors in Land elections.103
The German scholar who is probably most identified with the question
of the relationships between federal and Land politics, Georg Fabritius,104
has offered a useful set of hypotheses about federal politics and elections
in the Länder. First, he suggests that Land elections have not been purely
Land-based since the founding of the Federal Republic. Like a number of
other observers, he notes the federal themes taken up by the political 
parties in Land elections, the appearance of national political leaders in
the Land during campaigns, the joint membership of Land political lead-
ers in Land and national party committees, and the difficulty voters have
in distinguishing between federal and Land politics.105 For example, the
economic conditions in a Land, as is generally the case for an American
state, have more to do with federal than Land policies, yet the state of the
economy can have a powerful influence on a Land (or, in the United
States, state) election.
The second thesis is that in spite of the influence of federal politics, the
themes of Land politics are also important. The popularity of the prime
minister is a key variable, and Land politics, for example, policies regard-
ing schools, teachers, and curricula have become major issues over the
years. But the popularity of the prime minister sinks when his party at the
federal level is held in lower esteem. Fabritius argues, furthermore, that
the “normal vote” is more likely to be seen in Land elections, because fed-
eral elections exaggerate support or opposition. This “normality” exists
especially when there is no protest against federal policies. Like Dinkel, he
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also suggests that Land election results hardly carry over to the next fed-
eral election or vice versa, when the elections do not take place too closely
to each other.106 While there may be some evidence for the hypothesis that
the popularity of the prime minister suffers when his party at the federal
level is held in low esteem, a counterexample would be the Bavarian elec-
tion of 1998 which was held only a few months before the federal election.
In this election the prime minister remained very popular, and the CSU
actually picked up additional votes in spite of the national party’s weak-
ness. It also seems clear that the personal appeal of the prime ministers in
the Eastern Länder is a crucial factor in explaining election results in
Brandenburg, Thuringia, and Saxony.107
Thirdly, Fabritius argues that the degree of federal influence on the
results of elections in the Länder varies and is greatest in crisis periods.
Then Land elections most clearly have the character of protest elections,
where there is a kind of referendum for or against federal policies. He
notes that the chief beneficiary of the protest is not necessarily the major
opposition party; instead, it is frequently a protest party or group that
may have just formed or been relatively dormant.108 Examples in the mid-
to-late 1960s would be the rightist NPD and the Ausserparlamentarische
Opposition (APO) or extra-parliamentary opposition which consisted
especially of radical left students, the Greens from the late 1970s through-
out the 1980s, the right-wing Reps and DVU in the 1980s and 1990s, and
the PDS in the East in the 1990s and after 2000.
Land elections are also more likely to take on the characteristics of
protest elections when they occur at mid-term, i.e., not too soon before
or after a federal election. Here they may be seen as a kind of plebiscite –
though an unclear one – for or against the federal government, or, in any
case, as a kind of barometer or measurement of the current political 
climate. Voters can abstain or vote for a different party and still return to
their normal party in the federal election, which also applies to elections
for the European Parliament. Thus there appears to be more solidarity
with one’s normal party in federal elections.109 If this is true, though, it
seems inconsistent with Fabritius’ previous assertion that Land elections
are the more “normal” elections. Indeed, a recent empirical study, which
otherwise generally confirms Dinkel’s and Fabritius’ hypotheses above,
lends strong support to the argument that federal elections reflect more
the “normal” vote.110
The fourth hypothesis is that the “coordination” between Land elections
and federal politics which exists to some extent is the result of the inter-
locking relations (Politikverflechtung) between and among the Länder and
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the federation and the German party state. Thus the division of power
between the federation and the Länder does not mean a separation in
terms of policies or parties. The thesis of the “unitary federal state” is con-
firmed in Land elections. Party images are set by the federal parties, but
there is a strong mutual dependence between the federal and Land parties.
Most obviously the Länder are closely associated with federal politics via
the Bundesrat.111 This is reflected in a clever CDU campaign advertisement
in the 1958 Land elections in Hesse:
Deine Wahl in Hessenstaat
zählt im Bonner Bundesrat.
Regierung Zinn stützt Ollenauer,
wählt CDU für Adenauer.
A somewhat related theme to Fabritius’ last hypothesis has been devel-
oped by Gerhard Lehmbruch, who suggests that there is an incongruence
between the German party system and the federal system. The British
parties form a strong party system which leads to majority rule, i.e., the
“Westminster parliamentary system” of strong, disciplined party govern-
ment under the leadership of the prime minister with little necessity of
bargaining between Government and Opposition. The strong German
parties, in contrast, are forced to bargain because of cooperative federal-
ism or the Politikverflechtung which exists between the federation and the
Länder and the role of the Länder in the Bundesrat. The German party sys-
tem, therefore, is unable to provide the kind of party government found
in Great Britain, but must, instead, engage in a highly complex system of
bargaining and consensus politics. This can and does lead to blockage,
which can frustrate decision makers who are held accountable by the
public for their political promises. As a result, the federal cabinet minis-
ters try to work with Land politicians to support their policies, while the
Opposition leaders do the opposite.112
In a recent empirical study of the relationship between federal and
Land elections, Charlie Jeffery and Daniel Hough note that evidence of a
cyclical pattern of support for the main political parties and the national
level is now commonplace. Examples are mid-term congressional elec-
tions in the United States and other “second-order” elections such as the
European Parliament elections in the EU member states.113 Following a
review of the literature and data, and focusing especially on the findings
of Rainer Dinkel, cited above, the authors conclude that the data for
1949–90 generally support Dinkel’s picture of
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Land elections as ‘subordinate’, or second-order elections subject to an elec-
toral cycle whose turning points were set by the rhythm of the federal rather
than the Länder electoral arenas. Incumbency in federal government was
punished, especially at mid-term. The main federal opposition party held
up its vote share better, on occasion doing significantly better than expected,
while the gamut of smaller parties, apparently benefiting from voter exper-
imentation when less was at stake, generally did well.114
They also note the importance of voter turnout as a factor in explaining
Land election results. Turnout is generally considerably lower in Land elec-
tions, as it is in European Parliament elections, which punishes government
parties that fail to mobilize “their broadly contented supporters when less
is at stake,” hurts opposition parties less “as their voters are typically willing
to get out and make a point,” and reduces barriers to smaller parties, “espe-
cially those capable of mobilizing a concerted protest vote.”115
When they looked at the data for the period from 1990 to 1998, how-
ever, Jeffery and Hough reached somewhat different conclusions. The
trend since 1990 of increasingly lower turnout in Land elections appears
to be associated with reduced support for both the government and
opposition parties, so that “the success of small parties suggests less of
an anti-government effect post-unity than a more indiscriminate effect
penalising the wider federal party ‘establishment’.”116 Jeffery and Hough
reserve judgment on the question of whether this means that Land elec-
tions might have become uncoupled from federal politics and are no
longer “second-order” elections. They note the relevance of a number of
factors, such as holding Land elections on the same day as the federal
election and the important role of the personal appeal of the incumbent
prime minister. But a brief look at the results of the Land elections since
1998 suggests that the relevance of federal politics is still strong, e.g., the
CDU opposition made strong gains in all of the Land elections in 1998
and 1999, when the SPD–Green federal government seemed to be
floundering, but it lost significantly after December 1999 when the
party finance scandal involving former Chancellor Helmut Kohl was
revealed. On the other hand, the most recent elections in Hamburg and
Berlin suggested that local issues dominated the campaigns. Thus the
question seems still to be unresolved. There can be no doubt that fed-
eral politics can have a decisive influence on Land elections, but it is also
clear that local conditions and personalities can be important and even
decisive as well.117
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Conclusion
The brief overview of elections in the Länder provided above suggests
some major differences between regional parties and elections in Germany
and the United States. Some of these differences, of course, are due in part
to the presidential system (directly elected governor and separation of
powers) in the American states and the parliamentary system in the 
German Länder. Germany also has a multiple-party system (“limited plu-
ralism”118) in contrast to the American two-party system; indeed, there
may be as many as twenty or more parties participating in German Land
elections. Even though most of these parties fail to win seats in the parlia-
ment, usually three or four parties cross the 5 percent hurdle which is the
minimum needed to benefit from the proportional representation features
of the electoral laws. But the party systems vary, as they do in the United
States, between dominant SPD and CDU parties in some Länder and more
competitive systems in others; between Länder that have gone through
party realignments and those that have not; and, most importantly today,
between the old Länder and the new, where the PDS has replaced the
Greens and FDP as the “third force.” The result today is the three-party sys-
tem of SPD, CDU, and PDS in the East and the four-party system of SPD,
CDU, FDP, and Greens in the West. This difference complements the
north–south division between SPD and CDU/CSU that increasingly 
characterized the Federal Republic before unification.
Another difference is that most governments that are formed in the
Länder – as well as at the federal level – are two-party coalitions. Most of
these are between the SPD or CDU and a smaller party, such as the SPD
and Greens or the CDU and FDP; however, by early 2002 there were also
two SPD–CDU grand coalitions, one SPD–FDP coalition, one
CDU–FDP–PRO coalition, and even two SPD–PDS coalition govern-
ments, with the PDS “tolerating” an SPD minority government in Sax-
ony-Anhalt until 2002. Coalition governments are, of course, common in
parliamentary systems, while they are virtually unknown in the United
States. But the direct election of the governor, lieutenant governor, attor-
ney general, and frequently other state-level officials often results in the
representation of both parties in state executive positions. These are not,
however, coalition governments in the parliamentary sense of two or
more parties sharing responsibility for policy making initiatives. Nor does
a governor of one party who faces one or both legislative houses with an
opposing majority enter into a coalition, even if and when some cooper-
ation may be required to get legislation or appointments approved.
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The timing of elections and voter turnout are related in both countries.
Voter turnout rises when the regional elections are held close to or simulta-
neously with federal elections, and it also rises under the impact of federal
politics. For this reason about three-fourths of the American states hold
their state elections between federal elections. In Germany most Land elec-
tions are held between federal elections, and even when held in the same
year they are usually scheduled for different months. But the federal influ-
ence on German Land elections is clearly stronger than the federal impact
on American gubernatorial elections – there is little federal influence on
American state legislative races – as is demonstrated by the fact that during
the Reagan and Bush I presidencies the Republicans never had a majority
of state governorships. Even for mid-term congressional races, incumbency
is more important than federal politics. Yet state politics in the United
States are not entirely immune from federal influence as can be seen in the
role of the national media and decline of regional differences in helping to
bring about a narrowing of the margins in the state voting for president.119
Still another difference is the rise – usually temporary – of anti-estab-
lishment protest parties in some of the Länder at certain times. An impor-
tant example in the 1960s was the radical right NPD. In the late 1970s and
early 1980s the leftist Greens made their first appearance. In the late 1980s
and 1990s it was the radical right Republikaner and somewhat later the
DVU which largely, but not entirely, replaced the NPD. In the mid-1990s
it was the middle-class STATT Partei in Hamburg and the working-class
AFB in Bremen; in 2001 it was the PRO in Hamburg. And in all of the new
Länder, the PDS offered an alternative to voters who were disappointed
and even disgusted with the CDU and SPD. The closest parallels in the
United States would be the extreme right-wing David Duke in Louisiana,
who tried to run as a Republican, and the Reform Party, which enjoyed its
greatest success with the election of Jesse Ventura in Minnesota in 1998.
In sum, the overview of elections in the German Länder shows a rich
variety of political patterns and developments in the different regions of
the country. As in the United States, no two Länder are the same, and
some have a politics and party system that differ dramatically from other
regions, e.g., Bavaria vs North-Rhine Westphalia, Mecklenburg-Vorpom-
mern vs Saxony. The overview suggests that the north–south cleavage of
the old Federal Republic has been complemented since unification by an
east–west cleavage; however, it also shows that the north–south gap may
now include the new Länder (i.e., Saxony and Thuringia in the south), so
that in the future a north–south gap may be more prominent and endur-
ing than an east–west divide.
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The Federal Council, or Bundesrat
All federal states have some kind of second chamber that participates in
the legislative process and represents the constituent parts of the whole,
but Germany’s second chamber is unique in the world’s federal systems.1
It is unique in that it is a federal, not a Land, organ, in which the member
states are represented by their governments (i.e., cabinets). This means 
it is an executive as well as a legislative body, and it means also that it is
not a part of parliament, which is the Bundestag alone. Rather, it is a 
constitutional organ along with the Bundestag, the federal government,
the Federal President, and the Federal Constitutional Court that makes 
it possible for the Länder, via their governments, to participate in the 
legislative process. Of course this means that the Bundesrat is also a prod-
uct of the historical development of federalism in Germany and of the
German second chamber.2
History
The North German Federation and the Kaiserreich
Germany did not become a nation-state until 1871, following the Franco-
Prussian War. From that time to the present, there have been five clearly
delineated time periods and six – or possibly seven – political systems on
German territory. These are the Kaiserreich, also known as Hohenzollern
Reich or Bismarck Reich, of 187–1918; the Weimar Republic of 1918–33;
Hitler’s “Third Reich” of 1933–45; Allied occupation from 1945 to 1949;
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East from 1949 to 1989;
10
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and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the West from 1949 to the
present. Some might argue that the unification of the latter two states in
October 1990 by which the West German Federal Republic absorbed the
former East Germany created yet another political system, but that is a
questionable thesis that cannot be developed here. These different
regimes range from monarchy to democracy to fascist dictatorship to mil-
itary rule to communist dictatorship to Western democratic welfare state
capitalism. No other Western country has gone through so many political
changes in modern times. 
In 1867 the North German Federation was formed under the guidance
of the Prussian Prime Minister, Otto von Bismarck. It consisted of
twenty-two states, all of which were monarchies, and three city-states,
Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck; not included were Austria or the south
German states of Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden. It represented a
compromise between German tradition and the institutions of confeder-
ation on the one hand and the demands for some form of national union
with a central government and the constitutionally guaranteed participa-
tion of the population on the other hand. It was, therefore, a compromise
among monarchical, democratic, federal, and unitary principles within a
constitutional framework that provided for a complicated division of
powers and the de facto dominance of Prussia. Prussian dominance con-
tinued even after the founding of the Kaiserreich in 1871 that adopted
with some revisions the North German Constitution as its own.
The Kaiserreich included the three south German states for a total of
twenty-five states, ranging in size from Prussia, with three-fifths of the
population and two-thirds of the area of the Reich, to tiny Schaumburg-
Lippe with 32,000 inhabitants. Again, three of the states were “free” city-
states and all of the twenty-two territorial states were monarchies.3 There
were two chambers in the Reich, the popularly elected Reichstag and the
Bundesrat which represented the states. Like the old Bundestag of the 
German Confederation, the Bundesrat was comprised of members who
were rather like ambassadors sent by the state governments and instructed
by them on how to vote. Therefore, in contrast to the Staatenhaus pro-
posed by the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848–49, which was to be a part of
parliament with members at least legally free to vote their consciences, the
Bundesrat of the Kaiserreich was not a parliamentary body but rather a
chamber representing the monarchical governments in the states.4 Indeed,
sovereignty in the Reich resided in the Bundesrat.5
The distribution of seats in the Bundesrat was similar to that of the old
imperial Bundestag. Prussia had 17 of 58 votes, more than the 14 needed
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to block constitutional amendments, and the members were instructed
delegates sent by the state government to vote en bloc. But there was a
crucial difference: the North German Federation of 1867 and the Kaiser-
reich of 1871 were federations with a central state, while the German
Confederation of 1815 was a loose association of sovereign princes.6
Bismarck had thought originally of the Bundesrat as a potential gov-
ernment, or cabinet, which would counter the democratic pressures 
in the country as well as the fear that the Prussians would dominate 
the government. In fact the Bundesrat did not become either the basis 
of a cabinet or as strong a legislative body as the Reichstag, because the
idea of the nation-state, which favored the Kaiser and the popularly
elected Reichstag, was more powerful than the old-fashioned notion of a
confederation of princes.7
The Constitution of the Kaiserreich thus held two principles of legiti-
macy in balance: the rising principle of democracy and the traditional
principle of monarchy. On the other hand, the principle of government
responsibility to parliament, as in Great Britain, was not yet established at
the national or state level. The Bundesrat stood for the principle of feder-
alism, but also for monarchy. Even though it was overshadowed by the
Reichstag in the legislative process, it exercised veto power over the Reich-
stag and over constitutional change. It was, then, more than merely a
chamber representing the states.8
The Weimar Republic
With the collapse of the Kaiserreich in 1918, a new Constitution, often
seen as a model of democracy, was drafted and approved in a constitu-
tional assembly in the quiet town of Weimar, southwest of and away from
the then turbulent Berlin. The Weimar Constitution also provided for a
federal system with eighteen, then seventeen, member states and a second
chamber, now called the Reichsrat. Several different ideas concerning this
body were discussed, but in the end it remained a chamber consisting of
delegates selected by the governments of the states,9 now called Länder.
Prussian dominance was broken by having the different provincial gov-
ernments, rather than the central Prussian government, select delegates.
A major difference to the past, of course, was that now the governments
were democratically elected. The monarchies had been swept away in the
wake of the lost war.
But the powers of the Reichsrat, in comparison with its predecessor, the
Bundesrat, were reduced. It had no absolute veto, only a suspensive veto,
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the effect of which depended on the actions of the Reich President. 
It could not even stop constitutional changes. Like federalism in general,
the Reichsrat proved to be a weak institution in a state that, confronted 
by a series of foreign and domestic crises, became more centralized and
unitary than originally conceived. But the trend toward centralization
was nothing in comparison to the Nazi dictatorship that overthrew 
the Weimar Republic in January 1933 and eliminated the Länder and 
dissolved the Reichsrat in 1934.10
The new Länder after 1945 and the founding of the Federal Republic
Between 1945 and 1949, when the Basic Law came into effect, eleven Län-
der emerged in the Western Allied zones of occupation, only four of which,
Baden, Bavaria, and the city-states of Hamburg and Bremen, had existed
before 1934. Prussia, half of which was annexed by Russia and Poland in
1945 and seen by the Allies as having been too large and its influence too
militaristic (although this was not the case in the Weimar Republic), was
dissolved altogether in 1946. The Americans re-established Bavaria and
Bremen and created the Länder Hesse and Württemberg-Baden. The
French created the Rhineland-Palatinate and Württemberg-Hohenzollern
and considered annexing the Saarland until agreeing in the 1950s to return
it to Germany. The British re-established Hamburg and created North-
Rhine Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein as Länder. West
Berlin remained an occupied city. Baden, Württemberg-Baden, and
Württemberg-Hohenzollern were combined by the Germans – unlike the
other new states – to form Baden-Württemberg in 1952. By this time,
then, there were two large Länder in the North – North-Rhine Westphalia
and Lower Saxony – and two large Länder in the South – Bavaria and
Baden-Württemberg. Never before in German history had there been this
kind of rough regional balance. In the East, the GDR had also created or
revived five Länder after 1945, but they were virtually abolished in 1952
and replaced by fourteen districts in a highly centralized communist state. 
In 1948 the Western Allies directed the Land governments to prepare a
draft Constitution that, among other things, would have to provide for 
a federal system.11 Some Germans have argued or at least suspected that
federalism after 1945 was imposed on them,12 but it is clear that the Ger-
man constitutional founders also wanted a federal state.13 Federalism as
such did not become a major issue in the Herrenchiemsee Conference that
drafted the constitution; rather, it was the nature of the second chamber
that created controversy.14 The SPD generally favored a more powerful
342 The Länder and German federalism
chap  10  27/5/03  12:02 pm  Page 342
elected parliament and a second chamber with reduced powers, while the
CDU and CSU were more supportive of a second chamber equal in power
to the parliament. The SPD and the CDU in the British Zone also favored
a chamber comprised of uninstructed members selected by the Land par-
liaments, rather like the United States Senate before 1913, while the CSU
and southwest German CDU preferred the German tradition of instructed
members representing their governments, i.e., the old Bundesrat model.
The FDP position was not clear.15
When the Herrenchiemsee Conference, a preparatory committee of
experts, turned over its draft document in September 1948 to the Parlia-
mentary Council – the official constitution-making body established by
the Länder – it offered both the Senate and the Bundesrat solutions, the
latter of which could be subdivided into “classic” and “weakened” alter-
natives.16 The Parliamentary Council finally reached a compromise favor-
ing the “weakened” Bundesrat model. The Bundesrat was not given
powers equal to those of the parliament, or Bundestag, as in the “classic”
model, but the Constitution did grant membership on the basis of
instructed delegates appointed by the Land governments. German feder-
alists, after all, believed that the Länder should participate in law making
and in the administration of federal laws, both of which were very much
in the German tradition.17 This favored the representation of the Land
governments in a second chamber of the Länder that would mediate
between the federal and Land governments. This is the solution that is
most federal, in the sense that it provides for a federal division of powers
in which both levels are represented by governments. A Senate solution
would have duplicated in the Bundesrat the party representation in the
Bundestag, whereas representation in the Bundesrat was to be based on
the different principles of continuity, stability (i.e., long-standing inter-
ests of the Länder) and administrative expertise.18 Thus the Bundesrat of
the Federal Republic represents a special form of German federalism but
not the old federalism of the German princes.19
The Bundesrat today
Functions, composition, organization, and general procedures 
Even though Chapter IV (Articles 50–53) of the Basic Law is devoted to the
Bundesrat, it focuses only on the basic function of the chamber, i.e., par-
ticipation in the legislative process and administration of the federation
The Länder, Bundesrat, and legislative process 343
chap  10  27/5/03  12:02 pm  Page 343
and in matters affecting the EU; membership, representative principles
and voting; rules of order, certain procedures and committees; and provi-
sions concerning participation of federal cabinet members in Bundesrat
proceedings. Many other key provisions concerning this body are found in
other parts of the Basic Law. For example, details about the legislative
process involving the federal government, Bundesrat, and Bundestag are
contained in Articles 76 and 77; constitutional amendments, which
require a two-thirds vote in each chamber, are discussed in Article 79; the
Bundesrat’s role in finance legislation is found in Articles 104a, 105–109,
134, and 135; its role in approving federal regulations regarding the
administration of federal laws by the Länder is outlined in Articles 84 
and 85; its role in joint tasks is contained in Article 91a; the election by the
Bundesrat of one-half of the judges of the Federal Constitutional Court is
provided in Article 94; and other, generally less important, matters are
found in a variety of other Articles.20
Together with the Bundestag, Federal Government, Federal President,
and Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundesrat is a constitutional organ
of the federation, but with a focus on federalism. It is a second chamber
but not an “upper house” of parliament; nor is it a Länderkammer, or
chamber of the Länder, in which the Länder deal with matters that affect
them internally as regional units. Rather, Länderkammer, if that term is to
be used, should be understood as a federal organ which allows the con-
stituent parts of the union to participate in the governmental process of
the whole state.21 This has led some observers to use the term “participa-
tory federalism” in describing the German federal system. 
Unlike the Bundestag which begins a new session after each federal
election, the Bundesrat is a continuous body. Land governments decide if
and when the members change, usually as the result of a change in the
cabinet due to Land elections. The Bundesrat is not a body that represents
the people directly, but rather one that represents elected Land govern-
ments. It is, therefore, in part an executive and in part a legislative body.22
The goal is not so much a democratic one as one that focuses on a Ger-
man version of separation of powers and checks and balances.23 This, in
turn, promotes use of the term, “administrative federalism” in Germany. 
The Bundesrat is composed of members of and is appointed by the
Land governments (cabinets). Only these cabinet members may vote 
in the plenary sessions; civil servants may participate in the regular
committee meetings. The number of delegates each Land sends to the
Bundesrat varies roughly according to population. Each Land has at
least three votes. Länder with more than 2 million inhabitants have 4
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votes; with more than 6 million, 5 votes; and with more than 7 million,
6 votes (see table 10.1). Before unification the maximum number of
votes for a Land was 5. In contrast to Prussia in the Kaiserreich, no one
Land dominates the voting or has a veto over constitutional amend-
ments. But while population is considered, the differences in size of
population and territory between North-Rhine Westphalia or Bavaria
on the one hand and Bremen or the Saarland on the other hand are dra-
matic. When the five new Länder were created in the former GDR, con-
cern was expressed in the West that this would give the East, with a total
of 16.4 million inhabitants, 15 votes and leave North-Rhine Westphalia,
with 17 million inhabitants, 5 votes. To ensure that they would at least
be able to block constitutional amendments that they might see as dam-
aging their interests, in particular fiscal equalization among the Länder,
the four large Länder in the West were given 6 votes each in the Unifica-
tion Treaty of 1990 and in the amendment to the Basic Law of Septem-
ber 1990. In the Bundesrat tradition, the votes are cast as a block and on
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Table 10.1 The German Länder: their populations, representation in the
Bundesrat, and their capitals
Seats in
State (Land) Population Bundesrat Capital city
Baden-Württemberg 10,300,000 6 Stuttgart
Bavaria 11,900,000 6 Munich
Berlina 3,400,000 4
Brandenburg 2,600,000 4 Potsdam
Bremena 700,000 3
Hamburga 1,700,000 3
Hesse 6,000,000 5 Wiesbaden
Lower Saxony 7,700,000 6 Hanover
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 1,800,000 3 Schwerin
North-Rhine Westphalia 17,800,000 6 Düsseldorf
Rhineland-Palatinate 3,900,000 4 Mainz
Saarland 1,100,000 3 Saarbrücken
Saxony 4,600,000 4 Dresden
Saxony-Anhalt 2,800,000 4 Magdeburg
Schleswig-Holstein 2,700,000 4 Kiel
Thuringia 2,500,000 4 Erfurt
Federal Republic of Germany 81,400,000 69 Berlinb
Notes: a City-states; b Berlin is now the official capital, but some ministries will remain in
Bonn even after 2000.
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instruction of the Land governments. In case the Land has a coalition
government and the parties in the government do not agree on how to
vote, the Bundesrat members from that Land will most likely abstain;
this has the effect of a negative vote, since only positive votes are
counted. All coalition governments sign detailed agreements before
they form a government, and these include provisions concerning vot-
ing procedures in the Bundesrat.24 An obvious breakdown occurred in
March 2002 when the delegation from Brandenburg was divided
between the senior coalition partner, the SPD, and the junior partner,
the CDU, over the vote for or against the SPD–Green government’s
immigration reform bill. In spite of a vote against cast by a CDU minis-
ter, the SPD prime minister, Manfred Stolpe, cast a vote in favor which
provided the needed majority of 35 to 34. Stolpe’s vote was accepted as
official by the then president of the Bundesrat, the SPD lord mayor of
Berlin, Klaus Wowereit.25 Though this vote was considered to be uncon-
stitutional by many experts, the president of the Federal Republic,
Johannes Rau, reluctantly signed the bill which officially had passed the
Bundestag and Bundesrat. That decision was then appealed to the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court, which ruled in autumn 2002 that the vote in
the Bundesrat was, indeed, unconstitutional.
The Bundesrat elects a President each year on a rotating basis, begin-
ning with the largest Land, North-Rhine Westphalia. The President is
always a current Land prime minister or lord mayor of a city-state, and he
is second only to the Federal President in terms of protocol. He calls and
presides at the meetings of the Bundesrat, usually every third Friday, for a
total of about twelve meetings per year. The meetings are public, but the
public may be excluded under certain circumstances. Members of the fed-
eral government have the right to attend and speak at the plenary meet-
ings as well as to participate in meetings of committees in which federal
civil servants also may participate.
There is much less hierarchy in the Bundesrat than in the Bundestag.
The prime ministers and ministers in the Bundesrat are formally equal,
and the presidency changes every year. There is a certain hierarchy in the
so-called “political committees” – foreign affairs and defense, in which
the members are usually the Land prime ministers. The plenary meetings,
which are prepared in advance and therefore generally dispose of the long
agenda quickly and efficiently, are far more relaxed and business-like than
in the Bundestag, and expressions of approval or disapproval from the 
listening members are very rare.26
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The Bundesrat and the legislative process
The Bundesrat has the right to initiate legislation, but most bills come 
from the federal government (cabinet) or, to a lesser extent, from the 
Bundestag.27 In the most common case, the government sends its bill to 
the Bundesrat, which then has six weeks to respond. (If the bill is initiated
by the Bundestag, that chamber deals with it first; if the bill emerges 
from the Bundesrat, it goes first to the federal cabinet and then to the 
Bundestag.) The President of the Bundesrat sends the bill directly to the 
relevant committees. 
Most of the real work of the Bundesrat takes place in the committees, in
which each Land is represented officially by the relevant Land cabinet
minister. In the committee on foreign relations, the Länder are normally
represented by the prime minister. Each Land has 1 seat and 1 vote in the
committee, and majority votes there generally suggest how the Bundesrat
will vote. However, since each Land, depending on its population, has
from 3 to 6 votes in the plenary meetings, the majorities in the commit-
tee and later in the plenary meeting can be different. It is common for civil
servants rather than for ministers to represent their Land in the commit-
tee, which, together with the pressures of time, explains why the bureau-
cratic influence in the Bundesrat is high. But having access to the expertise
of Land bureaucrats in the legislative process that affects the Länder was
one of the reasons for adopting the Bundesrat over the Senate alternative
in the negotiations that led to the final version of the Basic Law.28
The committee must normally complete its work by Thursday, eight
days before the next Friday plenary meeting of the Bundesrat before the
end of the six weeks. The Land missions then begin a tightly organized
process by informing their prime minister’s staff (Staatskanzlei) of the
committee’s recommendation. The staff spends much of the week, and
especially the weekend, discussing and coordinating views in the Land
government. On Monday the chief of staff contacts his counterparts in
other Länder with the same party majority to arrive at a common posi-
tion. This means that the Land cabinets, which meet on Tuesdays, have
only a few but well-prepared days to consider the legislation and to decide
how to vote on Friday, when the Bundesrat meets. Thus the decisive stage
for Bundesrat decisions is the cabinet meetings of the Land governments,
but for ministerial coordination it is usually the committee stage.29
In effect the votes in the plenary meetings generally register the deci-
sions taken in committees and, in case of disagreement there, in a special
standing committee, the Permanent Advisory Committee, composed of
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the Land plenipotentiaries of the sixteen Länder, the Director of the Bun-
desrat, and a representative of the Federal Chancery. When the Bundesrat
was still in Bonn, these meetings were held in “Room 13” of the Bundesrat
building, and this tradition has been continued in Berlin. The Commit-
tee receives reports from the Federal Chancellor’s Office regarding the
meeting of the Federal Cabinet earlier in the afternoon. The members
comment to the Federal “Reporter” from the perspective of their respec-
tive Länder, which provides a useful confidential communication link
between the two levels. The meetings of the Committee are chaired by the
oldest serving member, who also formulates statements if and when such
are forthcoming. 
For our purposes the more important functions of the Committee are
the assistance it gives the President and Praesidium of the Bundesrat in
preparing the plenary meetings and its advice regarding administrative
tasks. Shortly before the plenary meeting of the Bundesrat the Committee
meets again and, if it discovers that there are different views regarding the
course or procedures of the upcoming meeting, the Committee, led by the
Bundesrat President, attempts to reach a quick compromise regarding
procedures or other disagreements.30
No later than the last Friday of the six weeks allowed the Bundesrat for
action, that chamber votes on the bill. The votes for each Land are cast as a
block, i.e., one member of the Land delegation casts from three to six votes.
Normally no more than two members are present from any one Land, and
sometimes only one member is present, since one member casts the votes
for the Land. The results are then sent to the federal government which
sends the bill to the Bundestag with its statement on any issues in dispute.
After considering the bill in committee and possibly making certain
changes with the approval of the government, the Bundestag either passes
or rejects the bill. If the bill passes, it is sent to the Bundesrat a second time.
The Bundesrat then has three weeks to react. The consequences of its
actions depend on the kind of legislation being proposed (figure 10.1).
If it is a “simple bill” or “objection bill” (Einspruchsgesetz), i.e., one
which does not involve the Länder in the bill’s administration or finances,
and the Bundesrat approves, it goes back to the government which gives it
to the Federal President for his signature. If the Bundesrat does not
approve, it can call for a meeting of the Mediation Committee,31 com-
posed of one member from each Land and an equal number of Bundestag
members, for a total of thirty-two. The number of members each party
sends from the Bundestag is based on proportional representation. If the
Mediation Committee reaches a compromise and first the Bundestag and
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then the Bundesrat accept, the bill goes to the government and the Federal
President for his signature. If the Bundesrat does not accept the compro-
mise, it has the right of a suspensive veto. If the veto represents a major-
ity of the Bundesrat, i.e., at least 35 of 69 votes, it can be overridden by an
absolute majority vote of the Bundestag. But if the suspensive veto repre-
sents a two-thirds majority of the Bundesrat, i.e., 46 votes, the Bundestag
can override only by a two-thirds vote, which would be virtually impossi-
ble in all but the rarest of cases. Since the Opposition would rarely have a
two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat, the government and its majority in
the Bundestag can normally count on passage of their “objection bills.” 
If it is a “consent bill” (Zustimmungsgesetz) which is the case for about
55–60 percent of all bills (but about 90 percent of the more important
bills32), the Bundesrat has potentially an absolute veto and is equal to the
Bundestag in legislative power. This occurs when any part of the bill con-
tains a provision concerning administrative procedures or certain issues
of public finances, which are the province of the Länder. If the Bundesrat
approves the bill, which it does in most cases, it goes back to the govern-
ment which gives it to the Federal President for signing. If the Bundesrat
does not approve, which is more likely to occur when the Opposition in
the Bundestag has a majority in the Bundesrat, i.e., when there is “divided
government,” the Bundesrat, the federal government, or the Bundestag
can each call one time for a meeting of the Mediation Committee. If the
Mediation Committee is unable to reach any compromise agreement, the
bill is dead. If it does reach a compromise, the bill goes back to the Bun-
destag, which must vote the compromise up or down without amend-
ment. If accepted, the bill goes back to the Bundesrat for its consent.
Whether an objection bill or a consent bill is involved, the Bundesrat has
three weeks to respond to the Bundestag in its “second reading.” In the
case of a constitutional amendment, the Bundesrat also has an absolute
veto in that both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat must approve the
amendment by a two-thirds vote.33
If one looks at the statistics from 1949 to 1994, one sees that the federal
government, which initiates about 60 percent of all legislation, has a suc-
cess rate of final passage of about 86 percent. The Bundestag, with about
33 percent of the initiatives, has a success rate of about 33 percent, and the
Bundesrat, with less than 10 percent of the initiatives, also has a success
rate of about 33 percent. Surprisingly, the Bundesrat has approved 98 per-
cent of the bills sent to it after approval by the Bundestag.34 Thus, it tends
either to approve legislation sent to it or to accept compromises in the
Mediation Committee when it disagrees. 
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“Consent bill” (Zustimmungsgesetz)
Federal Government Bundesrat Bundestag
Bill
Comment
Counterstatement
Decision Bundestag
Adopton   Rejection
Renewed
adoption
Countersignature
Federal President:
Signing of law
and promulgation
Decision Bundesrat
Adoption          Application to          Rejection
Mediation Committee
Decision Bundesrat
Adoption          Rejection
Mediation Committee
No proposed            Proposed
   amendments         amendments
§
= Bill
fails
= The bill fails in the case
that neither the Federal
Government nor the
Bundestag appeal to the
Mediation Committee
§
§
§
= The bill fails in the case that neither
the Federal Government nor the Bundestag
appeal to the Mediation Committee
Figure 10.1 The legislative process and the Bundesrat
Source: Deutscher Bundesrat.
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“Simple” or “objection” bill (Einspruchsgesetz)
Federal Government Bundesrat Bundestag
Bill
Comment
Counterstatement
Decision Bundestag
Adopton of bill       Rejection
Renewed
adoption of bill
Countersignature
Federal President:
Signing of law
and promulgation
Decision Bundesrat
No                   Application to
 Application      Mediation Committee
Decision Bundesrat
Mediation Committee
No proposed            Proposed
   amendment           amendment
§
= Bill
fails §
= Bill
fails §
= Bill
fails §
No Application to
Mediation Committee
Decision Bundestag
Overridden by
absolute majority
Not
overridden
Decision Bundestag
Overridden by
2/3 majority
Not
overridden
Objection by
absolute majority
Objection by
2/3 majority
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This does not mean, however, that the Bundesrat in practice has little
power. In the first place, it is involved in the legislative process from
beginning to end, except for bills initiated by the Bundestag, with many
opportunities to exercise varying degrees of influence. In the second
place, most deliberations in the Mediation Committee end in compro-
mise acceptable to both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat and, of course,
the federal government. In the third place, when the Bundesrat rejects a
bill and any attempts to reach a compromise in the Mediation Commit-
tee, it is virtually by definition an important piece of legislation, whether
it is an objection bill or a consent bill. 
The range in the percentage of consent bills vetoed in four-year periods
from 1949 to 1998 was 0–5.7. The most contentious periods were from
1972 to 1983 and from 1990 to 1998, when the Opposition (in the 1970s
the CDU/CSU, in the 1990s the SPD) had a majority in the Bundesrat and
was accused of a politics of “blockade” vis-à-vis the government. Even
though a number of important government bills were, indeed, blocked by
the SPD and their Green allies in the divided government of the 1990s
(twenty-one each in the period 1990–94 and 1994–98), the percentage of
all consent bills vetoed was only 2.6 and 2.3, respectively.35
The Bundesrat can call for a meeting of the Mediation Committee
within three weeks of the receipt of a bill passed by the Bundestag. (Or, in
the case of a consent bill, it can reject the bill outright, p. 350.) In contrast
to the plenary meetings, the sixteen members from the Bundesrat in the
Mediation Committee are not bound by instructions from their govern-
ments, and members from the Bundestag are also free to vote with their
consciences under Article 38 of the Basic Law. Needless to say, given the
strong party discipline in Germany, one can be skeptical about just how
“free” members from either organ really are, and some see the Bundesrat
as a crucial location for party politics.36 Nevertheless, on certain occasions
the Länder do break party ranks because of competing Land interests.37
Some observers even suggest that party politics has had a real impact in
only a minority of cases overall, even though party interests become more
important in conditions of divided government.38
Members of the Mediation Committee may not bring any civil servant
experts with them; only “genuine” members, i.e., Land ministers and
Bundestag members may participate. The Committee is seen as an instru-
ment of political compromise and consensus, and its meetings are confi-
dential and not open to the public. Minutes are published only after an
intervening session of the Bundestag, i.e., at the earliest about five years
after the meeting took place. Members are not legally required to report
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back to their respective bodies, and the compromise proposals that
emerge from the Mediation Committee must normally be accepted or
rejected by the Bundestag and Bundesrat without change.39
As indicated in the analysis above, the Mediation Committee is a pow-
erful and, therefore, somewhat controversial body. It combines the prin-
ciples of territorial and political representation and serves as a balance
between democratic and federal elements. But the fact that its meetings
are closed to the public, that reporting back to the two chambers is not
required, and that the Committee’s compromise proposals are not nor-
mally subject to amendments are viewed by some critics as having the
combined effect of reducing the legislative powers of the democratically
legitimated Bundestag. On the other hand, these procedures are also seen
as the conditions for promoting compromise.40 The Mediation Commit-
tee becomes especially controversial when, as in the 1970s up to 1982 and
during the 1990s, the Opposition in the Bundestag has a majority in the
Bundesrat and the Mediation Committee is used sometimes as an instru-
ment of opposition.41 In such cases it is especially clear that the Bundesrat
is not just a constitutional organ; it is also a political instrument.42
This development is a result in part of the proportion of bills that are
consent bills, i.e., bills over which the Bundesrat has an absolute veto. As
indicated above, the proportion of consent bills has been about 55–60
percent for several decades. In the very first session of the Bundestag from
1949 to 1953, the proportion of 43 percent was higher than expected.
While this could be seen as a positive development for German federal-
ism, it can also be interpreted negatively. Constitutional experts have
noted that consent by the Bundesrat is now required for many bills
because their legislative content was given to the federal government by
constitutional changes that, in fact, were made at the expense of the Land
parliaments. This is especially the case in concurrent legislation. Thus,
there has been an increase in federal laws that are administered with con-
siderable uniformity by the Länder and therefore require Bundesrat
consent. On the other hand, the increase in consent laws has given the
Bundesrat more influence over the contents of federal legislation, not just
their administrative features, which then can lead to controversy over
whether the Bundesrat can reject a government bill on the grounds of its
contents rather than because of administrative procedures, as was the
intent of the constitutional founders. The Bundesrat is not obliged to give
reasons for its rejection of a bill. This has led to the federal government’s
attempts on occasion to divide bills into multiple parts in order to avoid
as much as possible rejection of the whole package in the Bundesrat.43
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It is often argued that while the federal government has gained legisla-
tive powers since 1949, especially in the area of concurrent legislation, the
Länder have been compensated by their rights of administration and the
increase in the proportion of consent laws. As we have seen above, however,
it is the Land governments, not the Land parliaments, that have been com-
pensated. It is generally agreed that the Land parliaments have been the net
losers in the federal legislative process and in the transfer of general Land
legislative powers to the federal government. This is a major reason why
some observers refer to German federalism as “executive federalism.”44
Territorial vs partisan politics in the Bundesrat
As noted above, there were two periods in the 1970s and 1990s in particu-
lar, when strong criticism of the Bundesrat arose because of the “gridlock”
between the government and its majority in the Bundestag and the major-
ity of Länder votes in the Bundesrat. This criticism is based not only on the
traditional view that the Bundesrat has the function of territorial repre-
sentation, while the Bundestag has the function of partisan political repre-
sentation, but also on the more modern argument that a politics of
“blockage” in the Bundesrat undermines the political responsibility or
accountability of the popularly elected Bundestag. This is the main thesis
of Gerhard Lehmbruch, cited in Chapter 9, who pointed to the bargaining
and cooperation required by Politikverflechtung in general and in the Bun-
desrat in particular and the kind of hidden grand coalition or all-party pol-
itics that resulted. But the partisan disagreements that were perceived in
the 1990s appeared to go beyond a kind of all-party government to “grid-
lock” between the two legislative bodies and the parties that 
controlled them. There was strong public criticism of the Bundesrat, espe-
cially in the electoral period between 1994 and 1998, because it appeared
that some of the Kohl government’s badly needed economic reforms were
being blocked as a result of opposition by the Social Democrats and Greens
who together had won enough elections in the Länder to gain a majority
of votes in the Bundesrat. But while the general public and many scholars
complained about “gridlock” or at least noted the questionable role of par-
tisan politics in the Bundesrat, some scholars argued that the failures to
agree were exaggerated and, in the case of the important tax reform pro-
posal, not so much the fault of the Opposition as that of the smaller coali-
tion parties, FDP and CSU45 (a view strongly contested by others).46 Two
non-German scholars even suggested that in fact territorial politics were
increasingly replacing the more partisan relationships in the Bundesrat47 or
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that disagreements between the Bundestag and Bundesrat are a natural
result of different electoral outcomes at the federal and Land levels and
should therefore be considered part of the normal political process.48
The Land missions in Berlin49
All of the Länder have missions in Berlin headed by an official Land repre-
sentative who serves as a kind of Land ambassador, lobbyist, liaison officer,
and spokesperson for the Land government. The Land representative 
normally divides his or her time between Berlin and the home capital. A
number of high-level civil servants are also assigned to the mission. They
normally staff the Bundesrat committees for their Land and assist in 
liaison functions between Land and federal ministers and among civil 
servants of other missions, especially with regard to Bundesrat matters.
The missions also are informed by the federal government of issues 
affecting the Länder. 
In order to be able to report back to their governments, the civil ser-
vants in the missions have the right to attend all Bundestag plenary meet-
ings and committee meetings, with the right to be heard in the latter. In
plenary sessions this right is reserved in practice for Land prime ministers
or subject ministers (department heads). Attendance of Bundestag com-
mittee meetings by Land civil servants is important so that they can
report back immediately to their governments; this is essential in order
that the Länder can react to Bundestag actions within the generally limited
time they have at their disposal.
In addition to the above functions, the Land missions serve as a place
where the Land delegation in the Bundestag can meet, regardless of party
affiliation. The missions also perform public relations tasks, such as pro-
viding information and organizing cultural events, lectures, and various
social gatherings. They serve as places for interest groups from the Land
to meet with members of the Land delegation in the Bundestag or federal
ministers. From this brief description, it is understandable that the Land
missions have been called the “spiders in the web”50 of relationships
between the Länder and the federal government.
Conclusion
For several centuries the states were represented, first, in the Holy Roman
Empire, by a Reichstag; then in the German Confederation by a Bundestag;
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and in the North German Federation and the Bismarck Reich by a Bun-
desrat. During the Weimar Republic of 1919–33, the states were repre-
sented by a Reichsrat, and since the emergence of the Federal Republic in
1949 the Bundesrat has made its reappearance. It is clear, then, that in spite
of the numerous changes of regime, composition, and functions, the cur-
rent Bundesrat has deep roots in German history. 
Its historical function was to create some degree of union from many
separate states and in the process secure the autonomy of the individual
parts from the central authority. But this is no longer true in the Federal
Republic. The legitimacy of the federal state in Germany today is based on
constitutional postulates: democracy, rule of law, the welfare state, and
federalism. Federalism today serves as an additional means of dividing
power and thus of encouraging liberty.51
The Bundesrat today is very different in some key respects from its 
predecessors. It shares the function of representing the constituent parts of
Germany before the central authority and of participating in the decision
making process of that central authority. Its decision making powers are
especially important in legislation that deals with the administrative
responsibilities of the Länder. But with the exception of the short-lived
Weimar Republic, it differs sharply from the past in that it consists of 
representatives of democratically elected Land governments. It is not 
dominated by any single state or a combination of a few large states, and 
it serves both as an important check on the federal government and 
Bundestag as well as a joint decision maker on a majority of laws. For all of
these reasons German federalism is sometimes referred to as “participa-
tory,” “administrative,” or “executive federalism.” In any case, the Bun-
desrat, next to the United States Senate, is arguably the most important
second chamber in any other democracy, let alone any other federation. 
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Introduction
At first it would appear that this chapter is misnamed. Surely “European
and Foreign Policy” are themes that belong to the federal government.
They do, of course, but the Länder are not irrelevant in these areas.
Indeed, European policy is now to a considerable extent domestic policy,
and many responsibilities that have traditionally belonged to the Länder
have been and are today the subjects of European Community – now EU
– regulations and legislation. The efforts by the Länder to protect their
sphere of responsibility from EU incursions or, at the very least, to par-
ticipate in the decision making that affects them directly, have been of
varying success over the years. However, it seems as if they are now in 
a stronger position than ever before to influence decisions in Brussels.
They also continue to have a modest impact on foreign policy, particu-
larly in the area of foreign aid, where they have been quite successful in
very specific areas of activity.
The Länder and European integration
European integration as a challenge to the Länder
European integration, which dates back at least to the creation of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, has from the start
been supported strongly not only by all federal governments, regardless of
party or coalition, but also by the Länder. Nevertheless, the Länder have
often been frustrated by the loss of powers and influence they have suf-
fered in the process of European integration in addition to the continuing
11
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erosion of legislative powers to the federation. Some transfer of sover-
eignty must take place by definition in forming a more integrated Europe.
But whereas the federal government has been a participant in negotiating
such transfers, and therefore has agreed voluntarily to them, the Länder
have generally had little to say. Where federal powers have been trans-
ferred, legislation thereafter is drafted in the European Commission and,
possibly after some input from the European Parliament, adopted by the
European Council of Ministers. Of course the federal government is an
important participant in the Council. But the effect for the Länder has
been that they no longer have a voice in these matters in the domestic 
legislative process via the Bundesrat.
To add insult to injury, Article 24 of the Basic Law has been used as the
authorization for the federal government to transfer not only federal but
also Land powers to the EC/EU without Land participation.1 Indeed, after
the transfer of a Land power, the federal government gains the right to
participate in legislation in the Council of Ministers on the matter over
which it had no voice before. One should also note that the EC/EU has
preempted certain Land powers by invoking Article 235 (now Article 308)
of the European Economic Union (EEC) Treaty which serves as a kind of
enabling or implied powers clause or by referring to other articles, e.g.,
Article 100, which also provide the European Community (EC) with a
basis for action.2 Thus, European integration has meant an erosion of
Land powers from the beginning.3
While the complaint is often made that Land powers have been trans-
ferred to or preempted by the EC over the years, it is useful to ask just
which functions these were. First, we have already noted the indirect
transfer of Land powers that occurs when the federal government trans-
fers federal powers to the EC/EU over which the Länder then have no voice
via the Bundesrat. But this also applies to the Bundestag. That is, both leg-
islative chambers in Germany lose to the Council of Ministers when fed-
eral powers are transferred. Second, there is the direct loss of Land powers
owing to EC/EU preemptions. Thus, in the area of education and training
and more recently in research, technology and environment, it is often
claimed that EC policies have preempted certain Land powers. The Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) has said the EC/EU has no powers in the field
of education, but it has used its jurisdiction over economic policy to pro-
mote worker mobility. “Mobility” includes mutual recognition of stan-
dards and certification in vocational and professional training. Thus, the
ERASMUS and LINGUA programs that provide scholarships for students
in EC/EU member states to study in other member states require mutual
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recognition of academic standards.4 In the area of TV and radio, there has
been a dispute over whether the mass media fall under Article 92 (now
Article 87) of the EEC Treaty that permits regulation of regional economic
policy or under “culture,” which is a responsibility belonging to the Län-
der.5 In 1989 the federal government approved EC guidelines to which the
Länder objected, and Bavaria took the issue to the Federal Constitutional
Court. The Court sided with the federal government, but this incident
made the Länder all the more determined to gain access to EC decision
making by the federal government regarding EC policy.6 Construction,
water, and general environmental protection have come under EC law in
varying degrees, as have subsidies involved in regional economic policies.7
Since the member states implement most EC/EU legislation, this means
administration by the Länder for Germany. Some laws allow more leeway
than others, but the Länder are restricted especially in regional economic
policy, e.g., subsidies, and they must pay the costs of administration.8
It is common and understandable for the Länder to be critical of these
developments, but it is doubtful that such problems can be avoided in a
common market.9 In 1990 a commission established by the parliament of
North-Rhine Westphalia looked at the question of task transfers and
reported that it is not at all clear what exactly has been lost. This may be
due in part to the fact that transfers have also been made to the federation
via constitutional amendment, federal preemptions have occurred
through concurrent legislation and provisions in the Basic Law regarding
“uniform living conditions,” and Federal Constitutional Court decisions
have generally favored broader powers for the federation.10 Self-coordi-
nation among the Länder at the domestic “third level,” where Land offi-
cials meet in extra-legal forms to promote cooperation and coordination,
has also been a factor in the decline of Land legislative powers.11 Thus, the
intergovernmental relations or joint decision making (Politikverflech-
tung) between the federation and the Länder and among the latter also
make any assessment difficult, since powers and responsibilities are
mixed. It might be more accurate to speak of a redistribution of powers
among the three levels of EC/EU, federation and Länder, and the diffi-
culty of compensating the Länder in this process.12
In any case conventional wisdom states that there has been a steady ero-
sion of Land powers, which could be seen as contradicting the “eternal
federalism” clause of Article 79, para. 3, of the Basic Law.13 This real or
perceived erosion became a major reason for the search by the Länder for
procedures by which the federal government could continue to partici-
pate constructively in the process of European integration and at the same
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time provide adequate opportunities for Land participation that would
protect their interests.14
Early efforts to protect Länder rights in European integration
During the ratification process of the ECSC in 1951, concern was
expressed that the process of European integration could eventually turn
the Länder into mere administrative units.15 As a result the Bundesrat
insisted in its official reaction to the ratification law sent to it by the fed-
eral government that the participation of the Länder be secured in the
German decision making process regarding the ECSC. This demand was
not met, and in the end the Bundesrat was assured only that a subcom-
mittee of its foreign affairs committee would be kept informed by the 
federal government.
In the ratification process regarding the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the
Länder were a little more successful. The federal government agreed to
keep both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat informed of developments in
the EEC and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and to
make this information available before any decisions were reached in the
Council of Ministers which would have a direct effect on Germany or
would require implementing legislation. In fact, however, this did not go
much beyond the requirements of Article 53, para. 3, of the Basic Law
which states that the federal government is to keep the Bundesrat
informed. Real participation by the Länder in Community matters did
not occur.16
It took another twenty years before the Länder tried again to improve
their position in the European Community – or, technically, Communi-
ties (after 1967, ECSC, EEC and Euratom combined). This time the Län-
der as such, rather than the Bundesrat, started negotiations with the
federal government over procedures to involve the Länder in cases in
which their exclusive powers or essential interests would be affected. After
more than two years of talks, an exchange of letters took place in 1979
between Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the prime minister of North-
Rhine Westphalia, Johannes Rau, who was then chair of the Conference
of Prime Ministers. In the letter it was agreed that the federal government
would inform the Länder in a complete and timely manner about EC pro-
posals, and, insofar as these affected the exclusive powers of the Länder,
would give them the opportunity to present their positions completely
and in depth. Only for compelling reasons of foreign and integration pol-
icy could the federal government exclude the Länder.
European and foreign policy of the Länder 363
chap  11  27/5/03  12:03 pm  Page 363
The idea behind this letter was to involve the Länder directly rather
than via the Bundesrat. This idea was not applied consistently, however,
since it was soon agreed that overlap with the Bundesrat should be
avoided when it became involved in the process.17 There were also struc-
tural problems, such as the lack of Land instruments to coordinate the
flood of information and direct it to the appropriate subject ministries
and the difficulty of coordinating Land responses and arriving at some
consensus among the Länder. Thus, while it seemed as though the Länder
had now been able to secure their position in matters involving European
integration, practice proved otherwise.18
The Bundesrat and the ratification of the Single European Act
Various proposals and efforts in the early 1980s to reform the EC became
an increasing focus of attention, with the Single European Act (SEA)
emerging in 1986 as the most important development since the Treaties
of Rome in 1957 which the SEA amended. The Länder saw another
opportunity to replace the old procedures and devise new ones to protect
their interests, and when the federal government submitted the draft rat-
ification law for the SEA in February 1986, the Bundesrat was determined
to improve its position. It passed a resolution insisting that the position
of the Bundesrat be strengthened and suggested that Article 24 of the Basic
Law be amended to provide for the approval of the Länder in transfering
any of their autonomous powers to the EC. This led to charges that the
Länder were trying to interfere in the realm of foreign policy that
belonged to the federal government; but for the Länder European policy
had become domestic policy, and they were reacting accordingly.
In any case the resolution had the effect of persuading the federal 
government to make the ratification law a consent law, thus conceding to
the Bundesrat the right of veto. But the ratification bill still did not grant
the Bundesrat the right of participation in the federal government’s deci-
sion making process concerning EC legislation affecting the Länder. This
led to the Bundesrat’s insistence that the ratification bill be changed to
provide for its participation and that the Basic Law be amended so that
the transfer of autonomous rights under Article 24 could be made subject
to Bundesrat approval. The result was that the federal government was
forced to accept a change in the ratification bill which provided that the
federal government had to obtain the position of the Bundesrat before it
could approve any decisions of the EC Council of Ministers that wholly or
partially affected the exclusive legislative powers of the Länder or their
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essential interests. Furthermore, the federal government could deviate
from this position only for compelling reasons. In this case the federal
government was to provide the reasons and, upon the demand of the
Bundesrat, engage as far as possible representatives of the Länder in 
the negotiations with the consultative organs of the Commission and
Council of Ministers.19
In the meantime the Länder continued to push for more rights regard-
ing the EC, and at the Länder Prime Ministers’ Conference in Munich in
October 1987 ten theses were presented which outlined the demands of
the Länder concerning the nature of the EC and their rights. This was fol-
lowed in December by the “Federation–Länder Agreement” which again
outlined various information and participation rights of the Länder,
including Bundesrat representatives in the German delegation in Brussels
when negotiations were taking place on matters that affected the Länder
directly. In such cases, however, the leadership of the delegation which
still had only one vote in the Council of Ministers was to remain with the
federal government.
The success of the Bundesrat in improving its ability to protect its inter-
ests in matters concerning the EC has, of course, been criticized as an
example of cooperative federalism carried too far; indeed, the provisions
described above have been characterized as interfering in the responsibil-
ities of the federal government for foreign policy and even as unconstitu-
tional to some extent. At the very least a confusing picture is presented:
the Land representatives in the German delegation in Brussels receive a
double status; to the outsider they are representatives of the federal 
government, but internally they are representatives of the Länder.20
The negotiation and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU)
The Maastricht Treaty on the EC and EU, which we will refer to as the
Treaty on European Union (TEU), represents a new stage in the process
of European integration.21 It was designed not only to adapt the EC to a
new Europe following the events of 1989 but also to integrate further and
bind the larger, united Germany to Europe (“a European Germany, not a
German Europe”). Given the various rights of information and partici-
pation which the Länder had gained since the SEA, they were well pre-
pared for the challenge of Maastricht.
Even before the first summit meeting in Dublin in June 1990 concern-
ing the EC and EU, the prime ministers of the Länder had placed Europe
on their permanent agenda, including the idea of a “Europe of the
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Regions.”22 In the late summer of 1990, the federal government declared
its willingness to let the Länder participate in the internal preparations as
well as in intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) on the Maastricht
treaties. Delegates from Baden-Württemberg and North-Rhine West-
phalia represented the Länder in IGC meetings on the EU, and represen-
tatives from Bavaria and Hamburg participated in similar meetings on 
a European Economic and Currency Union. Next to Germany, only 
Belgium had subnational units involved in both intergovernmental 
conferences. Parallel to these conferences, the Bundesrat created a
Europe-Commission in which all sixteen Länder and the federal govern-
ment participated.23
In August 1990 the Bundesrat passed a resolution outlining its expecta-
tions for the Maastricht Treaty. These included anchoring the principle of
subsidiarity in the treaties with a specific reference to a European “third
level”24 of Länder and regions (if taken seriously, this would mean an
expectation that all member states become federal systems); opening the
meetings of the Council of Ministers to representatives of the Länder and
the regions; creating a special council for the regions; and providing for
the right of Länder and regions to bring cases before the ECJ to protect the
right of subsidiarity. These expectations were then confirmed by the Län-
der Prime Ministers’ Conference in Munich in December 1990.25
In the negotiations on the treaties during 1991, the German delegation
presented a position that was a compromise between the views of the fed-
eral government and the Länder. The delegation accepted the demand for
a regional council, but only as a consultative body, and the Länder agreed
to attach it to the Economic and Social Committee that advises the EU
Commission and Council of Ministers. The demand for anchoring the
principle of subsidiarity in the Treaty was accepted, but the demand for
regional participation in the Council of Ministers was not. The demand
to have the right to bring cases to the ECJ was revised.26
From the above one can already see the German influence on the final
results of the IGC meetings. The principle of subsidiarity was included in
the Treaty, which was seen as a significant accomplishment. However, in
the Munich Declaration of the Land prime ministers in December 1990,
the expectation was for three levels throughout the EU and a clear sepa-
ration of tasks between each of these. This was designed to counter the
“creeping accession of powers” by the EC and to oppose the provisions of
Article 235 (now Article 308) of the EEC Treaty of Rome that serve as a
kind of general or implied powers. Unfortunately, there are problems
with the expectations associated with the principle of subsidiarity: first,
366 The Länder and German federalism
chap  11  27/5/03  12:03 pm  Page 366
its meaning is not clear, especially to non-Germans; second, as written in
the TEU it applies to the member states, and subnational levels are not
mentioned; and, third, not even in German federalism is there a clear
division of tasks between the federal and Land levels. Rather, widespread
joint decision making and cooperation (Politikverflechtung) and a trend
toward a “unitary federal state” make it difficult to take seriously a
demand by the prime ministers of the Länder that there should be clear
divisions of powers in the EU.27
Another major achievement from the perspective of the Länder and
some other regions was the establishment of a Committee of the Regions
(CoR), even if it has only advisory functions vis-à-vis the Commission
and Council of Ministers. With the three new member states that joined
the EU in 1995, the CoR has 222 regional and local representatives; Ger-
many has twenty-four members. It is not nearly as important a body as
the prime ministers of the Länder hoped it would be. It is neither an inde-
pendent nor a homogeneous regional organ, and its influence seems
quite limited. Nevertheless, it appears to have more than a mere symbolic
purpose;28 though weak, analyses of its actions in the short time it has
existed suggest that it has had some impact on the Commission and
Council and in representing the regions before the “Reflection Group”
that reported to the IGC in 1996.29 On the other hand, the representation
in the CoR of mostly large cities, rather than regions in the German sense,
has altered considerably the original idea behind the concept of the CoR
and perhaps even weakened the status of the German, Belgian, and Aus-
trian regions while providing no incentive to nonfederal member states
to create regions.30
A third victory for the Länder and regions in Europe was the introduc-
tion of Article 146 in the EC Treaty that provides for subnational minis-
ters to represent member states in the Council of Ministers when their
autonomous rights are affected. The Länder had insisted on this right all
along, but they were forced to drop the issue in the IGC. It was then
revived by the Belgian regions and later accepted as part of the Treaty.31
It should be noted that the German local governments, which play a very
significant role in German politics and administration, were not absent
from the developments outlined above. The principle of “subsidiarity” that
was pushed so hard by the Länder received the “fervent” support of German
municipalities, which were also concerned about the transfer of their 
powers to the EU.32 There was disagreement between them and the Länder
governments, however, over their respective representation in the new CoR.
A compromise was reached according to which three of the twenty-four
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German seats would be municipal representatives, one each nominated by
the three local government associations representing the larger German
cities (Deutscher Städtetag), the smaller cities and towns (Deutscher Städte-
und Gemeindetag), and the counties (Deutscher Kreistag). German munici-
palities are not represented as strongly as those of other EU states, of course,
because the German Länder consider themselves to be the appropriate
“regions.” Nevertheless, the three local government associations, like the
Länder, have established a small combined office in Brussels which serves as
an “antenna” for gathering relevant information.33
EU policy making affects local governments in two general ways:
through regulations on a variety of topics and through grants. Regula-
tions affect the procurement of goods, services, and construction work by
municipal and county governments which are responsible for two-thirds
of all public spending on capital investments in Germany; second, as
noted above in the example from Saxony, the EU controls public subsidies
to the private sector; third, EU environmental regulations have become
more intrusive over the years; fourth, personnel polices are regulated by
the anti-discrimination provisions of the TEU; and lastly, drinking water
and sewage treatment are covered by EU regulations.34
The EU presence in Germany was small before unification with regard
to grants. But the Ruhr area has qualified for some aid owing to its trou-
bled smokestack industries, and all of former East Germany now quali-
fies. As a result of EU funding and regulations, some municipalities have
created an office that deals with EU matters; however, these require only
part-time attention in most cases. EU activities still have a low profile in
most local governments.35
As noted above, the Länder had rather high expectations of the TEU
concerning the European “third level” of regions below the national gov-
ernments. In the meantime it has become clear that these expectations
could not be realized. As Jeffery has noted, the Länder have “run up
against the buffers not so much of the limitations of their achievements
in the Maastricht Treaty, but rather a more insuperable problem: the
sheer heterogeneity of forms of sub-national governmental organization
in the EU.”36
The appropriate regional level simply does not exist in most EU mem-
ber states, as is reflected clearly in the CoR in which local governments,
rather than regions, are strongly represented.37 One result of the
region–local division in the EU is the encouragement this gives to differ-
ent and even conflicting interpretations of the concept of subsidiarity,
which is so important to the Germans.38
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The Länder, the EU, and constitutional changes
After the Maastricht Meeting of December 1991, a Joint Constitutional
Commission consisting of members of the Bundestag and Bundesrat was
formed in January 1992 to consider amendments to the Basic Law that
were deemed necessary after unification and continuing developments in
European integration. In June the Commission agreed to recommend a
new “Europe” article and to change Article 24.39
Thus, the old Article 23, which had been used by the five new Länder in
the former East Germany to accede to the Federal Republic and was now
obsolete, was replaced by a new Article 23 focusing on Europe. Article 23
and some other changes concerning Europe, including a new paragraph for
Article 24, were approved by the Bundestag and Bundesrat at the same time
they ratified the TEU in December 1992 (however, owing to a challenge
made before the Federal Constitutional Court, ratification did not go 
into effect until 1 November 1993, after the Court approved the German
ratification of the TEU).
The new Article 23 and the laws that have been passed pursuant to it
replace the various agreements that were made between the Länder and the
federal government in the past concerning Länder rights in the integration
process.40 Article 23, para. 1 suggests that the EU will preserve the princi-
ples of federalism and subsidiarity, and it binds future transfers of sover-
eignty to the consent of the Bundesrat. It provides for a comprehensive
exchange of information concerning the EU between the federal govern-
ment and the Bundestag and Bundesrat, and it gives the Bundesrat the
opportunity to state its opinion before the federal government participates
in the EU legislative process. The Bundesrat is to have the right to partici-
pate in the decision making process of the federal government. Where the
federal government has exclusive power but the interests of the Länder are
affected, the federal government is to take into account the opinion of the
Bundesrat. Where the autonomous rights of the Länder are affected, the
opinion of the Bundesrat shall prevail while keeping in mind the overall
responsibility of the federal government. And where the exclusive legisla-
tive authority of the Länder is involved, the Federal Republic shall be rep-
resented in EU councils by a representative of the Länder sent by the
Bundesrat. In this case the representation shall take place with the partici-
pation and agreement of the federal government in order to preserve the
interests of the federation. This last provision can be seen as an exception
to the rule that the federal government represents the country as a whole
in foreign affairs; on the other hand, the Bundesrat representative must
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cooperate with the federal government. By 1995 representatives of the
Länder nominated by the Bundesrat were participating in about 400 EU
committees and other bodies.41
It is worth noting that the “Law Regarding the Cooperation of the 
Federation and Länder in Matters Concerning the EU of March 1993”
provides that a two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat can force the federal
government to accept its position in case of conflict on a matter covered
by Article 23, para. 5, of the Basic Law. This, of course, underlines the
view that European policy is no longer foreign policy but a form of
domestic politics.42
A serious problem for the Bundesrat and Länder in actually being able
to take advantage of their new rights concerning the EU is the flood of
information that comes from Brussels. The problem is not new, and the
Bundesrat has had an “EC Committee” since the Treaties of Rome to con-
sider proposals for regulations from the EC Commission and proposals to
the Council of Ministers sent to the Bundesrat by the federal government.
This EC Committee has been very busy, which can be seen by the fact that
the Bundesrat considered 6,355 proposals from the EC between 1957 and
1994. The EC Committee has recommended a Bundesrat position for
most of these proposals. The numbers exceed the number of domestic
bills sent to the Bundesrat by the federal government over the same period
of time. The “flood of paper” has increased since 1989, when it began to
reach 70–80 documents each day. These are placed in a computer and sent
to all or some of the Länder on demand. Relevant documents are also sent
to Bundesrat committees. For proposals in the Council of Ministers that
affect the autonomous powers of the Länder, the federal government
informs the Länder of the time frame for decision making in the Council,
and the Bundesrat secretariat ensures that the appropriate committees
hold meetings on the proposals in time to meet the deadlines. All of this
requires close cooperation between the federal government and the Bun-
desrat and the Bundesrat and the Länder and demonstrates the demands
and complexity involved in Bundesrat participation in matters involving
the EU.43 Having “chosen a consensual approach in dealings with the Fed-
eral Government” throughout the first half of the 1990s, “there have been
no great trials of strength pitting Bundesrat against Federal Government
in the exercise of Article 23 powers.”44
A relatively new instrument in the Bundesrat is the EC Chamber,
authorized in 1988, and called the “Europe Chamber” since 1992 with the
amendment of Article 52, para. 3a, of the Basic Law. This Chamber is to
decide for the Bundesrat when there are serious time pressures or when
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confidential material is involved. Each Land has one member or a repre-
sentative with the same voting rights as in the plenary sessions. So far, this
chamber has met only three times. The last meeting was in December
1999, when the Chamber majority voted to ask the federal government to
oppose an EU environmental proposal that was to be considered in a few
days. The federal government voted for the measure anyway “for reasons
of state.” If, however, the Länder had opposed the measure by a two-thirds
majority, the federal government would probably have been bound to
accept the Chamber’s decision.45
Other reactions by the Länder to the EU
Observer of the Länder at the EU
Since the establishment of the EEC in 1958, the Länder have had an offi-
cial observer who keeps them informed directly or via the Bundesrat of
events in Bonn and Brussels. The scope of his activity was expanded to
include the ECSC and Euratom in 1965. He is appointed by the Confer-
ence of Land EU Ministers. He serves in the German delegation, if only
as an observer; but he is also a direct contact person for European insti-
tutions. From his offices in Bonn and Brussels, he was originally expected
to keep the Länder informed of activities that were to be dealt with by the
Bundesrat and to provide them with information over developments in
Brussels that affected Land responsibilities. This information was in
addition to materials supplied by the federal government, which were not
always timely or sufficiently complete. These and many other duties were
focused on the Länder, but the difficulties they experienced in handling
the information and in arriving at a timely consensus, along with other
problems, encouraged more focus on the Bundesrat. This came especially
with the rights of information and participation gained during the rati-
fication process of the SEA in 1986. As a result the Länder Observer no
longer transfers to the Länder routine drafts and documents from the
Commission and the Council of Ministers, since the Bundesrat now
receives these. The federal government also sends its materials directly to
the Bundesrat which transfers them to the Land Missions that are now in
Berlin. Where necessary or useful, the Observer now sends materials to
the Bundesrat. Since the SEA, the Observer has focused more on Brussels,
and his offices in Bonn were closed in 1999. He continues to gather rele-
vant information, assist the Länder with the organization and explana-
tion of materials sent to the Bundesrat, report on the activities of other
EU organs, and attend Bundesrat EU Committee and Europe Chamber
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meetings. New duties include above all assisting the Representives of the
Länder in Brussels.46
Land liaison offices in Brussels
The German Länder were the first “regions” in Europe to establish liaison
offices in Brussels in 1985 – an office for a local government, Birming-
ham, was opened in 198447 – and today all of the Länder are represented.
Each Land has its own office except for Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg,
which share a “Hanse” office. The purpose of these offices is to provide
information and documents relevant to their respective Land through
their contacts with EU organs, the German Permanent Representative’s
Office, other member states, and various interest groups in Brussels; to
explain their Land’s views on various issues; to help economic enterprises
in their Land with matters involving the EU; to try to obtain grants from
the EU structural funds for the weak Länder, especially in former East
Germany; to organize visits by politicians and others from the Land; and
to lobby in favor of their Land through exhibits and various personal con-
tacts; to promote efforts to educate the public concerning the EU, etc.48
These offices have often been models for more than 140 offices estab-
lished by the end of 1995 by other European regions and cities since
1984.49 German cities, towns, and counties are represented collectively by
a European Office in Brussels. In addition, some individual Länder have
established an office to represent their own local governments.50
Questions have been raised about the extent to which the Land liaison
offices might interfere with the federal government’s responsibilities for
foreign policy, but the conventional view seems to be that the Länder are
not prohibited from trying to influence EU organs which pursue policies
that affect the Länder. Of course the Länder may not try to transform their
offices into diplomatic institutions.51
The main differences between the Länder Observer and the Land Rep-
resentatives in the liaison offices is that the former is concerned with con-
tinuing, broad issues that affect various subject ministries but not
particular Länder. He enjoys a privileged position in his information-
gathering functions, and it is more efficient for him to send materials to
the Bundesrat than for the individual representatives in the Land liaison
offices to gather information on their own. The Land Representatives are
more concerned with lobbying and public relations and look for contacts
and influence for their Land. These activities can, of course, bring the
Länder into competition for EU projects. While the functions of the Län-
der Observer and the Land Representatives of the Land liaison offices are
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separate, they complement each other in the general effort to improve the
“Europafähigkeit” of the Länder, i.e., the capacity of the Länder to handle
their EU responsibilities.52
“Europe ministers” in the Länder
In recent years the Länder have appointed “Europe ministers” to take
responsibility for the various relationships among the EU organs, federal
government, Bundesrat and Länder. In most cases these are ministers who
share this responsibility with other fields, e.g., justice or economics, or
who are simultaneously the Land “ambassadors” in the Land missions in
Berlin. In 1992 the Conference of “Europe Ministers” of the Länder
(EMK) was formed to watch over the EU’s consideration of the principle
of subsidiarity. The Conference replaced the “Europe Commission” of the
Land Prime Ministers’ Conference. In their first meeting they agreed to
coordinate the interests of the Länder in matters concerning Europe. This
included their interests vis-à-vis the federal government and the organs 
of the EU as well as their own activities, such as the dissemination of
information about Europe. The operating assumption of the new Europe
Ministers’ Conference seems to be that European politics are now domes-
tic politics, and the Länder must act accordingly.53
Länder involvement in other foreign relations
Cross-border regions
Since the establishment of the EEC in 1958, forty transnational or cross-
border economic regions have been created in Europe. With nine states on
neighboring borders, it is no surprise that Germany is a member of fifteen
of these.54 Examples include the “Euregio Maas–Rhine” consisting of a
Dutch province, two Belgian provinces and the Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle)
region of North-Rhine Westphalia; the “Saar–Lor–Lux” region comprising
the Saarland, Lorraine, and Luxembourg; the “Arge Alp” consisting of Ger-
man, Swiss, Austrian and Italian Alpine regions; the “Four Motors for
Europe,” which includes Baden-Württemberg, Lombardy, Catalonia, and
the Rhône-Alpes regions; the “Euroregion Neisse” which joins border areas
of Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic; and the “Euroregion
Elbe/Labe,” which joins German counties around Dresden with counties in
Northern Bohemia in the Czech Republic.55 These regions have their own
administrative structures that promote cooperation and coordination of
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policies in areas such as regional economic development, traffic, environ-
mental protection, health services, and culture, education and sport.56 The
involvement of the Länder in such cross-border arrangements, with agree-
ment of the federal government, are now constitutionally authorized in the
new para. 1a of Article 24. The view that the Europe of the future will be a
“Europe of the Regions” that will eventually replace the current national
states is based in large part on examples such as the above.57
Other “foreign relations” of the Länder
German states that comprised the Holy Roman Empire and the German
Confederation – if they were large enough – had their own foreign offices
and diplomatic relations. Even in the North German Federation and the
Kaiserreich, the powers associated with foreign relations were shared to a
limited extent by the central government and the states. Thus Bavaria,
Württemberg, Baden and Saxony had some form of diplomatic relations
to certain states until the early twentieth century. The Länder in the
Weimar Republic between 1919 and 1933 had some limited treaty power,
but foreign affairs was now a matter for the central government.58
Article 32, para. 1, of the Basic Law gives the federal government 
jurisdiction over the conduct of foreign affairs. However, para. 2 calls
upon the federal government to “hear” a Land before the conclusion of a
treaty if special circumstances affect the Land. Such “circumstances”
might involve shipping in the Baltic or North Sea or Rhine River traffic.
Being heard does not necessarily mean the Land must approve; but it
probably does.
Article 32, para. 3 gives the Länder the right to make treaties with for-
eign countries with the federal government’s approval, if the contents of
the treaty fall within the legislative competence of the Länder. This para-
graph has led to some controversy between the Länder and the federal
government, because two different interpretations are possible. The fed-
eral government has argued that it has a concurrent power which allows
it to make treaties even when they affect the exclusive legislative powers of
the Länder (compare the American constitutional case of Missouri v. Hol-
land, which confirmed that treaties are the “supreme law of the land!”59).
The Länder insist that they alone have the power to make treaties when
these affect their autonomous authority.60 They also point out that only
they are in a position to implement the treaty’s provisions, since they are
responsible for administration; that is, there are no “transformation
rights” that accrue to the federal government by treaty as occurred in the
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United States after Missouri v. Holland. Federal comity makes it highly
unlikely that the federal government would try to commit the Länder to
administering a treaty they did not approve.61
The two sides have found a compromise in the “Lindau Agreement” of
November 1957. This agreement stipulates that the two sides disagree on
treaty powers, but that the federal government has the responsibility for
consular treaties, commercial treaties, and treaties with international
organizations. Where the Länder believe their exclusive rights of legisla-
tion are concerned, especially regarding culture, the Länder must consent
to federal treaties and must be given time to react. Finally, it was agreed
that in the case of treaties where the essential interests of the Länder are
affected, whether exclusive powers of the Länder are involved or not, they
are to be consulted in time.62
As a result of the Lindau Agreement, a Permanent Treaty Commission
of the Länder was also formed. This Commission meets monthy and 
consists of civil servants from the Land missions in Berlin. They con-
sider draft treaties sent to them by the Foreign Office or by another 
ministry interested in negotiating a treaty. The examination of the 
draft treaty begins with a focus on which part of the Lindau Agreement 
it falls under and normally ends with the consent of all of the Länder
before the federal government submits the treaty to the Bundesrat for 
ratification.63
Beyond certain treaty rights, the Länder have no power to conduct for-
eign affairs, and it cannot be said they conduct foreign policy on the side
(Nebenaußenpolitik).64 Visits abroad by Land ministers are for informa-
tion purposes only, in agreement with the federal government. The Land
offices in Brussels do not violate the foreign policy powers of the federal
government so long as they confine themselves to information-gathering,
forming contacts, and trying to exercise influence on EU organs. They are
separate from the German Permanent Representive’s Office in Brussels,
which does fall under federal foreign relations powers.65
Foreign aid and the Länder
As we have seen above, according to Article 32, para. 1, of the Basic Law,
foreign relations are the concern of the federal government. On the other
hand, the federal government must consult a Land before it concludes a
treaty with another country if the Land is affected in some special way.
And in those areas that fall under the legislative powers of the Länder,
especially culture – which includes education – the Länder may conclude
treaties with other countries.
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The Länder have always considered themselves free to conclude agree-
ments with subnational regions of other countries. Informal relations
with foreign states are also maintained, and, as long as federal comity is
not disregarded, this does not normally present the federal government
with any difficulties.66
Examples of Länder activities abroad are public and private foreign aid
projects, the latter of which is provided by nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) such as the Red Cross, church organizations, foundations,
schools, etc. The Länder become involved in foreign aid activities in three
ways: first, they sometimes participate in aid projects of the federal 
government in which, for example, they provide education, training or
research facilities or make available experts employed by the Länder; sec-
ond, they promote educational activities in their schools and elsewhere to
increase awareness of the developing world; third, they finance their own
development projects in Germany and abroad. In the domestic arena, for
example, they finance university and specialist college students (Fach-
hochschüler) and certain foundations. In the target developing countries,
they manage and finance their own projects or operate through an NGO.
These are usually modest programs ranging from emergency humanitar-
ian aid to the construction of village wells and rural hospitals to the train-
ing of midwives and classes to teach women how to use hand-operated
sewing machines. They do not become involved in large and expensive
projects. In 1993 they spent a total of DM 172 million (depending on the
exchange rate, about $105–115 million) on foreign aid, not including stu-
dent stipends in Germany; from 1962 to 1993 they provided almost DM
2.2 billion in aid.67
The Länder are in a particularly good position to offer aid in the form
of training in crafts and trades, given their highly respected “dual system”
of concurrent vocational education and practical apprenticeship training.
They also take great pride in providing relatively inexpensive but effective
practical aid that involves a good deal of personal contact with native
populations.68 Of course the impact of such programs is generally limited,
unless a multiplier effect can take place.69
Since the Länder do not provide enough aid to justify a Land ministry
for such purposes, there can be problems of coordination among the 
various ministers and their modest programs. Coordination does exist,
especially via the prime ministers’ staffs (Staatskanzleien), but problems
do arise, given the German tradition of ministerial responsibility, espe-
cially in the case of coalition governments. Formal treaties or contracts
are not the rule, so that a successor minister may not follow closely the
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plans of his or her predecessor. Land budget planning helps with coordi-
nation, but it does not solve all potential problems by any means. Given
the lack of public enthusiasm for foreign aid in Germany as in other
donor countries, it is also tempting to cut back projects that may be in fact
quite promising over time.
Problems between the Länder and the federal government can arise for
a variety of reasons. The Länder may make promises, real or perceived,
that they do not keep because of the nature of the agreement with the tar-
get country. Of course, if there is a legal commitment under international
law, the federal government feels bound to abide by the agreement. This
raises the question of the extent to which the federal government should
coordinate Land aid projects. The Länder and the federal government do
cooperate in many ways, and the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooper-
ation and Development meets two or three times a year with a “Fed-
eral–Land Committee on Development Aid.” In addition there is some
contact between the Federal Ministry and the Foreign Office with indi-
vidual Länder. But the federal ministries have no authority to instruct or
direct the Länder in this area of activity. Thus a Land or an NGO sup-
ported by a Land may build a hospital or school in Cuba or Nicaragua,
which for foreign policy reasons the federal government could or would
not do, whether it secretly approves or not.70
The responsibility of the federal government is limited by the fact that
the agreements between the Länder and the target countries do not nor-
mally fall under international law and therefore do not involve the federal
government. Otherwise, the Länder have to receive the consent of the fed-
eral government. But with few exceptions the federal government has
come to accept a kind of customary legal basis for Land practices. In
return, however, a strong sense of federal comity has prevented the Länder
from abusing this customary right.71
Foreign trade policy and the Länder
In 1995 a major national newspaper in Germany reported that in April of
that year the prime minister of Bavaria was leading a delegation of busi-
nessmen from his Land to Beijing, only to be met there by delegations
from North-Rhine Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, and Stuttgart, as
well as executive board members from three large German enterprises. All
were trying to arrange meetings with the same responsible Chinese eco-
nomic policy makers. This coincidental meeting was not only an example
of the lack of coordination among public officials but also generally sym-
bolic of overlapping activities and competition in the efforts by Land and
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even city officials to secure economic advantages for their constituents.
The result is that “Germany” may not be represented by any one office
with separate divisions but by multiple offices representing various Län-
der, cities, foundations, and agencies.72
It may be that other countries also face problems of coordination, but
these are probably more severe in federal systems where the constituent
units compete not only with other countries but also among themselves.
In meeting the competition for export promotion, they have four instru-
ments at their disposal: they provide grants for export consulting services,
especially to their medium-sized enterprises; they provide businesses in
their territories with subsidies to help them participate in foreign trade
fairs or organize their own trade fairs, e.g., Hanover and Leipzig; they
reduce the risks of exporting by giving certain guarantees against non-
payment for goods and services received; and they establish a temporary
or even permanent presence in selected foreign countries. In some cases,
as the report above demonstrates, Land ministers and prime ministers,
accompanied by business representatives, travel abroad on trade mis-
sions. In some cases, especially in China, trade partnerships are made
with certain regions. Land activites in Western countries, such as the
United States, are usually focused more on attracting investment in Ger-
many. As already noted above, the Land offices in Brussels are more inter-
ested in lobbying for various EU funds for regional development plans.73
Of course such activities can affect foreign policy and, under certain
circumstances, involve the federal government. Thus if a prime minister
or minister makes a controversial public political statement in the coun-
try he or she is visiting, e.g., concerning human rights, it makes a differ-
ence whether he or she is doing so as a party leader or as the representative
of the Land government. In the first case he is not speaking for any gov-
ernment; in the latter case his statement might be seen as interference in
the internal affairs of the country and cause an international incident
directly affecting the federal government’s responsibility for foreign pol-
icy making. Needless to say, the fine line might not always be understood
in all cases.74
As we saw on p. 374, foreign policy is an activity that belongs to the fed-
eral government in principle; however, whether in the area of foreign aid
or in foreign trade relationships, the Länder can act on their own within
certain limitations.75 They can conclude treaties with foreign states only
with the consent of the federal government; they may not interfere with
federal government responsibilities; Land spokespersons must abide by
standards of international behavior, e.g., regarding interference in the
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internal affairs of other states; and they must act in concert with the Ger-
man conventions of federal comity. On the other hand Land government
officials are generally free to comment in debates on foreign affairs in
Germany and to react critically to federal government policies.76
Conclusion
The Länder have not only experienced an erosion of their powers owing
to federal government actions and constitutional amendments, they have
also seen the EC (now EU) Commission and other EU organs make pol-
icy decisions that affect their powers. In some cases the federal govern-
ment, which has no authority in areas of exclusive Land powers, has
agreed in the Council of Ministers to legislation affecting the Länder, thus
undermining the constitutional protection the Länder thought they
enjoyed. As a result of these developments, the Länder have tried since the
beginning of European integration in the 1950s to gain meaningful rights
of participation in federal government decision making in Brussels.
While they had some limited success in the 1970s and early 1980s, they
were basically unable to gain the kind of influence that would provide
them with real protection against further incursions on their powers.
With the negotiations between the federal government and the Bun-
desrat over ratification of the 1986 SEA, however, the Länder were suc-
cessful in forcing the federal government to take the position of the
Bundesrat into account when voting on issues in EC councils that affected
Land interests and even to allow the Länder to participate in negotiations
in Brussels when exclusive Land interests were involved. These rights were
then confirmed after German unification by the addition of the new Arti-
cle 23 to the Basic Law. The result is that today the Bundesrat has consti-
tutional rights of participation that place the Länder in a stronger position
than ever before in the area of European integration.
The Länder have had liaison offices in Brussels for several decades, but
these have been strengthened over the years to provide them with a vari-
ety of services and contacts. More recently, the Länder have been appoint-
ing “Europe ministers” to help meet the many demands made upon them
by the increasing number of EU regulations and actions.
The Länder like to argue – and for good reasons – that European policy
is now domestic policy. That may be overstated in some areas, just as it
would not be correct to suggest – as some have – that the Länder have their
own foreign policies in general. On the other hand, they do participate in
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limited foreign aid projects, especially with subnational regions in third
world countries, and they appear to have had considerable success with
the education and training they have provided and the relatively small
amounts of money they have spent on their activities. Like American
states, they engage also in trade policies designed to increase exports of
home industries throughout the world. The Länder are, then, active if 
limited participants in the general arena of foreign affairs.
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The German model
The most commonly cited characteristic of American federalism is “dual
federalism.” This refers to constitutionally delegated powers for the 
federal government and reserve powers for the states, with each level of
government responsible for making, financing, implementing, and
administering its own policies. In case of conflict, federal law is supreme
so long as the federal government is authorized to act by the constitution.
German federalism is also sometimes described by German scholars as
“dual federalism,” but sometimes this means the same as above (Trennsys-
tem) and at other times something quite different. That is, it often means
“dualism” in the sense that the federal level is responsible for passing most
legislation and the Länder for implementing this legislation on their own
responsibility, usually with only legal supervision by the federation. Some
Germans also refer to their system as “functional federalism,” by which
they mean that the legislative function is largely a national responsibility,
the administrative function largely a matter for the Länder.
These terms are confusing in fact, not only because of the different
interpretations of “dual federalism,” but also because American dual fed-
eralism was abandoned to a considerable, though not complete, extent
with the emergence of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal in the
1930s and policies of following Administrations that were faced with the
challenges of the growing welfare state. These changes brought about
what became known as “cooperative federalism,” which was characterized
above all by the sharing of fiscal and administrative responsibility for a
wide variety of activities. Indeed, by the 1970s there were few government
programs that did not involve the federal government in some combina-
tion with the states and/or local governments. The federal government
12
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claimed the authority to pass legislation in almost any area it chose by use
of the implied powers and interstate commerce clauses of the constitution,
and, after the 1930s and 1940s, the Supreme Court generally accepted this
interpretation of broad federal powers. Cooperative federalism was cham-
pioned most enthusiastically during Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society pro-
grams in the 1960s, and it continued to grow even under the more
cautious Richard Nixon, whose “new federalism” tried to remove to some
extent the federal bureaucracy from its heavy involvement in state and
local governments through such innovations as revenue sharing. A reac-
tion set in with Ronald Reagan, whose “new federalism” was more like the
old dual federalism in that he sought to “sort out” the responsibilities of
the different levels and, in the process, return a number of important
functions to the states. Since this was to include the financing of these
activities, the support of many governors and interest groups was not very
strong, and in the end little actual “sorting out” occurred. But the enthu-
siasm for federal involvement in so many activities was dampened during
the Reagan era, and with the appointment of a majority of conservative
Supreme Court judges during the Reagan and Bush Administrations from
1980 to 1992, the Supreme Court has become much less supportive of and
even hostile in some cases to federal actions that can be seen as interfering
with state autonomy.
The German era of cooperative federalism also weakened, but certainly
did not eliminate, the German dualism of federal legislation and Land
administration. Cooperative federalism is usually identified with the
finance reforms of 1969 which were passed by the grand coalition of
CDU/CSU and SPD. These reforms provided for the sharing of the most
important taxes for federal and Land levels, authorized federal grants for
certain purposes, and even initiated a traditionally rejected “mixed
administration” in several “joint tasks” in which the Länder were deemed
to need financial assistance to meet the constitutional requirement of
“uniform living conditions.” In the meantime the joint decision making
and mixed administration called for by these reforms and other features
of German cooperative federalism came under increasing attack for their
inefficiency and lack of transparency.1
“Functional federalism” is also problematic, because Germans use
“functional” in contradictory ways. As already indicated, to some Germans
“functional” refers to federal legislation and Land administration. But
Frido Wagener, a leading legal scholar of public administration, distin-
guished between administration by function, as in the case of special dis-
tricts that are especially characteristic of American public administration,
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and the “territorial administration” typical of Germany, France, and many
other European states in which there is a high degree of unity of command.
The classical examples would be the fragmented administration of Ameri-
can local governments that have numerous special districts responsible 
for schools, public housing, airports, parks, sewerage, public transport,
etc., and the French prefectures or German cities and counties in which 
virtually all public activities are the administrative responsibility of the
local general purpose executives.
“Participatory federalism” is another term frequently applied to Ger-
many. This refers to the participation by the Länder in federal legislation,
that is, national policy making. This occurs informally through a variety
of committees and conferences, such as the conference of Land prime
ministers associated with the chancellor’s party, and more formally
through the Länder chamber, the Bundesrat. Federal legislation that
affects the Länder, which is about 60 percent of all federal legislation, is
subject to the absolute veto of the majority in the Bundesrat, while other
matters are subject to a suspensive veto. This regional level participation
in national policy making has no counterpart in American federalism,
where the governors may have some informal influence with the Admin-
istration and/or Congress but no formal access to decision making.
Indeed, governors can be ignored in the policy making process, especially
if they are not of the same party as that of the President. The federation in
Germany has gained a variety of powers or competences since 1949
largely at the expense of the Länder through concurrent and framework
legislation, but almost always with the approval of a majority of the Län-
der in the Bundesrat. In other words, the Länder relinquished certain pow-
ers over the years, mostly for financial reasons and because federal
responsibility was deemed more rational or appropriate, or because fed-
eral action was seen as more likely to produce more uniformity (since
1994 “equivalency”) of living conditions. These voluntary acts of relin-
quishing powers were, however, always done in return for Länder partic-
ipation in the federal policy making process. The powers relinquished
usually belonged to the Land parliaments, while the increased rights of
participation went to the Land governments, so that the exchange was at
the expense of the Land parliaments.
“Executive federalism” is therefore a term which is related to “participa-
tory federalism,” but it refers more to the increased role of Land executives
in federal policy making in the Bundesrat and to the role of prime minis-
ters, subject ministers, and civil servants in discussing, coordinating, and
even drafting common policies and procedures in various committees and
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groups (sometimes referred to as the “third level”). The Conference of
Minister-Presidents (prime ministers), the conference of education minis-
ters (Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK)), and the science council which deals
with higher education are well-known examples, but there are also infor-
mal conferences of the chancellor and prime ministers of his party that are
very influential in policy making.
The term “administrative federalism” is used to describe the adminis-
tration of most federal laws by the Länder. The general rule is still that the
Länder administer these laws on their own responsibility without inter-
ference or supervision by the federation except with regard to the legality
of Land practices. This stands in sharp contrast to the mixed responsibil-
ities found in the administration of many American grant programs,
which is a part of the American concept of cooperative federalism or
intergovernmental relations.
A term often heard in Germany that seems contradictory to American
ears is “unitary federalism.” It seems contradictory, of course, because
“unitary” suggests a unitary as opposed to a federal system, or at the very
least a highly centralized federal system. There is more centralization of
legislation and other matters in Germany than in the United States, but
“unitary” refers more to various policies, ideas, formal and informal
coordination, and constitutional provisions that lead to more uniformity
of public policy making and implementation with or without action by
the federal government and Bundesrat. The requirement of uniform or
equivalent living conditions is not only a constitutional requirement, it is
also a reflection of the value Germans hold for equality. It does not mean
that everyone should have the same standard of living – which some for-
eign observers and even some Germans seem to believe. Rather, it refers
to “living conditions” such as school facilities and salaries of teachers,
public transportation, roads, athletic facilities (including outdoor and
indoor swimming pools), public assistance, and general welfare. The con-
ferences of ministers and other committees and groups are also con-
cerned among other things with coordination and standardized practices
throughout the country. The most obvious result of the constitutional
requirement and ideology of equivalent living conditions is found in the
fiscal equalization procedures which, in the final analysis, bring the poor
Länder to 99.5 percent of the average total revenues of all of the Länder
but at considerable cost to the richer Länder.
A relatively new concept in Germany is “competitive federalism.” Over
the past several years, an increasing number of voices have been heard
that argue that the practices of German federalism have discouraged
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experimentation and autonomous actions of all kinds in the Länder.
Bavaria, joined by Baden-Württemberg and Hesse, has complained that
fiscal equalization in Germany rewards Länder that are perhaps less con-
cerned with cost-saving practices or more autonomy, because they receive
the average revenues of all the Länder regardless of their own policies. On
the other hand, the richer Länder have little incentive to be more cost-
effective, because as much as 80 percent of their above average revenues
are taken from them for transfer to the poorer Länder. The focus on fed-
eral policy making regarding most issues with only Land executive partic-
ipation in the Bundesrat also discourages the Länder from engaging in
autonomous experimentation. They have also addressed the more funda-
mental issue of Land autonomy and have insisted on the return of signif-
icant powers to the Land parliaments. The question, of course, is whether
the value of equality and the consitutional provision regarding equivalent
living conditions do not preclude serious efforts at autonomous decision
making in the Länder beyond relatively minor actions.
In summary, the German federal model is characterized by parliamen-
tary institutions, a strong party system, and a national government which
is responsible for policy making at the federal level in most areas outside
of education, culture, local government, and police, and autonomous
administration of these policies by the Land governments. However, the
Länder governments (which also means opposition parties) participate in
this policy making and can even exercise an absolute veto over most
important bills in the Bundesrat, so that it is not accurate to think of fed-
eral law making as being highly centralized. Administration is generally
carried out according to the principle of unity of command by the local
governments to which most federal laws are transferred by the Länder
for implementation. The most important tax revenues are shared by the
federal, Land, and to some extent local governments, which reduces pres-
sures for widespread resort to American-style federal grants. However,
some federal grants are provided under certain conditions, and there is
some joint financing of certain “joint tasks.” A key characteristic is also
the requirement to promote equivalent living conditions in the country
as a whole. The accretion of powers over the years by the federation; the
perfectionist and highly complex fiscal equalization procedures; the
numerous conferences of prime ministers, subject ministers, and civil 
servants regarding specific policy arenas; and the requirement of equiva-
lent living standards which is a reflection of the value Germans place on
equality together form complex pressures for policy conformity which is
captured in the term, “unitary federalism.”
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The characteristics of German federalism described above have major
consequences for the general political system. Peter Katzenstein pointed
to the inability of the Kohl government after 1982 to match the kinds of
significant changes brought about by the Thatcher and Mitterrand gov-
ernments or the Reagan Administration, in spite of the talk of a major
shift in direction (Wende) when the Kohl government assumed office.
Indeed, one could also argue that the SPD–Green coalition government
of Gerhard Schröder that came into office in 1998, after sixteen years of
Kohl and his CDU/CSU–FDP coalition government, has also proceeded
cautiously and incrementally. This is because the Federal Republic, in
spite of being in many ways a centralized society, is also a decentralized,
“semisovereign state” with “coalition governments, cooperative federal-
ism, a wide range of parapublic institutions, and . . . the state bureaucracy
itself ” which together create “domestic shackles that have tamed the
power of the West German state.”2
Challenges confronting the German model
Many Germans express considerable pride in and satisfaction with their
system of federalism, and some are eager to point to the advantages and
accomplishments they believe have resulted from the federal system
since 1949. A long list would include opportunities for greater grassroots
participation; the political experience gained by numerous political lead-
ers at the regional level and in the interlocking arrangements between
the regions and the center; the opportunities available to regional politi-
cians to be recruited into national politics; the identity which many Ger-
mans have with their regions; the fact that the Länder, while not as
autonomous as American states, do provide for generally effective and
honest administration; the division of powers which finds expression
especially in the Bundesrat (also seen by some as a disadvantage); and, in
spite of unification in 1990, the high degree of uniform living conditions
throughout the country.
On the other hand, one German scholar has written that “it is appar-
ent that German federalism is seen as permanently in need of reform.”3
The evidence for this statement is strong. Of the fifty amendments to the
Constitution since 1949, most have some connection with federalism.
There have been several reforms of financial relationships between the
federation and the Länder and among the latter, the last of which was 
in the summer of 2001. From the beginning the German Länder enjoyed
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little autonomy.4 By the 1960s Germany was being described as a “unitary
federal state,” which suggested not just a tendency toward centralization
but also various practices and policies that brought about a high degree
of coordination and participation in federal policy making. The finance
reform of 1969 ushered in the era of cooperative federalism which soon
became identified with Politikverflechtung, or a kind of intergovernmen-
tal, interlocking decision making process in the Bundesrat, in joint tasks,
in conferences and expert committees, etc., all subject to the “joint-deci-
sion trap” according to which the requirement of unanimity or near-una-
nimity leads to inefficient, ineffective, and fiscally wasteful decision
making based on the lowest common denominator.5 A study commis-
sions on Land boundary reform was formed in the early 1970s, and it rec-
ommended a consolidation of the then ten West German Länder to five or
six Länder of roughly equal size. In spite of considerable discussion, no
action was taken beyond some changes made in the Basic Law in 1976
concerning procedures for territorial revisions. Another study commis-
sion recommended in the mid-1970s some changes in the Basic Law
regarding federalism, but again no action was taken. The SPD–FDP coali-
tion government tried to expand federal authority even more in the
1970s, but it was thwarted to a large extent by the opposition in the Bun-
desrat and by growing economic problems.6 By the early 1990s, one
scholar in an admittedly somewhat polemical book called Germany a
“disguised unitary state” and argued that history, political structures, pro-
cedures, actions of political parties, public attitudes and other factors did
not favor genuine federalism.7 Following unification in 1990, some
changes were made in fiscal legislation, especially in order to accommo-
date the five new Länder, but no significant permanent changes in the
existing system were made. There were also some relatively minor
changes in the Basic Law in 1994 concerning federalism and other mat-
ters, but those who wanted a thorough revision were certainly disap-
pointed. As noted above, considerable dissatisfaction arose during the
1990s over fiscal relations, and, following a decision of the Federal Con-
stitutional Court in November 1999 requiring some rather major
changes, the prime ministers and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder ham-
mered out an agreement that will go into effect on January 2005 and last
until the end of 2019.
Voices calling for some major changes in German federalism were
hardly quieted by the financial agreement of 2001, because it did relatively
little to satisfy those who now argue that Germany needs a system of
“competitive federalism.”8 As indicated on pp. 192–194, the general
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theme is the need for more fiscal and policy making autonomy for the
Länder. This has been a long-standing demand of many Land politicians,
but it seems not to have been taken very seriously in the past. In more
recent years, especially since unification and the huge transfers of funds
to the East, it has become a serious demand. This can be demonstrated by
two examples. First, Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Hesse went
before the Federal Constitutional Court in 1998 and argued that the exist-
ing system of fiscal equalization was unconstitutional. In November 1999
the Court agreed in part and ruled that the Bundestag would have to revise
the law by the end of 2002 so that a new system of financing the Länder
could go into effect by 2005. As noted on p. 199, Chancellor Schröder and
the prime ministers of the Länder met in June 2001, after the recommen-
dations of a special expert commission had been rejected, and hammered
out an agreement for the period 2005–19. This agreement was reached at
the expense of the Federation, which agreed to increase its contributions
so that the richer Länder could retain a larger portion of their above- aver-
age revenues. Another part of the agreement provides for a continued
transfer of large amounts of money to the five new Länder in the East.
A second example is the announcement in August 2001 by Prime Min-
ister Roland Koch of Hesse that he would seek authorization from the
Bundesrat to engage in an experiment regarding the administration of
public assistance (Sozialhilfe) based on the “Wisconsin model” intro-
duced by Governor Tommy Thompson in the 1990s. This model, which
focuses on consultation, child care for single parents, basic job training,
and assistance in getting a job offer which must be accepted to avoid a
reduction in monetary aid, immediately became a focus of discussion in
the German media. Not surprisingly, many supported the idea, while oth-
ers rejected it. It is interesting to note that some opponents said it would
not work in Germany, while others claimed that the model was already
being applied to a considerable extent. In any case it is doubtful that Hesse
will receive permission by the Bundesrat majority to begin a process that
could be seen as undermining the strong belief in Germany that welfare is
a national responsibility and that all citizens must be treated equally.
The probable failure of Prime Minister Koch’s initiative is an example
of why it will be difficult to give the Länder more autonomy. More Land
autonomy means less attention paid to the constitutional requirement of
equivalent living conditions. This can be seen clearly in the United States,
where there are rather significant differences in social policy among the
more autonomous states. These differences will probably grow in time
under the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 which eliminated the old federal
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program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and
turned the new program, Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), over
to the states with federal guidelines. Given the value that Germans place
on equality, which, after all, is reflected in the provision for uniformity or
equivalence of living conditions, it is difficult to see how the Länder can
be granted more autonomy without a negative public reaction which
would surely be even stronger in the five new Länder than in the West. The
poorer Länder would find it difficult to maintain the generous welfare
programs to which many Germans have become accustomed and which
many would argue are necessary to keep current recipients from threat-
ening political stability through protests or even violence.
It should be noted in this context that conventional wisdom in Ger-
many holds that the Länder have little opportunity to be innovative,
whether because of the dominant policy role of the Federation, the inter-
locking relationships between the federation and the Länder and among
themselves, the lack of own source revenues, political culture and public
expectations, or for other reasons. Yet one might hypothesize that this
conventional wisdom is based in part the lack of studies on comparative
public policy in the Länder. It is at least possible that there are greater dif-
ferences than is generally recognized, and that the Länder do indeed
engage in some innovations within the constraints in which they operate.
This is one of the conclusions of Schmid and Blancke, whose careful and
sophisticated comparative study of employment policy demonstrated
that some differences exist in the initiatives taken by the Länder. These are
based to some extent on party differences, but, as in the United States,
more on social–economic pressures confronting the Land governments.9
Whether or not employment policies or welfare policies are exceptions
to the ability of the Länder to act with some autonomy, one might argue
that they could regain some greater initiative if they could achieve a less-
ening of the joint decision making processes which seem to hinder effec-
tive policy making and reform efforts.10 But this would probably require
some sorting out of responsibilities, and as Americans learned under
President Reagan’s “new federalism,” a sorting out of responsibilities in
the modern state is not a simple matter. In determining what is a matter
of federal concern as opposed to what is a matter for the Länder, it may
well be decided that the responsibility should be shared. This means
cooperative federalism, which is what those demanding more autonomy
appear to reject.
A successful sorting out of responsibilities would also mean that more
pressure would be placed on the smaller and poorer Länder to consolidate
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with their neighbors in order to reduce political costs, for example, for
separate cabinet ministers, parliamentary deputies, Land political parties,
etc.; reduce potentially costly competition for economic investments; and
to realize savings in scale. But besides the problem of the low likelihood
and feasibility of territorial reform, it is not clear how the joining of two
or perhaps even three small and poor Länder would improve significantly
their fiscal potential.
Another interesting question raised by the demand for more autonomy
is the extent to which the Land governments are willing to give up their
participatory rights in the Bundesrat and elsewhere in making federal pol-
icy.11 Indeed, there is reason to believe that some Land politicians would
not be willing to trade their rights to participate in “high politics” in return
for more Länder autonomy. Another question is the extent to which the
strong party system in Germany can be brought into conformity with
more autonomous Länder, since they have also been agents of a more “uni-
tary” federalism. (On the other hand, some scholars have suggested that
the parties are acting more autonomously today than in the past.)12 And it
must be asked, of course, to what degree the autonomy of the Länder has
already been or will be in the future affected by the responsibilities
assumed by the EU. The Länder have some influence via the Bundesrat on
EU policy making that affects them directly, and they are represented in
the EU’s CoR, but so far they do not seem to have been able to gain the
voice in EU policy making in the Committee that they had hoped for when
the TEU was negotiated in Maastricht in 1991.
Today German federalism is under discussion more perhaps than ever
before,13 and some of the criticism, which has always existed, has become
so extreme as to suggest that German federalism is a farce and should be
abandoned.14 The addition of five poor new Länder as a result of unifica-
tion has made the achievement of equivalent living conditions even more
difficult than it was before, in spite of the massive transfers to the five new
Länder. Old questions about the extent to which the Länder have lost
most of their important legislative functions in return for the right of par-
ticipation in federal policy making by Land executives are being raised
again with a new vehemence, and a serious discussion of more autonomy
for the Länder can be found today in the major newspapers, academic
journals, and in numerous books. Apparently in part as a response to the
EU’s 2002 Convention on the Future of Europe, the presidents of the Ger-
man Land parliaments began their own “Convention of Land Parlia-
ments” in the summer of 2002 in the Wartburg on devising means of
gaining more autonomy and drawing a clearer separation of federal and
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Land responsibilities. Their report is due by 2004, before the EU Conven-
tion has submitted its findings. How this body deals with the issue of
equivalent living conditions will be a major question. There seems to be
little doubt that the pressures for changes will have some impact on 
German federalism in the near future, and that these changes will not be
limited to the rather modest revisions made in the Basic Law in 1994 or
in the financing of the Länder in June 2001. Those interested in federal-
ism, in Germany and elsewhere, will be eager to learn about the changes
which finally emerge.
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